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The semantics of definite descriptions has been a central topic in 
philosophy of language ever since Russell’s landmark paper ‘On Denoting’ 
(1905). Russell argued that definite descriptions should not be seen as 
referential expressions, but instead as quantificational expressions. In other 
words, a sentential utterance containing a definite description should be 
understood as expressing a general/object-independent proposition. A 
problem arises with the view once we consider the fact that definite 
descriptions are used frequently and consistently to refer to particular 
individuals. Through this observation, Donnellan (1966) argued that 
definite descriptions would be better understood as having two distinct 
uses, one referential and one attributive or quantificational. We can call this 
the ambiguity problem in definite descriptions. 
In the following thesis we will present various solutions to the ambiguity 
problem. Initially, we will begin by analysing a modified version of 
Russell’s thesis drawing upon work from Kripke (1981) and Neale (1990; 
2004; 2005). This modern Russellian theory argues that the semantics of 
definite descriptions is always associated with a quantificational function, 
but that a speaker may employ definite descriptions to communicate 
something referential through the accompaniment of various pieces of 
pragmatic machinery. It is what we will term a ‘quantificational thesis’. In 
contrast to this view we will analyse two theses, from Kaplan (1970; 1979; 
1989a; 1989b) and Devitt (1981; 2004; 2007a), that each defend the existence 
of a referential function in the semantics of definite descriptions, in 
addition to a quantificational function. According to these views, there is a 
linguistic convention for using definite descriptions referentially, which is 
attested to in the ubiquitous referential uses in natural language discourse, 
and this convention must be grounded in their respective semantics. We 
will label these positions ‘ambiguity theses’. 
Throughout the foregoing thesis we will argue that the theories of 
descriptions under discussion adhere to a lexicocentric view of 
compositional semantics. A lexicocentric view of compositional semantics 
defends the idea that we can isolate words and assign them semantic-types 
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(their contribution to the compositional structure) without reference to the 
larger grammatical structures in which they fall. Therefore, the theories 
take the semantics of the definite article to be captured in its entry in the 
mental lexicon. Through an analysis of the faculty of language as 
understood in the linguistic program of generative grammar, we will argue 
that a lexicon contains no such information as to do so would involve 
taking it to contain grammatically complex information. Furthermore, we 
will argue that compositional semantics is best understood as emerging 
through grammatical derivations, and in particular a phase based 
derivational syntax. Through an analysis of three grammatical phases – a 
determiner phase, transitive verb phase, and complementizer phase – we 
will discover that much of what is traditionally labelled semantic, and 
captured within a type-based compositional semantics, can be reduced to 
properties of grammar. We will label this a ‘grammatical theory of 
meaning’. 
We will then apply this theory to various instances of definite descriptions, 
focusing on examples traditionally brought up in the literature, to illustrate 
that the semantics of definite descriptions can be understood best through 
the topology of the determiner phase and the wider grammatical 
configurations in which it can be placed. Furthermore, we aim to illustrate 
that the linguistic meaning of any sentential utterance containing a definite 
description can be given in reference to that utterance’s grammar and, 
critically, its grammar will dictate the utterance’s truth-conditional content. 
We will then offer an account of the genesis of the ambiguity problem(s) 
that have been discussed in the literature, which places grammar at the 
heart of the explanation. In doing this we will streamline our theory of 
descriptions with recent work in generative grammar and linguistic 
cartography, and take it to have greater empirical adequacy than the 
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“When I use a word”, Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a 
scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean – 
neither more nor less.” 
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make 
words mean so many different things.” 
Through the Looking-Glass - Lewis Carroll1 
 
A completed theory of meaning is the holy grail of the philosophy of 
language. Nevertheless, providing such a theory is not straightforward. 
The beginning of such a theory is instantly hit with a problem, which can 
be characterized in a distinction between those types of words that seem to 
carry idiosyncratic information as arbitrary signs for objects or events (apple, 
desk, football, run, write), and those whose role is to structure these arbitrary 
                                                          
1 Gardner (2000) observes that Humpty Dumpty’s views on meaning shares an ‘affinity’ 
with Carroll’s work in Symbolic Logic. Against the logicians, Carroll claims that “[t]hey speak 
of the Copula of a Proposition ‘with bated breath’, almost as if it were a living, conscious 
Entity, capable of declaring for itself what it chose to mean, and that we, poor human 
creatures, had nothing to do but to ascertain what was its sovereign will and pleasure, and 
submit to it” (1977, 232). 
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signs into useable linguistic strings (and, or, is, some, every, the).2 We can 
label the distinction one between descriptive/lexical words and 
functional/grammatical words, and the study of each ‘lexical semantics’ 
and ‘compositional semantics’ respectively.3 If language were bodily, then 
we might speak of the latter as providing the ‘skeleton of meaning’ and the 
former as providing its ‘flesh’ (Hinzen 2009b). It is the contention of this 
thesis that whilst Humpty Dumpty’s claim may hold of descriptive words, 
language’s flesh, it is certainly false if applied to functional words, 
language’s skeleton.4 We may have a certain authority over the word apple, 
but functional words are the cogs that keep language turning, they are the 
bones and ligaments that give natural language its particular anatomy, and 
with respect to such words our role as philosophers is like that of a 
anatomist, we must discover the skeletal blueprint for compositional 
semantics that nature has already put in place. 
The development of compositional semantics over the last century is tied to 
that of formal logic.5 Formal logic has provided many of the tools and 
mechanisms available for those wishing to give an account of the skeleton 
of meaning as well as the contribution of parts of speech to it. The aim of 
such an approach is to provide a way of capturing parts of speech formally 
that dictates how they may combine in any novel utterance to ground its 
meaning. Interestingly, however, one part of speech in particular has 
proved immensely difficult to analyse in a non-divisive manner, namely 
definite descriptions. The vast amount of ink spilt on the semantics of 
definite descriptions is testament to its seeming ability to evade capture, 
                                                          
2 We can understand the phrase ‘arbitrary signs for objects or events’ in the sense of de 
Saussure (1916), who understands a word to be an arbitrary pairing of sound, or sign more 
generally, and meaning. 
3 Interestingly, a similar distinction was drawn by medieval logicians, who distinguished 
between categorematic and syncategorematic words. The first sort, categorematic words, 
were understood as “those that can serve by themselves as terms in the strictest sense” and 
the second sort, syncategorematic words, are “those, such as conjunctions and prepositions, 
that enter into propositions only along with categorematic words” (Spade 1982, 190; see also 
de Rijk 1982). 
4 The truth is that if it were to hold even of descriptive/lexical words, then successful 
communication would become a thing of the past. 
5  It is important to note that compositional semantic theories existed prior to the 
introduction of formal vocabulary as observed in Frege (1879; 1884; 1893) and Russell (1903; 
1905; 1910/1962). For instance, a form of compositional semantics can be traced back to 
Indian grammarians such as Pānini, which did not employ the sorts of formal machinery 




that is, to evade having a settled contribution to the skeleton of meaning. 
The origin of the debate is to be found in Russell’s ‘On Denoting’ (1905), 
which, perhaps contrary to our expectations, takes definite descriptions to 
be quantificational. The impact of ‘On Denoting’ on philosophy cannot be 
underestimated and it led Ramsey to label the theory a ‘paradigm of 
philosophy’ (1931, 263). However, the definite descriptions literature 
remains at an impasse, between those that continue to champion the 
Russellian theory and those that reject it in favour of an alternative, that 
definite descriptions are referential or ambiguous. The present thesis is 
concerned precisely with ridding the literature of this deadlock through re-
imagining the debate as one concerning grammatical structure. It is the 
contention of this thesis that grammar can help explain why a problem 
concerning the semantics of definite descriptions arises in the first place, as 
well as a potential solution to it. Therefore, the thesis is concerned with the 
semantics of just one word, and therefore just one part of the semantic 
blueprint, the definite article. 
In what follows we will move away from the idea that grammar is ancillary 
to the construction of meaning, which is a trend that has its origin in both 
linguistics and philosophy. Chomsky, for instance, began his generative 
grammar enterprise with the claim that syntax is an ‘autonomous’ 
mechanism of language operating in isolation from, and independently of, 
meaning (1957, 15). Russell made a similar claim and warned that ‘any 
attempt to be precise and accurate’, with regards semantics, ‘requires 
modification of common speech both as regards vocabulary and as regards 
syntax’ (1957, 387). In opposition to these views we will place grammar at 
the heart of the skeleton of meaning, and claim that it is productive in the 
composition of semantic information within natural language. We will 
argue that grammar provides a nuanced and more fine-grained account of 
how meaning is built up in a sentence than formal logic, and that this can 
be used to further our understanding of the semantics of definite 
descriptions. Furthermore, we will argue that grammar provides a more 
fine-grained account of natural language reference than formal semantics, it 
expands the forms of reference enabled in formal logic through creating a 
‘hierarchy of reference’ (Sheehan & Hinzen 2011; 2013; Martin & Hinzen 




In a moment we will provide an outline of the structure of the thesis and 
the contributions that each chapter aims to make. Before we do this, though, 
it is important to set some limitations on what we aim to achieve. 
The first limitation is straightforwardly put, we will not argue that 
grammar provides insight into the semantic contribution of 
descriptive/lexical words in the construction of a sentence beyond the 
grammatical categories that they are situated within. The idea here is that 
there are parts of language that grammar has no authority over. For 
instance, it is not the case that grammar can tell us anything about the 
semantic differences between the words apple and pear. It can tell us about 
the differences between three apples and the pear but it cannot impact the 
descriptive, or idiosyncratic, information carried by a lexical item. This 
constitutes the first limitation. 
The second limitation is more pertinent to the progression of compositional 
semantics as a field of inquiry. In developing the idea that grammar 
informs semantics we will often characterize it as contrasting with work in 
formal semantics. Furthermore, we will criticize formal semantics for 
having a one-size-fits-all view of reference in natural language, a reduced 
and restrictive set of ‘forms of reference’. As we will see, however, the 
criticism is aimed at one particular conception of formal semantics, a 
lexicocentric version. However, the present thesis should not be viewed as 
rejecting or undermining the legitimacy of the application of formal logic to 
natural language semantics. Instead, it will be hoped that the work 
presented can be viewed as aiding in the grounding of formal semantics as 
a naturalistic and explanatory discipline. The development of the 
philosophy of language is most productive when it exhibits collaboration 
with work in linguistics, and the thesis presented here aims to further this 
partnership. It is not the aim of this thesis to disregard formal semantics as 
a discipline, and if it were it would surely fail. The aim is simply to provide 
a novel approach to how we understand the construction of semantic 
content within a sentence that places grammar at the heart of this assembly 
line. We leave open the possibility that the work presented can be 
integrated into the formal semantic discipline, we therefore view the result 
of this thesis primarily as collaborative. 
The following thesis can be divided into three parts. The first chunk (§1 and 
§2) details three ambiguity problems in definite descriptions and the 
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research framework that surrounds the literature dedicated to solving these 
problems. The second chunk provides a detailed analysis of the Russellian 
theory of descriptions (§3), which provides a solution to the problems 
through invoking pragmatics, and two major opposing theories from 
Kaplan and Devitt (§4), which both provide a semantic solution to the 
problems. The theories detailed in §3 and §4 will ultimately be rejected. The 
final chunk of the thesis will concern our own solution, which is developed 
on the basis that the ambiguity problems originate in virtue of facts about 
grammar. In §5 we will develop the idea that grammatical structure 
provides a skeleton of meaning. Finally, in §6 we will apply our work on 
grammar to various definite descriptions and observe that we can explain 
away the three ambiguity problems through the grammar of DPs in 
conjunction with the grammatical environments in which they can be 
placed. 
§1 will provide an extensive look into what we will understand as three 
independent ambiguity problems that emerge from the descriptions 
literature. It has long been accepted that definite descriptions have two 
distinct uses, the first is where a speaker uses a definite description to refer 
to a particular individual, and the second is where a speaker does not have 
a particular individual in mind but instead uses a definite description to 
attribute a property to who/whatever satisfies its descriptive content. It is 
the contention of this thesis that these uses give rise to the following three 
ambiguity problems (§1.1). In §1.2 we will analyse what we will term the 
‘classical ambiguity problem’. (CAP): Take an expression ζ containing a 
definite description d, is it possible that in one context of use d is 
semantically referential and in another context of use d is semantically 
quantificational? In §1.3 we will consider two grammatical ambiguity 
problems (GAP1/GAP2). GAP1: Take two grammatically distinct definite 
descriptions d and d’ that are part of the same wider expression ζ, is it 
possible that d is semantically referential and d’ is semantically 
quantificational in virtue of being grammatically distinct? GAP2: Take two 
grammatically distinct expressions ζ and ζ’, each of which contains the 
same definite description d, is it possible that ζ forces d to have a referential 
semantics and ζ’ forces d to have a quantificational semantics purely in 
virtue of the grammatical environment within which d falls? Too often the 
descriptions literature regularly jumps between these distinct problems 
without isolating their independence. The purpose of the thesis is to 
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provide an account of the genesis of each problem. We therefore begin with 
some stage setting through teasing apart the problems to be addressed.  
§2 will provide a detailed analysis of the research framework that is at the 
heart of the definite descriptions literature. To begin with, we will detail 
what we take to be the semantic terrain (§2.1) that surrounds the literature, 
which we will characterize through the distinction between literalism and 
contextualism. In particular, we will emphasize how each theory views the 
role of linguistic meaning in the specification of truth-condition content in 
an utterance or ‘what is said’. This section will introduce and define three 
terms that will be used throughout the thesis linguistic meaning, ‘what is 
said’, and ‘what is implicated’. In §2.2 we will then provide a sketch of one 
way of characterizing linguistic meaning, which will be carried out through 
a discussion of formal semantics. Following this, we will detail how 
linguistic meaning interacts with language use and pragmatics more 
generally in §2.3. The upshot of this will be a schematic for how we should 
understand referential expressions within this semantic terrain, which will 
be a lexicocentric account (an account whereby a term’s being referential is 
a result of its lexical entry). To conclude this chapter, in §2.4 we will 
provide an overview of the ‘forms of reference’ available to a theorist 
working within the confines of this research framework. It will later be 
argued that these forms of reference negatively impact the options 
available for explaining the three ambiguity problems. 
§3 will be concerned with providing an exposition and discussion of 
Russell’s theory of descriptions as well as two strategic amendments made 
to it by Kripke and Neale. To begin with, in §3.1 we will outline Russell’s 
theory and the problems it was designed to solve. We will observe that the 
theory takes the linguistic meaning of a sentence containing a definite 
description to equate to a quantificational paraphrase, which in turn 
equates to the sentence’s linguistic meaning and fully determines ‘what is 
said’. In §3.2 we will raise the CAP against the theory and Kripke’s solution 
to it. The Russellian position will be upheld and solve the CAP through 
positing pragmatic machinery, which enables a speaker to communicate 
something referential without alteration to the quantificational paraphrase. 
The rest of the chapter, §3.3 onwards, will be dedicated to Neale’s 
amendments to the theory. To begin with we will look at Neale’s alteration 
of the paraphrase that aims to bring it in line with DPs and specify the 
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semantic contribution of the definite article, and then we will look at 
Neale’s response to three problems commonly raised against the Russellian 
position (misdescription, incompleteness, and referential anaphora). We 
will conclude by providing two reasons to reject the Russellian position: (i) 
the Russellian paraphrase, even after Neale’s modifications, does not tally 
with grammatical facts about DPs, and (ii) the problems of, at least, 
incompleteness and referential anaphora are better explained through 
grammar. Furthermore, we will conclude that the pragmatic account of the 
ambiguity problems is a direct consequence of the restrictive forms of 
reference, and lexicocentric grounding, produced by formal semantics, 
which need not be accepted once we expand the forms of reference. 
§4 will turn to consider two rival positions to the Russellian theory, which 
both defend a semantic genesis to the ambiguity problems. In §4.1 we will 
introduce Kaplan’s direct reference theory, which takes referential uses of 
definite descriptions to include a semantic operator DTHAT. The operator 
DTHAT is part of the linguistic meaning of a referential use of a definite 
description, and contributes directly to ‘what is said’. We will reject 
Kaplan’s theory on the basis that it grounds the presence of DTHAT in 
referential uses upon such uses being linguistic conventions, but it fails to 
give a non-circular account of how the convention arises in the first place. 
In §4.2 we turn to consider Devitt’s causal theory, which takes a referential 
use of a definite description to be linked to its referent through a 
designating-chain. The presence of designating chains is again defended in 
relation to referential uses being instances of a linguistic convention. We 
will reject Devitt’s theory for the same reason that we rejected Kaplan’s, it 
does not provide an account of how such a convention arises. Throughout 
this chapter we will illustrate how such conventions can be grounded in 
facts concerning the grammar of definite descriptions and cross-linguistic 
research. Having pursued a pragmatic account of the ambiguity problems 
and two semantic accounts we now move toward a third option, a 
grammatical account. 
§5 will provide the groundwork for our grammatical account of the genesis 
of the three ambiguity problems. In §5.1 we will introduce the framework 
within which our theory will be developed, namely generative grammar, 
and will illustrate how it can be understood as a naturalistic enterprise. 
Following this, in §5.2 we will provide a detailed account of the component 
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parts of the faculty of language as understood in generative grammar: the 
lexicon, the sensor-motor interface, the conceptual-intentional interface, 
and the syntactic component. Finally, we will introduce the idea that 
syntactic derivations proceed via phases. The final point will lead into our 
attempt to align compositional semantics with grammar. In §5.3 we will 
argue that the three core phases involved in the derivation of a syntactic 
object directly correspond to certain semantic mechanisms traditionally 
subsumed under the rubric of formal semantics. The three phases C, v*, and 
D, will be said to organise clausal structure, thematic structure, and the 
forms of reference exhibited by the topology of DPs respectively. These 
results will be viewed as evidence for the view that grammar provides us 
with a ‘skeleton of thought’ or ‘blueprint’ for linguistic meaning. The 
concluding part of this chapter, in §5.4, will argue that grammar provides 
general directions for use (understood in the vein of Strawson 1950), and 
that these directions constitute linguistic meaning. Furthermore, we will 
argue (following Sigurðsson 2004b; 2007; and Hinzen forthcoming), that the 
linguistic meaning produced by grammar fully specifies ‘what is said’, 
therefore carving out an alternative to both literalism and contextualism 
and opening up a new avenue within which to pursue the three ambiguity 
problems. 
§6 will provide the final stage in building our thesis. We will begin in §6.1 
by expanding the forms of reference that have been employed in the 
descriptions literature. We will argue that the options provided in the 
semantic framework outlined at the start are not sufficient for the complex 
referential abilities that natural language affords us. Through a discussion 
of various types of definite description (deictic definite descriptions, 
adjectival modification in DPs, possessives, and epithets) we will develop a 
wide range of forms of reference available to such expressions. We will 
argue that the semantic status of a definite description is dependent upon 
two factors, (i) the configuration of the DP of which it is a part, and (ii) the 
grammatical environment within which that DP falls. In §6.2 we will reject 
all possibility that the definite article can be given a lexicocentric analysis, 
thereby rejecting that the article is itself semantically ambiguous, which 
will be based upon our arguments from grammar. Then in §6.3 we will put 
down some final words on how the linguistic convention associated with 
referential uses arose. Finally, in §6.4 we will look at the three ambiguity 
problems and explain their genesis and their respective solutions. We will 
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argue that the CAP does not hold and its emergence in the literature is the 
result of a failure to recognise its independence from the two GAPs. 6 
Furthermore, we will argue that the two GAPs are solved, unsurprisingly, 
with reference to the grammar of DPs (GAP1) and the grammatical 
environments in which those DPs can be placed (GAP2). In other words, 
whenever we see ambiguous uses of definite descriptions, there will always 
be some grammatical difference present in the background. 
The structure of the thesis should now be clear. We can conclude this 
introduce with a summation of a counterexample to Humpty Dumpty’s 
claim above. It is not the case that we have authority of the meanings of 
certain words. The meaning of the definite article is highly regimented 
through the grammar of DPs and the grammatical environments in which 
DPs can be placed. It is true that definite descriptions can be used in 
multifarious ways with corresponding effects on interpretation, but these 
are all grounded and distinguished in grammar. Therefore, grammar is not 












                                                          
6 We will argue that it does not hold only insofar as there are no grammatical differences in 








THE AMBIGUITY PROBLEMS 
 
A theory of meaning for natural language involves both lexical semantics 
(the meanings of individual words), and compositional semantics (how 
those words interact is phrases and clauses). The semantics of definite 
descriptions is a study interested in both levels, it is lexical insofar as it is 
interested in the meaning of the definite article, and it is compositional 
insofar as it is interested in the contribution of the article to definite 
descriptions and clauses that they are part of. It is commonly accepted 
within the philosophical literature that speakers can employ definite 
descriptions in two distinct ways, the first makes use of the expression to 
say something of a particular individual, and the second makes use of the 
expression to simply say something about what or whoever satisfies that 
expression’s descriptive content. The difference might be captured in the 
speaker’s orientation towards the individual. In the first case the speaker 
has in mind a particular individual and wishes to say something of that 
particular individual, whereas in the second case the speaker has only a 
basic expectation that something or other will satisfy the descriptive 
content of the utterance. We can label the first use referential and the 
second attributive or quantificational. The existence of the two uses must 
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be accounted for by any theory of descriptions, we will come to label this 
problem the ambiguity problem in descriptions. Accounting for the 
existence of two distinct uses has occupied much of the literature vis-à-vis 
definite descriptions since its inception, yet there remains to date an 
impasse in the topic.7 It is the purpose of this thesis to provide a novel 
solution to this impasse. 
To start with, let us provide a working definition of linguistic ambiguity: 
(1) Linguistic Ambiguity 
 An expression ζ is ambiguous if and only if its contribution to the 
content of what is expressed is distinct across uses (bank – as in 
riverside – vs. bank – monetary deposit).8 
If an expression ζ appears to exhibit (1), then we must explain why. We 
must explain the genesis of its ambiguity. Definite descriptions exhibit an 
ambiguity through having two distinct uses, and hence a theory of 
descriptions must account for the genesis of this ambiguity. We will claim 
that the impasse concerns three interrelated but independent ambiguity 
problems and the fact that there is no universally accepted answer to them. 
The three problems all concern the two uses, referential and attributive, 
outlined above. 
At the outset, in §1.1 we will give a cursory overview of each of the three 
problems and state why it is useful to separate them for the purposes of our 
investigation. Following this, in §1.2 we will analyse the first of the 
ambiguity problems, which we will label the classical ambiguity problem 
(CAP). It will be observed that the CAP gave rise to many of the issues 
surrounding the semantics of definite descriptions that are discussed today, 
as well as many of the theories of descriptions currently on the table. Next, 
in §1.3 we will discuss two further problems, which we will label 
grammatical ambiguity problems (GAPs). The purpose of this is to 
illustrate that the role of grammar may well be more central to the 
                                                          
7  In conjunction with the ambiguity problem there remain numerous further issues in 
definite descriptions, a recent anthology of papers collected by Remier and Bezuidenhout 
(2004) as well as the centenary commemoration of ‘On Denoting’ (Neale, 2005a) detail many 
of the controversies surrounding the various debates.  
8 The example of bank is an instance of a lexical ambiguity. We might solve such ambiguities 
by stated that whilst the two are homophones they are distinct words. However, further 
ambiguities that emerge in functional/grammatical words are not so easily accounted for. 
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understanding the semantics of definite descriptions than is commonly 
thought. Finally, in §1.4 we will outline four options available in explaining 
the genesis of the ambiguity problems: an ambiguity thesis (AT), a 
referential thesis (RT), a quantificational thesis (QT), and a grammatical 
thesis (GT). The primary aim of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the 
ambiguity problems that will form the backbone of this thesis, and a 
secondary aim is to begin igniting a narrative within which to ground a 
grammatical account of definite descriptions.  
1.1 
THREE AMBIGUITY PROBLEMS 
In what follows we will put forward three independent ambiguity 
problems in definite descriptions. The three problems can each be 
understood as emerging in the descriptions literature, but they have not 
been explicitly spelt out. It is important to make the distinctions however, 
as a solution to one problem need not be a solution to the other(s). The first 
problem is the classical ambiguity problem, which emerges from the work 
of Donnellan (1966; 1968): 
(CAP) The Classical Ambiguity Problem (CAP) 
  Take an expression ζ containing a definite description d, is it 
possible that in one context of use d is semantically referential 
and in another context of use d is semantically quantificational? 
In addition to the traditional problem, we posit two further grammatical 
ambiguity problems, which come to the fore in more recent literature:  
(GAP1) The First Grammatical Ambiguity Problem (GAP1) 
 Take two grammatically distinct definite descriptions d and d’ 
that are part of the same wider expression ζ, is it possible that d is 
semantically referential and d’ is semantically quantificational in 
virtue of being grammatically distinct? 
And, 
(GAP2) The Second Grammatical Ambiguity Problem (GAP2) 
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  Take two grammatically distinct expressions ζ and ζ’, each of 
which contains the same definite description d, is it possible that 
ζ forces d to have a referential semantics and ζ’ forces d to have a 
quantificational semantics purely in virtue of the grammatical 
environment in which d falls? 
From this point onwards, we will assume that if a thesis is taken to solve 
the problem of ambiguity in definite descriptions, then it will provide a 
solution to the genesis of all three problems. 
Frequently in the literature, all three problems are discussed in unison. The 
issue this raises is that a negative answer to CAP does not necessarily entail 
a negative answer to GAP1 and GAP2. Similarly, a negative answer to 
GAP1 does not entail a negative answer to GAP2 and vice versa. In virtue 
of this, when discussing some established theories in §3 and §4 we will 
attempt to retain some clarity through detailing which problem a particular 
theory of descriptions is designed to solve and how such theories might go 
about answering each of the three problems. The stronger the theory, the 
more success it will have at answering all three problems.  
The three ambiguity problems were instigated by a counter-intuitive 
account of definite descriptions offered by Russell. Russell claimed that 
definite descriptions, when part of a sentential utterance, have an 
attributive or quantificational semantics (1905). The motivation for the 
thesis was to discredit a treatment of definite descriptions as singular terms, 
which are terms whose meanings depend upon their referents. A central 
issue that emerges from the singular term treatment is that in cases where 
they fail to pick out a referent they become meaningless. The extension of 
this is that any sentential utterance containing such a definite description 
would likewise be meaningless and lack truth-conditions. It is this precise 
worry that Russell intended to quash. A quantificational treatment avoids 
this problem through denying that the semantics of a definite description 
depends upon a particular individual. Therefore, if the descriptive content 
fails to pick anything out, then quantifier scope can be used to throw out an 
appropriate truth-value (1905, 490).9 
                                                          
9 The Russellian theory will be analysed at length in §3. 
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Some forty-five years later, Strawson highlighted a clear intuition that 
definite descriptions are used ubiquitously and felicitously as referential 
expressions, and employed this intuition in defending the view that the 
referential uses should be represented semantically (1950, 320).10 According 
to this view, referring is not something an expression does on its own but is 
instead something that a speaker may use an expression for, and whilst 
definite descriptions may be used on occasion as quantifiers this doesn’t 
rule out the possibility that they may be used on occasion to refer (1950, 
326). The proposal was embedded in a semantic theory that takes the 
meaning of an expression to be associated with ‘general directions’ for its 
use. Definite descriptions can be used referentially, and therefore this fact 
should be represented in their semantics (1950, 327). A use of a definite 
description that results in a failure to pick out a particular individual 
would be considered “spurious”, neither true nor false, yet meaningful 
(1950, 331).11 The seed of a possible ambiguity problem was thus planted. 
Donnellan raised the possibility that we might integrate the two uses 
within a single theory, thereby providing an empirically more powerful 
theory (1966).12 With respect to the ambiguity, Reimer and Bezuidenhout 
state that Donnellan “attempted to incorporate elements of both Russell’s 
and Strawson’s account… he argued that whilst definite descriptions can 
function as quantifiers, such expressions can also function as referring 
expressions” (2004, 183). Furthermore, Donnellan wanted to state that the 
referential uses of definite descriptions were indeed analogous to uses of 
other singular terms (1966, 283-302). It is here that we find the origin of the 
CAP. A central question that emerged through these considerations is that 
of whether the dual function is best explained through semantics or 
supplementary pragmatic machinery.  
The ‘dual function’ of definite descriptions operates on two levels, the first 
concerns its existence simpliciter and the second concerns its genesis. The 
former is straightforwardly characterized, and is hardly controversial, 
                                                          
10  Reimer and Bezuidenhout note that Strawson did not intend to imply that such 
expressions are logically proper names, but instead “meant only that definite descriptions 
are linguistic devices used by speakers to ‘pick out’ objects or individuals about whom they 
wish to speak”, and therefore “never functioned as quantifiers” (2004, 183). 
11 In §5.4 we will resurrect Strawson’s idea that semantics can be associated with general 
directions for use, but we will motivate the idea through grounding it in grammar. 
12  Interestingly Donnellan believed that neither Russell nor Strawson accounted for 
referential uses of definite descriptions (1966, 281).  
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whereas the latter remains a matter of debate to this day. The existence of 
the ambiguity is established in the following pair of sentences: 
(2) The desk is covered with books. 
(3) I hope the joiner builds the desk in mahogany. 
The first sentence captures a referential use. A felicitous utterance of (2) 
will pick out a particular desk, which, in order for the sentence to be 
felicitous, is salient in either the utterance context or ensuing discourse. The 
second sentence captures an attributive/quantificational use. A felicitous 
utterance of (3) does not require the existence of a particular desk, and it 
requires no salient individual in either the context or discourse. The fact 
that the definite article can elicit these two functions remains a mystery. 
In what follows we will outline the CAP, which gave rise to many issues 
surrounding the semantics of definite descriptions in the first place. We 
will do this through an analysis of Donnellan’s examples (1966; 1968). Next, 
we will outline GAP1 and GAP2 providing examples for each. As we 
progress through three prominent theories of descriptions in §3 and §4 it 
will be flagged up that the theories often switch between the three 
problems without indicating when a switch has taken place. In making the 
distinctions above we will be able to state clearly the strength of each 
theory with respect to each problem. 
1.2 
THE CLASSICAL AMBIGUITY PROBLEM 
The classical ambiguity problem (CAP) is first discussed by Linsky (1963) 
who states that a speaker making an utterance of (4) can succeed in 
referring to a particular individual even if the woman spoken of is a 
spinster: 
(4) Her husband is kind to her. 
Assuming that the woman spoken about lacks a husband, the utterance is 
seemingly neither true nor false, yet in a context where a particular 
individual is salient, and at least for all intents and purposes appears to be 
the husband, the speaker may succeed in referring to that particular 
individual. The idea is that one can succeed in making reference to an 
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individual using a definite description even in cases where the descriptive 
content it contains fails to apply to the intended individual. It is this latter 
observation that Donnellan makes use of in creating the CAP. 
The prominent formulation of the ambiguity is found in Donnellan (1966). 
Donnellan illustrates that a sentence containing a definite description can in 
one context make a quantificational ‘statement’ and in another context 
make a referential ‘statement’ (1966, 285): 
A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an 
assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-
and-so. A speaker who uses a definite description referentially 
in an assertion, on the other hand, uses the description to 
enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking 
about and states something about that person or thing. In the 
first case the definite description might be said to occur 
essentially, for the speaker wishes to assert something about 
whatever or whoever fits that description; but in the referential 
use the definite description is merely one tool for doing a 
certain job--calling attention to a person or thing--and in 
general any other device for doing the same job, another 
description or a name, would do as well. In the attributive use, 
the attribute of being the so-and-so is all important, while it is 
not in the referential use. (1966, 285) 
Importantly, for Donnellan the referential use of a description employs 
descriptive content as “merely one tool for doing a certain job”, whereas in 
the attributive use the descriptive content is central. For instance, in the 
referential use it may be equally felicitous to use a proper name, a complex 
demonstrative, or a pronoun, whereas the same does not apply in the 
attributive use. We will come to see in §6.1 that this is in fact predicated by 
our grammatical thesis, which will provide further support for the thesis. 
Donnellan provides as concrete examples to ground the ambiguity. The 
example makes use of two utterances of Smith’s murderer is insane, each of 
which is uttered in a distinct context.13 The two contexts differ in that in the 
                                                          
13 The possessive Smith’s murderer can be understood as being derived from the definite 
description the murderer of Smith and hence qualifies as one itself. Possessives form just one 
grammatical construction taken in the literature to constitute definite descriptions. An 
analysis of a wider range of constructions is instigated by Neale (1990), which is discussed 
in §3.31. We provide a grammatical analysis of possessives in §6.13. 
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first there exists no salient referent to which the possessive Smith’s murderer 
might apply, whereas in the second there is. The first context is described 
as one in which two people come across the dead body of Smith, who they 
know to be a lovable character, and it appears that Smith has been 
murdered. The second context is one in which the two people are in a 
courtroom witnessing the trial of Jones, who is both accused of Smith’s 
murder and is behaving bizarrely in the dock. In the first circumstance an 
utterance of Smith’s murderer is insane is said to be attributive, whereas in 
the second it is said to be referential (1966, 282-286). The reason for this is 
that in the first context the referent of the possessive is not present and 
there is no obvious link, be it causal or perceptual, between the speaker and 
the individual picked out, whereas in the second context both the speaker 
and audience have Jones in sight and hence treat him as the referent. In the 
first circumstance the speaker merely wishes to predicate insanity of 
whoever satisfies the descriptive content of the possessive, whereas in the 
second circumstance the descriptive content is merely used as a tool for 
calling reference to Jones (1966, 286-287). The ambiguity is therefore set 
within a single expression, and emerges purely as the result of the context 
of the utterance. It exhibits the CAP. 
A further facet exists in the CAP, which involves instances of 
misdescription, and the truth-values that emerge as a result of 
misdescription. Linsky’s example above illustrates that in contexts where a 
particular individual is salient it is possible to use a definite description to 
refer even when the descriptive content is misapplied. The same goes for 
Donnellan’s example. In the court context an utterance of Smith’s murderer 
is insane is said to apply to Jones even when Jones is in fact innocent. The 
context of the courtroom offers the speaker the ability to pick out Jones 
with the definite description Smith’s murderer in virtue of the fact that Jones 
is the accused.  Jones is salient enough in the assumed role of being Smith’s 
murderer that the description can be felicitously used with him in mind. At 
this point it is worth reiterating Donnellan’s claim that the definite 
description is “merely one tool for doing a certain job”. Donnellan likens 
the referential use to terms that are typically assumed to be singular terms. 
With this in mind, the descriptive content becomes subservient to the act of 
reference, and, as with other singular terms, we can state that the definite 
description simply stands for the individual it picks out. A speaker is able 
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to misdescribe and succeed in referring in virtue of the definite description 
simply standing for a salient individual. 
Conversely, in the attributive use the descriptive content is all-important. 
In a context where there is no salient individual, the meaning of the definite 
description is entirely dependent upon its descriptive content. In the 
referential use it is possible to misdescribe Jones but nevertheless 
communicate that he is insane, however the same does not hold in the 
attributive use. For instance, if two speakers are walking through the 
woods and come across the dead body of Smith without any salient 
murderer around, the utterance cannot misdescribe if the utterance is to be 
felicitous. If, for instance, Smith was subject to a freak accident, then an 
utterance of Smith’s murderer is insane would be judged infelicitous after the 
true facts surrounding Smith came to light. Therefore, in the attributive use 
the descriptive content is paramount, whereas in the courtroom case the 
communicative act can fall back on the fact that there is a salient individual 
of whom both speaker and audience are aware. 
Instances of misdescription divide the two uses further with respect to the 
resultant truth-values in the respective contexts. In the courtroom context 
the descriptive content can misapply and yet the speaker can still express a 
meaningful utterance, yet in the woods context the descriptive content is 
central to that meaning and cannot be replaced by other factors. Donnellan 
claims that in the courtroom context the speaker can state something true of 
Jones even in an instance of misdescription. The example is set up such that 
Jones is salient and acting bizarrely in the dock, and the definite description 
is used ‘merely as one tool amongst many’ to state of that particular man 
Jones that he is insane. In Donnellan’s words “"I do not fail to refer merely 
because my audience does not correctly pick out what I am referring to… 
[n]or do I fail to refer when nothing fits the description" (1966, 295). The 
intended referent, Jones, is what is referred to. Alternatively, in the woods 
context, if Smith was not murdered, then it is not the case that the speaker 
said something true of Jones or anyone else. No salient individual is there 
to rescue the misdescription (1966, 295). In this context we wish to state of 
whoever murdered Smith that they are insane in virtue of their having 
murdered Smith, rather than any factor. The two uses therefore have 
distinct effects on the manner in which the truth-values for an utterance are 
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reached, and this difference can be seen in instances where the descriptive 
content fails to apply to an individual. 
We can now outline the CAP in more detail: 
(5) The CAP 
i. The same expression ζ containing a definite description d 
can be used either referentially or quantificationally, 
depending upon the context. Definite descriptions therefore 
have a ‘dual function’. 
ii. If a speaker uses ζ referentially, then she has in mind a 
particular individual, whereas if she uses ζ 
quantificationally this condition is not necessary. 
iii. If a speaker uses ζ referentially then the descriptive content 
is secondary to the referential function, whereas if ζ is used 
quantificationally it is primary. 
iv. If a speaker uses ζ referentially, then she can succeed in 
referring to a particular individual even in the case of 
misdescription. The same does not hold of the 
quantificational use. 
v. Following (iv), if a speaker uses ζ referentially then she can 
succeed in saying something true even if the individual 
picked out fails to satisfy d’s descriptive content. 
Finally we have one last observation that is implied by (i): 
vi. The ambiguity in ζ is not grounded in grammatical 
differences.14 Instead, it is either semantic or pragmatic. 
The descriptions literature engages with the ambiguity debate through the 
CAP. Nevertheless, it does not restrict itself solely to the issue of a single 
sentence have distinct uses across contexts. Advancing two further 
ambiguity problems, GAP1 and GAP2, will enable a clearer vantage point 
from which to analyse such theories of descriptions.   
                                                          
14 The final point here is made purely in virtue of the way the problem is set up as regarding 




TWO GRAMMATICAL AMBIGUITY PROBLEMS 
In the above section we gave an outline of the CAP and we observed that it 
originated with respect to a single expression used across varying contents. 
A natural conclusion that follows from the CAP is that the ambiguity is not 
grammatical but is instead semantic or pragmatic. However, there are 
further ambiguity problems that suggest it would be hasty to reject a 
grammatical account. We will now outline two grammatical ambiguity 
problems, GAP1 and GAP2, which are so named in virtue of explicitly 
noting grammatical differences present in two uses. It would be a mistake 
to suggest that the definite descriptions literature has ignored these 
ambiguities but it is true that it tends not to disambiguate them from the 
CAP. Whilst this is not a problem in principle, it is perhaps a problem in 
practice. For, it is the contention of this thesis that the two GAPs give us 
insight into how to solve the CAP, and how to account for the semantics of 
definite descriptions more generally.  
To reiterate, the GAP1 is as follows: 
(GAP1) Take two grammatically distinct definite descriptions d and d’ 
that are part of the same wider expression ζ, is it possible that d is 
semantically referential and d’ is semantically quantificational in 
virtue of being grammatically distinct?  
The following pair of sentences should illustrate the problem: 
(6) The manager is angry. 
(7) The mother of every child is angry. 
The ambiguity is thus as follows, a felicitous use of (6) will refer to a 
particular individual that is salient in the context or ensuing discourse, 
whereas the same does not need to hold in a felicitous use of (7). Typically 
described, (6) illustrates a referential use, whereas (7) illustrates an 
attributive use. As with the CAP, the same distinction concerning 
misdescription applies. 
The definite descriptions used in (6) and (7) are grammatically distinct, 
which can be illustrated through the fact that (7) can derive a possessive 
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construction every child’s mother, which is not the case with (6). Another 
striking fact about the two is that certain expressions may be exchanged for 
the definite article in (6) and retain communicative efficacy, whilst the same 
expression fails to do so in (7). This can be seen in the following pair, where 
the definite article has been exchanged for the distal demonstrative that: 
(8) That manager is angry. 
(9) #That mother of every child is angry.15 
The above substitution instance involves the article being exchanged for an 
expression almost univocally accepted to produce a singular term.16 In (8) 
the utterance would have the same communicative effect as that in (6), it 
still makes reference to a particular individual, whereas in (9) the 
demonstrative forces a reading that jars with the grammar of the rest of the 
phrase (captured in the presence of the quantifier). We thereby have a clear 
ambiguity between (6) and (7), and an equally clear grammatical difference 
between the two definite descriptions.  
The observation made about (8) and (9) illustrate that certain grammatical 
configurations for definite descriptions are amenable to referential uses, 
and thereby to the article being substituted for an alternative referential 
determiner, whereas other configurations are amenable to attributive uses, 
and fail to retain communicative efficacy in the substitution instance. 
Interestingly, the differences between (6/8) and (7/9) tally with intuitions 
raised in the descriptions literature in defence of semantic ambiguity theses. 
Typically, (6) will be used to generate an act of deictic reference. A speech-
act such as this interacts with out ‘deictic frame’ in order to refer. It is 
therefore unsurprising that the article in (6) can be exchanged for an 
inherently deictic demonstrative. Examples such as these abound in 
defence of a referential semantics for descriptions as in (6). 
We will see in §4 that deictic definite descriptions, and there corresponding 
similarities with distal demonstratives, are often raised as the foremost 
                                                          
15 We precede sentence (9) with a hash to signify that the intended attributive reading is 
highly marked. An alternative reading may be rescued if the context were to provide us 
with the information that the group of children all share the same mother. In this case, 
however, we lose the intended reading from (7). 
16  King is one of the exceptions to this. For King, complex demonstratives should be 
understood as quantificational expressions (2001). 
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evidence of a semantic ambiguity. The close-knit relationship between the 
two may be seen as evidence that referential descriptions are semantically 
derived from distal demonstratives, in virtue of possible cohesive 
semantics. At the other end of the debate, those that deny the existence of a 
semantic ambiguity often do so in virtue of the substitution failure in (7/9) 
(see §3). A rejection of the semantic ambiguity is thus founded on the fact 
that definite articles often cannot be substituted for deictic demonstratives, 
and hence their semantics registers closer to quantifiers. A third and final 
analysis, which is rarely explored, is that the semantic results observed in 
both (6/8) and (7/9) is a direct result of the grammar of determiner phrases 
(DPs). It is precisely this avenue that we will develop in §6.1. The GAP1 
therefore provides a route into a comparative grammatical analysis of the 
varying configurations that definite descriptions are enabled as DPs. 
Moving on, we can repeat the GAP2 as follows: 
(GAP2) Take two grammatically distinct expressions ζ and ζ’ each of 
which contains the same definite description d, is it possible that 
ζ forces d to have a referential semantics and ζ’ forces d to have a 
quantificational semantics purely in virtue of the grammatical 
environment in which d falls? 
The following pair of sentences should illustrate the GAP2: 
(10) The manager is angry. 
(11) I want to be the manager. 
The ambiguity can be set up as follows, a felicitous use of (10) will refer to a 
particular individual that is salient in the context or ensuing discourse, 
whereas there need not be any salient individual present for (11) to be 
felicitous. The first sentence states of a particular individual that she is 
angry, whereas the second sentence states that the speaker has a desire to 
become the manager but not that they wish to be the individual who is at 
the time of utterance the actual manager. Therefore, at least one felicitous 
use of (10) is referential, whereas at least one felicitous use of (11) is 
attributive. 
In the GAP2, the ambiguity is formed not through the definite descriptions 
themselves (which are identical), but instead through the larger 
23 
 
grammatical environment that the definite description falls within. We can 
once again illustrate the ambiguity through a substitution instance: 
(12) That manager is angry. 
(13) I want to be that manager. 
We can see that (12) retains the communicative intention exhibited in the 
referential use, whereas it becomes much harder to get the attributive 
reading for (13). Instead, (13) appears to force there to be a particular 
salient manager.  The difference is therefore one concerning the 
overarching grammatical environment in which the manager falls. In (12) it 
is acting as the grammatical subject, whereas in (13) it is the grammatical 
object and is c-commanded by a propositional attitude verb. 17  The 
ambiguity is thus set up within the sentential clause as a whole, as opposed 
to the DPs’ internal grammar. It is the GAP2 that provides us with an 
incentive for investigating the interaction of DPs with wider aspects of a 
clauses grammar (§6.1). 
In conclusion, the two GAPs are added to the CAP to establish the three 
ambiguity problems that require solutions within any adequate theory of 
descriptions. Through distinguishing the three it will be possible to 
understand the extent to which the Russellian theory (§3) and the two 
ambiguity theories (§4) deal with the problems. Through isolating potential 
grammatical differences in the two uses for definite descriptions we can 
begin to explore a third route (§5 and §6) that develops a grammatical 
grounding for semantic ambiguity in definite descriptions. The aim of this 
thesis is to provide a novel account of CAP, GAP1, and GAP2, which places 
grammar at the heart of the semantics of definite descriptions (§6.4). 
 
 
                                                          
17 Radford informally defines c-command as “a structural relation between two constituents. 
To say that one constituent X c-commands another constituent Y is (informally) to say that X 
is no lower than Y in the structure (i.e. either X is higher up in the structure than Y, or the 
two are at the same height)… a constituent X c-commands its sister constituent Y and any 
constituent Z that is contained within Y” (2004, 440). The term ‘structure’ simply refers to 
syntactic structure and height refers to positions within syntactic trees that are employed to 




THE GENESIS OF THE AMBIGUITY PROBLEMS 
The most prominent theories of descriptions appear to have adopted the 
proposition expressed in (5vi), which states that the ambiguity is not 
grammatical. There are a number of reasons that can be put forward to 
explain this. The first is that the ambiguity problem, as originally raised, 
concerns a single sentence being employed differently across contexts. In 
virtue of this it is difficult to suppose that grammar is responsible. 
Furthermore, within philosophy of language grammar has often been 
understood as ancillary to questions concerning meaning, simply acting as 
a way of dressing language up as opposed to being productive in 
compositional semantics (we will explore the semantic tradition 
responsible for this view in §2). It will be the job of the following thesis to 
break with this tradition and argue for a new role for grammar at the heart 
of compositional semantics (§5.3), acting as a ‘skeleton of thought’ (Hinzen 
2009a). Another reason for side-lining grammar spills from a lexicocentric 
conception of meaning in the literature. The descriptions literature often 
understands the meaning of the definite article to be something that the 
associated lexical item carries. In contrast, we will take the meaning of the 
article to be ‘exo-skeletal’ (a term drawn from Borer 2005, 15). An exo-
skeletal view of the definite article rejects the idea that its meaning is 
carried by its lexical entry and instead claims that it is derived through the 
grammar of DPs and the grammatical environments in which they fall 
(§6.12). Therefore, it will be facts about grammar that we take to be the 
genesis of the ambiguity problems. 
We can now turn to briefly summarize four theories on the genesis of the 
ambiguity problem. The first three, the ambiguity thesis (AT), the 
referential thesis (RT), and the quantificational thesis (QT), traditionally 
adhere to (5iv) together with a lexicocentric conception of meaning. The AT 
states that the ambiguity has its genesis in the semantics of the definite 
article: 
(AT) The Semantic Ambiguity Thesis 
 Take an expression ζ containing a definite description d, the 
semantic content of ζ in some contexts contains a referential 
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function and in others is a quantificational function (Strawson 1950; 
Devitt 1974; 1981a; 1981b; 2004; 2007a; 2007b; Kaplan 1970; 1979a; 
1989a; 1989b; 2005; Wettstein 1981; 1983; Reimer 1998; Amaral 2008). 
The dual function is thus part of the definite article’s linguistic meaning. 
We will explore two ATs in §4. The RT and QT each state that the 
ambiguity has its genesis in pragmatics: 
(RT) The Referential Semantics Thesis 
 Take an expression ζ containing a definite description d, the 
semantic content of d always elicits a referential function but in 
some contexts a speaker may succeed in communicating a 
quantificational statement in using ζ through pragmatic machinery 
(Frege 1948; von Fintal 2004; Elbourne 2013). 
(QT) The Quantificational Semantics Thesis 
 Given an expression ζ containing a definite description d, ζ always 
expresses a quantificational statement but a speaker may succeed in 
communicating a referential statement in using ζ through pragmatic 
machinery (Russell 1905; Kripke 1977; 2005; Neale 1990; 2004; 2005a; 
Salmon 1993; 2004; Bach 2004a; 2004b; 2007). 
Of these two theories we will only discuss the QT (§3), which defends the 
view that the linguistic meaning of the definite article is always 
quantificational. The terms ‘linguistic meaning’ and ‘pragmatic machinery’ 
will be unpacked in §2, and will be employed throughout the rest of the 
thesis. 
It should be clear at this point that the positive thesis to be advocated in 
this thesis is at odds with the above strategies. In brief, we will argue that 
the grammatical ‘topology’ of DPs produces a ‘hierarchy of reference’, 
which captures a range of ‘forms of reference’ that arguments can exhibit, 
from weak predicative and quantificational forms on one side, to strong 
rigid, deictic, and pronominal forms on the other (this idea will be 
developed in line with work in Longobardi 1994; 2005; Sheehan & Hinzen 
2011; 2013; Martin & Hinzen 2014). It will be observed that definite 
descriptions fall in the middle of this hierarchy, thereby enabling the two 
uses, referential and attributive uses. In conjunction with this, we will 
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argue that what form of reference a definite description exhibits is partially 
determined by the grammatical configuration it is placed within, including 
how it is valued with respect to ‘speech-event features’ (the idea of speech-
event features will be advanced in line with Sigurðsson 2004a; 2004b; 2009). 
The ambiguity problems will thus be explained as originating in grammar. 
We will call this the ‘grammatical thesis’ (GT): 
(GT) The Grammatical Thesis 
 Take an expression ζ containing a definite description d, the 
grammatical structure of d’s DP, together with the grammatical 
environment of ζ in which d falls, will determine the strength and 
form of reference that d exhibits. 
The GT thus rejects a lexicocentric view of the semantics of the definite 
article, and it rejects the view that the genesis of the ambiguity is to be 
found in pure semantics or pragmatics. In conjunction with the above, the 
GT will judge grammar to be an aspect of our species ‘biological 
endowment’, and our theory will thus be considered a naturalistic and 
explanatory account of compositional semantics. 18  We will therefore 
consider our theory of descriptions as one embedded in the faculty of 





                                                          
18 The thesis is made in line with an on-going discussion in biolinguistics (Uriagereka 1998; 
Piatelli-Palmarini, Uriagereka, and Salaburu 2009; Di Sciullo & Boeckx 2011). A secondary 









THE SEMANTIC FRAMEWORK 
 
The descriptions literature is founded upon semantic theories sketched out 
in the latter part of the 19th and early 20th century. It is within these theories 
that we observe the emergence of a framework for a formal compositional 
semantics of natural language. Furthermore, the framework developed 
incorporated a formal analysis of reference, quantification, predication, and 
truth. The development of formal semantics became central to the various 
philosophical solutions provided for the three ambiguity problems detailed 
in §1. In what follows, we will provide an exposition of a type-based formal 
semantics and pay close attention to the ‘forms of reference’ it enables for 
arguments. It will be observed that a type-based system is committed to a 
lexicocentric view of meaning, and that this negatively impacts the forms of 
reference it permits.19 We will refer to this lexicocentric restriction on forms 
of reference when we come to reject the Russellian theory (QT) in §3 and 
two ambiguity theories (AT) in §4, before providing a non-lexicocentric 
alternative, with expanded set of forms of reference, in §5 and §6. 
                                                          
19 A lexicocentric position defends the view that the semantic contribution of a word can be 




The semantic framework will be developed as follows. In §2.1 we will 
describe the semantic terrain that theories of descriptions fall within, which 
can be understood as founded upon a dispute between literalism and 
contextualism over the establishment of truth-conditional content. 
Following this, in §2.2 we will give a detailed exposition of formal 
compositional semantics, including an analysis of logical form, intensions 
and extensions, and structured propositions. Through this we will be able 
to understand the semantic apparatus available to the descriptions 
literature in explaining truth-conditional content. Next, in §2.3 we turn to 
look at how the formal system interacts with pragmatic machinery in 
effective communication, which will help us understand how such a 
system can be employed to explain actual language use. Finally, in §2.4 we 
will describe the forms of reference that are enabled within formal 
semantics, which we will label restrictive and will later reject on the basis 
that they fail to capture the expansive variation available in natural 
language reference. 
2.1 
THE SEMANTIC TERRAIN 
The semantic framework that is employed in the descriptions literature is 
built upon a question concerning “the role of context in the determination 
of truth-conditions” (Recanati 2004, 83). The concept of ‘truth-conditions’ 
and how they are established is thus central to the semantic framework and 
the theories of meaning it enables.20 The guiding intuition behind this is 
that in order to be a competent speaker of a language one must be able to 
understand and interpret the truth-conditions of sentences of the language, 
‘[t]o know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth conditions’ (Heim 
& Kratzer 1998, 1). Recanati derives the semantic terrain through a debate 
concerning the role of linguistic meaning in the determination of truth-
conditional content. We will follow the catalogue that he offers. 
In preparation for the rest of the thesis we must now introduce some 
central terminology that is used in order to classify semantic theories. The 
first piece of terminology that we will introduce is that of ‘what is said’ in 
using a particular expression. According to Recanati, given an expression ζ, 
                                                          
20 Even this claim comes with issues. For instance, debates exist as to whether meaning 
determines truth or the other way round. For more on this, see Pietroski (2005a; 2005b). 
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what a speaker ‘says’ in using ζ is to be associated with the truth-
conditional content expressed by ζ, ‘what is said’ is the truth-conditional 
content of the utterance (2004, 5), and in Hinzen’s words “it is to take such 
propositions to form the contents of propositional attitudes; and to take 
them to be ‘complete’ in the sense that a truth-value can be attached to 
them in a context of use” (forthcoming, 4). The question that is important in 
distinguishing semantic theories is what is involved in establishing ‘what is 
said’? In other words, what is the minimum level of machinery 
(grammatical, semantic, pragmatic, etc.) that is necessary for an utterance 
to have a propositional content and specified set of truth-conditions? 
We can delineate the semantic terrain through the distinction between 
literalism and contextualism. The two positions are formed over a dispute 
concerning whether ‘what is said’ is more closely related to the ‘linguistic 
meaning’ of an expression or whether the ‘linguistic meaning’ must be 
supplemented by pragmatic mechanisms in order to determine what is said 
(mechanism including, for instance, ‘speaker’s meaning’).21 Let us quickly 
define these terms. The linguistic meaning of an expression is derived from 
the conventional meaning associated with a given expression-type. The 
linguistic meaning of a token expression ζ is derived from the meaning of 
the expression-type ζ. In virtue of this, the linguistic meaning of a 
particular expression can be given in isolation from a particular context of 
use, linguistic meaning is thus context-independent. The linguistic meaning 
of an expression does not change across token instances of its use. It is for 
such reasons that the term ‘linguistic meaning’ is often used 
interchangeably with ‘literal meaning’ (Recanati 2004, 5). To take an 
example, consider (1): 
(1) I am tired. 
The linguistic meaning associated with (1) is the conventional meaning 
associated with the sentence-type expressed in (1). It might be paraphrased 
as ‘the speaker is tired’. The linguistic meaning of (1) can thereby be given 
without reference to who uttered it and when it was uttered. It can be given 
independently of context. 
                                                          
21 The term ‘linguistic meaning’ is often used interchangeably with the terms ‘sentence 
meaning’, ‘literal meaning’, and ‘conventional meaning’. We will attempt to stick to the term 
‘linguistic meaning’ throughout this thesis. 
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Conversely, the ‘speaker’s meaning’ of an expression ζ has to do with what 
the speaker can succeed in communicating/implicating in using ζ (2004, 5). 
For instance, given two separate contexts a speaker who utters (1) may in 
one context succeed in communicating that they desire a cup of coffee and 
in another context that they wish to avoid a social engagement. These two 
extra-linguistic pieces of information would be part of speaker’s meaning, 
they would be part of what the speaker meant in using (1). Nevertheless, it 
is understood that these extra-linguistic pieces of communication are not 
present in (1)’s linguistic meaning. Typically understood speaker’s 
meaning involves the enrichment of linguistic meaning through what we 
are calling ‘pragmatic machinery’.  
According to Recanati, we get a triad of stages within a given speech act 
(2004, 5), which we can put as follows: 
(2) ‘Sentence Meaning’ < ‘What is said’ < ‘What is implicated’  
The first of the three is entirely constituted by the linguistic meaning and 
the last of the three is entirely constituted by speaker’s meaning. The 
question is then, which side does ‘what is said’ fall? In other words, at 
which point do we have a full propositional structure with a fully specified 
set of truth-conditions. At this stage it is useful to make one further 
differentiation between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’. Given a 
particular speech act S, ‘what is said’ in S will be constrained by the 
linguistic meaning of the expression used in S. For instance, the 
proposition(s) expressed in a sentence such as (1) cannot include the 
proposition that spiders have eight legs. The linguistic meaning of (1) 
precludes the proposition spiders have eight legs being part of ‘what is said’. 
Conversely, as Recanati points out, given a set of strong contextual and 
background assumptions, or ‘stage-setting’, it is possible that ‘what is 
implicated’ by (1) includes the proposition spiders have eight legs. We should 
think of linguistic meaning as providing an utterance with a ‘semantic 
skeleton’, which in turn limits ‘what is said’ in such an utterance (2004, 6). 
The question remains as to whether the semantic skeleton provided by the 
linguistic meaning is sufficient to account for ‘what is said’.  
At this point we can provide two distinct answers to this question, one 
from literalism and one from contextualism. We will now define the two 
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positions following Recanati’s categorization of semantics theories. Let us 
begin with literalism: 
(L) Literalism 
The truth-conditions of a sentence are fixed by the rules of the 
language (with respect to context) quite independently of the 
speaker’s meaning. (2004, 85)22 
To defend literalism one must state that there is at least a minimal 
proposition provided by the linguistic meaning of an expression, which can 
be formulated without any input from the speaker’s meaning associated 
with its use. According to semantic minimalism, a particular form of 
literalism, semantics should be purely concerned with literal meaning alone. 
As Borg puts it, “[r]ecognizing a clear boundary between literal meaning 
and communication, and maintaining that a semantic theory owes us an 
explanation of the former but not the latter, would then be an instance of 
minimalism” (Borg 2004, 54). For minimalism, the position is that we can 
provide a minimal proposition for any sentence of a language through that 
sentence’s linguistic meaning. The ‘semantic skeleton’ that is provided by 
linguistic meaning is therefore sufficient, if literalism is correct, to produce 
propositional content. The theory is stated to “adopt a quite stripped down, 
or minimal, conception of the aims and limits of a semantic theory” (Borg 
2004, 17).23 Recanati thus understands literalism as splitting the triad in (2) 
up as follows: 
(L*) Linguistic Meaning → {Sentence Meaning, ‘What is said’} 
                                                          
22  Following this, Recanati outlines two further theories that fall under the rubric of 
literalism, which he terms the syncretic view and indexicalism. The two theories are said to 
be weaker forms of literalism in virtue of that fact that they “appeal to the speaker’s 
meaning in determining truth-conditions, but… only when the sentence itself demands it” (2004, 
85; Åkerman 2009, 155). The syncretic view claims that “what is said, in the intuitive sense, 
may be affected by primary pragmatic processes of the optional variety; but it draws a 
distinction between what is said in the intuitive sense (the input to secondary pragmatic 
processes), and what is strictly and literally said” (2004, 85; see also Salmon 1991; Bach 1994a; 
1994b; Soames 2002). And, indexicalism states that “no contextual influences are allowed to 
affect the intuitive truth-conditional content of an utterance unless the sentence itself 
demands it” (2004, 85). We might term the first form of literalism brute literalism in order to 
distinguish it from the two further views. The core point of agreement between the three 
versions is that it is only when absolutely necessary can we incorporate something 
contextual into what is said (Recanati 1993, 255). 
23 For a further defence of minimalism see Cappellan & Lepore (1997; 2005) and for a 
response against such forms of minimalism see Travis (2006).  
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 Speaker’s Meaning → {‘What is implicated’} 
The linguistic meaning accounts for the sentence meaning and what is said, 
whereas speaker’s meaning only plays a role in what is implicated. 
The second position is termed contextualism. We can define contextualism 
as follows: 
(C) Contextualism 
There is no level of meaning which is both (i) propositional (truth-
evaluable) and (ii) minimalist, that is, unaffected by top-down 
factors. (2004, 90) 
According to contextualism, there is no way in which the linguistic 
meaning (context-independent literal meaning) of an expression can 
provide that expression with a fully-specified set of truth-conditions (or, in 
fact, even a minimal proposition). Contextualism thus claims that one 
cannot hold that an expression is fully propositional at the same time as 
being wholly divorced from ‘top-down’ pragmatic factors. To clarify, if a 
‘factor’ of meaning is taken to be top-down, then it is “external and 
additional to what is said”, whereas if it is bottom-up, then it is “a process 
triggered (and made obligatory) by a linguistic expression in the sentence 
itself” (2004, 18). For contextualism then, the ‘semantic skeleton’ provided 
by linguistic meaning requires “contextual enrichment or ‘fleshing out’” in 
order to be propositional (2004, 6). Once again making use of the diagrams 
that Recanati uses we can state that contextualism splits the triad up as 
follows: 
(C*) Linguistic Meaning → {Sentence Meaning} 
 Speaker’s Meaning → {‘What is said’, ‘What is implicated’} 
The view defended here is that ‘what is said’, namely the truth-conditional 
content of an utterance, is first constrained by linguistic meaning but then 
enriched by context (in ways not necessarily demanded by the linguistic 
meaning). We therefore have the core difference between literalism and 
contextualism. Literalism defends the view that linguistic meaning alone 
fully specifies ‘what is said’, and contextualism defends the view that the 
linguistic meaning requires contextual enrichment in order to reach the 
level of ‘what is said’. 
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It is noteworthy that there is no mention of grammar in the organisation of 
either linguistic meaning or speaker’s meaning. In terms of how grammar 
is traditionally understood in the philosophical tradition this omission is 
easily rectified. The role of grammar is to help construct linguistic meaning 
in a manner that reflects the underlying thought that the speaker is aiming 
to express. In other words, it is merely the ‘clothing for the semantic 
skeleton’. 24  It plays no further role. However, this view of grammar is 
arguably misled. At the very least, grammar can be seen as organizing the 
‘skeletal’ aspects of meaning, and therefore as organizing linguistic 
meaning. In fact, in §5 we will argue that not only does grammar produce 
linguistic meaning but it takes us to the level of ‘what is said’ without 
recourse to either minimal propositions or contextual enrichment. It will be 
illustrated that grammar is richer than previously thought and contains 
syntactic projections dedicated to placing clausal structure within a 
‘speech-event’ frame, which fully specifies ‘what is said’ (in the sense of 
Sigurðsson 2004b; 2009). 
2.2 
FORMAL SEMANTICS 
An account of how the linguistic meaning of an utterance is derived 
involves providing an account of compositional semantics. Formal 
semantics is perhaps the most prominent tactic for accounting for 
compositional aspects of meaning. Its development is closely tied to the 
core tenets of literalism, and its use is widespread in the descriptions 
literature. In analysing formal semantics we will understand how and why 
truth-conditional content is so closely associated with meaning, and this 
will help us to understand the available options on the table for solving the 
three ambiguity problems. We will now provide a detailed exposition of 
how one might develop a formal compositional semantics for natural 
language. 
Natural language is part of our comportment towards the world and others. 
In virtue of this, it might seem reasonable to suppose that the contextual 
structure surrounding our utterances has a big impact on what they mean 
                                                          
24 It is precisely this tradition that is questioned by those such as Hinzen (2009b). The 
tradition in linguistics does not provide grammar with a more central role either, as can 
been seen in Chomsky’s earlier work (1957; 1966). 
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and the truth-conditional content that they express. However, in order to 
construct a semantics for natural language it is important to be decisive 
over what to consider relevant and what to consider ancillary in the 
production of meaningful communication. If semantics is to be a rigorous 
domain, then it must be clear in its aims and methodology. The basis of 
formal semantics as a discipline can be seen in Russell, “I… am persuaded 
that common speech is full of vagueness and inaccuracy, and that any 
attempt to be precise and accurate requires modification of common speech 
both as regards vocabulary and as regards syntax” (1957, 387). 25  It is 
worries such as these that led philosophers to search for a more rigorous 
manner in which to account for meaning and to abstract away from all of 
the imprecision that surrounds natural language use. The motivation 
behind formal semantics is that by using formal logic one can avoid 
misinterpretation of natural language utterances, and can instead provide 
unambiguous formal expressions. We could say that it is within this field 
that we see the birth of literalism.  
Formal semantics emerged originally as a method through which to 
translate the natural language used in proofs of mathematics into a 
language that was devoid of ambiguity (Frege 1879; 1884; 1893; Russell 
1903; 1919b; Russell & Whitehead 1910). Frege and Russell both 
independently attempted to reduce mathematics to logic. For each author, 
the objective was to rid mathematical proofs of the ambiguities and vague 
terms that were pervasive in natural language. The objective was achieved 
through a translation of the natural language sentences present in proofs 
into formal statements. Each author believed the success of this project was 
vital for progress in mathematics. Frege, for instance, felt that until the 
foundations of mathematics were uncovered and settled logically, “the 
whole structure of arithmetic” would be “defective” (1953, xiv).  
The formal language was created to translate steps in proofs, definitions, 
axioms, and so on. In order to account for these the two authors were 
                                                          
25 The eradication of common speech vagueness in favour of a new formal vocabulary and 
syntax is the aim of ‘On Denoting’ (1905). As Higginbotham notes it was the aim of this 
work to distinguish what may be termed ‘grammatical form’, which is the form that a 
natural language utterances takes, from ‘logical form’, which is the actual meaning of the 
utterance that is often obscured by the former (1993). The work in ‘On Denoting’ is seen as a 
success by many, not least Wittgenstein who states that “[i]t was Russell who performed the 




required to create a formalized language within which any possible 
statement of a proof could fall (Dummett 1973, 1). In Dummett’s words:  
Frege's first task was, thus, to give an analysis of this structure 
of the sentences of our language, adequate at least for such 
sentences as occur in a train of mathematical reasoning... it 
must explain also how the meaning of each sentence was 
determined from its internal structure… it must be a semantic, 
and not merely a syntactic, analysis. Frege had, in other words, 
to provide the foundation of a theory of meaning. (1973, 2)  
It is within this project that we begin to see the emergence of formal 
semantics as a discipline, and consequently the semantic framework used 
today in theories of descriptions. In its advancement, both Frege and 
Russell extended the formal treatment to natural language semantics more 
generally, and the formal project that Frege and Russell initiated has 
become the standard in twentieth century philosophy of language.26 
Frege began his project by adhering to the following rule, that “[t]here 
must be a sharp separation of the psychological from the logical” (1997, 90). 
The formal semantic system was therefore not to be determined by 
particular people and their mental states, and it was not to be determined 
by speakers’ intuitions as to what words and parts of speech meant. It is 
factors such as these that lead to vagueness. Instead, a theory of meaning 
should be universal in the sense that a given proposition contained within a 
proof would mean the same thing across varying contexts of use and even 
in instances where it was differently expressed.27 The theory should explain 
the semantics of sentence-types and word-types, not individual token 
utterances of sentences. Indeed, both Frege and Russell viewed this as the 
only way to capture the universality of proof. Formal semantics would thus 
be troubled by the ambiguity problems outlined in §1.1. 
Borg outlines the motivation of formal semantics as follows:  
[a]ccording to formal theorists, the point at which to study 
language is, at least initially, in terms of the formal features of 
                                                          
26 Indeed, it remains heavily defended (see Larson & Segal 1995; Heim & Kratzer 1998; 
Portner & Partee 2002; Pietroski 2005a; von Fintel & Heim 2010, each of which provides a 
framework for formal semantics). 
27 A very simple example of this would be the active sentence John hit Steve and the passive 
sentence Steve was hit by John, which likewise express the same proposition. 
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linguistic expressions. Thus we can talk about the meanings of 
words and sentences, where these are items assessed in terms of 
their formal features, prior to, or abstracted from, questions 
about the ways in which these expressions are used on a 
particular occasion or the communicative aims of the speakers 
who utter the words and sentences in question. (2004, 15)  
It is the investigation into these formal features of language and their 
interactions that provides us with a blueprint or skeleton for composing 
natural language semantics, a blueprint that can in turn be applied to any 
novel sentence in any natural language. 
2.21 
LOGICAL FORM 
Central to the formal semantics project is the notion of logical form. The 
logical form assigned to sentences is an abstraction from those natural 
language expressions they are meant to capture. Moreover, the project of 
providing a systematic logical form for natural language semantics can be 
viewed in two ways, as descriptive or as revisionary (Stanley 2000). In the 
first case, logical form is simply a method through which we can label 
semantic inferences. It is imposed on natural language (Borg 2004, 63). In the 
second case, logical form is a real part of natural language that is built up as 
part of our language faculty. A revisionary view of logical form 
understands it to be to natural language expressions (Borg 2004, 64). Borg 
notes that this view is often related to the program of generative grammar 
introduced by Chomsky that, up until recently, defended the view that 
logical form was a semantic ‘level of representation’ present in the faculty 
of language (Borg 2004, 64; Chomsky 1975; 1995). For the purpose of the 
present discussion we may leave these considerations alone. Currently, we 
are only interested in describing the process via which one might construct 
a logical form, rather than the further claim concerning whether it is a 
descriptive or explanatory tool in natural language research. We will save 
the latter question for §5.3. 
An important question to ask now is how does a semantic theory ground 
logical form in the first place? To begin with, at the base of logical form 
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there exist a minimum of two levels of formal complexity.28 The first level 
of complexity is that of the propositional calculus wherein the logic of the 
connection of propositions is considered. The second level of complexity 
breaks apart those propositions to investigate their internal logic, which 
was initiated with first-order logic. These two levels do not exhaust logical 
form, but they do form an appropriate starting point for our analysis of 
formal semantics. 
The first level of complexity contains propositions themselves as 
constituents, whereas the second level of complexity has sub-propositional 
parts as its constituents. These layers are described by Wittgenstein: 
[i]f we try to analyse any given propositions we shall find in 
general that they are logical sums, products or other truth-
functions of simpler propositions. But our analysis, if carried far 
enough, must come to the point where it reaches propositional 
forms which are not themselves composed of simpler 
propositional forms. We must eventually reach the ultimate 
connection of the terms, the immediate connection which 
cannot be broken without destroying the propositional form as 
such. (1929, 162-163) 
The two levels of formal complexity were intended to give an analysis of 
the semantics of any expression of natural language. As it turned out 
formal semantics had to admit further elements of formal complexity into 
the mix, but for the time being we will stick to the basics.29 
We will provide an outline of a type-based formal semantics shortly, but 
before we do it is important to distinguish logical form from grammatical 
form, a distinction that is retained in literalism. Consider (3): 
(3) John is tall. 
We can begin by listing features of (3)’s grammatical form. For instance, it 
includes a noun, an adjective, and a copula (that expresses present tense). 
                                                          
28 These two levels can be seen as being developed in Frege’s logic. A brief outline of work 
on the logical connectives can be found in ‘Negation’ (1918) and ‘Compound Thoughts’ 
(1963), and an insight into how Frege envisioned the internal formal structure of 
propositions can be seen in ‘On Sense and Reference’ (1948) and ‘On Concept and Object’ 
(1951). 
29 The advancements can be seen in Davidson (1967) and alternatively in the Model-theoretic 
view of Kaplan (1979b). 
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The adjective and copula combine to provide an intransitive verb phrase, 
which in turn combines with the noun phrase that acts as the sentence’s 
grammatical subject or thematic agent. Finally, the grammatical form so 
construed provides a declarative sentence. On the other hand, logical form 
does not employ such terminology. Instead, it treats grammar as an 
ancillary part of language, grammar is merely a tool for ‘expressing’ a pre-
existing logical form. Establishing the logical form is a strictly semantic 
enterprise. 
The question remains as to what exactly the difference is between the 
grammatical form of natural language and the logical form of semantics 
that lurks beneath it. Typically, formal semantics makes the claim that the 
grammatical form of a sentence does not run parallel to the structure of 
semantic information. The idea here is that given two identical grammatical 
forms it is possible to construct two distinct semantic forms, and vice versa. 
According to Higginbotham, this idea is pervasive in the semantics 
literature (1993, 174). The central facet to the lack of synonymy between the 
two forms emerges from the fact that:  
[l]inguistic structure is a matter… of what licenses certain 
combinations of words and other formatives as constituting a 
sentence of a language. But the concern of logical form is with 
the recursive structure of reference and truth. In distinguishing 
logical form from grammatical form we post a warning against 
the easy assumption that the referents of the significant parts of 
a sentence, in the ways they are composed so as to determine 
truth conditions, line up neatly with the words, in the ways 
they are composed so as to make the whole well-formed. (1993, 
1973-1974)30 
Logical form therefore deals with ‘the recursive structure of reference and 
truth’, which is charged with failing to necessarily run parallel to 
grammatical form. Let us unpack these claims further. 
The mechanism of recursion is a simple one and runs as follows. Given a 
set containing two members α and β, written {α, β}, we can label that set as 
                                                          
30 This account is not without its detractors. For instance, Hinzen (2007) makes a substantive 
claim that not only is grammatical form recursive, but is in actual fact central to the 
construction of reference and truth. Reference, for instance, is a property that is 
“systematically conditioned syntactically” within DPs and truth is a property of an 
expression’s ‘force’ “encoded in the upper regions of the CP layer” (2007, 165; 204). 
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being of either type α or type β. Further to this, we can add another 
element γ yielding the set {γ, {α, β}}, which will be of either type γ or 
whatever type was assigned to {α, β}. This system can continue ad infinitum 
as more elements are added. According to Higginbotham, the system is one 
that operates on formal representations, which are intended to stand for the 
referential and truth-bearing elements of language (1993, 174). 
Consequently, as a recursive structure is derived it represents the 
concatenation of reference and truth. 
We can now turn to consider how logical form recursively derives truth 
and reference. The logical form assigned to a sentential expression 
constructs a proposition. A proposition is something that is truth-evaluable 
relative to a particular world w of evaluation (at a minimum). The logical 
form a proposition captures will detail the conditions under which that 
proposition is true, its truth-conditions. The truth-conditions of a sentence 
will mirror a state-of-affairs such that if that state of affairs holds in w then 
the proposition expressed is true in w, and if this state-of-affairs does not 
hold in w then the proposition expressed is false in w. Therefore, the locus 
of truth is the sentence. The truth-conditions of atomic propositions are 
built up from parts that are not themselves truth-evaluable, for instance 
those parts of sentences including names, articles, quantifiers, verbs, 
adjectives, and so on. Therefore, the logical form of a proposition is a 
systematic construction of truth-conditions from non-truth-evaluable parts. 
This means that the logical form of a proposition is a composition of its 
parts. The centrality of truth to formal semantics is clear. As Heim & 
Kratzer state, “[t]o know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth 
conditions” (1998, 1), to know how the truth-conditions are constructed is 
to know how to analyse the compositional contribution of words and parts 
of speech to truth-conditional meaning. 
In order to construct logical form and provide a recursive account of 
reference and truth one can assign propositions and their parts semantic-
types, thereby creating a type-based semantics. Type-based semantics is a 
brand of compositional semantics that takes non-truth evaluable parts and 
produces a construction that is truth evaluable, namely a proposition.  At 
the outset the task involves breaking apart linguistic expressions and 
detailing the types of words and phrases that go to make them up. This 
work involves detecting regularities amongst such phrases or words. 
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Following this, one can then give the logical contribution of different types 
of phrases to any proposition they are found in.  For instance, we can, 
following tradition (Montague 1973, 22-23; Heim & Kratzer 1998, 28; Partee 
2000, 1), assign a sentence the semantic-type <t> standing for ‘truth-value’, 
and a referential term the semantic-type <e> standing for an ‘individual’ 
(Frege 1951, 171-173). From these base types we can develop a semantic-
type for any part of a proposition. This is indeed what it means to say that 
logical form deals with the recursive features of reference and truth. 
The two base types, <e> and <t>, can be used to assign any expression a 
semantic-type. For instance, if <e> and <t> are legitimate semantic-types 
then so is the type, or ordered pair, formed of the two, <e, t>. The ordered 
pair <e, t> does not behave like those types of <e> and <t> as it stands for a 
function, rather than a truth-value or individual. The function <e, t> states 
that if you give to it an individual of type <e>, then it will give you a 
proposition of type <t>. It is this asymmetry between functions and 
individuals that characterizes traditional compositional semantics. An 
obvious candidate part of a sentence for the type <e, t> would be a verbal 
phrase (for instance is tall). The verbal phrase is tall has the semantic-type of 
a function, which stands for a class (the class of tall things). The verbal 
phrase is tall can take a name, for example John, and give us a proposition 
whose truth-value is ‘true’ if John is in the class of tall things and ‘false’ if 
otherwise. Whilst the output of a proposition is of type <t>, in order to 
account for the internal logic of a proposition we must have a way of 
composing the semantic types that correspond to the parts of the 
proposition that are not of type <t>. Functions play this role of 
composition.31 Thus, a compositional formal semantics is born. 
The idea of functional compositionality comes from Frege, who stated that 
within any given sentence there will be a dichotomy between those parts of 
speech that are in some sense ‘complete’ and those that are ‘incomplete’ or 
‘unsaturated’. The base semantic-types <e> and <t> are complete, whereas 
complexes/functions such as the semantic type <e, t> are not. All non-base 
                                                          
31 The formal semantics under discussion here is called functionalism and is one of the more 
prominent formal semantic theories, however it is not the only available option. For instance, 
Pietroski (2005a) develops a contrasting formal system that he terms conjunctivism, which 
takes all elements involved in the formalism to be monadic predicates, which are tied 
together using a standard conjunction operation.  
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semantic-types act as unsaturated functions and therefore require 
completion/saturation. In Frege’s words: 
Statements in general… can be imagined to be split up into two 
parts; one complete in itself, and the other in need of 
supplementation, or ‘unsaturated.’ Thus, e.g., we split up the 
sentence 
‘Caesar conquered Gaul’ 
into ‘Caesar’ and ‘conquered Gaul’. The second part is 
‘unsaturated’ – it contains an empty place; only when this place 
is filled up with a proper name, or with an expression that 
replaces a proper name, does a complete sense appear. (1891, 
139) 
The notion of saturation matches that of functional composition. It is 
through this method that the formal semantic system can build up a 
proposition of type <t> from non-propositional parts. 
For clarity, let us analyse the sentence Caesar conquered Gaul, which we can 
break down into its constituent parts. To begin with we have the sentence 
as a whole, which is of the semantic type <t>. The sentence’s logical form 
expresses a proposition with a determinate set of truth-conditions. We can 
then extract the subject Caesar from the sentence, which is of type <e> 
standing for an individual. Once the subject is extracted we are left with a 
one-place predicate, or function, conquered Gaul, which is of type <e, t>. 
Finally, we can break apart this one-place predicate to get the sentence’s 
object Gaul (again of type <e>) and the two-place function conquered of type 
<e, <e, t>>. The original sentence can therefore be understood as being 
derived as follows: 
(4) [x] conquered [y] (Gaul) (Caesar) 
 [x] conquered [Gaul] (Caesar) 
 [Caesar] conquered [Gaul] 
In (4) we have two instances of saturation. The verb conquered is dyadic. 
The first step reduces the adicity of conquered by one to a monadic predicate 
and the second step gives us a proposition. A part of speech is said to be 
complete if it contains no empty spaces. Therefore, both the dyadic 
predicate conquered and the monadic predicate conquered Gaul are 
incomplete, whereas none of Gaul, Caesar, and Caesar conquered Gaul are. 
42 
 
Through the idea of functional composition a theory of meaning for natural 
language is born. Importantly, the theory of meaning should apply to all 
languages. It should be universal. Using a typed semantics we can give a 
sentence such as John is tall the following analysis: 
(5) i. John has the semantic-type <e>. 
ii. is tall has the semantic-type <e, t>. 
iii. Applying John <e> to is tall <e, t> gives us John is tall, which 
has the semantic-type <t>. 
Finally, applying a T-schema to the resultant sentence we get the truth 
conditions: 
 iv. ‘John is tall’ is true iff John is tall. 
We therefore specify the semantic-types of the words and their composition 
to enable a formal account of a natural language utterance. It is worthwhile 
noting that the semantic-types are properties of the lexical items themselves, 
thereby enabling their composition and subsequent contribution to truth-
conditional content as part of a semantic derivation. It for this reason that 
we label type-based semantics lexicocentric. 
Following Heim & Kratzer, we can make functional composition explicit by 
replacing the semantic-types with a formalism that captures them in a 
transparent manner (using a lambda term to stand for a function). 
(6) John is tall. 
‘λx. x is tall(John)’ is true iff x is tall. 
‘John is tall’ is true iff John is tall.32 
The above is meant to capture one way of constructing a formal 
compositional semantics. Whilst it is true that we have only mentioned a 
basic sentence, the intuition is that by using this system we can account for 
any well-formed sentential utterance found within natural language. For 
any word or part of speech we can provide a semantic-type, and for any 
well-formed utterance we can provide a compositional derivation of the 
semantic-types involved. Thus, the semantic-types together with their 
                                                          
32  The sentence is indicated through ‘quotation marks’, the arguments to be used in 
saturation are indicated in (standard brackets), and the truth clause follows the sentence.   
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modes of composition provide us with a way of accounting for the 
meaning of any novel utterance; a skeletal blueprint for linguistic meaning 
and truth-conditional content. 
2.22 
INTENSIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
In our exposition of logical form we mentioned base semantic-types used in 
the construction of a function based compositional theory of meaning. We 
stated that the semantic-type <e> stands for an individual, that the type <t> 
stands for a truth-value, and that the type <e, t> stands for a class. What we 
are talking about here are candidates for the extensions of the semantic-
types. The extension of a word or part of speech is what it denotes.33 In 
addition to having an extension, each word or part of speech has an 
intension. Traditionally defined, the intension of a part of speech is its 
meaning. The two are distinct in that the meaning of a part of speech 
determines what it denotes, but the meaning is not in turn identical with 
the denotation.34 For any word we can assign it a semantic-type, which 
dictates the form of its intension and extension, its meaning, and what it 
denotes. Kaplan calls the development of this system the ‘golden age of 
pure semantics’, and states that its beauty came in the fact that it was 
concerned with a “nice homogenous theory, with language, meaning, and 
entities of the world each properly segregated and related one to another in 
rather smooth and comfortable ways” (1970, 214).35 
The derivational dynamics of formal semantics is such that the intension of 
a sentence is determined by the intensions of its parts, and that the 
extension of a sentence is determined by the extensions of its parts.36 The 
                                                          
33 We will use the term ‘denote’ to stand for the relationship between parts of speech and 
their extensions, and reserve the term ‘refer’ for the ‘forms of reference’ we outline in §2.4. 
34  In §4.1 we will look at direct reference theory, which interestingly argues that the 
intension of a type <e> expression is identical with its extension. 
35 For Kaplan, the golden age of pure semantics was epitomized in Carnap’s Meaning and 
Necessity (1947), which distinguished three types of expression: sentences, individual 
expressions (names, individual descriptions), and predicates (1947, 1). Carnap provided 
intensions and extensions for each type of expression, and the tripartite distinction he 
provided was central to the development of formal semantics.  
36 Dummett holds that the slogan ‘the sentence is the unit of meaning’ is either a truism or 
non-sensical, and claims that Frege was “unwaveringly insistent that the sense of a sentence 
– or any complex expression – is made up out of the senses of its constituent words” (1973, 
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intension of a sentence is a proposition which has a determinate set of 
truth-conditions.37 The extension of a sentence is a truth-value, which is 
determined by the extensions of its parts in conjunction with the truth-
conditions. For instance, consider the two sentences in (7) and (8): 
(7) Ronaldo is tall. 
(8) Messi is tall. 
The two sentences pick out distinct sets of truth-conditions, and 
consequently the truth-schema for each is distinct: 
(7*) ‘Ronaldo is tall’ is true iff Ronaldo is tall. 
(8*) ‘Messi is tall’ is true iff Messi is tall. 
The reason for this distinctness is obvious. In the (7-7*) examples the 
subject has the intension of an individual concept RONALDO and the 
extension of the actual individual Ronaldo, whereas in the (8-8*) example 
the subject has the intension of the individual concept MESSI and the 
extension of the actual individual Messi. The distinct subjects alter the 
truth-conditional content of each sentence. The two sentences have the 
same compositional structure, but the lexical items employed as the 
subjects pick out different individuals through the intension of each 
denoting a distinct extension. It is the interplay between intensions and 
extensions that determines the truth-conditional content and resultant 
truth-values of the respective sentential expressions (Dummett 1973, 2). 
Natural language use is interlaced with our ability to make judgements 
regarding the truth or falsity of utterances. The ability to engage with 
questions of truth, to judge sentences as truths and falsehoods, is perhaps 
the defining property of our species as a linguistic animal. The role of 
logical form in composing the intensions of a sentence, a proposition, is 
what a formal semantics is aiming for in stating that to ‘know the meaning 
of a sentence is to know its truth conditions’. When we investigate the 
                                                                                                                                                   
4). In a derivational semantics such as functionalism we can speak of the words or parts of 
speech as being meaningful prior to their composition in a sentential derivation. 
37 The intension of a word or part of speech is precisely that which contributes to truth-
conditional content, and hence can affect the proposition’s truth or falsity (Dummett 1973, 2). 
Any other interpretation of a word or phrase that does not help establish truth conditions is 
therefore part of the term’s ‘tone’. 
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truth-conditions of a sentence we judge it to be true or false, and at this 
point, “no matter how trivial, the step from the level of thoughts to the 
level of referents has already been taken” (1948, 216; 1956, 294). In judging 
a sentence to be true we move from intensions, the truth-conditional 
content, to extensions, the relevant parts of the world that the intensions 
denote. The semantic theory we are tracing therefore states that it is the 
derivational dynamics of a type-based semantics together with 
intensions/extensions that enables our utterances to be judged for truth. 
2.23 
STRUCTURED PROPOSITIONS 
The formal semantics described thus far can be seen as producing 
‘structured propositions’ at the clause level of a semantic derivation.38 A 
structured proposition is a complex of non-propositional parts, which are 
its constituents (Russell 1919a, 2). A distinction can be made between two 
types of structured proposition, singular propositions and general 
propositions. Singular propositions are object-dependent, which means 
that their truth depends upon a particular individual. General propositions 
are object-independent, which means that their truth is not determined 
with reference to a particular individual. 
The type of structured proposition a derivation constructs is dependent 
upon its constituents and its compositional form.39 A singular proposition 
is a proposition whose subject is of the semantic-type <e>. In (7) the name 
Ronaldo is of type <e> and hence the truth-value of Ronaldo is tall depends 
upon the particular individual Ronaldo. General propositions differ from 
singular ones in that they are not about a particular individual. The subject 
of a general proposition is not of type <e> but is instead quantificational: 
(9) Someone is tall. 
                                                          
38 At this point we should mention that it is equally legitimate to take the intension of a 
sentential utterance as picking out a set of possible worlds, with the extension (truth-value) 
being determined relative to the world of evaluation. For the purposes of this exposition we 
will keep within the confines of structured propositions. 
39 It is worth noting that propositions are unities that go beyond a simple enumeration of 
their constituents (Russell 1903, 51). Russell states that “two facts [propositions] are said to 
have the same “form” when they differ only as regards their constituents” (1919a, 2). Thus 
(7) and (8) above have the same form but not the same constituents. 
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An utterance of (9) picks out a general proposition. Its truth is not 
dependent upon a particular individual. Instead, it is true just in the case 
that there exists one individual who is tall. The reason for this is that the 
subject is a quantifier phrase, which is not of type <e>. 
Frege describes general propositions as follows: 
[t]he words ‘all’, ‘any’, ‘no’, ‘some’ are prefixed to concept words. 
In universal and particular affirmative and genitive sentences, we 
are expressing relations between concepts; we use these words to 
indicate the special kind of relation. They are thus, logically 
speaking, not to be more closely associated with the concept-
words that follow them, but are to be related to the sentence as a 
whole. (1951, 173) 
The point being made is that the quantifier some in (9) is a relation that 
holds between the two predicates ‘being an animate object’ and ‘being tall’. 
The relation thus stretches across the sentence. 
The logical subject of (9) is not picking out a particular individual and 
cannot have the semantic-type <e>. We therefore need to invent a further 
semantic-type for quantifiers including some. The semantic-type must 
represent a general proposition and the idea that quantifiers are related to 
the sentence as a whole. In virtue of the quantifier some in (9) being a 
relation between two predicates we can assign it the semantic-type <<e, t>, 
<<e, t>, t>>, and a quantifier phrase someone the type <<e, t>, t> (Heim & 
Kratzer 1998, 146). The quantifier’s semantic-type thus holds all of the 
positions needed for the two predicates contained within the sentence, and 
once those positions are filled we receive the type <t>. The distinction 
between a quantifier and a referential term’s semantic-type is that the 
former contains no base type <e>. Wherever <e> occurs it is part of a 
complex, an ordered pair. We therefore have a dichotomy between type <e> 
expressions (Ronaldo, Messi, she, he, I, you) and type <<e, t>, <<e, t>, t>> 
expressions (some, every, all, many, few, most, least). We will argue in §5.342 
and §6.1 that the semantic-type dichotomy severely limits our ability to 
account for variations in the referential strength, or the forms of reference, 
that an argument can exhibit. 
It is worthwhile quickly looking at the claim that quantifiers are closely 
related to the clause as a whole. Russell, for instance, stated that a 
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quantifier is not meaningful in isolation from the verbal phrase it is part of 
(1905, 481). A quantifier thereby gains its meaning in relation to clausal 
structure. We might illustrate that with a paraphrase of (9): 
(9*) There exists at least one x such that x is human and x is tall. 
The quantifier some is not explicit in this paraphrase but is instead captured 
by the condition that ‘there exists at least one x’, which binds the variable in 
‘x is human’ and ‘x is tall’. The variable binding is thus spread across the 
sentence. It is because quantifiers give rise to variable binding across the 
clause that they can be understood to be closely related to the sentence as a 
whole, which helps explain their semantic-type <<e, t>, <<e, t>, t>> and its 
full clausal structure. 
We may conclude this section by listing three key differences between 
singular and general propositions. The first is that singular propositions 
contain an element of type <e> in a subject position whereas general 
propositions do not. The second is that the subjects of singular propositions 
are complete expressions (with no slots for saturation), whereas the 
subjects of general propositions require saturation. Finally, the subjects of 
singular propositions denote a particular individual, whereas the subjects 
of general propositions do not. These very minimal distinctions capture the 
dichotomy between singular and general propositions, a dichotomy that 
has been central to the descriptions literature. Furthermore, the dichotomy 
provides distinct contributions for each type of proposition to linguistic 




Thus far we have provided one way in which a compositional semantic 
theory can be constructed. The type-based formal semantics that we 
described above was introduced as a form of literalism and understood to 
ground linguistic meaning as well as fully specifying the truth-conditional 
content, ‘what is said’, in an expression. The derivational dynamics is 
determined by the semantic-types held by the individual words in an 
expression and hence the truth-conditional content of a given clausal 
structure can be provided in isolation from its use on a particular occasion. 
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At this juncture, we must turn to consider how the formal system interacts 
with actual language use. 
We can begin by providing a working definition of the 
semantics/pragmatics distinction and how it is constructed in literalism. A 
standard intuition is that semantics is concerned with language in isolation 
from use whereas pragmatics is concerned with language in use. The 
distinction can be seen as one between expressions of a language 
themselves and how they interact with the world (Szabo 2005, 1). For 
instance, the semantics of an expression ζ can be associated with ζ’s 
linguistic meaning, which is provided by the derivational dynamics of a 
type-based semantics. However, upon being used in a speech-act ζ will 
become entwined with further aspects of communication: communicative 
efficacy, context, the speaker’s intentions, background knowledge, cultural 
factors, and so on. Nevertheless, this distinction might be taken to 
constitute a “slogan” rather than a “clarification or explanation” (Salmon, 
2007, 340). We will now turn to offer more insight into how to construct the 
distinction below, which will help us as we progress to consider the 
various theories of descriptions. 
In our initial analysis of literalism and contextualism we described the 
tripartite distinction between linguistic meaning, ‘what is said’, and ‘what 
is implicated’. Thus far, we have associated the linguistic meaning of an 
expression with its logical form. For those defending literalism, the logical 
form of a clausal structure also fully specifies the truth-conditional content, 
or ‘what is said’. This final claim is denied by contextualism. Contextualism 
admits that linguistic meaning might be fully specified by logical form but 
denies that truth-conditional content is. Instead, contextualism contends 
that we must admit pragmatic machinery into the completion of truth-
conditional content. For contextualism, the truth-conditions of an 
expression are settled through both linguistic meaning and speaker’s 
meaning. However, the two positions do agree that ‘what is implicated’ is a 
matter of pragmatics and is settled through speaker’s meaning. We can 
therefore begin our discussion of the semantics/pragmatics distinction 
through an analysis of the common ground shared between literalism and 
contextualism, before turning to analyse where they diverge. 
An influential account of ‘what is implicated’ was provided by Grice (1989). 
Implicatures are understood to accompany the use of a linguistic 
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expression, consequently enriching the communicative act in which it is 
placed. It is possible to divide implicatures into two types, generalized 
implicatures and particularized implicatures. The two types of implicatures 
are grounded in what Grice terms ‘conversational implicatures’, which we 
can summarize as follows: 
 Quantity – I expect your contribution to be neither more nor less than is 
required. 
Quality – I expect your contributions to be genuine and not spurious. 
Relation – I expect your contribution to be appropriate to the immediate 
needs at each stage of the transaction. 
Manner – I expect you to make it clear what contribution he is making and 
to execute his performance with reasonable dispatch. (1989, 28)40 
The above maxims are understood to be present in all language use. Grice 
understands the conversational maxims in conjunction with what he terms 
a ‘cooperative principle’: “[m]ake your conversation contribution such as is 
required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose of the talk 
exchange in which you are engaged” (1989, 26). These maxims ground 
implicatures and can be understood as guides for communicative efficacy. 
The distinction between particularized and generalized implicatures can be 
put as follows, “[s]ome conversational implicatures seem context-bound, 
while others have a very general currency” (Levinson 2000, 92). 
We will begin with those implicatures that have a ‘general currency’, 
generalized implicatures, before moving onto consider ‘context-bound’, 
particularized, implicatures. An implicature is taken to be generalized if it 
is employed extensively in language use and without specific contextual 
background. Generalized implicatures are present across natural language 
as a whole (Grice 1989, 37). If an implicature is understood as generalized, 
then it can accompany an expression without any specific contextual 
machinery. The following would qualify as such an example: 
(10) I enjoy eating Spanish cuisine.  
 IMPLICATURE I think Spanish food tastes good. 
                                                          
40 The conversational implicatures are outlined by Grice in relation to a situation where the 
speaker and audience are mending a car. For the purposes of the quote, we have omitted 
this detail and extracted the core definition of each category. 
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In (10) we have an act of communication and a corresponding implicature 
but the implicature itself does not depend upon any particular context. The 
generalized implicature derived from (10) embodies an implicature that 
any competent language user would infer without specific reference to the 
context of use. 
The second type of implicature is labelled particularized in virtue of being 
employed in specific contexts where a particular set of background 
assumptions is present rather than a universal rule of pragmatics. Consider 
for instance the following exchange, which we will assume to be spoken in 
a context where the speaker and audience are discussing Spanish food: 
(11) My housemate is Spanish. 
 IMPLICATURE You should come round for dinner. 
In (11) the implicature depends upon background knowledge that has been 
supplied by the specific context in which it is uttered. Further instances of 
the utterance in (11) will fail to provide the same implicature and hence it is 
particularized. The two examples of generalized and particularized 
implicatures are not guaranteed by the linguistic meaning of the utterances 
but instead by how those utterances interact with general and particular 
rules governing contexts of use and so on. 
A further aspect of the semantic/pragmatics distinction concerns context-
sensitive expressions. Let us look again at the sentence in (1), repeated 
below: 
(1) I am tired. 
In order to understand (1) and assign it truth-conditional content it must be 
taken relative to a context of use. We might state that the truth-conditions 
of (1) require reference to a set of ‘contextual-coordinates’ that involve, for 
instance, the person that utters (1). The truth-conditions will vary 
depending upon who indeed utters (1). It might be said therefore that the 
truth-conditions require contextual enrichment in the sense intended by 
contextualism. However, as stated above, indexicalism (a form of literalism) 
claims that it is the linguistic meaning of (1) that demands saturation from 
the context (Recanati 2004, 88). According to indexicalism, if the linguistic 
meaning demands saturation from the context, then we can retain the view 
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that the linguistic meaning provides a specified set of truth-conditions. In 
other words, whilst (1) demands that it is understood relative to a 
particular context of use this demand comes from its linguistic meaning. 
The semantics of (1) thereby provides a minimal proposition for it in 
isolation from its use. Literalism thus rejects the notion that the truth-
conditional contribution of context-sensitive items like indexicals must be 
derived from pragmatic machinery. 
Another example that raises a distinct problem for literalism is as follows: 
(11) I’ve had breakfast. 
As Recanati notes, an utterance of (11) would be true if the speaker had 
eaten breakfast only once in their life, however that is not what is 
commonly meant by the speaker in uttering it. Instead a felicitous use of (11) 
is one whereby the speaker intends to communicate (12): 
(12) I’ve had breakfast this morning. 
According to contextualism, in order for (11) to express the proposition in 
(12) it must be contextually enriched, and this contextual enrichment is not 
necessarily demanded by the linguistic meaning of (11). For contextualism, 
the contextual enrichment applied to (11) comes courtesy of the speaker’s 
intentions in using it. The truth-conditions that a typical utterance of (11) 
expresses, namely those expressed explicitly in (12), are therefore provided 
by aspects of speaker’s meaning. Contextualism then takes this position 
further in claiming that there is no expression whose truth-conditions are 
settled without its being contextually enriched. In opposition to both 
literalism and contextualism we will argue in §5.42 that grammar fully 
specifies what is said in a speech-act through situating a clause in a speech-
event frame (Sigurðsson 2004b; 2009; Hinzen forthcoming). 
At this point we can introduce a final terminological distinction, which we 
can use in conjunction with the distinction between literalism and 
contextualism. The distinction concerns that between an ‘expression 
centred conception’ of semantics and a ‘speech-act centred conception’, 
with the former associated with literalism and the latter with contextualism. 
We can use Salmon’s definition of the two as follows, the expression 
centred conception states that “the semantic attributes of expressions are 
not conceptually derivative of the speech acts performed by their utterers, 
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and are thought of instead as intrinsic to the expressions themselves… that 
as such, they have a semantic life of their own”, whereas for speech-act 
conception semantic attributes “somehow reduce to, are to be understood 
by means of, are derived from, or at least are directly determined by, the 
illocutionary acts performed by speakers in using those expressions” 
(Salmon 2004, 238). The grammatical thesis (GT) will produce an 
alternative to each of these that we might label a ‘grammar centred 
conception’ of semantics. It will be illustrated in §5.4 that grammar encodes 
for speech-act features, which cannot be readily extracted from its linguistic 
meaning. 
To conclude this section on the semantics/pragmatics distinction we can 
derive a full speech-act and detail at which points the operations thus 
described take place. Initially we have the formal semantic system 
producing a logical form, which captures the linguistic meaning of the 
expression that will be employed in the speech-act. Upon being used, any 
element within the linguistic meaning that demands saturation from the 
context will become valued. At this point, literalism will claim we have 
fully specified truth-conditional content; we will have reached the level of 
‘what is said’. This constitutes an expression centred conception of 
semantics. Once the speech-act has occurred the utterance becomes 
enriched in a variety of ways through pragmatic machinery (context, 
speaker’ intentions, background and cultural effects, etc.) and provides the 
speaker and audience with a variety of implicatures, some generalized and 
potentially some particularized. It is only after this final stage that 
contextualism will understand there to exist a fully specified truth-
conditional content and what is said. All of the above work constitutes the 
semantic framework that is at the heart of the descriptions literature, and 
much of it will come to be rejected in favour of an alternative in §5. 
2.4 
FORMS OF REFERENCE 
The semantic framework that we have detailed provides a few options 
available in developing a blueprint or skeleton for compositional semantics. 
We introduced and outlined a type-based formal semantics and detailed 
how words are assigned such types.  Furthermore, we introduced 
pragmatic machinery that accompanies the logical form of an expression in 
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an utterance. To conclude this chapter we will look at the forms of 
reference that a formal semantics, in conjunction with pragmatic machinery, 
enables for arguments. Within the system developed the forms of reference 
will be understood to be properties of the lexical items themselves, which is 
a result of the type-based analysis. The forms of reference that we will 
detail are both lexicocentric and restrictive, but they are nevertheless 
employed in the descriptions literature (as will be made explicit in §3 and 
§4). 
We can begin by stating that certain arguments can be grouped as 
exhibiting a ‘strong’ form of reference. Arguments that fit in this category 
are assigned the semantic-type <e>, and include proper names, pronouns, 
and demonstratives. In terms of their semantic-type there are no formal 
distinctions between the various arguments that exhibit strong forms of 
reference. We can begin our discussion with proper names as exhibited in 
(13): 
(13) Ronaldo is tall. 
The name Ronaldo is a type <e> expression, which means that its intension 
is an individual concept and its extension is a particular individual. The 
proposition (13) expresses is thus singular. We can take Ronaldo to exhibit a 
strong form of reference in virtue of being an instance of rigid designation. 
The lexical entry for Ronaldo thus includes its being of type <e> and being a 
rigid designator, together with whatever idiosyncratic information that a 
language user may attach to it. The formal system developed takes this to 
constitute the names linguistic meaning. 
In contrast to proper names, some type <e> expressions do not have 
constant extension but are instead context-sensitive. For instance, a 
pronoun such as that in (14) is of type <e> but is nevertheless context-
sensitive: 
(14) I am tired. 
The semantic value of I is dependent upon the context of use. Formally, this 
is represented through taking the pronoun to be indexed and assigned a 
value from the speech-act context. The form of reference that the pronoun 
exhibits is once again captured as part of its lexical entry, and in virtue of 
being the lexical entry including its semantic-type <e>. The same analysis 
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extends to demonstratives, and arguably complex demonstratives, which 
are labelled as type <e> whilst being context-sensitive. The proposition (14) 
expresses is thus singular, just as with proper names. We can understand 
the pronoun in (14) as expressing strong reference.  
The second form of reference that we can introduce through the formal 
system is termed ‘weak’ and includes arguments that are quantificational 
or purely predicative. We will continue to term this a form of reference, but 
note the caveat that it is of a distinctly different, and weaker, sort than that 
of type <e> expressions. Amongst this class of expressions are included 
existential and universal quantifier phrases, bare nominals, and arguably 
definite descriptions.41  Quantifiers receive the semantic type <<e, t>, <<e, t>, 
t>>, and bare nominals the type <e, t>. Therefore, neither kind of expression 
is of type <e>. An example of an expression that exhibits a weak form of 
reference is (15): 
(15) Someone is tall. 
The argument in (15) does not pick out a particular individual, and the 
proposition (15) picks out is thus general. Once again the lexical entry for 
someone contains its semantic-type, which in turn dictates its linguistic 
meaning and contribution to the overall compositional semantics of the 
expression it is part of. 
The distinction between type <e> expressions, which exhibit a strong form 
of reference, and non-type <e> expressions including type <<e, t>, <<e, t>, 
t>>, which exhibit a weak form of reference, is the only semantic distinction 
available for detailing the forms of reference that arguments may exhibit. 
There is one further form of reference that is enabled within this formal 
system, but it emerges through pragmatic machinery, including speaker’s 
meaning, rather than an expression’s linguistic meaning. For instance, take 
a situation where the speaker and a member of the audience are aware of 
the culprit alluded to in (16): 
(16) Someone broke the window. 
An utterance of (16) includes an argument that expresses a weak form of 
reference. The quantifier someone has the semantic-type <<e, t>, <<e, t>, t>>, 
                                                          
41 A bare nominal is a “noun used without any determiner to modify it” (as in I eat fish), 
which is nevertheless capable of taking an argument role within a clause (Radford 2004, 437). 
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but the utterance may still manage to communicate a something about a 
particular individual given the context and speaker’s intentions. In uttering 
(16) the audience member who is aware of the culprit may succeed in 
inferring that the quantificational expression someone is being used to hide 
an individual’s, let’s say John’s, identity. There is nothing in the linguistic 
meaning that forces the expression to refer to John or any other individual. 
Instead, the act of reference is enabled through pragmatic machinery. We 
might term this a pragmatic form of reference. 
The three forms of reference exhibited above (the strong <e> form, the weak 
<<e, t>, <<e, t>, t>> form, and the pragmatic form) exhaust the range 
available within a type-based semantic system. Additionally, reference is 
understood as a property that a lexical item carries. In §5 and §6 we will 
criticize this lexicocentric conception of reference, and state that a thorough 
investigation of grammar can initiate a wide set of forms of reference that 
are grounded in grammatical configurations instead of lexical items. The 
argument will develop a ‘hierarchy of reference’ that ranges from weak 
quantificational reference through stronger forms exhibited in rigid proper 
names and ending with the strongest form in personal pronominal 
reference (Sheehan & Hinzen 2011; 2013; Martin & Hinzen 2014). The idea 
at the heart of this alternative is that compositional semantics should not be 
derived through a type-based lexicocentric system. Instead, the meaning of 
a word and its role in a compositional semantics is ‘exo-skeletal’, which 
means it is determined from the wider grammatical environment in which 
it is placed (Borer 2005, 15).42 The lexicocentric view, and the forms of 
reference it enables, is nevertheless central to the theories of description to 
which we now term, the QT (§3) and two ATs (§4), and grounds their 
respective solutions to the three ambiguity problems. Furthermore, as we 
will see, each theory is built in the mould of literalism.  
 
                                                          
42 The theory we will defend shares some similarities to supposition theory as developed 
through the 12th and 13th century by medieval logicians and grammarians. Supposition 
theory understands the referential status of a nominal expression, for instance a noun, to be 
derived through its interaction with the wider grammatical configuration in which it is 
placed. For instance, the word man in man is an animal has a wider referential function than it 
does in the sentence that man is an animal. Crucially for supposition theory, these 
grammatical differences have truth-conditional effects (for more on supposition theory, and 
the medieval precursors to the grammatical theory of meaning that we will defend, see 








THE RUSSELLIAN THEORY OF 
DESCRIPTIONS 
 
The two previous chapters detailed three ambiguity problems (§1) and the 
semantic framework within which the descriptions literature falls (§2). It is 
now time to analyse the most prominent theory of descriptions, the 
Russellian theory. It is worth stating at the outset that the Russellian theory 
is embedded within the framework of literalism and is thus moulded by 
the framework detailed in §2. Our purpose here will be to provide an 
exposition of the Russellian theory (1905) as well as two strategic 
amendments made to it by Kripke (1977) and Neale (1990; 2001; 2004). In 
§3.1 we will introduce the motivation for the Russellian theory, including a 
brief overview of the puzzles it was designed to solve (metaphysical 
commitments, bivalence). Next, in §3.2 we will reiterate Donnellan’s CAP 
and introduce Kripke’s pragmatic supplement to the Russellian theory. 
Kripke’s modification states that we can retain a Russellian semantics the 
linguistic meaning of definite descriptions and state that the genesis of the 
ambiguity is to be found in pragmatic machinery, including speaker’s 
meaning. In §3.3 we will review Neale’s further defence of the Russellian 
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theory and his attempt to streamline it with syntactic structure. 
Additionally, we will analyse his solutions to three problems often raised 
against it: the problems of misdescription, incompleteness, and referential 
anaphora. Throughout the thesis we will argue that the Russellian theory is 
committed to a lexicocentric view of compositional semantics and that the 
account it offers for referential descriptions is thus limited to the forms of 
reference outlined in §2.4. Furthermore, we will argue that the treatment of 
syntax offered by Neale fails to recognise key facets of the grammar of DPs 
that impact the semantic interpretation of arguments, including, critically, 
the forms of reference they may exhibit. For these reasons we will 
tentatively reject the Russellian theory with a view to providing a 
grammatical alternative (§5 and §6). 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold, the first aim is to elucidate and 
characterize Russellian theory of descriptions and the modifications it has 
undergone in the literature, and the second is to detail problems that it 
faces once applied to natural language use and certain aspects of the faculty 
of language (namely grammar). In developing the first aim we will provide 
an analysis of the backbone of the Russellian theory, namely its 
quantificational semantics for definite descriptions and interaction with 
pragmatic machinery. With respect to the second, we will detail problems 
that emerge specifically from the theory’s interaction with grammatical 
structure as currently understood in the generative enterprise. Overall, a 
core intention of this chapter is to provide reasons to think that an analysis 
of grammar might shed light on the semantics of definite descriptions, help 
integrate it into an empirical and explanatory enterprise of linguistic theory, 
and provide a stronger solution to the three ambiguity problems than the 
Russellian offers.  
3.1 
RUSSELL 
The Russellian theory remains the dominant account of the semantics of 
definite descriptions (Schiffer 2005, 1135). The proposal states that definite 
descriptions are quantifier phrases that create object-independent 
propositions. It is thus a quantificational thesis (QT). The fact that it 
remains the foremost theory of descriptions is remarkable given its age but 
it explains why Russell himself considered it his finest philosophical essay 
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(Neale 2005a, 810). For over a century numerous philosophers have 
maintained a Russellian theory of descriptions, and in the face of detractors 
they have sought to strengthen the theory through modification rather than 
abandon it (Kripke 1977; Neale 1990; 2001; 2004; 2005a; Bach 1981; 2004a; 
2004b; 2007; Salmon 1982; 1991; 2004). This collected effort says something 
about the power of the Russellian theory, namely that many believe it is 
worth saving.43 
The motivation for the Russellian theory is founded upon solving at least 
two puzzles. The first puzzle is that of the ontological status of individuals 
picked out by non-denoting descriptions, and the second puzzle concerns 
how we should account for the truth-conditions, and subsequent truth 
values, of propositions containing non-denoting descriptions. The first 
puzzle is one raised by Russell against the view that definite descriptions 
are singular terms. The puzzle concerns how we should assign semantics to 
non-denoting descriptions if they fail to make reference to particular 
individuals. The second puzzle derives from the first and has to do with 
whether or not we can assign truth-conditions to a proposition containing a 
non-denoting description. The two problems both relate to the ontological 
implications contained in stating that a given phrase is semantically 
referential. The Russellian answer to each problem is that propositions 
containing definite descriptions are semantically quantificational not 
semantically referential. 
3.11 
DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS AS SINGULAR TERMS 
The literature on descriptions is founded upon a particular conception of 
semantics that Russell developed in the Principles of Mathematics (POM 1903) 
and ‘On Denoting’ (OD 1905). Russell defended the view that in order for a 
given sentence to have a meaning, each constituent of it must also have a 
meaning (1903, 43; 1919a, 7). Within this tradition, an expression ζ is taken 
to be a singular term, or a genuine referring expression, if and only if the 
                                                          
43 Schiffer notes that “the theory Russell presented in 1905 is not acceptable in the form in 
which he then stated it” (2005, 1135). However, over the years numerous ‘reconstructive 
surgeries’ have been applied to the theory to keep it ‘up to date’ with modern semantic 
theory, and these are readily distinguished and labelled as Russellian. A Russellian theory 
of descriptions is simply one that remains true to the core insight that definite descriptions 
are semantically quantificational. 
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meaning of ζ is identical with the individual it ‘picks out’.44 In other words, 
ζ stands for an individual. Following this, if a sentence containing ζ is to 
have a meaning, then that meaning will depend upon the referent of ζ. The 
truth-conditional content of a proposition expressed by a sentence 
containing ζ will therefore depend upon the individual ζ picks out. This is 
what it means to say that the proposition is object-dependent. An object-
dependent proposition contains a singular term, which in order to be 
meaningful cannot fail to refer (Neale 1990, 5; Stevens 2011, 47). For 
example, given a sentence S that contains ζ, if S is to pick out a determinate 
proposition then ζ must pick out a determinate individual, and if ζ fails to 
do this then S fails to pick out a determinate proposition. In this case S 
would be meaningless and lack truth-conditions. This result is most 
unwelcome to those wishing to defend a truth-conditional semantics of the 
sort described in §2.2. 
One interpretation of Russell’s view in POM is that definite descriptions act 
as singular terms, their meanings depend on particular objects. Consider 
the following sentence: 
(1) The round square is a contradictory geometrical object. 
If we take the round square to act as a singular term, then its meaning will 
depend upon its referent. A consequence of this is that (1)’s truth-
conditional content will likewise depend upon the referent of the definite 
description. However, the phrase the round square fails to pick out an 
existing object. There are no round squares. A consequence of this is that (1) 
thus appears to lack a determinate truth-conditional content. Nevertheless 
(1) is true. It is true that round squares are contradictory geometrical 
objects. A potential solution to the problem presented by (1) is that we 
should posit some kind of existence to round squares to which we can refer. 
At this point a further problem emerges, for what kind of existence do 
round squares have? 
The existence problem is not restricted to definite descriptions. In POM, 
Russell acknowledges a wide range of singular terms. The term ‘denoting 
phrase’ was employed to cover all those phrases that were capable of 
picking out an individual. Russell states that “[a] concept denotes when, if it 
                                                          
44 It is often argued that Russell held a direct reference theory of singular terms. In §4.1 we 
will analyse a theory from Kaplan, which makes such a claim. 
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occurs in a proposition, the proposition is not about the concept, but about a 
term connected in a certain particular way with the concept” (1903, 54), and  
“[t]he fact that description is possible—that we are able, by the 
employment of concepts, to designate a thing which is not a concept—is 
due to a logical relation between some concepts and some terms, in virtue 
of which such concepts inherently and logically denote such terms” (1903, 
54). Therefore, denoting phrases are akin to logically proper names (Makin 
2000, 14). Another passage from Russell helps solidify this reading, “[i]f I 
say ‘I met a man’, the proposition is not about a man: this is a concept that 
does not walk the streets, but lives in the shadowy limbo of the logic-books. 
What I met was a thing, not a concept, an actual man with a tailor and a 
bank account or a public-house and a drunken wife” (1903, 54). At first 
glance, it appears natural to understand Russell as keen to treat denoting 
phrases as singular terms standing for particular existing individuals, 
which is a position often labelled ‘Meinongian’. 45  Within a modern 
compositional semantics they would be understood as exhibiting the form 
of reference captured in the semantic-type <e>. 
We can define the view as follows: 
(2) Definite Descriptions as Singular Terms 
A definite description stands for an individual and the meaning of a 
given definite description is identical with the particular individual 
it stands for (1903, 54).46 
The linguistic meaning of a definite description thus denotes a particular 
individual. Its truth-conditional contribution to a proposition it is 
contained within is thus an individual (or individual concept). In virtue of 
the linguistic meaning of a definite description fully determining its 
                                                          
45 This interpretation has its origin in Quine, who held that Russell took all denoting phrases 
to stand for existing things, “every word referred to something” (1966, 658). Furthermore, 
charging Russell with defending a Meinongian ontology, Quine argues that Russell is thus 
committed to a “intolerably indiscriminate ontology” until OD (1966, 658-659).  
46 The concept of a logically proper name is neatly captured by Mill who claimed that 
“[p]roper names are attached to the objects themselves, and are not dependent on the 
continuance of any attribute of the object” (1882, 41). Proper names pick out particular 
individuals directly. They stand simply as ‘marks’ for objects, rather than standing for a 
collection of attributes that a particular individual exhibits. Russell retains this concept of 
logically proper names throughout his philosophy (1919b, 143), however from OD onwards 
he rejected the inclusion of definite descriptions in the category of logically proper names. 
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contribution to ‘what is said’, the thesis is one founded in literalism. It is 
the view described in (2), often assumed to be defended in POM, that 
Russell came to reject in OD. Russell saw no way of reconciling the position 
that definite descriptions are singular terms with the ontological 
commitments that such a theory demands. 
The theory of descriptions is often understood as emerging as a vehement 
attack on Meinong’s theory of objects (1904), and the ontological 
commitments it entailed with respect to certain expressions. To understand 
the attack we can make use of some examples. Firstly, it is true that some 
denoting phrases pick out objects whose existence is uncontroversial: 
(3) Ronaldo is a footballer.  
Taking Ronaldo to be a singular term, an utterance of (3) picks out an object-
dependent proposition, a proposition whose truth depends upon the actual 
individual Ronaldo. As Ronaldo’s existence is uncontroversial, a sentence 
such as (3) picks out a determinate proposition with a determinate meaning, 
and we can straightforwardly investigate its truth. Similarly, (4) picks out 
an existing individual: 
(4) The manager of Manchester United is Dutch. 
If we take the manager of Manchester United to be a singular term, then the 
truth of (4) depends upon the individual it picks out. As that individual 
exists, the meaning of (4) is likewise determinate. However, it is not the 
case that all names or definite descriptions succeed in referring to an actual 
individual, as in (5): 
(5) The round square is a contradictory geometrical object. 
In contrast to (3) and (4), the subject of (5) does not pick out an existing 
individual. It has no denotation. If we are to take (5) to be expressing an 
object-dependent proposition, then we must understand the meaning of the 
round square as being related to a particular individual. However, as stated 
above, it is unclear what sort of individual the round square could be. 
One motivation often raised for the theory of descriptions is that Russell 
wanted to avoid positing an abundance of curious individuals to act as the 
extensions for any possible definite description. For instance, Russell 
wanted to avoid positing round squares, which are somewhat entailed if 
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we take the definite description in (5) to be a singular term. The 
quantificational theory is thereby concerned with a restricted and modest 
set of individuals, and equally a restricted and modest ontology. Russell 
does not want to let language rule his ontological commitments. It is often 
claimed that Meinong was not so restrictive and accepted that round 
squares maintained a sort of being, they were the objects of reference. 
Russell directly attributes this view to Meinong (1919b, 169), and 
Meinong’s ontology as thus been labelled a ‘jungle’ due to the abundant 
number of weird and wonderful objects it contained (Jacquette 1996). 
One reading of Meinongian ontology is that it posits referents for 
seemingly non-denoting phrases. 47 According to Makin, “[t]he most salient 
features of Meinong’s position… is his admitting of objects corresponding 
to empty descriptive phrases which are held to subsist but not to exist, and 
of objects corresponding to contradictory descriptions” (2000, 58). 
Meinong’s jungle thus contains the individuals picked out by empty 
descriptive phrases, including objects with contradictory properties 
(Russell 1919b, 169; Kripke 2005, 1015). Russell thereby saw his theory as 
reducing the ontological burden of denoting phrases, as Hacker notes this 
“enabled Russell to thin out the luxuriant Meinongian jungle of entites 
(such as the square circle) which, it had appeared, must in some sense 
subsist in order to be talked about” (1986, 8).48 
Following this interpretation, the project in OD was thus fuelled by a desire 
to avoid having language run riot on our ontological commitments. Russell 
understood singular terms as having a strong ontological commitment that 
rendered their linguistic meanings dependent upon particular individuals. 
Therefore, if definite descriptions were to be singular terms and to be 
                                                          
47 It is worth mentioning that this interpretation of Meining is not unanimously accepted. 
Jacquette notes that “[w]e can have as many beingless Meinongian objects as the semantics 
of discourse requires without inflating objects with unnecessary entities or objects with 
being by so much as one iota” (Jacquette 1996, 21). In other words, there is no ontological 
commitment to the referents of empty denoting phrases, they are simply intended referents. 
Kripke notes much the same thing, “[s]ometimes I have wondered whether Meinong (at 
least the Meinong of ‘On Denoting’) was an imaginary figure invented by Russell, who was 
so upset that he did not really exist that he invented a doctrine that even beings like him 
have some weaker form of existence” (2005, 1015).  
48 The ‘thinning out’ of the Meinongian jungle is something Quine likewise notes as an aim 
of OD (1966, 659). However, Stevens argues that “whether Russell realised it or not… those 
objects”, objects of a Meinongian jungle (impossible objects for instance), “could already 
have been eliminated by the 1903 theory” (2011, 52). 
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meaningful, then their referents better have some form of existence. 
Furthermore, if a proposition containing a definite description (understood 
as a singular term) is to be understood as having a fully specified set of 
truth-conditions, that is, fully specify ‘what is said’, then the linguistic 
meaning of the definite description must contribute to what is said. 49 
Russell therefore saw a rejection of (2) as the only way in which to avoid 
unnecessary embellishment to one’s ontology. It was in this rejection that 
the theory of descriptions was formed. 
3.12 
ON DENOTING 
The theory of descriptions emerged initially in OD and was later cemented 
in the Principia Mathematica (PM 1910/1962). The theory is regularly taken to 
mark a radical shift in Russell’s approach to the ontological commitments 
of denoting phrases. Instead of treating them as singular terms, Russell 
opted to analyse them as ‘incomplete symbols’ (PM 1962, 66; Hacker 1986, 
8). The linguistic meaning of incomplete symbols was quantificational and 
completed through the verbal phrases that they attached to. In providing 
this analysis, the resultant propositions contained no singular terms and 
were therefore general and object-independent. It is through such means 
that sentences such as (5) could be given a fully specified truth-conditional 
content without recourse to an ontological commitment to round squares. 
The upshot of the theory was that there was a decrease in the number of 
expressions whose meanings depended upon particular individuals and a 
reconceptualization of definite descriptions as being quantifier phrases.  
As a historical note, it is important to mention that not everyone believes 
the POM to hold such a radical set of ontological commitments, and such an 
abundant ontology. It is true that Russell defends the view that a sentence 
containing a definite description must involve that description providing a 
constituent to the proposition the sentence expresses, but the machinery in 
                                                          
49 Definite descriptions thus do not contribute to truth-conditional content in the same way 
as singular terms do, ““[w]henever the grammatical subject of a proposition can be 
supposed not to exist without rendering the proposition meaningless, it is plain that the 
grammatical subject is not a proper name” (Russell & Whitehead 1910/1962, 66). Therefore, 
“to entertain an object-dependent proposition about a particular individual, one must be 
acquainted with that individual”(Neale 1990, 17-18). Instead, with denoting phrases we are 
acquainted with ‘special propositional constituents such as denoting concepts’ rather than 
actual living breathing individuals (Stevens 2011, 55). 
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POM can do this without recourse to ontological commitments to the 
referents of empty descriptive phrases. As Stevens points out, “there must 
be a constituent in the subject position of a Russellian proposition if it is to 
have a truth-value, but there is something in the position of a Russellian 
proposition expressed by a sentence containing an empty denoting phrase, 
namely an empty denoting concept” (2011, 64). We might thereby take it to 
be true that the theory of descriptions avoids an ontological commitment to 
the referents of empty descriptive phrases, but state this without endorsing 
the Quinean treatment of the POM as defending a Meinongian ontology. 
3.121 
DENOTING PHRASES 
In the period between 1903 and 1905 Russell had become dissatisfied with 
treating definite descriptions as singular terms, which he claimed was both 
‘artificial’ and ‘to be avoided if possible’ (1905, 484). The first reason for this 
was that denoting phrases do not guarantee the existence of the individual 
that they are meant to stand for. The second reason is that we need an 
account that renders (5) true without recourse to an ontological 
commitment to round squares. A choice was made to form a dichotomy 
between denoting phrases and singular terms. In opposition to (2), 
denoting phrases were defined as quantifier phrases whose contribution to 
truth-conditional content did not depend upon a particular individual. 
Russell defines denoting phrases solely in virtue of their ‘form’ (1905, 479):  
[b]y a “denoting phrase” I mean a phrase such as any one of the 
following: a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the 
present King of England, the present King of France, the centre 
of mass of the Solar System at the first instant of the twentieth 
century, the revolution of the earth round the sun, the 
revolution of the sun round the earth. Thus a phrase is denoting 
solely in virtue of its form. (1905, 479)  
Kripke understands Russell to be defending a syntactic parallelism 
between all types of denoting phrases (2005, 1007). Kripke’s label of a 
syntactic parallelism has to do with the fact that all denoting phrases can be 
given a quantificational analysis: 
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[a]lthough at first blush a definite description might appear to 
be a complex term designating a single object, it is parallel in 
form to the other denoting phrases. If it were natural to analyse 
the other ‘denoting phrases’, such as ‘every man’, ‘some man’, 
‘a man’, and so on, as really quantifiers and quantifier phrases, 
so would it be to analyse corresponding phrases beginning with 
the word ‘the’. (2005, 1007) 
Stevens notes that the term ‘denoting phrase’ is meant to capture 
something purely grammatical, which might be captured simply in stating 
that such phrases have the form of determiner phrases (DP), whose 
structure contains a determiner (D) and, at least, a noun phrase (NP) 
complement (2011, 11). Furthermore, the theory of descriptions is intended 
to provide a framework for natural language quantification more generally 
(2005, 1007). Furthermore: 
A phrase may be denoting, and yet not denote anything; e.g., 
"the present king of France". A phrase may denote one definite 
object; e.g., "the present king of England" denotes a certain man. 
A phrase may denote ambiguously; e.g., "a man" denotes not 
many men, but an ambiguous man. (1905, 479) 
This passage highlights the final abandonment of (2). We may understand 
the linguistic meaning of a denoting phrase without ‘acquaintance with the 
objects denoted’ by it (1905, 480). The three options listed here are cross-
categorical and apply to any denoting phrase. Finally, the term denoting 
phrase is applied without reference to grammatical differences, further 




The Russellian theory of descriptions defends a QT, thereby rejecting the 
view that the linguistic meaning of a definite description is ever referential 
                                                          
50 As Stevens notes, “it is very important to recognize” that denoting “is not a function 
carried out by a linguistic expression; it is a function carried out by a concept that is 
expressed by a linguistic expression” (2011, 54). 
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(Stevens 2011, 21).51 Any sentence containing a definite description thus has 
the logical form of a complex of variables bound by quantifiers, which are 
spread across the proposition it expresses. The Russellian analysis thus 
rejects the view that definite descriptions are of type <e>, and instead takes 
them to be type <<e, t>, t>. In virtue of being a quantificational complex, 
studying the semantics of definite descriptions involves an analysis of the 
propositional whole over which it is spread. For Russell, an analysis of 
definite descriptions cannot be made in isolation: 
[d]enoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but 
that every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur 
has a meaning. The difficulties concerning denoting are, I 
believe, all the result of a wrong analysis of propositions whose 
verbal expressions contain denoting phrases. (1905, 480) 
And in PM:  
[a]ll phrases (other than propositions) containing the word the 
are incomplete symbols: they have a meaning in use, but not in 
isolation. (1962, 67) 
It is in virtue of the fact that definite descriptions are not complete symbols, 
they are not type <e>, that we must reject the referential view (1905, 480; 
1962, 173). 
Interestingly, the above passages appear to take a view that is inconsistent 
with what we have labelled a lexicocentric treatment of meaning. Russell’s 
conception of quantification prevents the article having a meaning in 
isolation, and opts instead to treat it as semantically operative only insofar 
as it is embedded within a clausal structure. Nevertheless, the semantic 
contribution of the definite article remains consistent across clausal 
environments. The theory as currently conceived retains a quantificational 
treatment yet abides with a lexicocentric view through reimagining the 
Russellian semantics. This final point will be detailed, and subsequently 
rejected, when we come to look at Neale (§3.3). 
 
                                                          
51 The forms of reference described in §2.4 would take the view to deny that the linguistic 
meaning of a definite description ever exhibits a ‘strong’ form of reference (i.e. rigid, deictic, 




THE THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS 
Russell understood definite descriptions as both the most interesting and 
the hardest of all the denoting phrases to give an analysis for (1905, 481). In 
contrast to other quantificational phrases, Russell took definite descriptions 
to assert uniqueness (1905, 481). The formal apparatus of universal and 
existential quantification was not, on its own, sufficient to handle this 
condition. Instead, a complex of the two in conjunction with an identity 
condition must be called upon. As an example, Russell assigns to the 
expression the father of Charles II (F) was executed (E) the following 
quantificational paraphrase "[i]t is not always false of x that x begat Charles 
II and that x was executed and that 'if y begat Charles II, y is identical with 
x' is always true of y'"(1905: 482).52 Or in a less convoluted logical form: 
(6) x(F(x) & y(F(y)  y=x) & E(x)) 
The illusion of definite descriptions being referential phrases is shattered, 
as nothing referential remains in the underlying logical form of the 
denoting expressions. The formula "gives a reduction of all propositions in 
which denoting phrases occur to forms in which no such phrases occur" 
(1905, 482). Uniqueness is captured through stating that there is at least one 
x such that x has the property F and that for any value for y if y has the 
property F then y must be identical with x. Therefore, definite descriptions 
form a special type of quantification. They pick out one unique individual. 
We can now turn to analyse how the Russellian theory solves the two 
problems introduced at the start of §3.1 concerning the ontological 
commitments of definite descriptions and the truth-values attached to 
sentences containing empty denoting phrases. Russell asks us to consider 
the sentence the present King of France is bald. It is clear that the sentence is 
meaningful and we know what it would take for it to be true, we know the 
truth-conditional content it expresses, yet the definite description has no 
                                                          
52 An interesting historical note is that Russell uses negated universal quantification instead 
of existential quantification. Kripke claims that this may be done to avoid asserting existence 
(Kripke 2005, 1008). This is further attested to by Stevens who states that the formalism does 
not commit to their being an individual that acts as the value for x (2011, 62). In OD the 
universal quantifier is primitive (2011, 21). 
68 
 
denotation. The sentence is not true, as there is no King of France, therefore 
it must be false. As Russell notes:  
By the law of excluded middle, either "A is B" or "A is not B" 
must be true. Hence either "the present King of France is bald" 
or "the present King of France is not bald" must be true. Yet if 
we enumerated the things that are bald, and then the things 
that are not bald, we should not find the present King of France 
in either list. (1905, 485) 
The law of excluded middle proves tricky for a singular term analysis of 
the definite description. For instance, if we were to list the set of all bald 
things, then we would notice that the set does not contain the King of 
France, and the same goes for the set of non-bald things. In virtue of failing 
to denote, the present King of France does not pick out an individual in either 
set. Alternatively, in virtue of being quantificational, Russell’s theory can 
solve the problem through scope without invoking any ontological 
commitment to a present King of France. 
The law of excluded middle states that one of either the present King of 
France is bald or the present King of France is not bald must be true. We know 
the first sentence is false. Therefore the second sentence must be true. We 
can interpret the second sentence in two ways, which elicit a scope 
distinction concerning the negation: 
(7) The present King of France is not bald. 
(8) It is not the case that the present King of France is bald. 
Russell states (7) remains false, but (8) is true in virtue of it implicating that 
there is no present King of France (1905, 490; 1962, 69). Furthermore, (8) is 
the genuine negated sentence as the negation has scope over the entire 
clause.53 Through (6) we can formalize the two as follows: 
(7*) x(F(x) & y(F(y)  y=x) & ¬B(x)) 
(8*) ¬x(F(x) & y(F(y)  y=x) & B(x)) 
                                                          




When the negation takes scope over the entire expression the logical form 
states that it is not the case that there exists an individual who is both the 
present king of France and bald, which is the desired result. The scope that 
is enabled by the quantificational structure thus solves the problem of 
empty denoting phrases and retains the law of excluded middle, which is a 
positive result for the Russellian. 
We can conclude with a brief overview of the Russellian theory: 
(9) The Russellian Theory of Descriptions 
 i. A definite description d has no meaning in isolation from a 
clausal structure. 
 ii. The linguistic meaning of a proposition p containing d is 
quantificational and object-independent. 
 iii. ‘What is said’ in using p can be understood without 
identification of d’s denotation. 
 iv. From (i)-(iii), definite descriptions are not captured in the 
semantic-type <e>. 
 v. The truth-conditional content and subsequent truth-value of 
p can be given when d is an empty descriptive phrase 
through scope, without further ontological commitments. 
As is obvious, the theory described in (9) is in direct contrast to that in (2), 
and it constitutes the first major development in a QT for the three 
ambiguity problems. The Russellian solution to the genesis of the three 
ambiguity problems is dependent upon further modifications made to the 
theory that integrate it with actual linguistic practice. At this point in time, 
the Russellian theory is arguably limited to the ‘shadowy limbo of the 
logic-books’ (to use one of Russell’s own expressions against him, 1903, 54). 
We can now turn to the central question of this thesis, to what extent can 
such a theory, a theory embedded in concerns over metaphysics and logic, 
be an adequate theory of natural language descriptions and the three 






The first major modification to the Russellian QT comes from Kripke (1977; 
1980). Kripke recognized the metaphysical and logical merits of the 
Russellian theory, as well as recognizing the clear linguistic intuition that 
definite descriptions are frequently used to refer. Kripke therefore 
recognised the existence of an ambiguity problem. In the wake of 
Donnellan’s popularization of the classical ambiguity problem (CAP), 
Kripke sought to integrate the Russellian thesis with wider aspects of 
language use. The modification Kripke provided in accounting for the CAP 
reverberated through philosophy of language and impacted how the 
discipline views the interaction of semantics, pragmatics, linguistic 
meaning, speaker’s meaning, and truth-conditional content. The modern 
era of Russellian defence turns on the claim that our linguistic intuitions 
that definite descriptions can be used referentially may latch onto 
pragmatic, rather than semantic, facts about language. 
We detailed the CAP in §1.2, but let us briefly reignite the intuitions it is 
based upon. A sentence such as (10), for instance, can be used to refer to a 
particular desk: 
(10) The desk is covered with books. 
Supposing that there is indeed a desk present in the utterance context, we 
understand (10) as having said something about that particular desk, as 
having referred to it. However, a Russellian would claim that the intuitions 
are mistaken if they meant to capture the linguistic meaning of the definite 
description in (10). The ambiguity problem is thus that the Russellian must 
explain how it is that we understand a felicitous use of (10) as referring to 
the salient desk, and that this use is conventional.  
Kripke upheld a unified semantics for definite descriptions. All definite 
descriptions are semantically quantificational.54 Following Donnellan (1966, 
297), Kripke believed the CAP to be founded in pragmatic facts about 
                                                          
54 According to Kripke, the term ambiguity should be reserved for semantics. If there were 
to be an ambiguity, then it must emerge as part of the semantics, not simply in the way an 
expression can be used (1977, 262). In other words, Kripke denies that an ambiguity in how 
use expressions equates to a genuine ambiguity. 
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language use. 55  The main crux of his modification was to solidify a 
distinction between semantics qua a theory of meaning in isolation from use, 
and pragmatics qua a theory of natural language communication. We might 
understand Kripke as introducing the distinction between linguistic 
meaning and speaker’s meaning. Kripke explained the genesis of the CAP 
as follows, the linguistic meaning of a definite description is always 
quantificational, however, in certain instances they can be used to refer 
through being supplemented by pragmatic machinery that accompanies 
what is said. We might understand the view as an advance on Donnellan’s 
claim that “whether or not a definite description is used referentially or 
attributively is a function of the speaker's intentions in a particular case" 
(1966: 297). Therefore, if the referential use is enabled not through linguistic 
meaning but instead through speaker’s meaning, then the genesis of the 
CAP is not semantic. 
3.21 
RIGIDITY 
At this juncture it is vital to introduce the concept of ‘rigidity’. It has been 
claimed that the attributive/referential distinction is one between non-
rigid/rigid descriptions respectively. 56 Kripke accepts that definite 
descriptions can be used referentially, but denies that such uses elicit rigid 
reference. We can define a rigid designator as follows: 
(11) An expression is a rigid designator if it designates the same object in 
every possible world in which it exists (1981, 48). 
Proper names are understood as the quintessential instance of rigid 
designation (1981, 48). Names are understood to pick out the same 
individual in every possible world and enable ‘trans-world identity’ in 
possible world semantics. The name Ronaldo therefore picks out the same 
individual in every possible world in which he exists, even in worlds in 
which he never became a footballer. Conversely, definite descriptions do 
                                                          
55 With respect to Smith’s murderer is insane, Donnellan claimed that “"[t]he grammatical 
structure of the sentences seems to … be the same whether the description is used 
referentially or attributively: that is, it is not syntactically ambiguous" (1966: 297). It is for 
such reasons that we distinguish the CAP from the two grammatical ambiguity problems 
(GAP1 and GAP2). 
56 In §4.1 we will look at one such claim from Kaplan (1970, 1979a). 
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not meet the condition of trans-world identity. For instance, the definite 
description the winner of the 2014 Ballon d’Or picks out Ronaldo in the actual 
world, but may pick out Manuel Neuer, or anyone else for that matter, in 
another possible world. There is nothing essential to the definite 
description that makes it rigidly refer to Ronaldo, and it is not an essential 
property of Ronaldo that he won (1981, 48-49). In denying that the 
referential use of definite descriptions can be associated an act of rigid 
designation, Kripke is denying that such a definite description would pick 
out the same individual in every possible world. There is an intuitive 
validity to these claims. However, if rigidity is not the source of the CAP, 
then what is? 
3.22 
THE SEMANTICS/PRAGMATICS DISTINCTION I 
As previously stated, the answer Kripke provides for the genesis of the 
CAP is that it is a result of pragmatic machinery that accompanies an 
utterance. The machinery comes in at the speech-act level, which captures 
linguistic performance. A distinction is thus drawn between linguistic 
meaning, which can be given in isolation from use, and pragmatic 
machinery that accompanies a given speech-act. For Kripke, semantics is 
thus context-independent instructions to build truth-conditional content 
(Stojanovic 2008). 57  A compositional semantics for an expression can 
therefore be given without recourse to pragmatic embellishments that 
accompany a particular illocutionary act. It can be given without reference 
to particular speech-acts in which it is employed. It now becomes 
transparent that a Russellian QT is framed within literalism.58  It is thus an 
‘expression-centred’ conception of semantics, “the semantic attributes of 
expressions are not conceptually derivative of the speech acts performed by 
their utterers, and are thought of instead as intrinsic to the expressions 
themselves… that as such, they have a semantic life of their own” (Salmon 
2004, 238). 
                                                          
57 Alternatives to this formulation are given by Carston (2008). 
58 Recanati states that this is the key part of the literalist ‘idealisation’, which is based upon 
the claim that “[f]or every statement that can be made using a context-sensitive sentence in a 
given context, there is an eternal sentence that can be used to make the same statement in 
any context” (2004, 84). 
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The ambiguity problem that Kripke’s modification aims to solve is put 
succinctly by Reimer: 
[i]t is uncontroversial that definite descriptions can be used 
either referentially or attributively – that they can be used to 
communicate either singular or general propositions. It is also 
(relatively) uncontroversial that, when used attributively, the 
proposition literally expressed by the sentence uttered is a 
general proposition. What is controversial is the claim that, 
when used referentially, the proposition literally expressed by the 
sentence uttered is a singular (rather than general) proposition. 
(1998, 92)  
Devitt similarly puts the problem as follows: 
[a] pragmatic explanation of referential uses must be based on 
the view that a person using a description referentially in 
uttering a sentence conveys a singular proposition while saying a 
general quantificational proposition. (2007b, 49) 
Therefore, the issue concerns whether what is said in a referential use of a 
definite description is a singular proposition, or whether the referential 
aspect of the utterance is merely communicated as part of what is 
implicated. 
Kripke provides an account that adheres to the latter analysis, that 
referential uses of descriptions merely communicate singular propositions 
rather than literally expressing them. The account must explain how one 
can deviate from the linguistic meaning of an utterance in order to 
communicate something distinct. The first important thing to note is that 
within literalism and expression-centred conceptions of semantics it 
remains possible for a speaker to deviate from the linguistic, or literal, 
meaning of a given expression when using it in a particular speech-act. As 
Salmon notes, with respect to a particular expression, “[w]e are constrained 
by the symbols’ system of representation – by their semantics – but we are 
not enslaved by it. Frequently… what we represent by means of a symbol 
deviates from the symbol’s semantics” (2007, 345), and this deviation is 
‘systematic’ (2004, 238). The pragmatic machinery that Kripke employs in 
accounting for the CAP is an instance of a systematic deviation from 
semantic form, as we will see in §3.23. 
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To schematize the above, we can state that within a single speech-act there 
exists, at a minimum, the literal linguistic meaning of the utterance, 
information associated with the utterance context, the speaker’s intentions 
in using the utterance, and various further principles governing language 
use. It is the final three of these that constitute the pragmatic machinery 
that enables the deviation captured in the referential uses of descriptions. 
In Kripke’s words: 
 [t]he notion of what words can mean, in the language, is 
semantical: it is given by the conventions of our language. What 
they mean, on a given occasion, is determined, on a given 
occasion, by these conventions, together with the intentions of 
the speaker and various contextual features. Finally what the 
speaker meant, on a given occasion, in saying certain words, 
derives from various further special intentions of the speaker, 
together with various general principles, applicable to all 
human languages regardless of their special conventions. (1977, 
263) 
In the Russellian QT it is the first of these, linguistic meaning, that fully 
determines truth-conditional content and what is said. The context of the 
utterance and the intentions of the speaker clear engage with the linguistic 
meaning of the utterance, but they do not impact what is said. The former 
constitutes the semantics and the latter two factors constitute the 
pragmatics.59 
The semantics/pragmatics distinction that Kripke works to is clearly that of 
literalism, and the solution to the CAP is as well. The construal of what 
counts as semantic is restricted to deny all aspects of language use that 
come in at the speech-act level (unless demanded by the expression’s 
linguistic meaning as in indexicalism). Those defending a Russellian QT 
often accuse their opposition as making a mistake regarding the 
semantics/pragmatics distinction. The mistake is often charged as one that 
emerges through defending a ‘speech-act’ centred conception of semantics. 
Keeping this in mind, we can now turn to look at how Kripke founds his 
pragmatic supplement to the QT, which he takes to protect the view from 
referential counterexamples. 
                                                          
59 To reiterate, Recanati states that literalism “denies that the speaker’s meaning play any 




SPEAKER’S INTENTIONS AND SPEAKER’S REFERENCE 
The strategic modification that Kripke makes to the QT is one that concerns 
natural language quantification more generally, and how speakers may 
employ quantifier phrases in linguistic communication. The idea that he 
puts forward is that the speaker’s intentions in using an expression can 
provide the communicative act with a ‘speaker’s referent’. A speaker’s 
referent is an individual that it tied to the utterance through the context and 
the fact that the speaker intended to say something about that individual.60 
In virtue of this, whilst the linguistic meaning of a definite description is 
quantificational and the proposition it is part of object-independent, the 
speaker may succeed in communicating something about a particular 
salient individual in virtue of that individual being the speaker’s referent. 
Therefore, for any given definite description d the speaker’s referent is the 
individual that the speaker intended to refer to by using d in a particular 
speech-act. The speaker’s referent is contrasted with d’s semantic referent, 
which is the individual, who or whatever it may be, that is actually picked 
out by d’s linguistic meaning. The two often converge but do not 
necessarily have to. We can delineate the two by stating that the speaker’s 
referent is created as part of pragmatics and the semantic referent, as its 
name suggests, is determined by linguistic meaning alone. It is the 
distinction between the speaker’s referent and semantic referent that 
Kripke takes to be at the heart of the CAP. 
Speaker’s referents are determined as a form of generalized implicature 
that accompanies certain expression as a linguistic convention. We can 
return to some ambiguity instances to see how it operates. To being with, 
let us consider an instance of misdescription: 
(12) Her husband is kind to her. 
In the context, the speaker and audience observe a couple that they assume 
are married. If the man in question is not the woman’s husband but is 
instead a friend, then the definite description has failed to correctly 
describe the individual. As stated in §1.2, the speaker may nevertheless 
                                                          
60 The concept of a speaker’s referent is related to generalized implicature as found in Grice 
(1989, 28; Kripke 1977, 263). 
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communicate something about the man if he is sufficiently salient in the 
utterance context. The speaker may succeed in communicating a statement 
akin to ‘that particular man is kind to the woman in question’. In such an 
instance, the speaker succeeds in communicating something that diverges 
from its linguistic meaning. Kripke claims that this is enabled through the 
audience apprehending the speaker’s referent. If the woman had a husband, 
but the husband was not present, then the actual husband would constitute 
the semantic reference. However, in this situation the communicative act 
depends upon the speaker’s referent, not the semantic referent. Critically, 
all of this occurs without alteration to what is said. 
The analysis extends readily to Donnellan’s courtroom example. In this 
example there is a man, Jones, in a courtroom dock who is accused of 
Smith’s murder and who is acting bizarrely. Two people are in the 
courtroom observing Jones’ trail and one says to the other: 
(13) Smith’s murderer is insane.  
Further to the details given, let us suppose firstly that Jones is innocent and 
that a man named Wilson is the actual murderer but has thus far evaded 
capture. The distinction between speaker’s referent and semantic referent 
thus comes to the fore. In (13) the speaker’s referent is Jones, whereas the 
semantic referent is Wilson. Therefore, the distinction is between “what the 
speaker’s words meant” and what “he [the speaker] meant, in saying these 
words, on that occasion” (1977, 262). The semantic referent is meant to be 
captured solely by linguistic meaning and the speaker’s referent is, 
unsurprisingly, captured by what we have previously termed speaker’s 
meaning. 
In order to justify the dichotomy between speaker’s reference and semantic 
reference as a piece of general pragmatic machinery, as a generalized 
implicature, it must not be limited to particular uses of definite descriptions 
(1977, 265). Interestingly, Kripke states that the distinction holds with 
proper names in addition to quantifier phrases. Consider the following, 
two people are looking across a garden at a man named Smith who is 
raking leaves, both people mistake Smith for another man named Jones and 
consequently one speaker asks the other what is Jones doing? The other 
person replies with the response Jones is raking leaves. If we are interested 
purely with the semantic referent of Jones, then the response is false 
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(assuming Jones is not raking leaves elsewhere), whereas if we are 
interested in the speaker’s referent, the intended referent, of the name Jones, 
then the response is true. The distinction is once again formed between the 
expression’s linguistic meaning and the speaker’s meaning that 
accompanies it.  
The semantic referent of Jones is always the actual individual Jones 
irrespective of the speaker's intentions. However, the speaker’s referent is 
determined in the utterance context through pragmatic machinery 
including the speaker’s intentions in using the name Jones. We might 
understand the speaker’s referent to enable the communication of a 
proposition that is not strictly expressed as part of what is said. As Kripke 
states, “clearly both participants in the dialogue have referred to Smith, and 
the second participant has said something true about the man he referred 
to if and only if Smith was raking the leaves (whether or not Jones was)” 
(1977, 263). In other words, we might take the speech-act to communicate 
something true insofar as we can understand the speaker’s referent to 
enable an embellished speech-act. The response can be understood as being 
true if and only if the two are engaging with what is implicated as opposed 
to what is said. 
The speaker’s referent, as a piece of general pragmatic machinery, is 
described by Kripke as follows: 
Suppose a speaker takes it that a certain object a fulfills the 
condition for being the semantic referent of a designator, “d”. 
Then, wishing to say something about a, he uses “d” to speak 
about a, he says “φ(d)”. Then, he said, of a, on that occasion, 
that it φ’d; in the appropriate Gricean sense, he meant that a φ’d. 
This is true even if a is not really the semantic referent of “d”. If 
it is not, then that a φ’s is included in what he meant, but not in 
the meaning of his words. (1977, 263-264) 
The employment of a speaker’s referent in the exchange above enables the 
two members of the communicative act to discuss Smith even though the 
proper name, strictly speaker, refers to Jones. 
Let us tentatively define some terms employed by Kripke: 
(14) Speaker’s Intentions 
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A speaker’s intentions are those that the speaker has in using an 
utterance, and accompany it in order to achieve a particular 
communicative goal.  
(15) Semantic Reference 
The semantic referent of an expression ζ is the individual that is 
picked out by ζ’s linguistic meaning, “[i]f a speaker has a designator 
in his idiolect, certain conventions of his idiolect determine the 
referent in the idiolect: that I call the semantic referent of the 
designator” (1977, 263). 
(16) Speaker’s Reference 
The speaker’s referent of an expression ζ is the individual that the 
speaker intended to refer to in using ζ, “[w]e may tentatively define 
the speaker’s referent of a designator to be that object which the 
speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes 
fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the 
designator” (1977, 264).61 
It is the interaction of the three factors above that constitutes Kripke’s 
account of the CAP. Kripke’s idea is that a definite description d has a 
semantic referent, but that semantic referent is not rigidly denoted. 
Therefore, the proposition expressed by a sentence containing a definite 
description will be object-independent, and what is said will never depend 
upon a particular individual. Nevertheless, in a particular speech-act a 
speaker can employ d intending to refer to a particular individual. In such 
an instance, a speaker’s referent is created, and the utterance can be seen as 
communicating something about that particular individual. We might say 
that the speaker expresses an object-independent proposition, but 
communicates an object-dependent one. The creation and subsequent 
                                                          
61 Kripke is keen to point out that with certain terms we have to speak of the semantic 
referent on a particular occasion, “[i]f the designator is ambiguous, or contain indexicals, 
demonstratives, or the like, we must speak of the semantic referent on a given occasion. The 
referent will be determined by the conventions of the language plus the speaker’s intentions 
and various contextual features” (1977, 263). 
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The linguistic proposal is that a given set of arguments, including at least 
quantifier phrases and proper names, express a semantic referent but may 
be used on occasion to communicate something about an individual not 
necessarily linked to the utterance through its linguistic meaning. Kripke 
devises a test that any semantic ambiguity thesis must pass. The test was 
invented to be applied to any counterexample put forward to linguistic 
proposals in general (1977, 265; Reimer 1998, 90-91).  Consider a linguistic 
proposal P and a counterexample C, C is a proper counterexample to P iff it 
is not possible to hypothesise a language L wherein P is stipulated to be 
true and C still occurs. Applying this to the foregoing discussion we get the 
following test. Consider a hypothesised language, as similar to English as 
possible, wherein the Russellian QT is stipulated to be correct, then within 
this language is it possible to imagine Donnellan’s distinction arising? 
The idea goes as follows, let us assume that within a hypothetical language, 
which we will call Russell-English, definite descriptions are stipulated to be 
paraphrases of a Russellian logical form.63 Therefore, when a speaker utters 
(17) it is stipulated to have the linguistic meaning associated with a 
Russellian paraphrase: 
(17) Her husband is kind to her. 
                                                          
62 It is worth noting that the above account of speaker’s reference is not uncontroversial. 
Recanati and Bezuidenhout both defend the view that we do not reach the level of what is 
said until we have enriched the linguistic meaning of the utterance with speaker’s meaning, 
including speaker’s reference (Recenati 2004, 90; Bezuidenhout 1997; 2002). 
63 Kripke’s test introduces three strengths for the Russellian languages, weak, intermediate, 
and strong. The first states that the Russellian semantics is stipulated to account for the 
semantics of definite descriptions, the second states that definite descriptions are 
abbreviations or paraphrases of their Russellian analysis, and the third states that definite 
descriptions are banned from the language and instead the Russellian paraphrases are used 
in their place. The test is meant to apply to each, but if it succeeds in the strong Russellian 
language, i.e. if this language exhibits the ambiguity, then test subsequently holds for the 
intermediate and weak languages (1977, 265). 
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Does the CAP occur in an utterance of (17) in Russell-English? According to 
Kripke it does. For instance, given an utterance of (17) in Russell-English 
there is no reason to believe that a referential use would be banned. 
Recalling the instance of misdescription that we have employed in relation 
to (12) previously, Kripke states that speakers of Russell-English are “no 
more infallible than we” and like normal English the speaker will use (12) 
to refer “precisely because they think, though erroneously, that the Russellian 
truth conditions are satisfied” (1977, 265-266). Therefore, the story goes that 
Russell-English retains a referential use of definite descriptions, even 
though it has a Russellian semantics for such expressions. 
The test for Russell-English is meant to illustrate that an expression 
stipulated to have a Russellian semantics may still be used to create an 
object-dependant, or singular, proposition. In addition to definite 
descriptions, other expressions, including generalized quantifiers, can 
likewise be used to make object-dependent propositions. According to 
Sainsbury (1979), Neale (1990, 87-88), and Reimer (1998, 92) this fact is 
meant to provides further support to Kripke’s test, and to show that 
Donnellan’s distinction is not semantic.64 
We can illustrate the wide range of expressions that Kripke applies his 
theory to through a further quantifier phrase. As an example, consider a 
situation where three people are at a party and one person, who we shall 
call Smith, has brought an expensive bottle of champagne. Towards the end 
of the night Smith intends to open the bottle only to find that it has 
vanished! Everyone present, except for Smith, knows that Jones drank the 
champagne. The following exchange takes place between Smith and 
another party-goer, who we shall call Wilson: 
(18) Smith: What happened to the champagne? 
Wilson: Well, somebody [gestures towards Jones] must have drunk 
it. 
Smith: Typical Jones. 
In Wilson’s retort to Smith he succeeds in communicating an object-
dependent proposition about Jones, which is illustrated by Smith’s final 
                                                          
64  It should be noted that Reimer does defend the view that definite descriptions are 
ambiguous, but not in the manner that Donnellan suggested (1998, 93). 
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reply. Nevertheless, accompanying the quantifier phrase somebody is a 
gesture and the utterance will most likely involve an exaggeration of the 
quantifier’s pronunciation, an exaggeration in its intonation. These features 
of the utterance are crucial if such examples are meant to strengthen the 
conclusions reached through Kripke’s test. 
The problem with making the claim that Donnellan’s distinction can be 
applied to any quantificational expression is that with respect to 
generalized quantifiers such as that in (18) the speaker must add alterations 
to the quantifier’s standard intonation and/or include an act of ostension. 
None of this is necessary with referential uses of descriptions. Taking (18) 
as an example, we can see that the object-dependent proposition is only 
communicated with the help of the gesture and assumed intonation 
without which it is unlikely that Smith would give the same response. It 
might be argued that this fact is unimportant, however intonation is 
something that is settled through the derivation of morphophonemic 
information, which is itself a reflex of grammatical structure that underlies 
Wilson’s utterance in (18). These facts are not recognised by those that liken 
Wilson’s utterance in (18) with referential uses of descriptions. The distinct 
phonetic marking is a direct result of an underlying morphophonemic 
distinction between (18) as used to communicate an object-dependent 
proposition, and a standard use. The implication of this is that the 
pragmatic machinery that Kripke takes to be at work across the board with 
argument expressions may not be a unified phenomenon, and moreover 
may not be responsible for the genesis of the ambiguity in the first place. 
A further issue with Kripke’s test is the legitimacy of the core claim that (17) 
expresses an eternal context-independent sentence as captured in the 
Russellian paraphrase. Contextualism, for instance, would take any 
instance of (17) to be semantically underdetermined and lacking truth-
conditional content at all prior to contextual embellishment (Recanati 2004, 
84; Bezuidenhout 2002, 205). We cannot therefore stipulate the Russellian 
semantics as capturing the fully specified truth-conditional content that any 
utterance of (17) expresses. Kripke’s test is productive to the debate but it 
depends upon the core tenet of literalism, namely that for every sentence 
there is a context-independent proposition that it picks out that fully 
specifies truth-conditional content. It is dependent upon an expression-
centred conception of language. For contextualism, the test fails to 
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materialize. Nevertheless, it is obvious from the test that Kripke’s theory is 
meant to be a general piece of pragmatic machinery whose presence 
enables object-dependent propositions to be communicated with 
expressions whose semantics was not itself object-dependent.  
Kripke’s modification to the Russellian QT initiated the modern debate on 
descriptions and the nature natural language semantics more generally. 
The modification introduced a foundation from which the distinction 
between linguistic meaning and speaker’s meaning (including the context 
of utterance, speaker’s intentions, implicatures, and general pragmatic 
machinery that accompanies communication) could be applied to definite 
descriptions. We can now briefly summarize the modified Russellian QT: 
(19) *The Russellian Theory of Descriptions 
i. The linguistic meaning of a proposition p containing d is 
quantificational, object-independent, and fully specifies 
truth-conditional content and ‘what is said’. 
ii. In a given speech-act the semantic referent of d is derived 
through its linguistic meaning alone, but accompanying the 
speech-act is pragmatic machinery that creates a speaker’s 
referent. 
iii. A speaker can communicate an object-dependent 
proposition using d through the speaker’s referent, which 
depends upon the speaker’s intentions in using d and the 
context in which d is used. 
iv. The semantic referent and speaker’s referent often converge 
but do not necessarily have to. 
v. From (iii)-(iv) the genesis of referential uses of definite 
descriptions, including misdescription, is pragmatic. 
vi. The pragmatic machinery employed in establishing a 
speaker’s referent is a generalized implicature that 
accompanies a wide range of expressions including 
quantifier phrases and proper names. 
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The modified Russellian theory contains the central claims made by those 
who defend QTs. As is clear from the description, a Russellian solution to 
the CAP is that is has its genesis in pragmatic machinery that accompanies 
the linguistic meaning expressed in communication. We will provide a 
detailed Russellian account of all three of the ambiguity problems shortly, 
but before we do that we must consider the second and final modification 
to the Russellian QT provided by Neale, which was developed in order to 
bring the theory in line with linguistic theory. 
3.3 
NEALE 
It is with the introduction of the CAP, and Kripke’s proposed solution to its 
genesis, that we observe the beginning of the modern era in the 
descriptions literature wherein the theory began taking natural language 
use seriously. It was observed that the Russellian QT can be understood as 
a form of semantic literalism, and retained the Russellian paraphrase as the 
linguistic meaning of sentences containing definite descriptions. 
Nevertheless, there remain problems for the Russellian. The first of which 
is that the Russellian QT, as currently sketched, fails to credit grammatical 
structure with any influence on the semantics of expressions. This is not a 
problem in principle, but it does require an explanation as grammar is 
elementary in the composition of natural language expressions and 
therefore potentially impacts truth-conditional content. Furthermore, there 
remain three further problems for the Russellian including misdescription, 
incompleteness, and referential anaphora. We have already described one 
Russellian account to misdescription, but we will now analyse Neale’s 
unified solution to all three problems.  
The discussion of Neale (1990; 2004; 2005a; 2005b) will begin with an 
outline of the set of expressions he takes the Russellian account to apply to, 
which will help us to further understand the Russellian solution to all three 
ambiguity problems. Next we will look at how Neale sets up the 
semantics/pragmatics distinction, which will form backbone of his 
Russellian solution to the ambiguity problems as well as the problems of 
misdescription, incompleteness, and referential anaphora. Following this, 
we will turn to analyse Neale’s attempt to streamline the theory with the 
syntactic structure of DPs. At this point it will be observed that the strategic 
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modification that Neale provides is grounded in a lexicocentric 
understanding of compositional semantics. Furthermore, we will criticize 
the theory for failing to account for details of DPs that may impact how we 
look at the semantics of arguments and definite descriptions specifically. It 
is the contention of this thesis that a more thoroughgoing analysis of DPs 
raises problems for the lexicocentric version of the Russellian QT that Neale 
creates.  
3.31 
THE VARIETIES OF DESCRIPTIONS 
In the discussion so far we have employed a limited range of definite 
descriptions. We have employed uniquely identifying descriptions such as 
the present King of France and possessives such as Smith’s murderer and her 
husband.65 If we bear in mind that the Russellian theory of descriptions is 
meant to capture all possible uses of definite descriptions, then there 
remain a multitude of other expressions that it should likewise apply to. 
The theory is meant to cover all instances of expressions beginning with the 
definite article the and all instances of expressions that are grammatically 
derived from expressions beginning with the definite article. The first 
positive in Neale’s defence of the Russellian theory is that it extends it to 
cover all expressions commonly held under the umbrella term ‘definite 
description’. Neale claims that the Russellian theory applies equally to, at 
least, each of the following (1990, 10): 
(20) i. Plural descriptions (the players). 
 ii. Numberless descriptions (whoever shot Smith). 
 iii. Possessives (Smith’s murderer). 
 iv. Indexical descriptions (My mother). 
 v. Relativized Descriptions (The father of every girl). 
 vi. Derived nominal constructions (Smith’s departure) 
 vii. Gerundive nominal constructions (My leaving in such a hurry). 
                                                          
65  It is worth noting for purposes of accuracy that Russell does extend his theory of 
descriptions to plurals in PM *30 (Neale 2005a, 828; PM 1910/1962, 232-237). 
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 viii. Anaphoric descriptions 
 ix. Epithets 
Neale states that to capture facts surrounding all of (20i) to (20vii) within a 
single theory of descriptions would involve looking at how the theory 
“interacts … with theories of indexicality, ellipsis, syntactical structure, 
anaphora, modality, tense, and attitude reports” (1990, 10). The mention of 
syntactical structure is one often absent from the work on descriptions and 
it illustrates that Neale is intensely keen to employ as much data from 
natural language as possible.66 The focus on natural language is a welcome 
advance on Russell’s own theory, which, as stated before, was mainly 
interested in the metaphysical commitments of parts of logic. This is to 
Neale’s credit as much linguistic data was largely ignored with respect to 
definite descriptions, or regarded as subservient to facts about logic, prior 
to Descriptions (1990).67 
3.32 
THE SEMANTICS/PRAGMATICS DISTINCTION II 
Neale echoes Kripke (1977), Grice (1989), and others (Bach 2004b; Salmon 
2004) in accounting for the referential uses of definite descriptions through 
pragmatic machinery. Neale employs a distinction between “the proposition 
expressed by an utterance and the proposition (or propositions) the speaker 
seeks to communicate by it, what we might call the proposition(s) meant by 
the speaker” (1990, 62). It is a parallel distinction to that made between 
semantic reference and speaker’s reference.  Neale defines the distinction as 
being that between “the genuinely semantical features of an expression ζ 
and those features of the use of ζ that issue, at least in part, from non-
semantical facts about the context of utterance and from constraints 
governing rational discourse” (1990, 62). But what does Neale have in mind 
by semantics? And, critically for our purposes, what role does syntax take 
in this treatment of semantics? 
Neale defines semantics and the role of syntax as follows: 
                                                          
66 We will use the terms syntactic structure and grammatical structure synonymously unless 
otherwise indicated. 
67 This statement is aimed at the philosophical literature as opposed to linguistics literature, 
which was more amenable to work in syntactic theory. 
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Flushing out the modal: a semantic theory for a language L will 
provide, for each sentence X of L, a blueprint for (a template, a 
schematic or skeletal representation of) what someone will be 
taken to be saying when using X to say something. The 
blueprint associated with X is its semantics, and the set of such 
blueprints, one for every sentence of a language L, is the 
semantics for L. (The study of these blueprints is also called 
semantics. The study of the role of word meanings is called 
lexical semantics; the study of the role of syntax is called 
compositional semantics.) (2004, 85) 
As we can see the study of semantics is multifaceted, it contains lexical 
semantics (which is the study of the meaning of words in isolation from 
sentences they may partake in) and compositional semantics (which is the 
often formal treatment of the manner in which the semantic-types of the 
lexical items in the sentence fit together).68 Compositional semantics is thus 
syntactic. However, we should not immediately understand the term 
syntax here as being that as analysed by generative grammarians. Instead, 
the term is employed simply to stand for the combinatorial nature of logical 
form. Furthermore, semantics provides skeletal blueprint for meaning in 
natural language.69 
As for pragmatics Neale has the following to say: 
[a] pragmatic theory will explain how interpreters identify 
what a speaker means by uttering a sentence (or sentence 
fragment) X on a given occasion given (at most) what a 
semantic theory has to say about X… a pragmatic theory will 
explain how interpreters identify what A said and implied by 
uttering X on that occasion given (at most) what a semantic 
theory has to say about X. If a pragmatic theory explained only 
how interpreters identify what A implied given (at most) what 
the speaker said as ‘input’, a gaping hole in our taxonomy of 
theories would appear. (2004, 85) 
                                                          
68 We discussed compositional semantics in detail in §2.2 
69 It should be noted that we agree with Neale that compositional semantics is involved in 
providing a skeleton or blueprint for natural language meaning. However, we disagree as to 
how this skeleton should be account for. In §5.3 we will argue that grammar itself is 
responsible for this skeleton, and thus grammatical derivations can be understood as 
providing a grounding for the skeletal aspects of semantics. Furthermore, it will be argued 
that the concept of syntax employed in logical form is superfluous if one takes it to uncover 
an underlying mental reality.  
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Pragmatics thus has to do with linguistic communication and the 
interaction of semantic content with wider aspects of a speech-act, in 
particular what a speaker meant in a given speech-act. A competent 
speaker of a language will be competent in both the semantics of a 
language L and the pragmatics involved in using L.70 In interpreting a given 
sentence S, the competent speaker identifies both ‘what is said’ and ‘what is 
implicated’. 
These definitions feed into the distinction made between the proposition 
expressed by a given sentential expression ζ and the proposition the 
speaker meant in using ζ. In accordance with literalism, Neale 
distinguishes between an expression-type and a particular token use of an 
expression, and states that definite descriptions, as an expression-type, are 
semantically quantificational.71 Referring back to §2, the expression-type is 
associated with the linguistic meaning. Therefore, in using a definite 
description referentially one employs an expression ζ that is of a 
quantificational semantic-type, which in order to be interpreted correctly is 
supplemented with ‘non-semantic facts’. The non-semantic facts partly 
comprise the meaning that the speaker wishes to convey in using ζ. Herein 
lays Neale’s account of the genesis of the three ambiguity problems. The 
proposition expressed is quantificational, whereas the proposition meant 
may be referential. Once again, therefore, the ambiguities are enables 
through pragmatic machinery accompanying the expression. 
Neale accepts that the semantic values of certain expressions are impacted 
by the context of utterance, but states that this is codified to the 
expression’s linguistic meaning rather than the speaker’s meaning. 
Therefore, just as with Kripke, Neale looks to be defending a form of 
indexicalism. Consider (21) for instance: 
(21) I am tired. 
According to Neale, the linguistic meaning of I is constant across contexts 
but the semantic value may vary depending upon who utters it (1990, 68). 
                                                          
70 Neale states that a pragmatic theory should indeed be universal across languages (2004, 
85). 
71 This point harks back to what we have said previously in the notion of an eternal sentence 
S that is associated with an actual utterance of S. Take a particular expression ζ, the 
expression-type is the unchanging semantic category that is associated with it, and each 
token use of ζ has this type as its semantic-type. For details, see §2.2. 
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The semantic value changes from use to use thereby providing distinct 
propositions for each utterance of (21). In virtue of providing distinct 
propositions, each utterance has distinct truth-conditions.  The sentence in 
(21) fulfils the conditions of being referential as the truth-conditions will be 
dependent upon the particular object that is picked out in both actual and 
counter-factual situations. Critically, all of this is established as part of 
(21)’s linguistic meaning. 
Accordingly, whilst (21) is semantically referential, (22) is not: 
(22) The table is covered with books.  
At first glance this appears counter-intuitive. For instance, the definite 
description the table is context-sensitive and its semantic value will change 
depending upon the context of utterance, just like an indexical. However, 
Neale states that an utterance of (22) nevertheless has the semantics ‘there 
is one and only one object that is both a table and covered with books’. It 
will create a relation between ‘being a table’ and ‘being covered with 
books’ and state of that relation that only one unique individual satisfies it. 
In other words it remains quantificational. If one retains this Russellian 
paraphrase, then the denotation of the table can change without alteration to 
the sentences truth-conditions, but this is not to say the truth-maker will 
remain the same. When the Russellian paraphrase is accepted the 
referential uses must therefore emerge from outside of the semantics. The 
distinction now becomes prominent, as whilst it holds that the proposition 
expressed is not object-dependent the individual it picks out will still be 
part of what the speaker meant and intended to communicate in saying (22), 
they were trying to communicate something about a particular table. 
The same point can be made through considering the truth makers for (21) 
and (22). Neale wants to say that with (21) an object x picked out by the 
indexical in a particular utterance is tied inherently to the propositional 
content. In virtue of this, the particular object x is a necessary part of the 
truth maker for (21) across all possible worlds of evaluation. Conversely, 
given a particular utterance of (22) it may on one occasion denote the table 
y and hence y will act as part of the truth maker for (22), but this need not 
be the case, for instance another table z might on another occasion make (22) 
true. In the y case the speaker may communicate a proposition through 
using (22) that has to do with y and hence y is part of what the speaker 
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meant, but the proposition expressed is no more to do with y than it is to 
do with z. The distinction at work gives Neale the basis for his account of 
the CAP as being pragmatic and that this pragmatics has no impact on the 
semantic content/linguistic meaning of a given definite description.  
Let us combine the distinctions made by Kripke and Neale into our 
framework distinction between linguistic meaning and speaker’s meaning: 
(23) Kripke’s distinction between semantic reference and 
speaker’s reference, and Neale’s distinction between the 
proposition expressed and the proposition meant, can be 
generalized as a distinction between linguistic meaning 
and speaker meaning. For instance, if a property P of a 
given expression ζ is part of ζ’s linguistic meaning, then it 
is semantic, it is part of the semantic skeleton/blueprint, 
and if P is part of what a speaker meant in using ζ, then it 
is pragmatic. 
We can now relate the two theories neatly with our work on the 
semantics/pragmatics framework provided in §2. 
3.33 
THE RUSSELLIAN PARAPHRASE 
The linguistic meaning of a sentence containing a definite description, its 
semantic skeleton or blueprint, is a Russellian paraphrase. Nevertheless, 
Neale is keen to highlight that it might be argued that the paraphrase is so 
vastly in contrast with the surface syntax of definite descriptions that it 
cannot be accurate.72 For instance, a sentence such as the father of Charles II 
                                                          
72 Surface syntax is a term reserved for the grammatical and morphophonemic structure that 
is expressed in a particular speech act (including written and sign language). The concept of 
surface syntax is to be taken in contrast with deep syntax. The contrast is born out of the fact 
that one and the same proposition can be expressed through varying surface syntax. For 
instance, John kicked the football can be expressed in two distinct ways: 
 
(i) John kicked the football. 
(ii) The football was kicked by John. 
 
Whilst the surface syntax is distinct, the first being active and the second passive, they both 
exhibit the same proposition with John as the logical subject and the football as the object. The 
distinction originates in Chomsky (1957; 1965), wherein Chomsky took grammatical 
structure to operate over two levels, the first (deep syntax) organized the thematic structure 
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(F) was executed (E) receives the paraphrase in (24) and the formalization in 
(25): 
(24) It is not always false of x that x begat Charles II and that x was 
executed and that 'if y begat Charles II, y is identical with x' is 
always true of y'. 
(25) x(F(x) & y(F(y)  y=x) & E(x)) 
Streamlining the view with syntactic structure is a difficult task, but Neale 
takes the unwieldy paraphrase to be inessential to the Russellian QT. It is 
not necessarily the case that one must retain this paraphrase in order to 
defend the view that definite descriptions express a Russellian semantics 
(1990, 39). The alternative is to take notice of the natural language syntax 
and to use it to inform the formalism, thereby avoiding the criticism that 
the theory fails to match surface syntax. 
In order to understand the criticism of the Russellian paraphrase Neale 
invites us to consider a standard quantifier phrase, for instance all tigers (T) 
are dangerous (D) and a first-order formalization of it in (26): 
(26) x(T(x) ⟶ D(x)) 
At least two parts of the sentence all tigers are dangerous fail to be captured 
by the formalization. The first is that within the formalization there is 
nothing corresponding to the nominal phrase all tigers, and the second is 
that it involves a sentential connective even though it does not contain two 
further sentences (1990, 40). The same problem carries over to (25) as 
nothing in the logical form corresponds to the nominal the father of Charles II 
and once again it contains sentential connectives. 
Neale proposes to retain a nominal-like structure in the logical form of 
quantifier phrases and thus definite descriptions. The idea is one mirrored 
in Heim & Kratzer’s compositional semantics (1998). The process is as 
follows, if φ is a well formed formula then [Dx: φ] is a well formed formula 
where Dx binds “any free occurrences of x in the formula with which it 
combines [namely φ] to form a unary quantifier” and if ψ is a well formed 
formula then [Dx: φ](ψ) is a well formed formula where “[Dx: φ] binds any 
                                                                                                                                                   
of the sentence and the second (surface syntax) is formed through transformation that create 
the sentence as perceived on a particular occasion. 
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free occurrences of x in the formula with which it combines [namely ψ] to 
form a formula” (1990, 42). 73  In less technical vocabulary, given any 
determiner or quantifier (for instance the), it attaches to a formula (for 
instance the bare noun phrase man, to create the man) and binds any free 
variables in that formula to create a restricted quantifier phrase. Following 
this, the quantifier phrase attaches to a formula (for instance the verbal 
phrase is tall) and binds any free variables in the verbal phrase to create a 
further completed sentential formula the man is tall. 
Employing this new formalism for a sentence such as the F is G we get the 
following: 
(27) [The x: Fx](Gx)  
Within Russell’s theory of descriptions the determiner the is a quantifier of 
a special sort in that it asserts uniqueness. The new formalism of Neale’s is 
required to capture this fact if it is to avoid losing the insights of the 
Russellian theory. Neale introduces the following truth-clause in order to 
do this: 
(28) [The x: Fx](Gx) is true iff |F – G| = 0 and |F| = 1 
The idea behind this move of Neale’s is that the formalism to the left of the 
truth clause respects the surface syntax of sentences containing definite 
descriptions, whilst overall (28) stays true to the Russellian semantics and 
the problems it was designed to solve (1990, 45). As we can see, the notion 
of the definite description as the subject of the sentence is captured by [The 
x: Fx], which forms a restricted quantifier, and the notion of uniqueness 
that is central to singular definite descriptions is captured by the truth 
clause that defines the formalism. 
The formalism that has been adopted extends naturally to further forms of 
descriptions listed in (20), and it does so without recourse to the unwieldy 
Russellian paraphrase. For instance, Neale illustrates that we can now give 
an account of plural definite descriptions such as the Fs are Gs: 
(29) [The x: Fx](Gx) is true iff |F – G| = 0 and |F| = > 1 
Numberless descriptions such as whoever shot JFK: 
                                                          
73 A similar process is outlined by Heim & Kratzer (1998, 145-146). 
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(30) [who x: Fx](Gx) is true iff |F – G| = 0 and |F| = ≥ 1 
As well as descriptions containing relative clauses (the man who loves Mary 
is insane), relativized descriptions (the mother of every boy is proud of him), 
possessives (Smith’s murderer), and so on (1990, 46-47). The theory of 
descriptions, as modified by Neale, now becomes a “more general theory of 
natural language quantification” (1990, 46). Two positives emerge from this 
theory, the first is that it arguably captures the syntax of natural language 
better than the Russellian formalism, and secondly that it unifies many 
forms of quantification that share related properties (including the role of 
restriction on the quantifier it attaches to). 
The formal structure [Dx: φ] is meant to capture the structure of a DP and 
its formation through the composition of D and an NP complement. The 
DP is syntactically associated with the argument places of sentences: 




The syntax of DPs as described here mirrors the process whereby a definite 
description becomes a restricted quantifier phrase. The determiner position 
holds the quantifier and the complement (NP or whatever else occupies 
that position) restricts the quantifier. The construction of a DP involves the 
D position being merged to its complement, in this instance NP, and this 
creates the restriction on the quantifier. Returning to a type-based analysis 
we can label D in (31) of type <<e, t>, <<e, t>, t>>, and the restricted 
quantifier phrase at DP as type <<e, t>, t>. Distinct definite descriptions 
employ distinct terms occupying D. However, in each case a process of 
restriction takes place on the quantifier. This is the first move in Neale’s 
theory that, arguably, takes natural language syntax seriously (2004, 119). 
It is a positive step for the descriptions literature to consider how the 
theory interacts with further aspects of the faculty of language, and in 
particular grammar. Nevertheless, it is not the case that the formalism is 
explained in terms of grammar. In other words, there is no explanation of 







formalism. The problem is that the D position is no closer related to 
quantificational determiners than it is to, for instance, rigidly referring 
terms such as proper names. Furthermore, the case of proper names seems 
to suggest that the semantics of arguments might be derivative from the 
grammar itself. Take for instance the two sentences Ronaldo is tall and the 
English Ronaldo is tall. Each contains an instance of the lexical item Ronaldo 
yet it is the grammatical structure that dictates its interpretation. Two 








In (32) Ronaldo would be interpreted as a proper name, whereas in (33) it is 
interpreted predicatively.74 The two instances of the term Ronaldo therefore 
receive a semantic interpretation based upon the syntactic positions that 
they occupy as opposed to their lexical entry (Longobardi 1994; 2005).75  
Furthermore, if we associated the D position with a quantifier expression, 
then we fail to explain why (32) does not receive a similar analysis. As is 
visible from the above examples, the D position is no more closely related 
to the [Dx:] part of the quantificational formalism as it is too rigid 
designation. A straightforward answer may be offered here, which would 
be in line with Neale’s account, which is that it is the lexical entry for the 
word that dictates its semantic contribution. In other words, it isn’t the case 
that D dictates the semantic contribution of the article but it is the articles 
                                                          
74 It is worth noting that Neale does not explicitly recognize proper names as being in D, 
instead choosing to place them in N (2004, 118), contrary to much linguistic research 
(Longobardi 1994; 1996; 2005; Semenza, Longobardi, Cocolo, & Granà 2001; Roberts 2001, 
140; Alexiadou, Haegeman, & Stavrou 2007, 203; Zamparelli 2014, 155) 
75 The name Ronaldo in (32) will have undergone movement from N into D indicated by the 
arrow, which is what forces the rigid reading. We will return to this point in §5.34. 
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lexical entry and the semantic-type it carries in that entry. Therefore, as 
Ronaldo and the have distinct lexical entries with distinct semantic-types, 
their semantic contribution is likewise distinct. It is an answer such as this 
that we have been calling lexicocentric, and it comes with problems.  
We can see from the distinction between (32) and (33) that the lexical entry 
for Ronaldo fails to dictate its semantic contribution in all instance of its use. 
In (32) it is rigid and in (33) predicative. However, these differences are 
neatly explained if we associated the semantics of Ronaldo, as an argument, 
as being derivative from its underlying grammar. Words that occupy N are 
predicative, and words that undergo N-D movement are rigid (Longobardi 
1994; 2005). Additionally, were we to rely on the lexical entry forming the 
two uses we would essentially posit grammatical, compositional, 
information in the lexical entry, which would be contrary to how many 
linguists view the lexicon (Marantz 2000; 2006; Borer 2005; Boeckx 2008). It 
is therefore worth questioning whether we can provide a lexical account of 
the semantics of the definite article either. The lexical entry for the article 
the would thus contain grammatical information, and the semantic-type we 
posited would thus be structural. Therefore, it appears as if Neale’s attempt 
to streamline the Russellian paraphrase with grammar is a case of 
backward engineering. The lexicocentric view, that is demanded to explain 
the distinction between (32) and (33), is thus tacked onto a grammatical 
category. There is nothing special in the analysis that provides (31) with a 
particularly strong syntax/semantic mapping in the same way that an 
extensive account of DP and the configurations it enables might. The tie 
between the quantificational semantics and a DP thus looks stipulated. An 
alternative would be to take the topology of DPs to create a range of 
semantic interpretations for arguments, what we have been calling ‘forms 
of reference’, which the lexical items placed within a certain configuration 
end up taking on. We will return to provide a theory based on such an idea 
in §5.3.  
The interesting part about Neale’s modification here is that it acknowledges 
that both grammar and semantics are generative, compositional, engines 
for linguistic structure. Through linking the Russellian theory with 
grammar as in (31) Neale is able to illustrate how semantic structure might 
be generated in line with grammar in order to retain a nominal 
construction in the logical form of definite descriptions. Nevertheless, as 
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we have stated it might underestimate the role of grammar in constructing 
meaning in the first place. Furthermore, it is open to the counter that D can 
be associated with both referential and quantificational structures. For 
instance, one might state that D creates a referential semantics and that the 
NP simply restricts the act of reference. We will see in §4 that these options 
have been explored. In order to avoid stipulation as to the contribution of 
DPs to compositional semantics we must analyse them more closely. 
Nevertheless, for the time being we will continue to analyse Neale’s 
version of the Russellian QT.  
3.34 
APPLYING THE RUSSELLIAN THEORY 
In what follows, let us assume that a modified Russellian theory provides 
the correct semantics for definite descriptions and see how far it takes us in 
answering three common problems for such theories: misdescription, 
incompleteness, and referential anaphora. Following Evans (1982), Neale 
outlines two ways in which definite descriptions can be used referentially. 
The first takes definite descriptions to function as names, and the second 
takes definite descriptions to function as demonstrative expressions. The 
following pairs of sentences outline the two distinct functions (1990, 85-86): 
(34) The manager of Manchester United is Dutch. 
(34*) Louis van Gaal is Dutch. 
(35) The desk is covered with books. 
(35*) That desk is covered with books. 
Neale analyses the example in (34) as follows, if both speaker and audience 
are aware that Louis van Gaal is the manager of Manchester United, then 
one of the propositions meant by an utterance of (34) is the object 
dependent proposition in (34*). In a likewise fashion, an utterance of (35) 
together with an appropriate gesture will also communicate an object-
dependent proposition to the audience, which could have equally been 
communicated with (35*). The question remains as to whether, in virtue of 
the fact that the definite descriptions in (34) and (35) can be used to 
communicate the same object-dependent propositions as (34*) and (35*) 
they are semantically referential? Neale thinks not. 
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One reason for this is that it is possible to communicate object-dependent 
propositions with standard quantifier phrases such as everyone and someone. 
For instance, Wilson’s reply in (18) repeated here as (36) communicates the 
same proposition as (37): 
(36) Smith: What happened to the champagne? 
Wilson: Well, somebody [gestures towards Jones] must have drunk 
it. 
Smith: Typical Jones. 
(37) Jones must have drunk it. 
The idea is that, as in (34) and (35), the speaker succeeds in communicating 
an object-dependent proposition using an expression that is semantically 
quantificational. Following this observation, the explanation of the 
referential use of definite descriptions is a general observation about how 
pragmatic machinery embellished natural language quantification. It is 
worth noting at this point what we said earlier when discussing Kripke, the 
quantifier phrase in Wilson’s retort is likely accompanied by distinct 
intonation effects (or an ostensive act), which hint at a non-standard, non-
canonical, use of the phase and therefore potential grammatical differences. 
Nevertheless, using the idea of pragmatic machinery, Neale sets to work 
diffusing some common problems often raised against Russellian theories. 
According to him, it is the superior manner in which the Russellian QT 




The CAP raises the problem of misdescription. Recall the courtroom 
context wherein (38) is uttered: 
(38) Smith’s murderer is insane. 
In uttering (38) the speaker attempts to communicate the object-dependent 
proposition that Jones is insane. Assuming Jones is insane, it is intuitive to 
take the speaker to have said something true even though the descriptive 
content of (38) is not met. In Neale’s words “it is the object S [the speaker] 
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wishes to convey something about rather than the descriptive condition 
used to get at this object that is of semantical relevance” (1990, 91). 
Following from this observation, is it correct to take such instances as 
undermining a Russellian QT? 
Neale states that taking instances of misdescription to support a referential 
semantics analysis “relies on the existence of a clear intuition that the 
proposition expressed is still true despite the fact that neither Jones nor 
anyone else satisfies the description” (1990, 91). Do we in fact have a clear 
intuition that what the speaker said was true if Smith was not murdered? 
Donnellan’s point was that because the speaker intended to speak of Jones 
in using Smith’s murderer they must have said something true. It is this 
intuition that is questionable. For, if it is not the case that there is a 
particular individual that killed Smith, how can we say that individual is 
insane, and, more pertinently, how can we say that what the speaker said, 
rather than simply implicated, was true.  
There are two intuitions at work here, which need to be reconciled. The 
first is that in some sense the speaker said something true if the speaker 
succeeded in communicating something about Jones, namely that Jones is 
insane. The second is that in some sense the speaker said something false, 
namely that there is an individual x such that x killed Smith and x is insane. 
According to Neale the Russellian has a straightforward answer to this 
question. It is as follows: 
[t]he proposition expressed by an utterance of ‘the F is G’ is still 
descriptive, but the speaker may exploit the fact that both 
speaker and hearer are willing to entertain the idea that some 
particular individual b is uniquely F in order to communicate 
an object-dependent proposition about b. Again, the 
proposition that b is G may well be part of what is meant but it 
is not the proposition expressed, nor is it implied by it. Applied 
to Donnellan’s example, the proposition expressed by my 
utterance of ‘Smith’s murder is insane’ is false; but the 
proposition I intended to communicate is true (if Jones is 
indeed insane). (1990, 92) 
The Russellian answer is thus that (38) is false in terms of its linguistic 
meaning, what is said, but may be true in terms of its speaker’s meaning, 
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what is implicated.76 The two intuitions are thus captured. Therefore, Neale 
concludes that the Russellian “has the edge” in the case of misdescription. 
It is important to note for the thesis that we will offer later that instances of 
misdescription may well be outside the explanatory remit of a grammatical 
theory of meaning. The syntax of natural language is blind as to whether 
the structure it creates in an utterance will misdescribe an individual, event, 
and so on, in the context. For instance, from the point of view of grammar, 
(39) and (40) are identical: 
(39) Smith is raking the leaves. 
(40) Jones is raking the leaves. 
If a speaker uses (39) to refer to Jones, then grammar has no impact on this, 
similarly if a speaker uses (40) to refer to Smith. The idiosyncratic 
information carried by the lexical entry for Smith and Jones is thus not 
constrained by grammar. The grammatical theory of meaning is thus 
reduced to purely compositional aspects of semantics. However, this 
should not speak against the theory. For instance, it is not the case that 
formal semantics, as described in §2.2, has any impact on the distinction 
between (39) and (40) either, insofar as it provides a skeletal blueprint for 
its compositional semantic structure. We admit therefore that pragmatic 
machinery may well be involved in the interpretation of idiosyncratic 
information carried by lexical items. The grammatical thesis (GT) that we 
will provide will argue that grammar alone determines the semantics of 
arguments insofar as they are referential or quantificational, insofar as they 
exhibit a strong or weak form of reference, but it does not prevent instances 
of misdescription or spurious acts of reference. Therefore, we will argue 
that whether (38) is semantically referential or not, whether it is referential 
in its truth-conditional contribution to what is said, is a matter of its 
underlying grammar (§5.3, §5.4, and §6.1), but we will not rule out 
potential instances of misdescription where pragmatic machinery may 
enable idiosyncratic information to be put aside for the purposes of 
communicative efficacy. However, we will state that where an argument’s 
grammar dictates that it is semantically referential the descriptive content 
                                                          
76 The passage from Neale states that the object-dependent proposition is not implied by the 
linguistic meaning of (38). However, what Neale means is that it is not a direct semantic 
implication of it. 
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plays second fiddle to the referential interpretation (an example of such an 
argument will be detailed in §6.11 wherein we discuss deictic descriptions). 
3.342 
INCOMPLETE DESCRIPTIONS 
Another issue often raised against the Russellian is that of incompleteness. 
The problem of incompleteness has to do with how a Russellian QT deals 
with definite descriptions that are not uniquely identifying. For the most 
part, when we use definite descriptions they fail to uniquely identify their 
referents. According to Wettstein, there is good reason to suppose that only 
by positing a semantic ambiguity can we begin to explain incomplete 
descriptions (1981; 1983). Consider the following sentence: 
(41) The desk is covered with books. 
A Russellian analysis of the linguistic meaning captured in (41) is that it 
states there is exactly one unique desk that is covered with books. 
Nevertheless, no object uniquely satisfies the descriptive content desk, there 
exists more than one desk in the world. However, providing (41) with a 
referential semantics avoids the problem as it does not uniquely quantify 
over the domain. Instead, under a referential analysis the descriptive 
content provides the speaker and audience with enough material to pick 
out the particular desk in the context. The problem for the Russellian is 
how to account for such uses without granting a semantic ambiguity. 
Neale’s account is once again concerned with a more general account of 
natural language quantification. Incompleteness is not something special to 
referential uses of descriptions. It exists in non-referential uses and 
quantifier phrases more generally. In virtue of this Neale claims an 
“account of the phenomenon [of incompleteness] cannot be based on a 
referential interpretation” (1990, 101). According to Neale, the best option 
available to the Russellian is to take quantifier phrases to be elliptical for 
completed expressions and to state that the elliptical material is 
“recoverable from the context of utterance”, through what are termed 
‘contextual coordinates’ (1990, 96). Neale terms this form of ellipsis 
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‘pragmatic’, and contrasts it with linguistic, or syntactic, ellipsis (2004, 83).77 
Importantly for Neale, appealing to these two factors (ellipsis and 
contextual coordinates) requires no ad hoc addition to the Russellian theory. 
For, in virtue of the fact that incompleteness is a widespread phenomenon, 
“contextual coordinates and ellipsed material are independently required 
by any adequate theory of natural language quantification” (1990, 101). 
Neale’s theory is that incompleteness is a general phenomenon, it is present 
across a wide range of quantifier phrases, and in virtue of this the solution 
can be given without recourse to defending a semantic ambiguity.78 
We can illustrate ellipsis through taking (41) to be elliptical for (42): 
(42) The desk [in the seminar room in Durham’s philosophy department 
at time t] is covered with books.79 
The elliptical material in the brackets provides (42) with a unique desk, 
which is what the Russellian QT seemingly demands for the sentence to be 
true. The same carries over for standard quantifier phrases as in (43): 
(43) Everyone left the party at 8pm. 
(44) Everyone [who attended the party at x at time t] left at 8pm. 
In other words, when a phrase is incomplete it is because the material that 
would make it complete has been dropped from the utterance, and this 
explains (41). 80  This fits in with Neale’s project of generalising the 
                                                          
77 The idea of linguistic ellipsis is that whereby material is deleted in the phonetic realisation 
of an expression. For instance, in the following sentence the italicised element may be 
dropped from the phonetic representation of the expression but is nevertheless interpreted, 
‘I can play football but John can’t play football’. Conversely, pragmatic ellipsis is where 
additional material may be interpreted as part of the speech-act but is not present in the 
syntactic representation as in, ‘I am going to a party at John’s house’. 
78
 The position has been labelled by some a ‘hidden indexical theory of descriptions’ in 
virtue of its positing ellipsis (Schiffer 1995; Bezuidenhout 1997). Schiffer criticises the 
position for being in conflict with direct reference theories of indexicals (1995), although 
Bezuidenhout, whilst not agreeing with Neale, sees no such conflict (1997, 382). 
79 Neale also recognizes the possible objection that the elliptical material may itself contain 
referential elements, but he states that “this is very different from saying that the description 
is interpreted referentially” (1990, 100). For further discussion on this issue see Neale (1990, 
99-102).  
80 It should be noted that Wettstein rejects this account of incompleteness on the basis that 
the incomplete description could be filled out by any number of equally applicable pieces of 
elliptical material. Additionally, Wettstein states that the speaker will have no particular 
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machinery employed in referential uses of definite descriptions to fit a 
wider class of expressions that are part of natural language quantification.81 
The Russellian QT once again looks to be strengthened.  
Interestingly, a phenomenon akin to incompleteness affects proper names 
as well: 
(45) Ronaldo is a footballer. 
An audience with a rudimentary knowledge of world class footballers may 
be unsure as to whether the speaker was referring to the Brazilian 
phenomenon Luis Ronaldo or the Portuguese winger Cristiano Ronaldo. 
There are a variety of ways to solve this problem. Firstly, the audience may 
ask the speaker who they intended to refer to. Secondly, the audience may 
recover from the context the intended referent. And thirdly, we might take 
the name to be indexed to a particular individual whilst being phonetically 
identical with other differently indexed instances of the name Ronaldo.82 
The same goes for (46): 
(46) He is a footballer. 
If (46) is uttered in a room full of people, without any further contextual or 
ostensive cues, then it will be difficult for the audience to apprehend the 
intended referent. In each of (45) and (46) ellipsis can help to alleviate the 
problems. It is worth noting that Neale views descriptive third-person 
animate and inanimate pronouns as the ‘most incomplete of descriptions’, 
and hence his elliptical view readily extends to them (2004, 125-129). The 
problem of incompleteness therefore appears widespread across arguments 
in natural language. Furthermore, incompleteness raises an issue for how it 
is that the linguistic meaning of the expressions fully determines truth-
conditional content, or what is said, in such examples. 
                                                                                                                                                   
preference for one over the other (see 1981, 97). The discussion in Wettstein is not relevant to 
our present purposes and is heavily criticised (Neale 1990, 98-102; Salmon 1982; 1991). 
81 Whilst endorsing ellipsis Neale is quick to point out that this is not syntactic ellipsis. There 
is nothing in this thesis to suggest that the elliptical material can be syntactically recovered 
or that it has been deleted during the syntactic derivation, a suggestion that Neale considers 
‘absurd’ (2004, 139-143). 
82 It must be noted that none of this is intended to imply that the name fails to be a rigid 
designator, but simply that we should be aware that, from a purely communicative point of 
view, it might be labelled incomplete in a similar manner to the quantifier phrases. 
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The examples in (45) and (46) do not lend support to the claim that 
incompleteness and ellipsis is a phenomenon that is special to quantifier 
phrases. Instead, incompleteness may be a phenomenon that occurs with 
all arguments excluding perhaps first person pronominal reference. In a 
similar manner to the quantifier phrase examples, it is the descriptive 
content carried by the arguments in (45) and (46) that makes them 
incomplete. For instance, in a room containing more than one man, where 
no contextual or ostensive cues are offered, (46) cannot disambiguate its 
referent. This is because the only descriptive material it carries is that the 
referent be singular and masculine. Therefore, the existence of 
incompleteness in quantifier phrases more generally does not support the 
Russellian QT, any more than (45)-(46) support an ambiguity thesis. 
The proper name and pronoun examples might be criticized on the basis 
that they do not elicit an incomplete nominal restriction of the sort 
contained in definite descriptions. The argument between Neale and 
Wettstein concerns instances whereby a determiner is restricted by its noun 
phrase (NP) complement whilst the NP complement itself leaves the 
expression incomplete. The proper name and pronoun examples do not 
follow this pattern as their descriptive content is radically diminished in 
virtue of not having an NP restriction. However, when we look at complex 
demonstratives the same problem is present: 
(47) That desk is covered with books.  
In a context where more than one desk is present and each desk is covered 
with books we once again get a problem akin to incompleteness. On the 
face of it, the linguistic meaning is insufficient for the audience to 
apprehend the intended referent. Nevertheless, sentences such as (47) are 
frequently treated in the literature as object-dependent.83  Therefore, the 
idea of arguments requiring pragmatic ellipsis will not add weight to the 
Russellian argument and it cannot be seen simply as a wider account of 
natural language quantification, contrary to Neale’s claims (1990, 101). 
Instead, the idea as employed by Neale may simply be the identification of 
a widespread phenomenon present in the majority of arguments employed 
in natural language use, a phenomenon that is ubiquitous in both natural 
language reference and quantification. 
                                                          
83 It is worth noting that some deny that complex demonstratives are referential (King 2001). 
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A second thing to consider with respect to incompleteness is the role of 
context in the securing of a referent for incomplete descriptions. Following 
Lewis (1972), Neale states that certain expressions employ contextual 
coordinates including coordinates linked to the speaker, addressee, time of 
utterance, and place of utterance (1990, 69; 101). The contextual coordinates 
are demanded as part of the linguistic meaning of incomplete definite 
descriptions independently of speaker’s meaning. An incomplete 
description together with the values given to the contextual coordinates 
that its linguistic meaning demands produces its semantic value. The 
concept of contextual coordinates used here is not one of free contextual 
enrichment of the sort posited in contextualism. The reference to ellipsis 
and contextual coordinates made by Neale thereby retains the literalism 
endorsed by a Russellian QT. 
If we are less content with the tenets of literalism however, then we might 
opt for an account whereby incomplete descriptions are semantically 
underdetermined and are ‘enriched’ by pragmatics in such a way as to 
provide truth-conditions, such a view would be an instance of 
contextualism as outlined in §2. Bezuidenhout, for instance, states that: 
[d]efinite descriptions […] are not semantically ambiguous but, 
rather, semantically underdetermined. To interpret a sentence 
containing such an expression, pragmatic processes of various 
sorts must operate on an incomplete conceptual representation 
of the meaning of such a sentence, so as to yield a complete 
representation of the truth-evaluable content which that 
sentence has when used in some particular conversational 
context. (1997, 385-386) 
The same follows for incomplete descriptions. Incomplete descriptions do 
not receive a truth-evaluable content – truth-conditions – until they are 
‘enriched’ by the context of utterance. As such, there is no problem with a 
definite description being incomplete. Any definite description (uniquely 
identifying or otherwise) requires contextual enrichment in order to 
provide its contribution to truth-conditions. The critical part of this analysis 
is that ‘what is said’, that is, the truth-conditional part of an utterance, 
depends upon this enrichment. This is not the case with a Russellian 
account as the linguistic meaning of an expression ζ remains unaffected by 
context, only the semantic value of ζ is affected. 
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At this juncture, we can introduce a third potential position that is in 
contrast to both Neale’s elliptical account of incompleteness and the 
alternative from contextualism. The third position will be grounded in 
grammar and form part of the GT to be detailed in more thoroughly in §5 
and §6. It has been observed that incompleteness is rife in arguments. It is 
present in at least definite descriptions, quantifier phrases, proper names, 
and certain pronouns. Completeness is achieved through contextual 
coordinates valuing the expressions relative to the speech-act. A 
lexicocentric theory, as characterized in a Russellian QT, distinguishes the 
varying incomplete expressions on the basis of their conventional meaning, 
which in turn informs their linguistic meaning. We will offer an alternative, 
non-lexicocentric, account of the distinct manners in which incomplete 
expressions interact with context. Furthermore, within the QT those 
contextual coordinates are purely determined through pragmatic 
machinery (speaker’s meaning). However, we will detail that certain 
contextual coordinates often assumed to be pragmatic, which we will 
group under the heading of speech-event features (following Sigurðsson 
2004a; 2004b), are actually grammatical. In virtue of this, we will suggest 
that the grammatical engine of language actually codes for utterances to be 
taken relative to the context, which is established prior to any pragmatic 
influence.  
The first part of our grammatical alternative concerns the topology of DPs 
(the topology of DPs will be discussed in detail in §5.342). In distinguishing 
the manner in which arguments interact with context we can turn to the 
interaction between the DP head, D, and its NP complement. Introducing 
some new terminology, we can take DPs to constitute a syntactic phase and 
understand D to constitute a phase ‘edge’ and NP to constitute a phase 
‘interior’ (we will explain this terminology properly in §5.25 and §5.34). For 
instance, definite descriptions have content in both the edge (D) and 
interior (NP), demonstratives have an optional interior, and pronominal 
expressions cannot co-occur with an explicit interior: 
(48) [D It [NP ∅]] is covered with books. 
(49) [D That [NP (desk)]] is covered with books. 
(50) [D The [NP desk]] is covered with books. 
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In terms of interaction with context, (48) is most reliant on context, the next 
most reliant is (49), and finally the least reliant is (50). The idea behind the 
DP topology is that the phase edge is the locus of reference and the phase 
interior is the locus of descriptive information (Sheehan & Hinzen 2011; 
2013; Martin & Hinzen 2014). The more descriptive content an expression 
contains, the less it will rely upon contextual supplementation. In 
correspondence with these distinctions we see an increase in referential 
strength in accordance less interpretive reliance on the interior (referential 
strength thus decreases from (48)-(50)). We will see later in the thesis that 
we take the topology of DPs to partially constitute the semantics of 
arguments, therefore distinguishing it from lexicocentric semantic-type 
theories. The first alternative we will make with the QT is that the manner 
in which an argument interacts with context is determined by the 
grammatical configuration of the DP in which it is contained. 
The second part of our grammatical alternative concerns speech-event 
features, which are posited as part of the complementizer phrase (C) that 
projects at the top of all syntactic clauses. According to Sigurðsson, every 
syntactic clause contains syntactic projections corresponding to speech-
Time (ST), speech-Location (SL), logophoric-Agent (LA), and logophoric-
Patient (LP) (Sigurðsson 2004b, 230). Furthermore, the matrix C contains 
speech-event features that a valued relative to the exact speech-act taking 
place. Within modern cartographic syntax it is not possible to think of a 
sentence as fully derived, syntactically complete, and isolated from a 
speech-event. A syntactic clause is thus always valued relative to the 
speech-event it is part of, even if no phonetic material is realised on these 
speech-event projections (2009, 172). Let us consider an incomplete 
description: 
(51) [C ST SL LA LP [The desk is covered with books]. 
We have introduced the speech-event projections to illustrate the point. An 
utterance of (51) is always taken relative to the speech-event, and hence the 
fact that the descriptive content fails to pick out a unique individual is thus 
unimportant. There is essentially an inherent domain restriction picked out 
by the values of the speech-event features, which forces the desk to be 
understood just in the present speech-event. In other words, syntax makes 
the definite description, or sentence as a whole, complete enough, relative 
to the speech-act context, to identify a referent (Hinzen, forthcoming). We 
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will discuss this idea further in §5.4, but we introduce it to give a flavour of 
how a grammatical theory might venture to explain incompleteness. 
Critically, all of the above, the topology of DPs and the speech-event 
features, takes place prior to pragmatics getting a look-in. Therefore, there 
is at least one possible alternative to both literalism and contextualism in 
instances of incompleteness. 
3.343 
ANAPHORA 
Another topic that is raised against the Russellian comes from referential 
anaphora. Typically, anaphora is categorized in, at least, the following 
three ways: 
(52) As bound variables:      
 Some player broke his foot. 
(53) As referential expressions:     
 The manager is in the technical area.  He looks angry. 
(54) As definite articles or disguised descriptions (E-type anaphora):
 Every man that owns a donkey beats it. 
With respect to definite descriptions, examples (53) and (54) are the 
interesting examples. In (53) the anaphoric pronoun shares a referent with 
the definite description, and in (54) the anaphoric pronoun is, arguably, a 
proxy for a definite description. Neale focuses his attention on examples 
like these and so shall we. The question is to what extent the Russellian can 
account for the relationship between anaphoric pronouns and the 
expressions that act as their antecedents. 
Let us begin with the type of anaphora exhibited in (53). Neale uses the 
following pair of sentences to outline the problem for the Russellian (with 
the italics highlighting the antecedent phrase and anaphoric phrase 
respectively): 
(55) [α The manager] is in the technical area.  [β He] looks angry. 
In (55) the anaphoric pronoun β is tied to the antecedent definite 
description α. Neale points out that there are two options for 
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understanding the anaphoric pronoun, either it is a bound variable or it is a 
referential expression. If the anaphoric pronoun is a bound variable, then it 
is required that it is c-commanded by the antecedent phrase, whose role it 
is to do the binding.84  C-command does not stretch across sentences, and 
hence the anaphoric pronoun in (55) is not a bound variable and must 
therefore be a referential expression (1990, 171-176). The problem for the 
Russellian, as Neale sees it, is that if β is a referential expression and is 
anaphoric on α, then β must inherit its referent from α, and if β inherits its 
referent from α, then α must likewise be a referential expression. This 
argument for definite descriptions having a referential semantics, at least in 
these instances, is named by Neale the ‘argument from anaphora’ (1990, 
176). 
With respect to the example in (55) the role of the anaphoric pronoun is to 
hook onto a discourse referent introduced by the antecedent description. 
The explanation Neale offers for this phenomenon is drawn from his 
understanding of how definite descriptions can be used to communicate 
object-dependent propositions. In order to maintain the view that β is a 
referential expression Neale must account for how there comes to be a 
referent that it hooks onto. The account once again involves the general 
distinction between the linguistic meaning and the speaker’s meaning. The 
antecedent description α communicates an object-dependent proposition 
and thereby makes salient a particular individual, without, according to 
Neale, being a referential expression itself. Following Lewis (1979), Neale 
claims that the anaphoric pronoun can then hook onto the salient 
individual, without the further claim that this is because the definite 
description is referential. Once again this argument is generalized to 
account for instances of standard quantification and anaphora where the 
anaphoric pronoun is not c-commanded, hence bound, by the quantifier, as 
in (56): 
(56) Someone broke the vase. He will get the bill in the post. 
                                                          
84 Radford informally defines c-command as “a structural relation between two constituents. 
To say that one constituent X c-commands another constituent Y is (informally) to say that X 
is no lower than Y in the structure (i.e. either X is higher up in the structure than Y, or the 
two are at the same height)… a constituent X c-commands its sister constituent Y and any 
constituent Z that is contained within Y” (2004, 440). The term ‘structure’ simply refers to 
syntactic structure and height refers to positions within syntactic trees that are employed to 
illustrate syntactic derivations. 
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The point of this is to account for the anaphoric pronoun being referential 
without committing to the view that the antecedent description, or 
quantifier phrase, is referential as well (1990, 177). 
One possible problem emerges when we conjoin the two sentences in (55) 
to create an individual sentence as in (57): 
(57) The manager is in the technical area and he looks angry. 
If we recall that Neale’s view involves the communication of an object-
dependent proposition in order for the anaphoric pronoun to hook onto a 
referent, then the problem is clear. The problem is that in virtue of this 
being a single sentence the first conjunct does not manage to communicate 
an object-dependent proposition that the second conjunct can make use of. 
If we consider the communicative act, there is not enough time for the 
truth-conditions for the first conjunct to be settled and hence the contextual 
coordinates established for the antecedent. Nevertheless, the Russellian can 
retort that the audience’s ability to parse the sentence in real-time may 
enable the relevant individual to become salient in time for the anaphoric 
expression to make use of it. In such a case the Russellian must then 
explain how this parsing is enabled. 
A further option that Neale outlines comes from non-referential uses of 
descriptions and pronouns that are anaphoric on them. The following is 
such an example: 
(58) The inventor of bifocals was a genius and he ate a lot of fish. 
In the case of (58) the definite description is, according to the Russellian, 
used attributively, and hence neither communicates an object-dependent 
proposition nor makes salient a particular individual. What then is the 
linguistic meaning of the anaphoric pronoun if it is neither a bound 
pronoun nor a referential pronoun? According to Neale, the anaphoric 
pronoun is a proxy for the antecedent description, the pronoun is 
interpreted as a “repeated occurrence of its antecedent”, it is interpreted as 
a definite description (1990, 183). This analysis is a popular account of what 
are termed E-type anaphora exhibited in (54). In fact, Neale goes so far as to 
state that the transformation from a definite description to a pronoun may 
well be a “linguistic rule that operates on syntactical representations” (1990, 
184). Of course, this position makes a strong claim concerning syntactic 
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derivations and the manner in which transformations might hide semantic 
facts. If such claims are legitimate, then perhaps such an account will deal 
with (57) also.  
Nevertheless, a syntactic problem arises if one is hoping to take the account 
above to explain (57). The argument above for Neale’s proxy account is that 
at some level of syntactic representation the anaphoric pronoun is actually 
a definite description. Following this, there exist transformation rules that 
replace the description with a pronoun and force a deletion of the 
accompanying noun phrase. Of course, all of this is done prior to the 
assignment of morphophonemic features to the expression and prior to its 
being spoken. However, there is evidence to suggest that the pronouns in 
examples such as (57) originate in the noun phrase position and then move 
into the determiner position afterwards, which is a phenomenon known as 
N to D movement. 85  The reason for this, it is argued, is to allow the 
pronoun to check its referential features (Cardinaletti 1993; Progovac 1998; 





The problem for Neale is that the whole DP has now been occupied by the 
pronominal element, thereby leaving room for neither a definite 
description nor a transformation to occur. In addition, the fact that the NP 
is now left empty, through NP deletion, illustrates an important syntactic 
difference, namely that pronouns are ungrammatical if the NP compliment 
is filled. The same goes for a stronger view that the pronoun originates in 
the D position, which again bans the presence of material in the NP. Taking 
all these things into consideration leaves considerable doubt as to the proxy 
theory of pronouns, especially when applied to (57). There would have to 
be an account for why this process took place, and why the pronoun was 
                                                          
85 In Martin & Hinzen (2014) they suggest that the pronoun moves once more from D into 
what they term a ‘deictic layer’ in the extended edge of DPs, which is responsible for the 
strong deictic interpretation that pronouns receive, this is what they term D-to-D# 






rendered favourable to the deleted definite description. Therefore, (57) 
remains a problem for the Russellian. Critically, the problem is one that is 
founded upon the underlying syntactic structure of DPs where definite 
descriptions and pronouns fall. A thorough understanding of the syntactic 




It is worthwhile briefly summarizing Neale’s position and the modified 
Russellian QT that it provides. We have illustrated that the position retains 
a strong defence of semantic literalism and is arguably lexicocentric. 
Furthermore, we have looked at some problems for the theory, including 
the CAP as well as problems from misdescription, incompleteness, and 
anaphora. We observed that the solutions to each problem were couched in 
an attempt to place the theory within a wider theory of natural language 
quantification and the semantics/pragmatics distinction. Additionally, we 
introduced some reasons to doubt the solutions that emerge once we look 
at the underlying grammatical structure of such expressions. In §6 we will 
develop the points introduced here in more detail once we have explained 
our fully-fledged grammatical theory of meaning.  
We can provide a final formulation of the Russian QT as follows: 
(60) **The Russellian Theory of Descriptions 
i. The linguistic meaning of any definite description d is a 
Russellian paraphrase modified to align with surface syntax. 
ii. The lexical entry for the definite article is of type <<e, t>, <<e, 
t>, t>>, and when merged in D and combined with an NP it 
is a restricted quantifier phrase of type <<e, t>, t>. 
iii. A speaker may succeed in communicating an object-
dependent proposition p containing d through pragmatic 
machinery that accompanies the utterance, but the linguistic 
meaning remains object-independent.  
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iv. Instances of misdescription, incompleteness, and referential 
anaphora, are all explained in reference to pragmatic 
machinery that accompanies an utterance of p. 
v. The phenomena in (iii)-(iv) are present across the board with 
natural language quantification, and so too is the pragmatic 
machinery that explains them.  
vi. Following (v), the pragmatic machinery employed in 
explaining referential uses of definite descriptions is more 
economic than its semantic counterpart. The pragmatic 
machinery comes “in some sense, free: the machinery that is 
appealed to is needed anyway” (1990, 80-81). 
We will make reference to (60) throughout the rest of the thesis when 
mentioning QTs.  
To conclude this section we will analyse how the Russellian QT as outlined 
in (60) deals with each of the three ambiguity problems from §1.1.86 The 
solution provided to the CAP has been given numerous times above; a 
Russellian QT rejects the existence of a semantic solution. The genesis of the 
CAP is to be found in pragmatics. The two uses are enabled through 
pragmatic machinery that accompanies an utterance. A sentential utterance 
containing a definite description can be used on occasion to successfully 
communicate an object-dependent proposition, whilst ‘what is said’ 
remains object-independent. The linguistic meaning is quantificational but 
the speaker’s meaning allows the communication of an object-dependent 
proposition thereby enabling referential uses. As for the first grammatical 
ambiguity problem, GAP1, this is likewise answered in the negative. Neale 
explicitly states that the modified Russellian paraphrase is meant to 
account for the linguistic meaning of any expression that contains the 
definite article or is derived from a definite description. The ambiguity in 
GAP1 is therefore likewise enabled through pragmatic machinery and as 
such there is no semantic ambiguity. Finally, as for GAP2 Neale does not 
explicitly address the ambiguity, however as we can see from the answer to 
GAP1 the linguistic meaning for any sentence containing a definite 
description as the subject will express an object-independent proposition. 
                                                          
86 See §1.1 for an outline of the three ambiguity problems. 
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Therefore, GAP2 is likewise answered in the negative. The pragmatic 
genesis offered for CAP, GAP1, and GAP2 retains the core tenets of 
literalism and the distinction between linguistic meaning and speaker’s 
meaning. The linguistic meaning of a definite description is always 
quantificational and is specified lexically. Finally, as for what is said, this is 
derived entirely from the linguistic meaning. The truth-conditional 
contribution of a definite description to a proposition containing it is 
always quantificational and thus creates an object-independent proposition. 
In the next chapter we will analyse two theories that defend the existence of 
a semantic ambiguity, which are from Kaplan and Devitt. The two theories 
both defend semantic literalism, and both appear to support a lexicocentric 
account of compositional semantics, however they deny the unified 
Russellian account of the semantics of definite descriptions. It is to these 

















Two Ambiguity Theories of 
Descriptions 
 
In §3 we introduced the Russellian QT and two strategic modifications of it 
from Kripke and Neale. It was observed that the theory falls within the 
bounds of semantic literalism and can be described as lexicocentric. 
Furthermore, we gave some reasons to think that an analysis of the 
grammar of DPs and speech-event features in syntax might provide an 
alternative to the QT. However, it is not the case however that by endorsing 
a form of semantic literalism, and a lexicocentric view of compositional 
semantics, one is forced to accept a Russellian QT. The ensuing chapter will 
introduce and analyse two ambiguity theses (AT), which retain a form of 
literalism whilst defending the view that definite descriptions are 
semantically ambiguous (thereby answering at least one of CAP, GAP1, or 
GAP2 in the positive).  
To begin with, in §4.1 we will analyse Kaplan’s AT (1970; 1979; 1989a; 
1989b; 2005). Kaplan’s theory takes referential uses to be semantic and 
instances of direct reference. It is a direct reference theory. The theory 
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attempted to bring referential uses of definite descriptions in line with 
demonstratives and other indexical expressions. It states that such 
expressions employ a semantic operator, termed DTHAT, which enables 
direct reference. Furthermore, it takes DTHAT to explain the linguistic 
convention associated with referential descriptions. In virtue of reference 
emerging as a property of a semantic operator, the theory thus rejects 
dependence upon pragmatic machinery in order to explain referential uses 
of descriptions. We will analyse and ultimately reject Kaplan’s AT, and its 
solution to the genesis of the ambiguity problems, on the basis that the 
operator is stipulated to account for linguistic convention without 
providing sufficient reason for its existence. In §4.2 we will introduce a 
second AT from Devitt (1974; 1981a; 1981b; 2004; 2007a; 2007b). The second 
AT takes referential uses of definite descriptions to take part in a causal 
network forming a designating chain with the individuals that they pick 
out. It is a causal theory. According to Devitt, definite descriptions, 
demonstratives, and indexicals all employ designating chains that enable 
them to act as referential expressions, and it is these chains that explain the 
linguistic convention associated with referential uses of descriptions. 87 
Furthermore, these chains are enabled through the semantics of definite 
descriptions, and are not pieces of pragmatic machinery. As with Kaplan, 
we will reject Devitt’s AT on the basis that it stipulates the designating 
chain in order to account for linguistic convention rather than explaining 
either the convention or the genesis of the causal chain. Following Recanati, 
we will term the two theories neo-Russellian and neo-Fregean respectively 
(Recanati 1993, 28-34).88 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a critique of the two ATs, 
which were developed in line with literalism and a lexicocentric 
compositional semantics. The first criticism is that neither succeeds in 
providing an explanatory account of how the linguistic convention for 
referential uses emerges in the first place, and the second is the two 
theories simply stipulate the referential semantics in order to fit the 
                                                          
87 Devitt does however reject a direct reference theory, instead taking descriptive content to 
be semantically operative in referential descriptions (1990; 2012a). 
88 The first theory labelled ‘neo-Russellian’ should not be confused with the Russellian 
theory of descriptions analysed in §3. It is called neo-Russellian in virtue of defending a 
view of singular terms that is arguably present in Russell’s earlier work in Principles of 




linguistic convention. In doing this, we will argue that the linguistic 
convention for referential descriptions can be understood as emerging 
through the grammar of DPs and the close-knit grammatical relationship 
that the definite article and distal demonstrative share. The first claim will 
be based upon the topology of DPs, and the second will be formed through 
cross-linguistic evidence gathered from Montagnais, Plains Cree, and 
dialects of Mandarin. We will conclude that the linguistic convention for 
referential uses of descriptions, which the two ATs employ to ground their 
semantic theories, is best understood as arising through grammar. In §5 
and §6 we will develop these idea into an integrated grammatical theory of 
meaning. 
4.1 
A NEO-RUSSELLIAN THEORY 
The first AT we will analyse comes from Kaplan’s direct reference theory, 
which we will label neo-Russellian. Recanati labels such theories neo-
Russellian in virtue of their conception of singular terms and singular 
propositions (1993, 28), a conception that is reminiscent of that found in 
Russell (POM 1903, 54). Direct reference theory has at least three important 
aims: to give an account of what constitutes a genuine singular term (and 
singular proposition), to account for the semantics of indexical expressions 
(including at least demonstratives, complex demonstratives, and pronouns), 
and to provide a referential semantics for certain uses of definite 
descriptions.  
To begin with, direct reference theory is interested in giving an account of 
singular terms, which are understood to exhibit a purely referential 
function (Recanati 1993, 29). To give us a clear starting point let us provide 
a working definition of a singular term: 
(1) Singular Term 
ζ is a singular term if and only if the following two conditions hold: 
i. The semantic function of ζ is to stand for an individual. 
ii. A proposition p containing ζ is object-dependent. 
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Direct reference theory defends the above definition of singular terms with 
a caveat that the only semantic contribution of ζ to p is the actual individual 
it stands for. The theory was developed by Kaplan as a way of grounding 
rigid designation, and was extended to cover a wide range of arguments 
that can be used referentially. The core tenet of direct reference theory is 
that it denies the presence of a Fregean sense/intension in the semantics of 
singular terms (Kaplan 1989b, 568). 
It is commonplace to understand Frege as defending the view that the 
semantics of a singular term is identical with a definite description that 
accurately depicts the referent (1948, 210). The semantics of a proper name 
would thereby contain descriptive content or would at least pick out its 
referent through a description, or cluster of descriptions (Searle 1958; 
Strawson 1959; Wittgenstein 1953), understood as an ‘intermediary sense or 
connotation’ (Stevens 2011, 14).89 We might call this a mediated reference 
theory. The view being defined is often labelled descriptivism.90  Direct 
reference theory is formed in opposition to descriptivism, and denies that 
any descriptive content is semantically operative in singular terms (Kaplan 
1970; 1979; Soames 2002, 5). In this sense, direct reference theory is more 
simplistic. It defends the view that the semantic content of a singular term 
just is the individual it picks out.91  
Kaplan states that the term ‘direct’ in direct reference “means unmediated 
by any propositional component, not unmediated simpliciter” (Kaplan, 
                                                          
89 Additionally, under this reading we might understand Frege as defending the view that a 
singular term can have a sense without having a referent. Evans (1982) questions this 
interpretation of the Fregean program, and suggests that in actual fact the interpretation of 
Frege’s position on singular terms that is most consistent with his other comments is that 
singular terms that lack a referent also lack a sense. In accepting this reading one 
understands Frege as defending the view that singular terms have a de re sense. As Evans 
notes “Frege nowhere said that absolutely any kind of singular term could have a sense 
whether or not it has a referent.” Yet, the inclusion of definite descriptions into this system 
does indeed say this, again Evans notes that “so long as he regarded definite descriptions as 
singular terms, such a recognition [that expressions may have a sense without a referent] 
was absolutely imperative. The recognition of non-Russellian singular terms would require 
some alteration, in that Frege’s global identification of the semantic value of a singular term 
with its referent would have to be given up” (1982, 38-39). Whichever interpretation you 
choose, a Fregean who defended the view that singular terms have a sense if and only if 
they had a referent would be unable, in Evans’ view, to treat definite descriptions as 
singular terms. 
90 The reading of Frege that takes him to defend descriptivism is one found in Kaplan (1970; 
1979a) and Kripke (1981). 
91 It may be understood as an Individual concept/essence (Davidson 2000, 295). 
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1989b, 569). For instance, whilst the descriptive content of a definite 
description d may help the auditor identify the intended referent of d, it 
does not play any part in the semantic content or ‘what is said’ in terms of 
its truth-conditional contribution to a sentential utterance that it is a part of. 
According to Kaplan, the above claim must hold in order for there to exist 
authentic singular propositions. The theory of descriptions thus proposed 
by Kaplan, and the AT it defends, is thus based upon referential 
descriptions acting as singular terms and contributing to singular 
propositions. In a type-based semantics we can thus understand Kaplan as 
stating that referential descriptions are of type <e>, which is in contrast to 
the Russellian QT. 
4.11 
SINGULAR PROPOSITIONS 
Sentences containing singular terms are taken to express singular 
propositions. We can define them as follows, “[s]ingular propositions are 
propositions that are about a particular individual in virtue of having that 
individual as a direct constituent.” (Fitch & Nelson 2013) A variety of 
philosophers have held the view that singular propositions contain terms 
that elicit a form of direct or unmediated reference, including Mill (1882), 
Russell (1903; 1905), Marcus (1961), Kripke (1981), Salmon (1986), Soames 
(2002), and, most prominently, Kaplan (1970; 1979a; 1989a; 1989b; 2005). For 
many, not least Kaplan, direct reference theory is the only alternative to 
descriptivism that retains a robust distinction between singular and general 
propositions. 
Kaplan provides the strongest support and most hard line analysis of those 
that defend a form of direct reference theory. Singular propositions are 
distinguished from general ones in virtue of being about particular 
individuals but also ‘having that individual as a direct constituent’. 92 
Singular propositions therefore contain individuals and properties 
                                                          
92 As Stevens points out, it is tempting under Russell’s analysis of singular and general 
propositions to take general propositions to fail to contain the things they are about. 
However, as he points out general propositions are about denoting phrases, not actual 
living breathing objects, and hence “[t]he theory allows these two claims”, that general 
propositions are distinct from singular ones but still contain the things they are about, “to be 
asserted without incompatibility by denying that sentences containing denoting phrases in 
subject position are about the things these phrases purport to denote” (2011, 14). 
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themselves as constituents (Davidson 2000, 285). Kaplan distinguishes the 
two forms of propositions in the following manner: take (2) and (3) to 
illustrate different types of logical subject (italicised), and then formalize 
them as the ordered pairs in (4) and (5) respectively: 
(2) Every spy is suspicious. 
(3) John is suspicious. 
(4) <<’Every’, S>, P> 
(5) <John, P> 
Let us assign a truth value to each of (2) – (5) relative to a possible world w 
and time t. Additionally, take P to pick out the predicate ‘being suspicious’ 
and S to pick out the predicate ‘being a spy’. Following this, (4) 
“determines the function which assigns truth to a given w and t if and only 
if every member of S(w, t) is a member of P(w, t)” (1970, 218). Conversely, 
(5) determines a function which assigns truth to a given w and t if and only 
if John is a member of P(w, t). John is a constituent of the proposition (5), 
expressed by sentence (3), and its truth in w at t depends specifically upon 
John, whereas this is not the case with (2). Sentence (2) has no particular 
individual (neither John nor Mary nor Ronaldo) as a constituent in the 
proposition that it expresses. Sentence (2) is thus general, it is about the 
denoting concept expressed by the determiner phrase every spy, whereas 
sentence (3) is singular, it is about John. 
To clarify some differences between descriptivism and direct reference 
theory we can begin with a discussion of names. Direct reference theory 
states that a name is merely a label, or tag, for the individual it stands for. 
As such, a name contributes no descriptive material its semantic content, a 
position often termed Millian (Almog 1986, 228; Abbott 2010, 14). As an 
example consider (6): 
(6) Ronaldo is Portuguese.  
A direct reference theory takes the name Ronaldo to pick out the individual 
Ronaldo, which in turn acts as a constituent of the proposition expressed by 
(6) without further mediation. Descriptivism, conversely, understands the 
referent of Ronaldo as being picked out through mediation of an associated 
true description of the individual (Frege, 1948, 210). For instance, in (6) the 
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name Ronaldo might identify Ronaldo through mediation of the true 
description ‘the winner of the 2014 Ballon d’or’. The description thus forms 
part of the semantic content of the sentence. It is part of what is said. The 
name Ronaldo has the same extension under both descriptivism and direct 
reference theory, however the intension is distinct. For descriptivism, the 
intension is a true description, or cluster thereof, of Ronaldo, whereas for 
direct reference theory it is the particular individual itself.93 Therefore, the 
admittance of descriptive content into the semantics, and propositional 
content, expressed by (6) is not necessary if the name is understood as 
making direct reference to the appropriate individual. Direct reference thus 
shares an affinity with the notion of rigidity introduced by Kripke (1981). 
We can understand Kaplan, therefore, as taking the linguistic meaning of a 
proper name to be identical with the individual it stands for. 
With respect to the descriptions literature, the interesting aspect of direct 
reference theory is that it can be applied to other expressions besides 
proper names. For instance, admitting definite descriptions into the direct 
reference framework would, theoretically, ban them from having 
descriptive content as part of their semantic contribution to what is said. 
Assume (7) is said in the presence of Ronaldo (the intended referent): 
(7) The forward is Portuguese.  
A direct reference analysis of (7) contributes a particular individual to the 
proposition it expresses in a manner identical to (6). In virtue of this the 
descriptive material forward is not part of (7)’s propositional content. The 
NP restriction forward is not part of the definite description’s linguistic 
meaning or what is said. Conversely, for the descriptivist this content is 
central and semantically operative. The direct reference theorist on the 
other hand, in denying a place in the semantics for descriptive content, is 
led to the view that “terms that are directly referential… are of necessity 
meaningless, since to endow them with a meaning distinct from their 
reference would be to ascribe them a descriptive or attributive function 
over and above their referring function” (Recanati 1993, 29). A strong 
interpretation of descriptivism thus denies a referential function to singular 
                                                          
93 Frege states that with respect to a given name ‘opinions as to the sense may differ’ (1948, 
210). This raises a question concerning what description would suffice as the semantic 
content of a name. For instance, would a single true description suffice, or would we need 
the inclusive disjunction of all those true descriptions of the individual (Searle 1958, 172).  
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terms. Alternatively, direct reference theory retains the referential function 
as central and unmediated. If definite descriptions are labelled as being 
instance of direct reference, then they act like labels or tags for their 
referents. Singular terms have no further semantic content beyond their 
referential function. 
4.12 
MODES OF PRESENTATION 
There are at least two problematic questions that can be posed to a direct 
reference theory of definite descriptions: why is descriptive material denied 
a place in the semantics of singular terms? and if one defends such a 
position, then what role does the phonetically realised descriptive content 
expressed in arguments play in natural language reference? At this point 
we can note that there is nothing specific about the lexical items used in the 
descriptive content of a definite description that renders them absent from 
the semantic content. Therefore, the answer to the two questions posed 
must rest elsewhere. Moreover, it is clear that a competent auditor will 
make use of the descriptive content in identifying the referent of a definite 
description. We therefore need an account of exactly what role the 
descriptive content actually plays. 
The following claim from Kaplan will help elucidate the answers, he states 
that: 
[s]ome or all of the denoting phrases used in an utterance 
should not be considered part of the content of what is said but 
should rather be thought of as contextual factors which help us 
interpret the actual physical utterance as having a certain 
content. (1970, 219) 
In other words, given the definite description in (7) direct reference theory 
understands the descriptive content as simply aiding the auditor in 
identifying the referent but it does so without contributing to the truth-
conditional content of the expressed proposition or what is said. The 
descriptive content in the NP of (7) has as much effect on its linguistic 
meaning as an ostensive act of pointing would that may accompany it. We 
can label the descriptive content a ‘mode of presentation’ of the referent. 
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The mode of presentation carried by a singular term is not part of its 
semantic content, but it does help identify its referent and in order to do 
that it must be interpretable. Kaplan claims that “it is the ‘sense’ of the 
demonstration that is grasped by the competent auditor of utterances 
containing demonstration [a mode of presentation]” but whilst this is the 
case he remains adamant that the mode of presentation is not part of the 
semantic content of what is expressed (1970, 221). For Kaplan, the worry is 
as follows: 
[i]f we force all phenomena that suggest a special demonstrative 
use of language, along with what I regard as a corresponding 
feature – a special singular form of proposition – into the 
Fregean mould of linguistic elements with a sense and a 
denotation, the sense being the element which appears in the 
proposition (thus leaving us with only general propositions), 
then important insights will be lost. (1970, 222) 
Therefore, if one takes the sense of a singular term to be part of the 
proposition expressed, then one is left with only general propositions, 
propositions that cannot contain individuals as constituents. Accordingly, 
views such as descriptivism are reduced to maintaining quasi-singular 
propositions (Schiffer 1987). This is the answer to the first question raised 
above. 
The theory being developed by Kaplan is intended to cover a wide range of 
expressions that are capable of being used referentially: names, indexicals, 
demonstratives, complex demonstratives, and definite descriptions. As a 
result of this, we can state that direct reference theory does not distinguish 
the grammatical structure of singular terms in so far as semantic content is 
concerned. As Kaplan notes: 
[w]e shall take the component of the proposition which 
corresponds to the demonstrative to be the individual 
demonstrated. Thus the varying forms which such a 
demonstration can take are not reflected in the content of the 
utterance. (1970, 220-221) 
Despite the clear grammatical differences that are found within the 
aforementioned range of expressions, Kaplan states that they all create 
instances of direct reference and contribute in an identical manner to 
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semantic content. Their modes of presentation may differ but their 
contribution to the semantic content will not. 
The importance of the existence of varying grammatical forms of singular 
terms can be seen in the different ways in which they present their referents. 
For instance, a bare deictic demonstrative presents its referent in a distinct 
manner to a definite description. A bare deictic demonstrative may present 
its referent through an ostensive act, whereas a definite description may 
present its referent through phonetically realised descriptive content. We 
can illustrate this with the following two sentences: 
(8) The desk is covered with books. 
(9) That [the speaker points at a salient desk] is covered with books.  
In (8) the referent is presented through descriptive material, whereas in (9) 
it is presented through the demonstrative in conjunction with an ostensive 
act. If we assume that the subjects of both (8) and (9) are singular terms, 
then regardless of how the referent is presented both singular terms 
contribute the same individual to the proposition expressed, they 
contribute the same semantic content. Finally, it is important to note that 
the semantic content of (8) and (9) is taken relative to the utterance 
context.94 
Direct reference theory thus takes the descriptive content of a singular term 
to be a mode of presentation that, relative to a context of utterance, 
provides an individual as the terms semantic contribution to a proposition 
it is part of. Furthermore, the mode of presentation is distinct from a 
Fregean sense in virtue of failing to be part of the proposition expressed. 
We can tentatively state that the linguistic meaning of a singular term is 
identical with the individual it picks out in the utterance context, and that 




                                                          
94 Modes of presentation are likewise drawn upon to explain the cognitive impact of identity 
statements. Two names, Hesperus and Phosphorus may pick out the same referent, but they 




CONTENT, CHARACTER, AND CONTEXT 
According to Kaplan there are two components that go together to form the 
meaning of an expression. These are the expression’s ‘content’ and the 
expression’s ‘character’ (1989a, 500). Let us begin with the former. The first 
thing to say about the content of an expression is that it is “always taken 
with respect to a given context of use” (1979a, 83). The content of a sentential 
utterance is “what has traditionally been called a proposition” (1979a, 84; 
1989a, 500) and the content of a sub-sentential expression “is its 
contribution to the truth-evaluable propositional content of the sentence 
containing it” (Taschek 1987, 164). Non-indexical expressions have a fixed 
content across contexts, whereas indexical expressions have a context-
sensitive content (1989a, 501-502). We can associate the content of a 
sentential expression with its truth-conditional content, or what is said in a 
particular utterance of it.  
To begin with let us illustrate the difference between expressions that are 
context-sensitive and those that are not. Take an expression such as (10): 
(10) Cristiano Ronaldo is injured on February 12th 2011. 
Irrespective of who utters (10), and at what time, it will always have a 
constant semantic content and thus a constant set of truth-conditions. What 
is said will not change across contexts. The semantics of (10) is the same 
regardless of who says it or when it is said (1989a, 506). Alternatively, an 
expression such as (11) will have a different meaning across contexts: 
(11) I am injured on February 12th 2011. 
For instance, it would mean something distinct if I uttered it than if 
Cristiano Ronaldo did. The former would cash out as (12) and the later as 
(13): 
(12) Thomas Hughes is injured on February 12th 2011. 
(13) Cristiano Ronaldo is injured on February 12th 2011. 
124 
 
The reason for this is that the pronoun I in (11) has a context-sensitive 
content. Its semantic contribution must be taken relative to the utterance 
context.  
The second type of meaning termed ‘character’ is what determines the 
content in a given utterance. An expression’s character is defined as follows, 
“I call that component of the sense of an expression which determines how 
the content is determined by the context, the ‘character’ of an expression.” 
(1979, 83-84; 1989a, 505; Taschek 1987, 165) Therefore, with respect to the 
utterance context, the character will dictate the semantic content of the 
expression. Once again, some expressions have a context-sensitive 
character and other do not. As Kaplan notes, “[i]dexicals have a context-
sensitive character. It is characteristic of an indexical that its content varies 
with context. Non-indexicals have a fixed character. The same content is 
invoked in all contexts” (1989a, 506). The role of character therefore is to 
establish the content of an expression as used on a particular occasion 
whilst not itself being part of that truth-evaluable content. The character of 
an expression is thereby a function from contexts to contents (1979a, 84; 
1989a, 506). 
According to Kaplan, the character of an expression is “what is set by 
linguistic conventions” and he also claims that “it is natural to think of it as 
meaning in the sense of what is known by the competent language user” 
(1989a, 505). We now have a difficulty with fitting character into our 
understanding of linguistic meaning. First of all, the character of an 
expression is not part of what is said in a particular utterance, it is not part 
of the truth-conditional content of the utterance. Nevertheless, it does play 
a role in securing the truth-conditional content. If we recall our definition of 
linguistic meaning from §2.1, we associated it with a sentence or 
expression-type, which particular utterances are tokens of. We can think of 
character in the same light. Furthermore, with respect to being competent 
with a language we can state that to know how to use an expression is to 
know how to employ its character, expression-type, in particular utterances 
(1970, 84). In knowing how to do this, the language user will consequently 
know how to determine truth-conditional content.  
The character of the indexical in (11) will in once instance produce the 
semantic content associated with (12) and in another instance produce (13). 
A competent language user will be able to determine, relative to the context, 
125 
 
what is said in any given use of (11). Importantly, whilst the content that 
the indexical contributes to the proposition expressed will be distinct across 
contexts the character will not. This is why we can associate character with 
linguistic meaning or the expression-type. For instance, the character of the 
first person pronoun will always provide the proposition expressed with 
the speaker as its semantic contribution.95 
In sum, every meaningful utterance has a specified semantic content that is 
derived from the expression’s character and the context in which it is used. 
We can distinguish indexical from non-indexical expressions as follows; 
with respect to an indexical expression we may state that the character is a 
function from “contexts to extensions” and the character of a non-indexical 
expression “just is its (constant) content” (1989a, 507). We can extend this to 
state that the character of a compound expression is a function of the 
character of its parts and the content of a compound expression is a 
function of the content of its parts (1989a, 507). At this point it is worth 
stating that the theory does not employ pragmatic machinery to settle 
truth-conditional content. It is essentially endorsing indexicalism. The 
character of indexical expressions, its linguistic meaning, demands 
contextual saturation in order to have a semantic content.  
It is worth clarifying this final point if we are to continue claiming that 
Kaplan’s AT is a form of literalism. The role of context in settling semantic 
content might be seen as contradicting this claim. However, to reiterate the 
definite of indexicalism we gave in §2.1, “no contextual influences are 
allowed to affect the intuitive truth-conditional content of an utterance 
unless the sentence itself demands it” (Recanati 2004, 85). It is the final 
clause that makes Kaplan’s view one captured by literalism. The linguistic 
meaning of an indexical expression demands saturation from the context in 
the specification of its truth-conditional content. Kaplan’s theory of 
indexicals therefore allows context to play a role in the semantic content 
only insofar as the expression’s linguistic meaning demands it (a view akin 
to Neale’s outlined in §3.32). It remains robustly in the mould of literalism. 
Clearly, there are many interrelated factors that go together in establishing 
which particular individual an indexical picks out. The context-sensitive 
                                                          
95 This is true in all cases except that of quotation.   
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nature of indexicals can, according to Kaplan, be further divided into 
particular contextual coordinates.  In the same vein as Neale, Kaplan states 
that the contextual coordinates would include the world of utterance, time, 
speaker, and position (within the world). The valuations of these 
coordinates will provide an individual to the proposition the indexical is 
part of. We can solidify this analysis with an example: 
(14) I am tired. 
The character of the expression, being composed of the character of its parts, 
looks to the context and values it accordingly. One use of (14) could be 
understood as expressing the semantic content captured explicitly, without 
indexical expressions, in (15): 
(15) Thomas J. Hughes is tired at 3pm on August 15th 2014 in Durham 
(in the actual world). 
The truth-conditional content expressed by (14) in this instance is 
equivalent to (15). All of this is done without recourse to pragmatic 
enrichment, speaker’s meaning, and so on. We can now turn to analyse 




Kaplan’s theory of descriptions is developed in line with the machinery 
outlined above in conjunction with the introduction of a semantic operator 
termed ‘DTHAT’. The operator is taken to be present in every singular term 
in order to signify that the term elicits direct reference. It is posited in the 
semantics of demonstratives, pronouns, and definite descriptions. The 
operator indicates that the singular term it is attached to will contribute an 
individual to the proposition that it is part of. It is therefore part of the 
linguistic meaning of singular terms and is responsible for what is said. 
Additionally, the operator signifies that the singular term will be aided by a 
particular mode of presentation of the intended referent. Taking δ to be a 
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mode of presentation, Kaplan defines an expression eliciting direct 
reference as follows: 
(16) In any context c, DTHAT[δ] is a directly referential term that 
designates the demonstratum, if any, of δ in c, and that otherwise 
designates nothing (1989a, 527). 
The DTHAT operator applies to definite descriptions as follows, “[i]nstead 
of taking the sense of the description as subject of the proposition, we use 
the sense only to fix the denotation which we then take directly as subject 
component of the proposition” (1970, 223). Referential uses of definite 
descriptions include the DTHAT operator, which forces them to be 
interpreted as singular terms. The descriptive content thus acts as δ, 
securing a referent without being part of the semantic content.  
To elucidate the idea we can make use of some examples. First of all, 
consider (17): 
(17) DTHAT [the manager] is angry. 
In (17) we have the operator that is responsible for the utterance creating an 
act of direct reference and the descriptive content in the square brackets 
acts as the mode of presentation of the intended referent (1989a, 521). It is 
important to note that the operator is not there to translate the definite 
description into something rigid, but is the source of direct reference on its 
own (Kaplan 1989b, 579). According to Kaplan, whenever a definite 
description is used referentially the schematic in (16) applies.96  
In virtue of the descriptive content merely acting as a mode of presentation 
it is places on a part with an ostensive act, perhaps pointing. In his own 
words, Kaplan states that “if pointing can be taken as a form of describing, 
why not take describing as a form of pointing?” (1970, 223). The idea 
expressed here is not without its critics. Bach, for instance, denies that 
describing can be a form of pointing. According to him, by accepting such a 
claim we place “no epistemological constraint on what one can ‘directly 
                                                          
96
 In ‘DTHAT’ (1970; 1979) Kaplan takes the descriptive content of a definite description to 
be semantic but not part of the propositional content, however in later work Kaplan’s 
position alters slightly in that he denies any semantic significance at all to the 
demonstration/modes of presentation (1989b, 582). Nevertheless, in both versions of the 
theory the descriptive content of a referentially used definite description plays the role of 
securing the referent of the singular term.  
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refer’ to” and accordingly the ability to form singular thoughts about any 
object is “created with the stroke of a pen” (Bach 2004b, 209).97 The problem 
Bach is raising can be observed in the following sentence: 
(18) DTHAT [the first child born in the twenty-second century] will be 
bald. 
In virtue of (18) following the schematic of (16) the operator creates a 
singular proposition. The problem is that there is currently no individual 
that can act as a constituent of the proposition expressed in (18). 
Accordingly, we would not be able to settle (18)’s truth-conditional content 
or what is said without the individual’s identity being established. An 
extension of this problem is that the speaker would not be able to entertain 
a genuine singular thought about that individual (2004b, 209). It is for 
reasons such as these that Bach takes the proposition expressed by (18) to 
be, at best, object ‘involving’ as opposed to object-dependent. Bach claims 
that such expressions ‘single-out’ an individual but fail to make reference 
to it (2004b, 210).98 
The problem Bach raises with respect to (18) does not materialize with 
deictic uses of definite descriptions, uses where the object of reference is in 
fact identifiable by the speaker. In deictic uses of descriptions a speaker 
may succeed in having a singular thought and expressing a singular 
proposition, which for Kaplan is enabled through DTHAT. In order for 
Kaplan to defend his AT the theory need only be correct for one sort of 
definite description, deictic descriptions could fit the bill. Nevertheless, it 
would require explaining why deictic uses, such as (17), can carry DTHAT 
whereas further ones such as (18) cannot. Following this an AT could be 
forged through the presence or absence of DTHAT and the resultant 
                                                          
97  Bach’s comments are made with respect to the following passage from Kaplan, 
“[i]gnorance of the referent does not defeat the directly referential character of indexicals…a 
special form of knowledge of an object is neither required nor presupposed in order that a 
person may entertain as object of thought a singular proposition involving that object” 
(1989a, 536). 
98 Bach is keen to point out that this is not a discussion of terminology, but instead the 
terminological difference points to a substantive difference. In “singling out” we do not 
necessarily create a singular proposition, and therefore the speaker need not have a 
corresponding singular thought, whereas in “referring” the act must create a singular 
proposition in order to be a legitimate act of reference (2004b, 210). An expression ‘singling 




consequences for propositional content, which creates a “duality of 
function” in the definite article (1970, 224). Irrespective of Bach’s claim, 
Kaplan is keen to defend an AT and it is grounded in the presence or 
absence of the DTHAT operator. 
We can provide a further example to capture Kaplan’s AT: 
(19) DTHAT [the manager of Manchester United] is angry. 
(20) The manager of Manchester United is angry. 
The difference between (19) and (20) is just the present of the DTHAT 
operator. In virtue of this, Kaplan would take (19) to expresses a singular 
proposition and (20) to express a general proposition. The distinct truth-
conditions in the two examples equates to a distinction in what is said by a 
speaker in using the two. Take u to represent an utterance of (19) and u’ to 
represent an utterance of (20), the truth-value of both u and u’ will depend 
upon the same individual in the actual world, in this case Louis van Gaal. It 
is not until we test the truth-value of each in distinct modal contexts that 
we see a difference. The truth of u in a possible world w’ will be dependent 
upon Louis van Gaal again as he is a constituent of the proposition 
expressed by (19). In virtue of the DTHAT operator causing direct reference, 
the individual Louis van Gaal remains central to the truth-conditions of 
(19). Conversely, the truth of u’ in w’ is not dependent upon Louis van Gaal. 
The sentence in (20) expresses a general/object-independent proposition 
due to lacking the DTHAT operator and hence the proposition it expresses 
does not contain Louis van Gaal. In (20) its truth in a possible world w’ will 
be dependent upon whomever satisfies the descriptive content manager of 
Manchester United in w’. Through these modal contexts we can see that 
Kaplan readily accepts an AT (1970, 227). Finally, the distinction is, 
according to Kaplan, that of a de dicto/de re distinction.99 We will say more 
about which of the three ambiguity problems (CAP, GAP1, and GAP2) the 




                                                          





The identification of a referent for a singular term involves a multifaceted 
process including its linguistic meaning, the utterance context, the 
speaker’s intentions, and further pragmatic machinery. The value that is 
placed upon each part of this process in the creation of a speech-act will 
determine the view one is likely to adopt as to the nature of referential uses 
of definite descriptions. With respect to this, Wettstein asks the following 
question “[w]hat exactly bridges the gap between the meagre lexical 
meaning of such an indexical expression and its determinate reference?” 
(1984, 64). In order to understand how direct reference theory interacts 
with wider aspects of communication we should seek an answer to this 
question. 
Reimer (1992) outlines three views with distinct answers to the above 
question. The three views are distinguished as follows: first of all we have 
the contextual view, which states that demonstrative (direct) reference is 
“determined entirely by certain publicly accessible features of the context”, 
secondly we have the intentional view, which states that “speaker 
intentions are ‘criterial’ in demonstrative reference”, and thirdly we have 
what is termed a quasi-intentional view according to which “both 
contextual features and intentions come into play in the determination of 
demonstrative reference” (1992, 373). According to Reimer, Kaplan’s work 
in DTHAT (1970; 1979a)100 is defending the third view, the quasi-intentional 
view.101 
Reimer notes that speaker’s intentions play a role in demonstrative 
reference but this role is “at most, a limited one” (1992, 374). For instance, 
take a situation where a speaker intends to inform his audience of the 
identity of a man in a painting, who he believes to be Rudolf Carnap, and 
utters (21): 
(21) DTHAT [that] is one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th Century.  
                                                          
100 Reimer references the reprinted copy (Kaplan 1979a), which includes a discussion on 
intentions involved in disambiguating the referent in an act of demonstration. 
101 The three positions outlined should not, for our current purposes, be confused with 
contextualism or any form of literalism as outlined in §2.1. 
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Unbeknownst to the speaker, however, the painting was recently replaced 
with one of Spiro Agnew and (21) is thereby false. We might understand 
the act of reference to pick out Spiro Agnew, the context of utterance 
provides saturation of the indexical with the individual in the picture. The 
speaker may have intended to refer to Carnap, however they likewise 
intended to refer to the individual in the painting who they mistakenly 
believed to be Carnap. As Reimer notes, “the intended demonstratum… 
failed to emerge as the actual demonstratum” (1992, 373-374).102 
Nevertheless, certain contexts demand that the speaker’s intentions must 
be involved in securing a referent. Take for instance (22): 
(22) DTHAT [that (vague hand gesture)] is Louis van Gaal.103 
The vague hand gesture, which acts as the mode of presentation, will 
simultaneously pick out a wide range of referents including, for instance, 
“a clump of clover, a nearby pond, a neighbour’s cat” (1992, 374). 
Irrespective of this, (22) can be used to say something informative in virtue 
of it successfully picking out an individual but this will depend upon the 
“intended demonstratum”. According the Reimer, the speaker’s intention 
“has the effect of ‘disambiguating’ my vague demonstration”. In cases such 
as (22) the context alone is too messy for the audience to identify the 
appropriate referent and as such recourse to speaker’s intentions are central 
to its disambiguation (1992, 374). 
The ensuing discussion should not be thought of as invalidating the claim 
that what Kaplan has developed is a form of semantic literalism. The first 
point to rehearse is that the linguistic meaning of a demonstrative 
expression (which includes referential uses of definite descriptions) 
determines the role that context plays. As we have stated when outlining 
indexicalism, the theory remains a form of literalism so long as the role of 
                                                          
102  A defence of a purely contextual view is given by Wettstein, who believes that 
“contextual cues and indeed a whole range of extra-contextual cues, provided, e.g. by the 
social and cultural environment, have semantic significance” and that “[i]t is by such cues 
that the gap between meaning and reference” (1984, 65). In such a case, the speaker’s 
intentions do not play an operative role in the securing of the relevant referent. 
103  In the foregoing we will capture ostensive acts in standard brackets. An act of 
demonstration including phonetic material and an ostensive act will therefore appear as 
[phonetic material (ostensive act)]. In the above we described both as being part of the 
‘mode of presentation’ of the referent and we retain this analysis. The distinct brackets are 
simply employed to indicate that the ostensive act is non-verbal. 
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context is that of saturating something demanded by the linguistic meaning 
of the expression, as opposed to being what we have termed ‘free 
contextual enrichment’. This is upheld in direct reference theory. The role 
of speaker’s intentions is an interesting one, for it is not the case that the 
linguistic meaning of a demonstrative will change across contexts where 
the speaker’s intentions are to refer to distinct individuals using, for 
instance, the same demonstrative. For instance, the linguistic meaning of 
the demonstrative does not change between (23) and (24): 
(23) DTHAT [that (vague hand gesture)] is Ronaldo. 
(24) DTHAT [that (vague hand gesture)] is Messi. 
The individual picked out in the two speech-acts is distinct but this does 
not affect the linguistic meaning of the demonstrative. Furthermore, 
speaker’s intentions are not included as part of the linguistic meaning, even 
though, on occasion, they may help in disambiguating a referent for the 
audience. In cases such as (22)-(24) what is said is still determined by the 
linguistic meaning of the demonstrative, which is a function from the 
utterance context to its content. Literalism, in the form of indexicalism, is 
thus retained. 
It is now time to see how Kaplan’s AT accounts for the genesis of the three 
ambiguity problems from §1.1. 104  The solution offered to the CAP is 
straightforward, Kaplan provides a semantic account of the CAP, and 
accounts for the fact that a single expression can in one instance be used 
referentially and in another quantificationally though stating that in the 
former case the definite description includes the semantic operator DTHAT, 
which forces an instance of direct reference, whereas in the latter case it 
does not. DTHAT is part of a referential description’s linguistic meaning 
and what is said in a sentential utterance containing such an expression is 
thus a singular proposition. When DTHAT is absent the linguistic meaning 
is dependent upon the descriptive content and what is said is thus a 
general proposition. 
The solution offered to GAP1 depends upon whether we interpret Kaplan 
as stating that DTHAT can be attached to any definite description 
whatsoever. When we look at the manner in which Kaplan’s theory is 
                                                          
104 See §1.1 for an outline of the three ambiguity problems. 
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developed we see that it is primarily involved with understanding 
demonstrative reference and indexicals. More often than not such 
expressions are used to make deictic reference, that is, reference to 
individuals in the context at hand. The motivation for extending this theory 
to definite descriptions, which Kaplan takes to be quite natural, is 
potentially the result of the data under consideration. If one is considering 
deictic uses of definite descriptions, then it is natural to understand them as 
operating in a manner resembling demonstratives. Hence, if the semantic 
operator DTHAT is employed in explaining demonstratives, then it should 
likewise explain deictic uses of definite descriptions. 
It is possible to interpret Kaplan’s AT as extending to GAP1. For instance, 
compare (25) and (26): 
(25) The manager is angry. 
(26) The mother of every child is angry.  
It is a reasonable interpretation of Kaplan to understand him as taking (25) 
to exhibit an instance of direct reference, and we could capture that by 
adding DTHAT. However, the operator is not as straightforwardly applied 
to (27). The distinction can be seen with respect to (27): 
(27) DTHAT [That mother of every child] is angry. 
A natural reading of (27) where it includes the direct reference operator is 
to understand it as referring to one particular mother (all the children share 
the same mother), however this is not a standard interpretation of (26). We 
might reconceptualise Kaplan’s theory to state that the DTHAT operator 
may apply to (25) in virtue of its grammatical form lending it to being used 
for demonstrative reference, and yet bar it from being applied to (26). If 
Kaplan were to accept this analysis, then GAP1 would be understood to be 
explained through semantics. The extension of Kaplan’s theory may not be 
something he himself would admit to. Either way, there would need to be 
an explanation of why certain definite descriptions were amenable to 
DTHAT and others were not. 
Finally, as for GAP2 Kaplan makes no specific claims. It would seem that 
Kaplan would answer GAP2 in the negative, and state that any ambiguity 
in definite descriptions is entirely a matter of whether there is the DTHAT 
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operator present. Therefore, the wider grammatical configuration in which 
the definite description falls does not figure in the account. Nevertheless, 
we can clearly see that Kaplan answers at least one ambiguity problem, the 
CAP, in the positive, and provides a semantic solution grounded in the 
presence and absence of the DTHAT operator. Furthermore, Kaplan states 
that the definite article exhibits a “duality of function” (1970, 224), and we 
can therefore conclude that the theory is also lexicocentric. It is the lexical 
specification of the definite article that is ambiguous, and it is its dual 
function that enables one case to exhibit the direct reference operator 
DTHAT. Lastly, the duality of function feeds into what is said.  
4.16 
GROUNDING THE SEMANTIC OPERATOR DTHAT 
We have developed the direct reference theory, the semantic operator 
DTHAT, and the AT that is at the heart of Kaplan’s thesis. A given 
utterance containing an indexical singular term (pronoun, demonstrative, 
referential description) determines a function that, relative to the context of 
utterance, fixes the propositional content and provides an individual as a 
constituent of that content. The linguistic meaning of an indexical includes 
the semantic operator DTHAT, which determines what is said and 
produces a singular proposition whose truth depends upon a particular 
individual. Attached to an indexical expression is a mode of presentation, 
which may be realised as phonetic material, an ostensive act, and so on. 
The following examples exhibit part of the range of expressions that the 
direct reference theory applies to, and those expressions whose linguistic 
meaning would include the DTHAT operator: 
(28) I am tired. 
(29) He is tired. 
(30) That is covered with books. 
(31) That desk is covered with books. 
(32) The desk is covered with books. 
The italicized subjects in (28)–(32) contain DTHAT, but have distinct modes 
of presentation. The variety of expressions that the operator applies to 
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raises a pressing question, what grounds the existence of the DTHAT 
operator in the first place with respect to such a wide variety of expressions 
and yet bans it, for instance, from being applied to referential uses of 
existential quantification? 
To begin with let us repeat examples (19) and (20) above, which illustrate a 
referential use and quantificational use of the same expression: 
(19)  DTHAT [the manager of Manchester United] is angry. 
(20) The manager of Manchester United is angry. 
In the above examples we have the same phonetic material in the same 
grammatical configuration and yet (19) exhibits an instance of direct 
reference, which creates a singular proposition, and (20) does not, thereby 
creating a general proposition. The only discernible difference is the 
presence/absence of the semantic operator DTHAT. In order to state that 
the sentence the manager of Manchester United is angry is semantically 
ambiguous it appears the theory’s only recourse is to stipulate that the 
referential use is accompanied by the DTHAT operator and the 
quantificational use is not. At best this argument is begging the question 
and at worst it is circular. There needs to be an account of the genesis of 
DTHAT in referential uses that is not simply stipulated.  
If we consider further indexical expressions, then the problem becomes 
more pressing. Referential uses of indexicals, as in (28)-(31), seems to fit 
naturally with Kaplan’s analysis, yet not all indexicals are so 
straightforwardly fitted together with the DTHAT operator. Consider for 
instance (33):  
(33) Ronaldo always pressures the goalkeeper and when he does that 
goalkeeper normally makes an error. 
A felicitous reading of (33) can be taken whereby the speaker is discussing 
a general trait in Ronaldo’s style of play in which, from game to game, he 
pressures the opposing team’s goalkeeper. In this instance, the complex 
demonstrative does not pick out a particular individual but instead picks 
out a different referent from game to game. Seeking to apply the DTHAT 
operator to complex demonstratives therefore seems less straightforward 
than it does for pronouns and bare demonstratives. It is true that examples 
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wherein complex demonstratives are used referentially far outweigh those 
where they are used attributively, but the existence of such examples raises 
doubts as to the straightforward application of the operator to all 
seemingly indexical expressions. As with (19) and (20), we need a 
principled way of segregating expressions to which DTHAT applies and 
those to which it does not. 
It is not sufficient to state that referential uses of definite descriptions and 
complex demonstratives constitute a linguistic convention, and we cannot 
simply ground that convention through reference to the presence of 
DTHAT. The presence of DTHAT merely formalizes the convention once it 
has been accepted, and, critically, accepted as grounded in semantics. The 
problem may well be rooted in the fact that DTHAT, as employed in 
referential descriptions, is a property of the lexical entry for the definite 
article, the theory is lexicocentric. Its presence or absence in a definite 
description thus seems arbitrary and dependent upon what reading we 
intend to come out at the end. At this point we can delve a little deeper into 
the grammar of DPs, wherein we might find an answer for the existence of 
the convention in the first place as well as the explanation for definite 
descriptions and complex demonstratives being ambiguous. 
It standardly assumed that arguments in natural language are to be found 
in DPs, which contain a determiner (D) and a noun phrase (NP) 
complement: 
(34) [D [NP]] 
In addition to the structure in (34), there is evidence to suggest that DPs 
extend further to include, at least, a deictic projection (DeixP) and a further 
determiner later (D#P) in its edge (Martin & Hinzen 2014; for similar ideas 
see Zamparelli 2000b; Leu 2008): 
(35) [D# [Deix [D [NP]]]] 
With the extended projection for D, we begin to get a clearer grammatical 
differentiation for (28)-(32), which reflects the referential, or ambiguous, 
functions they exhibit. To begin with, (28) and (30) are captured as follows: 
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(36) [D I [DEIX ∅ [D ∅ [NP ∅]]] am tired.105 
(37) [D ∅ [DEIX that [D ∅ [NP ∅]]] is covered with books. 
To reiterate what we said in §3.342, the structure from D onwards, D, Deix, 
D#, is the DP phase edge, and NP is its interior. Following Martin & 
Hinzen’s analysis, we can state that the edge is the locus of reference and it 
contains those expressions that are univocally referential (2014, 102; see 
also Sheehan & Hinzen 2011; 2013). When the edge is filled and the interior 
is empty, we only get the strongest possible forms of reference, personal 
reference and non-descriptive deictic reference. Additionally, note that in 
these cases there is no ambiguity problem, and DTHAT may be posited in 
each case (if we choose to defend a DTHAT analysis) without controversy.  
Moving on, we will note that in (31) and (32) both the edge and interior are 
filled: 
(38) [D ∅ [DEIX ∅ [D that [NP desk]]] is covered with books. 
(39) [D ∅ [DEIX ∅ [D the [NP desk]]] is covered with books.106 
To begin with, it is worth quickly stating that the NP in (38) is optional, 
whereas it is demanded in (39) in order for the sentence to be felicitous. We 
will make use of this distinction to argue that the linguistic convention for 
using complex demonstratives referentially is stronger than that for 
definite descriptions. The forms of reference exhibited by (38) and (39) are 
weaker than (36) and (37) as is illustrated by the fact that the referent they 
pick out need not be contextually salient. The idea we will pursue in §5 and 
§6 is that when the edge and interior are both filled we get the potential for 
ambiguity, which is meant to explain the distinction between (19) and (20) 
as well as (33).107 An analysis of the grammar of DPs alone will not explain 
when a complex demonstrative or definite description can exhibit DTHAT, 
but it does help illustrate why they are ambiguous and yet other 
expressions, (36) and (37), are not. Further to this, when the entire edge is 
                                                          
105  Martin & Hinzen suggest that first person pronominal reference exhibits D-to-D# 
movement (2014, 102). Nothing in the present debate turns on this. The symbol ∅ indicates 
that the syntactic category is empty. 
106 In §6.11 we will argue that the DeixP is filled with phonetically null deictic information, 
insofar as the DP is used for deictic reference.  
107 We will have to make use of further grammatical work to fully explain (19) and (20) that 
will be introduced in §5 and §6. 
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empty and only the NP is filled we get a purely predicative (or descriptive) 
reading: 
(40) I enjoy watching [D ∅ [DEIX ∅ [D ∅ [NP football]]]. 
In (40) we cannot add DTHAT to the DP as there is no way to get it to 
exhibit direct reference.108 Critically, the presence or absence of DTHAT is 
not dictated by the lexical items but by the grammar of DPs, it is not 
lexicocentric. It is in such work that we might be able to ground a non-
stipulated account of the presence and absence of DTHAT in arguments. 
However, even if we did that the distinct forms of reference that each type 
of argument exhibited would not be captured besides in their mode of 
presentation. 
The point we are getting at is that Kaplan’s AT does not distinguish the 
arguments that always exhibit strong reference (personal pronominal and 
bare demonstratives) from those that are ambiguous (complex 
demonstratives and definite descriptions), through employing the DTHAT 
operator. Furthermore, there is no account of the linguistic convention for 
using definite descriptions referentially over and above the presence of a 
DTHAT operator. We can conclude this section with the observation that a 
thorough investigation into the grammar of DPs may well provide insight 
into the ambiguity problems.  
4.2 
A NEO- FREGEAN THEORY 
The second AT that we will analyse comes from Devitt (1974; 1981a; 1981b; 
2004; 2007a; 2007b). Devitt also defends the existence of a semantic 
ambiguity in definite descriptions, but unlike Kaplan he does not take 
referential uses to be instances of direct reference (1990; 2012b). Devitt’s 
theory rejects the claim that the only semantic contribution of a referential 
description to truth-conditional content is the individual it picks out.109 
Instead, he defends the view that the descriptive content is both 
                                                          
108 There is reason to believe that the grammar of DPs produces a ‘hierarchy of reference’, 
with referential strength increasing as the interpretation rests heavier on the phase edge 
(Sheehan & Hinzen 2011; 2013; Martin & Hinzen 2014).  
109  Additionally, Devitt claims his view is not committed to the idea that referential 
descriptions are rigid designators (2004, 295-296).  
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semantically operative and part of the proposition expressed. It is part of 
what is said. It is the inclusion of descriptive content into the propositional 
content that leads Recanati to call the view neo-Fregean (1993, 32). It states 
that a definite description contributes both descriptive content and an 
individual to the semantic content of a proposition it is part of.  
4.21 
THE CAUSAL THEORY 
Devitt’s theory of descriptions is founded in the idea that a causal chain of 
communication exists between a singular term and its referent (1974, 186). 
The idea at work here is similar to that employed by Kripke with respect to 
proper names (1981, 59n). However, Devitt extends the analysis to cover 
pronouns, bare and complex demonstratives, and referential uses of 
definite descriptions (1981a; 1981b). Within this theory, it is the existence of 
a causal chain between an utterance of a singular term and the particular 
individual it picks out that allows it to refer. Causal chains are the 
mechanisms that enable reference. The defence of a semantic ambiguity is 
then formed with respect to causal chains, referential uses of descriptions 
form causal chains with the particular individual that they pick out 
whereas attributive uses do not. 
4.22 
CAUSAL CHAINS 
In order to understand the theory we should first say something about 
what constitutes a causal chain and how referential uses of descriptions 
come to be associated with them. The first point to recognise is that the 
theory is developed in a similar fashion to the concept of rigid designation 
developed by Kripke. To recall, a term is taken to be a rigid designator if 
and only if it designates the same individual across all possible worlds in 
which that individual exists. 110  The quintessential rigid designators are 
proper names. According to this view, rigid designators are linked to their 
referents through a ‘causal chain of communication’, which is passed down 
through the linguistic community enabling a speaker to use a rigid 
                                                          
110 Kripke defines rigidity as follows, “[l]et’s call something a rigid designator if in every 
possible world it designates the same object, a non-rigid or accidental designator if it is not 
the case” (1981, 48). 
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designator without the referent being present (1981, 59n). Rigid designators 
‘stand for’ the individual that they are linked to through this chain of 
communication/causal network. 
Nevertheless, there needs to be a point at which the causal chain is initiated, 
which might be labelled the ‘initial baptism’ of the referent with the name.  
Devitt terms such a baptism a ‘naming ceremony’. For instance, take the 
name Aristotle and the individual Aristotle to whom it refers. At some point 
in time there was a naming ceremony wherein the referent became tied to 
the name. Following this, through a causal network the name was passed 
down through the linguistic community enabling people to rigidly 
designate the individual Aristotle with the name Aristotle without ever 
having met the man. In Devitt’s words: 
[t]he central idea of the causal theory of proper names is that 
our present uses of a name, say ‘Aristotle’, designates the 
famous Greek philosopher Aristotle, not in virtue of the various 
things we (rightly) believe true of him, but in virtue of a causal 
network stretching back from our uses to the first uses of the name to 
designate Aristotle. Our present uses of a name borrow their 
reference from earlier uses. It is this social mechanism that 
enables us all to designate the same thing by a name. (1974, 184) 
As we will see, Devitt employs a similar tactic in order to explain the 
semantic significance of referential uses of definite descriptions. 
The naming ceremony, as described by Kripke, involves fixing the referent 
for the rigid designator. This process may take place through the 
employment of a definite description but that does not mean that the 
description becomes part of the meaning of the name. To clarify, Kripke 
states that “the idea of fixing a referent” is “opposed to actually defining 
one term as meaning the other” (1981, 60). The procedure involved in a 
naming ceremony is described by Devitt as follows: 
They [the audience] perceived the ceremony, using at least their 
eyes and ears. To perceive something is to be causally affected 
by it. As a result of the effect it had on them, they were in a 
position to use the name Nana later to designate a cat. What 
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they gained at the ceremony, it seems appropriate to say, was 
‘an ability to designate by Nana by Nana’. (1974, 185)111 
It is in situations like this that the causal network associated with a name is 
established. Through witnessing this event those present gain the ability to 
begin employing the name as a rigid designator. Devitt labels these causal 
chains ‘designating chains’ or ‘D-chains’ (1981a, 515). 
The concept of a D-chain is meant to capture the manner in which all 
singular terms are tied to their referents. The theory is not one concerned 
with just explaining proper names, as Devitt states “it is plausible to think 
that deictic demonstratives and personal pronouns involve such a 
convention” (1981a, 516). In order words, the employment of a D-chain is a 
linguistic convention that helps to explain how such terms are capable of 
being used referentially in the first place. Therefore, when using singular 
terms “a certain object participates in the referential convention and thus 
exploits the causal-perceptual link to that object; a hearer participates in the 
referential convention and thus takes account of clues to what has been 
exploited” (2007a, 22). We might think of the employment of a D-chain as a 
linguistic skill. If a speaker is competent with respect to a certain language 
and using singular terms, then they will be able to make use of these D-
chains. This ability is part of a competent speaker’s linguistic arsenal. 
4.23 
THE GENESIS OF AMBIGUITY IN DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS 
The account of the genesis of the ambiguity problems provided by Devitt 
involves a distinction between D-chains and what he terms ‘attributive 
chains’ (A-chains). The ambiguity is formed by stating that referential uses 
of descriptions are enabled by D-chains, what he calls ‘designating 
descriptions’ or D-descriptions, whereas quantificational uses are attached 
to A-chains, what he called ‘attributive descriptions’ or A-descriptions 
(1974, 196-198; 1981a 516-517; 2007a, 22).112 A distinction between the two is 
founded upon the idea that it is only the D-descriptions that ‘designate’ 
                                                          
111 Italics of Nana added. 
112 Interestingly, Devitt carries this analysis over to names stating that we get a distinction 
between D-names and A-names, thereby committing to the idea that certain names are 
attributive (1974, 196).  
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their object (1974, 198). 113  As previously stated, Devitt understands 
referential uses of descriptions (D-descriptions) to be instances of a 
linguistic convention, which he defines as follows: 
(41) There is a semantic convention of using ‘the F’ to refer to x which 
exploits both a causal-perceptual link between the speaker and x 
and the meaning of ‘F’. (2007a, 22) 
The linguistic convention is labelled semantic (rather than an example of a 
generalized implicature as in the Russellian QT) and it creates a causal 
network with the individual through the descriptive content of the definite 
description. 
Let us return to the CAP and see what Devitt has to say about Donnellan’s 
courtroom example, which was elucidated in §1.2. The speaker who utters 
(42) is taken to have the individual Jones in mind and believes that their 
utterance will pick him out: 
(42) Smith’s murderer is insane. 
In virtue of this we can say that the speaker succeeds in communicating a 
singular proposition to her audience. Devitt analyses the situation as 
follows, “[i]t was because of our experiences of Jones during his trial, and 
our beliefs about him, that we used ‘Smith’s murderer’ in that utterance… 
In a sense, the object itself leads us to use the particular definite description 
in such cases” (1974, 191).  A D-chain is thereby created between Smith’s 
murderer and Jones. The D-chain enables the expression to be a designating 
expression. The linguistic meaning of the possessive Smith’s murderer is 
referential and what is said in an utterance of (42) is a singular proposition. 
As the theory behind D-chains is meant to cover a wide variety of 
expressions labelled singular terms, we can say that a process similar to 
that described above is applicable to pronouns, bare and complex 
demonstratives, and proper names (1981a, 517). 
The analysis given above might appear to suggest that Devitt reserves the 
existence of D-chains, and by extension the label of D-description, to 
                                                          
113 Devitt also takes anaphoric descriptions to be instances of d-descriptions, which are 
explained in virtue of the anaphoric element borrowing “characteristics from the singular 
term on which it depends” (1974, 197). The causal network is formed between the singular 
term and the referent, which the anaphoric element then latches onto. 
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instances where a definite description is used deictically. If we recall the 
concept of the naming ceremony and the fact these chains are meant to be 
causal, then it is natural to take referential uses to form a causal network 
through the fact that the referent is close to hand. That is, it might be 
understood that the only way to ensure that causal network is upheld with 
a definite description is to have direct access to the referent at the time of 
the utterance. However, Devitt denies this and wishes to defend the idea 
that a D-description can occur when the intended referent is in actual fact 
absent. For instance, an utterance of (43) can count as a D-description even 
in the absence of the intended referent: 
(43) The manager of Manchester United is angry. 
If the speaker who utters (43) is aware of the causal network that links the 
definite description to the intended referent, then an utterance of (43) may 
likewise connect with a D-chain and thereby express a singular proposition. 
The linguistic convention to refer using a definite description, and the 
semantic grounding of this convention in D-chains, is thereby available 
whenever an accessible causal network is. An instance of (44) however 
would fail to connect with such a network: 
(44) The largest animal in the world is a whale. 
The causal network for (44) is not established and hence there is no D-chain 
to link the definite description and the referent. That is not to say that such 
a D-chain is impossible, it is not denied access to a D-chain in principle, but 
simply to state that the speaker would not be in a position for her utterance 
to connect with it. The example in (44) therefore constitutes an A-
description (1981a). 
In order to solidify the theory as one concerned with semantics, Devitt 
states that the role of D-chains “has a crucial bearing on truth” (1974, 
202).114 We can understand the role that D-chains have on truth through the 
Smith/Jones case raised by Kripke and analysed in §3.23. Let us recall the 
example where the speaker misidentifies Smith as being Jones and utters 
(45): 
                                                          
114 The argument put forward to defend the semantic dimension of Devitt’s theory can be 
readily extended to cover the pragmatic thesis offered by the Russellian that accepts the 
relevance of a speaker’s referent to communicative efficacy.  
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(45) Jones is raking the leaves.  
Devitt provides the following analysis. The speaker employed a D-chain, 
and consequently a D-name, which was intended to pick out the salient 
individual Smith. However, the speaker misdescribes the individual. 
Therefore, according to Devitt the speaker is taken to partially denote Jones 
and partially denote Smith.115 The first partial denotation is made through 
the fact that the name Jones is causally linked to a particular individual 
Jones (who is not present). The second partial denotation is made through 
the idea that the name Jones is linked through a causal/perceptual chain (a 
D-chain) to the salient individual Smith. Accordingly, the audience, in not 
knowing any better, holds two distinct beliefs, “the true one that that man 
(pointing to Smith) is raking the leaves, and the false one that that man 
(pointing to Smith) is Jones” (1981a, 514). The impact on truth-conditions is 
formed by whether we take the D-chain formed through the causal 
network to Jones or the one formed with the salient individual Smith. It is 
this that Devitt points to in order to account for our conflicting intuitions as 
to whether what the speaker said was true or false. Additionally, we cannot 
take recourse to the concept of a speaker’s referent due to the fact that it is 
unclear which individual would emerge as the correct one. In other words, 
the two D-chains are both partially constitutive of the truth-conditions 
expressed by (45), which is not the case with A-descriptions. 
The distinction between D-descriptions and A-descriptions is semantic, and 
it is meant to account for the genesis of, at least, the CAP. Moreover, the 
theory states that whilst both types of definite description have 
semantically operative descriptive content, it is only referential uses that 
employ the descriptive content to employ a D-chain. It is only D-
descriptions whose descriptive content connects with a causal chain. The 
theory is at odds with the direct reference theory discussed above as it 
accepts that the descriptive content is more than a mere ‘mode of 
presentation’ of the referent, but it is in fact responsible for the emergence 
of an appropriate D-chain. Critically, the defence of the view is founded 
upon a strong commitment to referential uses of definite descriptions being 
an instance of a linguistic convention. It claims that the frequency and 
                                                          
115 Devitt introduces the concept of a partial denotation to be understood in a manner similar 
to Field’s idea of certain scientific terms being ‘referentially indeterminate’ (1974, 202). 
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consistency of such uses speaks in favour of a semantic account of 
referential uses. 
4.24 
REFERENTIAL USE AND LINGUISTIC CONVENTION 
We have stated numerous times that Devitt defends the semantic 
significance of referential uses of definite descriptions on the basis that 
such uses constitute a linguistic convention. The critical question to ask 
here is how this linguistic convention lends support to the idea that 
referential uses are grounded in semantics. In Devitt’s words: 
When a person has a thought with a particular F object in mind, 
there is a regularity of her using ‘the F’ to express that thought. 
And there need be no special stage setting enabling her to 
conversationally imply what she has not literally said, nor any 
sign that her audience needs to use a Gricean derivation to 
understand what she means. This regularity is strong evidence 
that there is a convention of using ‘the F’ to express a thought 
about a particular F, that this is a standard use. This convention 
is semantic, as semantic as the one for an attributive use. In 
each case, there is a convention of using ‘the F’ to express a 
thought with a certain sort of meaning/content. (2004, 283) 
The above passage outlines the core tenets of Devitt’s theory, referential 
uses of descriptions are instances of a linguistic convention, that 
convention is semantic and part of ‘what is said’, it requires no special 
‘stage-setting’, it is not to be considered a Gricean implicature or part of 
pragmatic machinery, and, finally, referential uses are as semantic as the 
attributive ones. Therefore, Devitt explicitly denies that referential uses 
merely communicate or imply singular propositions as argued by the 
Russellian QT (2007a, 17). 
One question that raises doubts over Devitt’s theory comes from a 
Russellian standpoint, and it concerns whether the same convention is 
present in standard quantifier phrases, given that they too can be used 
referentially. Consider (46): 
(46) Someone broke the window. 
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In a situation where the speaker and a member of the audience are aware of 
the culprit, who we shall name Wilson, (46) can be used to communicate a 
singular/object-dependent about that individual. Nevertheless, such uses 
are not frequent and require ‘special stage setting’. As Devitt notes, “with 
enough stage setting almost any expression can be used to convey almost 
any thought” (2004, 283). It is the fact that no such stage setting is required 
for definite descriptions to be used referentially that we can understand 
such uses as a linguistic convention, and a semantic one at that.  
Another point that Devitt raises in favour of the semantic significance of 
referential uses has to do with how speakers identify the appropriate 
referent. According to him, the Russellian theory requires an account of the 
pragmatic machinery that makes the connection between what is said and 
what is implicated, it is not enough to simply state that the individual is 
‘salient’ or ‘what the speaker intends’ as this merely “labels the problem 
without solving it” (2007a, 24). Alternatively, Devitt believes that his theory 
straightforwardly answers the question of how we identify the referent of a 
definite description. In his own words: 
[w]hat provides the needed identification is the referential 
meaning of ‘the F’, a meaning established by the convention of 
exploiting causal-perceptual links between thoughts and 
objects… [t]he referential use of a definite, like the use of a 
demonstrative or pronoun, makes the object of thought salient 
to the hearer because she participates in the appropriate 
referential convention. (2007a, 24) [Italics omitted] 
The disambiguation of the appropriate referent is tied to the mechanism of 
the causal-network/D-chain that is formed between the speaker, the 
utterance, and the referent, all of which come together in a linguistic 
convention that shared by the audience. The solution will seem 
unsatisfactory to the Russellian. The Russellian will likely already accept 
that speakers interact with a referential convention, but simply state that it 
is grounded in pragmatics.  
To avoid this Russellian counter, Devitt must provide a satisfactory answer 
to the following question, how is it the case that a linguistic convention 
becomes a semantic fact? In answering this question we will analyse 
Reimer’s argument by analogy, which is an argument that Devitt endorses 
in support of his position (2004, 285). The argument goes as follows. Take 
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an expression ζ whose linguistic meaning is m, in time a non-literal 
meaning of ζ, which we will term m’, might become a conventional 
linguistic meaning of ζ. In this case, the expression ζ can in one instance 
mean m and in another m’, as both are now conventional meanings of ζ. 
Reimer invites us to consider the word incense. The word incense can be 
used to express the proposition that an individual became angry: 
(47) Ronaldo was incensed at the decision. 
The intended reading of (47) is now commonplace and can be understood 
as a conventional way of using the word incense, however the verb 
originally meant ‘to make fragrant with incense’. Hence, the use that we 
observe in (47) originated as a metaphor and over time became a linguistic 
convention. As Reimer notes, “the metaphor is dead: due to its frequent use, 
its former metaphorical meaning has become one of its (two) literal 
meanings” (1998, 97). The idea is that the previously metaphorical meaning 
has become standard, and that “the fact that an expression is standardly 
used to mean such-and-such suggests that it can be used – literally- to 
mean such-and-such (1998, 98). The metaphorical use is thereby established 
as a semantic convention. 
It is the increased frequency of uses such as (47) that saw the literal 
meaning of the verb incense extended to include a second standard 
meaning. With an increased frequency of usage language hits a tipping 
point at which a once metaphorical meaning of a term becomes a literal 
meaning, and is thus subsumed as part of that terms semantic content or 
linguistic meaning. The standard meaning is understood to be “grasped 
immediately: that is, without the mediation of any Gricean-style inferences” 
(1998, 98). If the process described above is true for the verb incense, then 
might it explain referential uses of descriptions?  
It is clear that referential uses of descriptions are ubiquitous, so should we 
understand them as being ‘grasped…without the mediation of Gricean-
style inferences’? Devitt readily applies this analogy to definite descriptions:  
[p]eople do not now grasp what speakers commonly mean by 
the verb ‘incense’ in that Gricean way…[a]nd people do not 
grasp what a speaker means by a referentially used definite in 
that way either. Rather, they grasp the meaning immediately 
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and directly because that is the meaning it conventionally has. 
(2004, 285) 
The fact that such uses are standard means that there is no need to fall-back 
on Gricean implicatures to explain their existence. The semantics does the 
job before pragmatics gets a look-in. 
The idea behind referential descriptions being a linguistic convention is 
defended, at least in part, by analogy to dead metaphor (as exhibited in the 
verb incense). In outlining the concept of a dead metaphor, Reimer states 
that an expression can subsume a previously metaphorical meaning as one 
of its standard, and hence literal, meanings. However, the extension of this 
idea to referential descriptions is not a straightforward as it might appear. 
The story given for the verb incense is questionable, and, further to this, 
what reason do we have for thinking that a grammatically complex word, 
such as the definite article, can be given a similar analysis. Let us consider 
these points in turn as they will raise doubts over the legitimacy of the 
argument from analogy. 
To begin with, the idea behind the verb incense being an instance of a single 
expression with two standard meanings may be questioned. For instance, it 
is not uncommon for one phonetic label to be attached to two or more 
distinct meanings and consequently two or more distinct lexical items. 
Consider the phonetic label bank, if we are to understand this label as 
picking out a single lexical item, then that lexical item has a variety of 
meanings including: ‘the land alongside or sloping down to a river or lake’, 
‘a long, high mass or mound of a particular substance’, ‘the cushion of a 
pool table’, ‘a financial establishment’, ‘a stock of something’, and so on. 
Each of these meanings constitutes a standard use of the phonetic label bank, 
but are we to assume from this that the label stands for a single lexical item 
with a wide range of conventional meanings. The answer to this is clearly 
no. Instead, we understand these distinct meanings as captured in distinct 
lexical items, which share a phonetic label and are hence homonyms. There 
are numerous examples of homonyms in English as well as cross-
linguistically and perhaps the example of incense given above is one such 
instance. The original meaning of incense remains as one of its possible 
literal meanings, but once the metaphorical meaning becomes standard 
what is to stop it becoming a distinct lexical item in its own right? In 
proposing this idea we can retain the view that the two words share the 
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same source and hence the new lexical item’s etymology will be tied up 
with the original term. Nevertheless, there is nothing to stop the new 
conventional meaning for incense being subsumed under a new lexical item, 
particularly as we progress through generations of new speakers. The two 
uses are equally well explained by speakers employing distinct lexical 
items.  
Another problem is how the story for incense informs us about the 
semantics of the definite article. It may be plausible to take the two 
meanings associated with incense to indicate the existence of two lexical 
items, but it is much harder to make this claim with respect to the definite 
article. One reason for this is that the two meanings for incense are based in 
idiosyncratic descriptive information, whereas the two potential meanings 
for the concern functional information. The word incense is a descriptive 
word, whereas the word the is grammatical or functional. Nevertheless, 
pursuing the idea that the article has two distinct lexical entries, one 
capturing a referential function and one capturing an attributive function, 
we might expect this to be reflected in at least one language. There is no 
evidence in English that such a distinction can be made, and there little to 
no cross-linguistic evidence either (for more discussion on this possibility 
see Amaral 2008).116 One important thing we can draw from this discussion 
however is that both Reimer and Devitt defend a lexicocentric conception 
of the semantics of the definite article.  
The distinction between descriptive/lexical and functional/grammatical 
words raises further doubts over the argument from analogy. Within a 
syntactic derivation, descriptive words like incense are merged into lexical 
categories (N, V), whereas the definite article is standardly analysed as 
falling in a functional category (D). 117 Lexical categories contain ‘items with 
idiosyncratic descriptive content’, whereas functional categories contain 
words that have ‘no descriptive/lexical content’ and ‘serve an essentially 
                                                          
116 Amaral considers evidence for the existence of two distinct determiners that correspond 
to the two uses in Malagasy (Keenan & Ebert 1973) and the Monchengladbach dialect of 
German (Hartmann 1982). 
117 The word category here should be understood as a syntactic projection. For instance, the 
phrase DP is headed by the category D. For the purpose of the ensuing discussion we will 
state the distinction as one holding between words, however that is not strictly true. The 
distinction is actually formed between syntactic projections, it is a distinction between 
lexical projections and functional projections. We will return to this distinction and provide 
a thorough analysis in §5.21. 
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grammatical function’ (Radford 2004, 454-460). Traditionally understood, 
functional categories are grammatically complex and their role in a 
sentence goes beyond their dictionary definition through organizing the 
content provided by the lexical categories. Additionally, it is impossible to 
define a word that is associated with a functional category without 
reference to the larger grammatical configuration within which it is found. 
In other words, once we investigate the meaning of words such as the 
definite article we go beyond standard ‘lexical semantics’ to investigate 
‘compositional semantics’. Indeed, this is one of the arguments against 
lexicocentric views. It is possible to list a dozen examples of dead 
metaphors for words associated with lexical categories, but no such 
examples exist for words associated with functional categories. It is for 
reasons such as these that we should deny the existence of a lexical 
ambiguity in the definite article, as the meaning of such a term is heavily 
impacted by grammatical structure. 
The above passages might suggest that we are attempting to undermine the 
idea that referential uses of descriptions are instances of a linguistic 
convention, but this is not the case. All we wish to say is that the argument 
provided by Reimer and Devitt, which seeks to illustrate how a linguistic 
convention becomes a semantic fact, fails. Nevertheless, the referential uses 
are cases of a clear linguistic convention and Devitt is correct to note that 
they exist without any special stage setting or conscious effort on the part 
of the speaker or audience. As will come as no surprise, we wish to defend 
the view that the linguistic convention arises through grammatical facts. 
We have already provided one reason to think that the linguistic 
convention is based on grammar through our analysis of DPs in §4.16. In 
what follows we will further strengthen this account through reference to 
cross-linguistic evidence. The evidence will illustrate a close relationship 
between the definite article and distal demonstratives. 
There are many languages across the world that lack the definite article but 
nevertheless have the same communicative power as those with them. This 
raises a question. How do such languages achieve the same communicative 
results when using an utterance that would be associated with a definite 
description in English? Historically, the definite article in English is 
understood to have emerged from demonstrative pronouns 
(Christophersen 1939). With demonstrative pronouns traditionally 
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analysed as being referential, could this possibly explain the referential 
linguistic convention for definite descriptions? Did they emerge as a type of 
demonstrative? The emergence of the definite article system in English can 
be understood in more clarity once we look at cross-linguistic evidence. 
We can shed some light on the linguistic convention of referential uses of 
descriptions by looking at Montagnais. Montagnais is an Algonquin 
language that lacks an article system. However, it has a rich system of 
demonstratives. Demonstratives are traditionally split into two types, distal 
and proximal, which are distinguished in terms of what we will term 
‘locational’ information. Distal demonstratives are typically employed to 
pick out an individual that is far from the speaker (that/those), whereas 
proximal demonstratives are used to pick out an individual that is close to 
the speaker (this/these). Critically, a bare demonstrative includes this 
locational information. The first interesting point about Montagnais is that 
the distal demonstrative can function as a non-deictic or anaphoric element, 
but when it does the locational information is no longer interpreted (Cyr 
1993, 205). Additionally, Cyr observes that there is a correlation between 
the grammatical configuration in which the distal demonstrative falls and 
how it is interpreted (as a standard demonstrative/definite article). In Cyr’s 
words, “the pre-posed demonstrative noun-determiners of Montagnais 
may be real definite articles, while the postposed ones may be genuine 
demonstratives” (1993, 207).118  For instance, in (48) below ne acts as a 
referential definite article: 
(48) Ek  ne  assi  kau  ekue  tshishishaukut 




‘And then the Earth started over again to be heated by the sun.’ 
Critically, the definite element ne in (48) does not carry any locational 
information surrounding the distance of the object from the speaker (1993, 
                                                          
118 We can place this idea within a cross-linguistic context, “[i]f this is the case, however, 
Montagnais, contrary to English and French, for instance, but similar to many other 
language with a definite article system, does not make any morphological distinction 
between definite functions, demonstrative functions or pronominal third person functions. 
The morphological identity of articles and demonstratives would hence make Montagnais 
more similar to a language like Ute and Swahili” (1993, 207). 
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199-201). These observations are made in relation to a thorough 
investigation of a Montagnais corpus, which illustrates a strong correlation 
between pre-posed demonstratives and their interpretation as referential 
definite descriptions with the locational information ‘bleached’ (1993, 214-
216). This is enough for Cyr to conclude that Montagnais has a definite 
article, which has emerged from the demonstrative system. The emergence 
of a syntactic category that is indistinguishable from definite articles but yet 
emergent from demonstratives gives us further reason to support the idea 
that the linguistic convention of referential uses of definite descriptions is 
the result of a close-knit relationship with demonstratives.119 Therefore, we 
might think of the definite article as a demonstrative that has been bleached 
of its locational information, thereby making it more amenable to 
quantificational uses whilst retaining a standard referential use. 
It is worthwhile saying something more about the idea of demonstratives 
containing ‘locational’ information and the contrast that creates with 
articles. This will help illustrate how deictic uses of demonstratives and 
definite descriptions emerge, which are the standard examples used to 
defend the referential convention for definite descriptions. As stated, there 
exist, at least, distal and proximal demonstratives, which are distinguished 
in virtue of containing implicit information regarding the location of the 
intended referent. The locational information might be stated as follows: 
(49) That = [The + there] 
 This = [The + here]120 
It is the nature of this locational information that creates a strong link 
between definite articles and distal demonstratives as opposed to proximal 
ones. For instance, definite articles can be replaced by the distal 
demonstrative whilst retaining the semantic integrity of the original 
sentence more frequently than they can with proximal demonstratives. This 
can be illustrated in epithet constructions: 
(50) John is such a bad driver; the idiot will get himself killed one of 
these days. 
                                                          
119  In a similar vein, Huang notes that in certain dialects of Mandarin the distal 
demonstrative is used in a manner that suggests it too is acting as a definite article (1999, 92). 
120 Similar ideas have been explored by Elbourne (2005) and Leu (2009). 
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(51) John is such a bad driver; that idiot will get himself killed one of 
these days. 
(52) *John is such a bad driver; this idiot will get himself killed one of 
these days. 
As we can see, the article in (50) can be replaced by a distal demonstrative 
in (51) and express the same proposition, which is difficult to interpret from 
(52). Additionally, it is seemingly a cross-linguistic fact that when a 
language wishes to use a demonstrative but has no use for the locational 
information it opts for the distal, not the proximal demonstrative (Cyr 1993, 
1999; Huang 1999, 92).  
We might therefore begin to understand the definite article as a distal 
demonstrative that has had the locational information bleached from it. In 
virtue of this bleaching, the definite article becomes less deictic and thereby 
weakens its demand to be interpreted referentially, thus giving rise to the 
ambiguity. Additionally, the demonstratives can appear without a NP 
complement whereas the definite article does not. This suggests that the 
locational information attached to demonstratives seemingly plays the role 
of descriptive content that would otherwise be present in the NP. When 
that information is bleached, as in the definite article, the element must be 
accompanied by a filled NP. All of this points towards a strong relationship 
between the distal demonstrative and the definite article and provides part 
of the explanation that we will provide for referential uses being instances 
of a linguistic convention. The foregoing discussion casts light on the 
linguistic convention associated with referential uses of definite 
descriptions, but has offered a grammatical, rather than lexical, thesis 
through cross-linguistic evidence. 
To rekindle Devitt’s AT we might ask how it is that we discern whether or 
not a particular definite description connects with D-chain to create a 
referential use. Devitt claims that the linguistic convention provides a good 
reason to accept that the linguistic meaning of a referential description is 
constitutive of what is said. In his own words, “what is said by an utterance 
of a sentence, S, is determined by the conventional meaning of S according 
to the semantic conventions participated in by the speaker in making the 
utterance” (2007a, 11). Reference fixing is determined by D-chains, and 
these chains are enabled through the linguistic convention associated with 
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referential uses of descriptions, which, critically, are part of the linguistic 
meaning of such utterances. Therefore, the position defended is inherently 
tied with how the linguistic convention arises and stands or falls based on 
this. We have provided a distinct account of the linguistic convention, but it 
is not formed through D-chains. It is instead formed through the close 
grammatical relationship shared between the definite article and the distal 
demonstrative, a relationship that will become even clearer once we 
analyse the grammar of DPs more carefully in §5.342. 
The work on Devitt illustrated a further AT that is present in the literature, 
which takes referential uses to be a linguistic convention and that this 
convention must be captured in their semantics. It is now time to see how 
Devitt’s theory handles the three ambiguity problems from §1.1 (which are 
repeated above in §4.15).  
The solution offered to the CAP is as follows, a given utterance ζ containing 
a definite description can in one context be used attributively and in 
another referentially as a result of the two exhibiting distinct semantic 
conventions. The referential use of a definite description is explained 
through the semantic convention that speaker’s partake in, which consists 
in a causal network (D-chain) that exists between the utterance and a 
particular individual. In such a case, the truth-conditional content or what 
is said is such an utterance is a singular/object-dependent proposition. 
Alternatively, the attributive use of a definite description is explained 
through no such D-chain existing to link the utterance and the intended 
individual. Therefore, the explanation of the genesis of the CAP is semantic.  
As for GAP1, it is likely that Devitt will reject it in virtue of his account of 
the CAP. The idea behind his theory is that referential uses of definite 
descriptions are enabled by D-chains, and hence any definite description is 
in principle available to use referentially just so long as the speaker can 
engage with the D-chain that links the utterance and speaker. However, 
Devitt’s examples of referential uses, and their similarity with deictic 
demonstratives, appears to suggest that he would defend the view that 
certain definite descriptions are more amenable than others to referential 
uses. It might be understood that sentences containing definite descriptions 
wherein the article may be exchanged for a demonstrative more frequently 
exhibit referential uses than those whereby the demonstrative would alter 
the communicative efficacy. Therefore, Devitt’s theory suggests that the 
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grammatical structure of a definite description may make it more inclined 
to be used referentially although this is not explicitly defending, however 
in principle any definite description once supplied with a D-chain may 
exhibit a referential use. 
Finally, as for GAP2 the solution Devitt will offer is most likely the same as 
we have outlined for GAP1. The grammar of certain sentential utterances 
may make them more inclined to be used referentially, but in principle any 
sentence containing a definite description can be so used. Therefore, Devitt 
defends a semantic genesis for at least one of the ambiguity problems, and 
that this solution retains the core insight of literalism that there is no 
requirement for free contextual enrichment (the referential use is grounded 
in linguistic meaning), and is a lexicocentric view (the article itself is 
ambiguous). 
We have now provided an analysis of the Russellian QT and two ATs. In 
each case we observed that theories uphold semantic literalism and are 
lexicocentric. Throughout §3 and §4 we have provided reasons to think that 
analysis of grammatical structure, in particular that of DPs, might 
illuminate an alternative account of the three ambiguity problems. In §5 we 
will build the grammatical theory of meaning that we take to constitute the 
skeleton or blueprint for compositional semantics. The analysis will be 
required prior to its direct application to varying forms of definite 
descriptions. Critically, our theory will provide an alternative to literalism 
and contextualism that has framed the descriptions literature so far 
discussed. Additionally, we will see that a lexicocentric theory of 
descriptions is no longer tenable once grammar has been understood as 
productive in the construction of semantic content, linguistic meaning, and 












GRAMMAR, LINGUISTIC MEANING, AND 
‘WHAT IS SAID’ 
 
So far we have analysed the Russellian QT (§3) and two ATs from Kaplan 
and Devitt (§4). In rejecting each view, we argued that each adhered to a 
lexicocentric conception of semantics and thus failed to provide thorough 
scrutiny of determiner phrases (DPs), which in turn negatively impacted 
the account of the ambiguity problems that they were designed to solve. 
The Russellian QT gave a pragmatic account of the three ambiguity 
problems, whilst the two ATs gave a semantic account. In what follows we 
will provide reason to think that a third route may be preferable. The third 
route takes compositional semantics to be grounded in grammar, as 
opposed to the semantic-types assigned to lexical items. We will label this a 
‘grammatical theory of meaning’, and it will provide the backbone to our 
grammatical thesis (GT) for definite descriptions to be given in §6.  
The following chapter will develop two interrelated arguments. The first is 
that syntactic structure is productive in the composition of semantic 
content, and the second is that it fully specifies linguistic meaning as well 
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as what is said. To this end, in §5.1 will argue that the study of natural 
language syntax, as exhibited in generative grammar, can be understood as 
an explanatory and naturalistic method for studying a universal property 
of our species. Next, in §5.2 we will advance this argument in line with 
developments in linguistic minimalism, which will involve an analysis of 
the faculty of language (FL) and its component parts. Through this 
syntactic analysis, in §5.3 we will argue that much of what is traditionally 
posited as part of a semantic faculty (C-I) is in actual fact explained through 
syntax. Moreover, we will provide an analysis of three core parts of 
syntactic derivations (C, v*, and D), and argue that we can reduce the 
machinery posited in C-I to aspects of phase based derivations. As a 
working guide, we will attempt to see how far we can push Hinzen’s claim 
that syntax is the ‘skeleton of thought’ (2009b), a blueprint for 
compositional semantics, and, more important, a non-lexicocentric account 
of reference. Lastly, in §5.4 we will revisit the topic of linguistic meaning 
and what is said through a strategic development of Strawson’s idea that a 
theory of meaning provides general directions for use (1950; 1961). It will 
be argued that the three phases C, v*, and D provide specific instructions 
for using expressions, and we will take these instructions to constitute 
linguistic meaning. Through this analysis, we will then turn to explain how 
the grammar of a particular utterance can be understand as fully specifying 
what is said. We will argue that the linguistic meaning of an utterance fully 
specifies what is said in virtue of syntax coding for the utterance’s relation 
to the speech-event taking place (Sigurðsson 2004b; 2007). Through these 
features we need not rely on minimal propositions, as in literalism, or free 
contextual enrichment, as in contextualism, to create what is said, but 
instead on grammar (Hinzen forthcoming). We will conclude with a 
summary of the GT, which we will then invoke in accounting for the three 
ambiguity problems in §6. 
5.1 
LANGUAGE AS A NATURAL OBJECT 
The ability to use language is unique to our species. It is part of our 
biological endowment, a ‘direct gift of nature’ (Chomsky 2000, 81). It allows 
us open ended creativity, the ability to create and understand novel 
utterances together with only physical limits on the length of such 
utterances (2000, 3). Language affords us the ability to think in 
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propositional terms, to create utterances whose content is either true or 
false. It also allows thought and speech that is radically stimulus free. This 
point divides into two further ones: first of all we can speak of objects and 
events in the past and future, without having any relevant stimuli present; 
and secondly language affords us concepts, and accordingly thoughts and 
utterances, about things that can never be directly dependent upon stimuli 
(1966, 59-60). It is these aspects of human language that separate it from 
mere communication as exhibited in the animal kingdom. 121  One 
conclusion that can be drawn from all of this is that at least some aspects of 
grammar and semantics are unique to human language. 122  Language 
“varies little among humans and without significant analogue elsewhere” 
and “[i]t is largely responsible for the fact that alone in the biological world, 
humans have a history, cultural evolution, and diversity of any complexity 
and richness, even in the technical sense that their numbers are huge” (2000, 
3). It is therefore, arguably, responsible for the majority of the distinctions 
that exist between humans and the rest of the animal world. 
Chomsky outlines three factors to be investigated in the development of 
any adequate linguistic theory. Critically, these three factors are 
understood to be employed in the investigation of any biological faculty: 
1. Genetic endowment, apparently nearly uniform for the species, 
which interprets part of the environment as linguistic experience, 
a nontrivial task that the infant carries out reflexively, and which 
determines the general course of the development of the 
language faculty. 
2. Experience, which leads to variation, within a fairly narrow 
range, as in the case of other subsystems of the human capacity 
and the organism generally.  
3. Principles not specific to the faculty of language. (2005, 6) 
In summation, the first factor is associated with what is termed ‘Universal 
Grammar’ (UG) and is taken to be a species trait, the second factor is 
                                                          
121 For instance, this is what separates it from birdsong (Gentner et al. 2006; Berwick et al. 
2011), the dances of bees (Gallistel 2009), the pyow-hack noises of Putty-nosed monkeys 
(Arnold and Zuberbühler 2008), and the putative syntax of Campbell’s monkeys (Ouattara 
et al. 2009).  
122 It should be noted that some aspects of physiology relevant to the production of human 
language are also unique (Lieberman 1968; 2003). 
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linguistic stimuli that triggers and interacts with UG, and the third factor 
concerns the extent to which laws on nature more generally help shape FL. 
A linguistic theory is evaluated in accordance with its ability to account for 
all three factors. 
According to Chomsky, a linguistic theory can be judged through three 
levels of adequacy. The first is termed ‘descriptive adequacy’, a linguistic 
theory satisfies descriptive adequacy “insofar as it gives a full and accurate 
account of the properties of the language, of what the speaker of the 
language knows” (2000, 7). The second is termed ‘explanatory adequacy’, a 
linguistic theory satisfies explanatory adequacy if it shows “how each 
particular language can be derived from a uniform initial state under the 
‘boundary conditions’ set by experience” (2000, 7). 123  An explanatorily 
adequate theory of language must be able to predict what sentences are 
possible in a given language and what languages are possible given the 
underlying universal laws governing FL (Chomsky 1965, 30). Explanatory 
adequacy moves beyond particular languages to search for universal laws 
governing grammar, semantics, and phonetics, which underpin the species 
specific trait of language (1966, 94). The third, and strongest form, of 
adequacy is termed ‘principled explanation’, a linguistic theory achieves 
principled explanation if it can provide an account of natural language that 
situates it within general properties of organic systems (2004, 106; 2005, 2). 
Establishing what aspects of natural language are explained by systems not 
unique to language is central to principled explanation, such systems are 
termed ‘third factor’ aspects of language design (2005, 6). For Chomsky, a 
‘genuine theory of human language’ must satisfy both descriptive and 
explanatory adequacy at least. Finally, a successful linguistic theory will be 
able to account for two problems that face all species traits: the first is 
concerns how the trait develops through maturation in the individual, and 
the second is that of how the trait evolved in the species in the first place. 
Language acquisition concerns how a speaker comes to be competent in 
using a language. An explanation of acquisition requires solutions to the 
following two questions: what initial state was required as part of the 
speaker’s biological endowment? And, what processes, biological or 
                                                          
123
 The term ‘boundary conditions’ is meant to capture the idea that during the acquisition 
of a language the child is exposed to limited and fragmentary data concerning the language 
she is learning and yet without conscious effect learns it. 
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cultural, must the speaker have gone through in order to acquire this 
competence? For Chomsky, the answer to the first question is that the 
initial state or biological endowment shared by every individual across the 
species is UG (2000, 4; 2000 78). UG is the “general features of grammatical 
structure [that] are common to all language and reflect certain fundamental 
properties of the mind” (1966, 98). The answer to the second question is 
that humans possess a ‘language acquisition device’ that, when provided 
with a suitable level of stimuli, develops language in the individual with 
the end point being linguistic competence in a language. In Chomsky’s 
words, “[t]he environment triggers and to a limited extent shapes an 
internally-directed process of growth” (2000, 78). UG and acquisition 
interact in such a way as to provide principles and parameters in language 
learning, “language universals that set limits to the variety of human 
language” (2000, 98). Distinct languages are thus captured by parametric 
variation (2000, 8; Newmeyer 2005). The linguistic stimuli that an 
individual speaker encounters value these parameters to produce, for 
instance, the learning of English. Importantly, there is no conscious effect 
on the part of the child, and acquisition is largely unreflective, “the speaker 
of a language knows a great deal that he has not learned” (1966, 98). 
Language acquisition is therefore an organic process. 
Language evolution concerns a species trait and involves giving an 
explanation of the genesis of our linguistic abilities, our linguistic biological 
endowment. This problem has been labelled by some as one of the hardest 
problems in science (Christiansen & Kirby 2003). In virtue of this the 
subject remains in its infancy, although a number of volumes dedicated to 
the topic have emerged in recent years.124 If we are to understand language 
as a biological endowment, containing UG and a language acquisition 
device, then we need an account of how and when it emerged as part of 
our species’ phenotype. The varying theories cut through different 
approaches to language, with generative grammarians such as Chomsky 
giving a different story to, for example, computational linguists. For 
instance, some argue that language evolution began at the very beginning 
of the hominid ancestry some 7myr ago through stages of proto-language 
                                                          
124 See for instance Jackendoff (2003), Christiansen & Kirby (2003), Piatelli-Palmarini, Juan 
Uriagereka, and Salaburu (2009), Fitch (2010), Larson, Déprez, and Yamakido (2010), Di 




(Tallerman 2007), others that it emerged as an adaptive reaction to 
changing surroundings (Pinker 2003), and finally many Chomskyans argue 
that it emerged almost instantaneously as an instance of punctuated 
equilibrium consisting of an exaptation of a pre-existing trait to serve a new 
function (Gould and Lewontin 1979; Hauser et al. 2002; Tattersall 2004). The 
last view is held most widely by generative grammarians who place the 
recursive aspect of language, captured by its open-ended creativity, as the 
central facet of linguistic evolution. For such authors, the evolution of a 
cognitive ability to manipulate recursive structure is what evolved, and its 
interaction with sound and meaning is incidental, although central, to 
language. Further positions exist that suggest that recursion alone is not 
enough to account for language evolution and instead suggest that we need, 
at least, an account of the process of lexicalisation, an account of how we 
get the building blocks that act as input to the recursive device in the first 
place (Hughes & Miller 2014). Whatever option one chooses, the 
evolutionary and developmental aspects of language are central to any 
explanatory linguistic theory, and place such theories in line with other 
naturalistic enterprises in biology, in particular the Evo-Devo program 
found in biology (Carroll 2005; Hauser 2009). 
In virtue of what we have discussed so far it is reasonable to understand 
the methodology of linguistics to be tied to the sciences of mind and 
biology more generally. This view – that language is a natural object and 
capable of naturalistic investigation - has led some to term this approach to 
language biolinguistics (Jenkins 1999). Clearly, language is part of our 
mental world, it is a mental phenomenon. However, as Chomsky notes it is 
important to understand the word ‘mental’ here as “on a par with 
‘chemical’, ‘optical’, or ‘electrical’” (2000, 106). The term should imply no 
metaphysical commitment to, for instance, substance dualism. Language 
should therefore be studied in much the same way as any phenomenon 
found in the natural world. It is a form of methodological naturalism. In 
virtue of these claims, we can understand the study of natural language 
semantics, and by extension definite descriptions, as being a naturalistic 
study, and hold it to the same standards of rigor that we would any other 
natural object. In this vein, we can understand the three ambiguity 
problems outlined in §1.1 as scientific problems, which should be 





The linguistic theory that we are describing is one found within the 
enterprise of generative grammar. Generative grammar posits the existence 
of FL, which is unique to humans. FL constitutes a faculty of mind and 
should be understood in a similar fashion to other cognitive faculties such 
as vision. FL interacts with a wider group of cognitive abilities that humans 
exhibit to provide a complete theory of language (2000, 168). Central to 
generative grammar is the claim that FL is internal to the biological make-
up of humans and it thereby constitutes what we might term internalist 
study. Accordingly, Chomsky believes that “linguistic theory is mentalistic, 
since it is concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying actual 
behaviour” (1965, 4). 
Generative grammar emerged in opposition to behaviourism, which, at the 
time, held a dominant position in both psychology and the philosophy of 
mind and language (Chomsky 1959). Behaviourism defended the view that 
grammar could be learnt purely through general learning mechanisms that 
an individual has for analysing experience. The mechanisms themselves 
were not grounded in any specific linguistic endowment. Language 
acquisition, for instance, is explained through the child observing and 
imitating the behaviour of fully competent linguistic individuals it comes 
across. This is where the theory becomes questionable. For, how can a child 
infer the complex system of grammar with its myriad intricacies? How can 
a child infer the system of binding, varieties of movement, case assignment, 
and so on, simply through a general learning mechanism? The 
insurmountable difficulties involved in a behavioural theory of grammar 
inspired Chomsky’s work from the very beginning: 
[t]here is surely no reason today for taking seriously a position 
that attributes a complex human achievement entirely to months 
(or at most years) of experience, rather than to millions of years 
of evolution or to principles of neural organization that may be 
even more deeply grounded in physical law. (1965, 59) 
The problem Chomsky had with behaviourism was that it did not suppose 
any particular innate linguistic endowment. Behaviourism therefore lacked 
the capacity to explain the speed at which children learn language, and the 
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fact that they have access to only a limited set of stimuli yet still manage to 
acquire language without clear and explicit instruction. 
The core thesis of generative grammar is that individuals are biologically 
endowed with UG and a language acquisition device. The generative 
aspect of the program concerns the fact that we can use a finite set of 
elements to create an infinite set of novel utterances. To capture this 
Chomsky proposed that we can model language through hierarchical tree 
structures. 125  Hierarchical structure is built up through a derivational 
process involving grammatical phrases: NPs, VPs, and so on. A phrase is 
understood to be constituted by a head (which is associated with a 
particular grammatical category), a complement (which is the grammatical 
phrase it is directly above in the hierarchy), and a specifier, which 
facilitates various operations that we will detail later on (including 
movement). These three aspects of a phrase, its head, complement, and 
specifier, are universally present across all syntactic projections. The 
tripartite distinction within a grammatical phrase is now understood under 
the rubric of X-bar theory (Boeckx 2008, 129). 126  Through hierarchical 
structure grammatical relations are formed. The range of possible 
grammars available to the species are captured within the grammatical 
hierarchy and the relations it instantiates between phrases. To understand 
all of this more clearly, and to provide a solid foundation for our 
grammatical theory of semantics, we must now look at FL in more detail. 
We will do this through the latest incarnation of generative grammar in the 
Minimalist Program (or minimalism for short). 
 
                                                          
125 The hierarchical model of language should be contrasted with the perceived linear order 
of utterances. The fact that linguistic utterances follow a linear order is therefore likely a 
physiological constraint. In virtue of grammatical structure being hierarchical but speech 
physiology being linear there needs to be a mechanism to convert the former into the latter. 
Typically, such a mechanism is based on a linear correspondence axiom (see Kayne 1994; 
Uriagereka 1999, 252; 2012, 49). 
126 X-bar theory is a theory concerning the levels of projection exhibited by a phrase head. 
The X stands for the grammatical category that acts as the phrase head, and the theory 
claims that every phrase head projects from a minimal position through to a maximal 
position that acts as the label of the overall phrase. It is through this idea that we can state 
that the phrase head, as opposed to the phrase complement or specifier, is what acts as the 
label and is visible to further syntactic computations. The X-bar schema is meant to be a 
theory concerning the topology of phrases in general and can therefore be understood as 




THE FACULTY OF LANGUAGE 
FL is taken to be the natural object that is investigated in linguistic theory. 
Generative grammar, as an overarching methodology, can be instantiated 
in various ways, and FL can be differently designed depending upon which 
version of generative grammar one adopts. Minimalism provides the latest 
incarnation of FL within the Chomskyan enterprise (1995; 2000; 2001; 2004; 
2005; 2007; 2008; Uriagereka 1998, 2012). In what follows we will outline FL 
and its various components as understood in minimalism. This will involve 
looking at the lexicon and the main systems that interface with syntax. 
Furthermore, we will outline the operations present at the heart of syntax, 
namely Merge, Agree, Transfer, and the system’s derivational dynamics as 
found in syntactic cycles or phases.  
Minimalism states that FL is composed of at least four parts; a lexicon (LEX) 
that constitutes the individuals ‘mental dictionary’, the syntactic 
component of language, and two interfaces labelled a sensory-motor 
interface (S-M) and a conceptual-intentional interface (C-I). We can 






The input to the syntactic component is LEX, which provides a lexical array, 
or numeration, of lexical items that form the words employed in the 
generation of a syntactic object (Chomsky 1995, 225). Following this a 
“purely syntactic object” is produced, which has as ‘end-points’ the two 
interfaces (Uriagereka 2009, 1). The resultant structure is then transferred to 
the interfaces to receive a phonetic and semantic assignment, let us call this 
operation ‘Transfer’. In virtue of having to satisfy the interfaces, syntactic 
objects that are available to Transfer are said to have met ‘legibility 







with meeting the requirement of full interpretation, which is the principle 
that there should be no superfluous elements in the syntactic 
representation (1995, 27; 130). The legibility requirements, which act as the 
name suggests, force certain criteria to be met by the syntactic component 
that make the syntactic object readable to the two interfaces, let us call this 
process ‘Agree’. This is what Chomsky means when he says that language 
is the link between sound and meaning, which is constituted by syntax 
(2005, 10). We will now briefly outline each node on the above illustration 
of FL in turn, beginning with LEX and the two interfaces before moving on 
to look at the syntactic component that holds FL together.  
5.21 
THE LEXICON 
As already stated, LEX constitutes the speakers mental dictionary or a 
device through which we access our “conceptual repertoire” (Boeckx 2008, 
74). According to Chomsky, LEX contains items that are bundles of features 
(Chomsky 2008, 135). A given lexical item ϑ therefore is a set of features 
that include phonological, semantic, and formal properties of the word. The 
set of features that ϑ has will be a subset of the set of all possible features 
[F]. Let us define a feature as follows: 
(2) FEATURE 
A feature [f] is a “primitive, minimal unit of linguistic organization” 
and is a property of a lexical item (Uriagereka 1998, 598; Chomsky 
2008, 139). For any given language, “FL specifies a set of features 
available” from a “universal repertoire” of features [F]. Hence, for 
any given feature [f], [f] is drawn from [F] (Gallego 2010). 
We can state of a word such as apple that it may contain the following 
feature matrix (Chomsky 1995, 238):127 
(3) Phonological: [æpəl] 
 Semantic: [+ edible], [+ fruit], [+ spherical] 
 Formal: [+ noun], [+ singular]  
 
                                                          
127 Following convention we will place features inside square brackets with the + and – 
acting as indictors of whether or not something bears the property that [f] stands for 
(Chomsky 1995, 230-231; Adger 2010; Adger & Svenonius 2011). 
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Of the three types of feature, only the formal features are visible to the 
syntactic component. The sorts of feature that may be labelled formal 
include syntactic categories (N, V, A, etc.), φ-features (person, number, 
gender), case (nominative, accusative, etc.), and possibly theta assignment 
(agent, patient, theme, etc.). 128  Additionally, features are split into two 
categories: interpretable and uninterpretable (we can represent the former 
by [f] and the latter [uF]). If a feature is interpretable, then it has a value, 
whereas if it is uninterpretable, then it does not. For instance, a set of 
interpretable φ-features might be {[3rd person], [singular], [masculine]}, 
whereas a set of uninterpretable φ-features will have one or more feature 
unvalued {[+/- person], [+/- number], [masculine]}. During the course of a 
derivation syntax must rid the object it is producing of any uninterpretable 
features in order to meet legibility requirements. We will see how this is 
done in §5.25. Once lexical items have been used in the course of a syntactic 
derivation and transferred to the interfaces, the valued features can be 
called upon to assign to the syntactic object transferred a phonetic and 
semantic assignment. As Boeckx notes, the Chomskyan picture of LEX is 
one whereby it is “an idiosyncratic, to a large extent, arbitrary linking of 
sound and meaning” (2008, 74; Chomsky 1995, 236-241). 
In contrast to Chomsky, others take there to be a distinction between a 
narrow lexicon and a broad lexicon, where the latter contains information 
about usage and pronunciation, and the former contains a very minimal 
amount of information perhaps limited to an unvalued feature that allows 
it to be selected for a place in the syntactic derivation. 129 Under such a view, 
the word apple does not contain a formal categorical feature, for instance N, 
but is instead a ‘category-neutral root’ (written √apple) that is provided 
with a category only through the syntactic context in which it is placed in 
the derivation (Marantz 2000; 2006; Boeckx 2008; 77). In other words, the 
material held in the lexicon by a √root does not contain formal features. It 
only contains phonological/semantic features. In what follows we will 
adopt this view, whereby lexical items such as apple are treated as category-
                                                          
128 Theta-assignment is the process through which an argument contained in a clause comes 
to bear a thematic-role. 
129 The narrow/broad distinction is from Distributed Morphology. The feature that enables 
selection is labelled an edge feature (EF), “[f]or an LI [lexical item] to be able to enter into a 
computation, merging with some SO [syntactic object], it must have some property 
permitting this operation. A property of an LI is called a feature, so an LI has a feature that 
permits it to be merged. Call this the edge-feature (EF) of the LI (2008, 139). 
167 
 
neutral roots that receive a syntactic category through the syntactic 
context/configuration that they are placed in. 
There is an important point to be made here between the types of words 
that act as category-neutral roots and those that do not. There is a 
distinction in generative grammar between what are traditionally labelled 
lexical categories and functional categories, which together combine to 
create a syntactic derivation.130 Lexical categories are syntactic projections 
that contain lexical roots, which are also termed ‘open-class’ items in virtue 
of being category-neutral as part of LEX (Boeckx 2008, 77). If a lexical item 
is open-class, then this means its syntactic category is determined in virtue 
of the syntactic context it is placed within, syntactic projections that are 
considered lexical categories include noun (N), verb (V), adjective (A), 
adverb (ADV), and preposition/postposition (P) (Chomsky 1986, 2; Radford 
2004; 40). Lexical items capable of being placed in such categories are roots, 
or what we have previously termed descriptive words. Conversely, another 
group of words termed ‘closed-class’ items exist, which correspond to 
functional categories and, supposedly, carry their syntactic category with 
them as a feature. We have labelled these functional or grammatical words, 
and they can be contrasted with the former in virtue of carrying seemingly 
small amounts of descriptive content. For example, the word the is a 
functional item whereas apple is a lexical item. The former has the category 
feature of being a determiner (D), whereas the latter is category-neutral. 
The two are both lexical items yet are distinct. Syntactic categories that are 
considered functional categories include complementizer (C), tense (T), 
light verb (v), determiner (D), little n (n) (Radford 2004, 454; Boeckx 2008, 
77).131 Lexical items that are placed in such categories are functional. The 
functional categories determine the lexical category that a lexical root 
subsumes and they also provide the appropriate relations between 
                                                          
130 The distinction at play here once again has a precursor in the work of medieval logicians 
and grammarians, who made a distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic 
words that roughly tracks that made between lexical and functional categories respectively 
(see de Rijk 1982; Spade 1982). 
131 Radford defines a light verb as a verb “with relatively little semantic content” such as 
make in make fun of, “[h]owever in recent work… this term is extended to denote an abstract 
affixal verb (often with a causative sense like that of make) to which a noun, adjective or verb 
adjoins. For instance, it might be claimed that the suffix –en in a verb like sadden is an affixal 
light verb which combines with an adjective like sad to form the causative verb sadden” (2004, 
461). The light verb analysis is further extended such that all transitive verbs are raised from 
V into v*. 
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syntactic categories. As Radford notes, words that fall within functional 
categories “serve primarily to carry information about the grammatical 
function of particular types of expression within the sentence” (2004, 40), 
and as Boeckx states, they “enter into checking relations” (2008, 77). The 
functional categories therefore serve to organise and value the categorical 
features of the lexical roots, thus ensuring that the syntactic object created 
meets legibility requirements demanded by the interfaces. This is the 
concept of feature-checking, which we will discuss in §5.25 below. 
In order to understand how the interaction between functional categories 
and lexical categories work it is useful to consider an example. Take for 
instance the word race as used in the two sentences below: 
(4) Ronaldo won the race. 
(5) Ronaldo is racing for the ball.  
In (4) the lexical root becomes categorized as N in virtue of being placed in 
a position headed by the functional category D, whereas in (5) it is 
categorized as V in virtue of being placed in a position headed by the 
functional category v*. The root √race can be placed into the following two 







In (4*) the root is added to a projection (the hierarchical structure indicated 
through the tree format and nodes) headed by the functional element D 
(the element that projects to the phrase level indicated by P) and thereby 
exhibits a nominal category N. In (5*) however, the root is added to a 
projection headed by the functional element v* and thereby exhibits a 
verbal category V (Marantz 2000, 27; Boeckx 2008, 77). The functional 









transmit information that values them with the appropriate formal features. 
This is a system termed Agree, whereby the categorical features that N and 
V exhibited are inherited from D and v respectively. Therefore, a distinction 
exists between open-class lexical items, or roots, that are category neutral 
and placed in lexical categories, and those that correspond to closed-class 
items, that are of a fixed category and subsequently carry a particular 
formal feature that organises the syntactic objects they create. 
5.22 
THE S-M INTERFACE 
The Sensory-Motor interface (S-M) is one of two interfaces that act as the 
‘end-points’ of a syntactic derivation. S-M deals with everything from pure 
physiological vocalisation to more nuanced facets of phonology including 
intonation and prosodic stress. The most interesting facet of the S-M 
interface is that it can only work with a linear structure/order, as opposed 
to a hierarchical structure. Syntax, on the other hand, is hierarchical, as 
Boeckx notes, “syntactic objects are at least two-dimensional: there is a 
horizontal dimension defined by combining α and β, and the vertical 
dimension defined by projection” (2008, 66). To clarify, the horizontal 
dimension is determined by the idea that two elements may combine, and 
the vertical dimension is determined by the fact that one of those elements 
will project, or label, the resultant structure. For instance, if one merges N 
and D, the resultant structure will be labelled a DP in virtue of D projecting 
to label the overall structure. Linear structure is demanded by 
physiological limitations. In virtue of this, the S-M interface demands a 
linear order that is systematically derived from the hierarchical structure 
that syntax provides.132 Following Kayne, it is now assumed that a process 
of linearization takes place that makes the syntactic hierarchy useable, 
translating it into the linear order that we perceive in language use (Kayne 
1994, 3; Uriagereka 1998, 222; 2012, 49). Critically, this linearization process 
is highly systematic and should be understood to be a linguistic universal. 
Finally, the syntactic object must hit legibility requirements forced on it by 
S-M. In reaching these requirements the syntactic object becomes capable of 
                                                          
132 Hierarchical structure can be understood as over determining possible linear structures. 
A process of linearization is then needed to systematically provide one linear order that 
becomes the one used by S-M (see Uriagereka 1999, 253 for discussion). 
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being assigned a phonetic realisation and makes use of the phonological 
features carried in by the relevant lexical items. 
5.23 
THE C-I INTERFACE 
For philosophers the Conceptual-Intentional interface (C-I) is by far the 
most interesting as it deals with the interaction between syntax and 
semantics. The central question concerning the interaction of syntax and C-
I involves looking at just how much machinery we need to posit as being 
part of C-I, or as Uriagereka puts it ‘how much of semantics does syntax 
carve out?’ As already mentioned, we can understand lexical items as 
carrying features, either inherently or through receiving them in the course 
of a syntactic derivation, and a selection of these features will be semantic. 
Take for instance the word apple. Attached to this word, although dormant 
with respect to syntactic operations, will be semantic features potentially 
including [+ edible], [+ fruit], and other such properties traditionally 
associated with the word in English. Once the word has been through the 
appropriate syntactic operations it will be part of the material transferred to 
the C-I interface. At this point the semantic features that we have stipulated 
to be attached to apple will become interpreted and part of the idiosyncratic 
information read off the word. We can understand this as being part of the 
lexical semantics of the word, which, with respect to the features listed, is 
largely unaffected by the syntactic component. 
There are however more important issues surrounding the interaction of C-
I with syntax, one of which concerns those features that are operative in a 
syntactic derivation. First of all, a lexical item such as apple will, once 
inserted in the syntactic derivation, take on a bundle of grammatical 
features including [φ-features] and a [case] feature. Traditionally 
understood, the [case] feature will be unvalued, hence uninterpretable, and 
the [φ-features] will be valued, hence interpretable. For instance, upon 
being merged to a D element, such as the indefinite article an, the root 
√apple will contain the φ-feature bundle {[3rd person inanimate], [singular]}. 
Whilst such features are considered grammatical they are interpreted at the 
C-I interface and hence have semantic effects. As a result of this, we can 
state that syntactic structure has semantic effects upon at least person, 
number, and, in some languages, gender. Further to this, there is another 
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aspect of syntactic structure that will clearly effect the C-I assignment, 
which concerns syntactic categories. As we have stated, a root such as 
√apple receives its nominal reading in virtue of being merged with an 
appropriate item that is of the syntactic category D. In virtue of this, it is 
syntax, and not the lexicon, that determines the fact that the item is 
nominal. We can see this illustrated with respect to the root √race in (4*) 
and (5*) above. Once again, syntax appears to structure and inform the 
semantic assignment.  
It is part of legibility requirements demanded by C-I that φ and case 
features are checked and valued. Once all features are checked, and C-I’s 
demands are met, the syntactic object created can be transferred to the 
interface for a semantic assignment. This is how the interaction between the 
syntactic component and C-I works. There are multiple theories on what 
then happens in C-I but there is no clear consensus. It is useful now to 
recall what we said in §2.2 about logical form. Many theorists believe that 
something akin to the logical form is present as a component of C-I and 
thereby assigns to the transferred syntactic object an appropriate logical 
form. However, as Hinzen correctly points out “[w]e can formalize 
semantics, to be sure. Yet, this won’t tell us why it exists or why it does 
what it does” (2008, 348). We need an account of why certain grammatical 
configurations produce certain pieces of logical form, and the regularity 
and consistency with which they do. Accordingly, Hinzen believes that 
rather than simply expressing thought, syntax is thought’s skeleton and is 
thereby strongly productive in the assembly of compositional linguistic 
meaning, syntax is “what literally constructs a thought and gives it a shape, 
much as our bones give shape and structure to our body” (2009b, 128). The 
operations in syntax actually explain many of the operations we see posited 
in formal semantics, including, for instance, operations understood to 
produce instances of concatenation. It therefore seems unnecessary to 
duplicate such operations in C-I without an explanation of why language 
adheres to such redundancy. We will further this idea below in §5.3. 
5.24 
THE SYNTACTIC COMPONENT 
We have outlined LEX and the objects it produces, which act as the input to 
the syntactic component. In addition, we have outlined the two interfaces 
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that act as the ‘end-points’ for the syntactic component. It now remains to 
give an account of what constitutes the syntactic component, which acts as 
the link between the interfaces. The first thing we can say about the 
syntactic component is that it is generative, it generates syntactic structures. 
We can say that syntax is computational and combinatorial. Chomsky takes 
the operation at the heart of the syntactic component to be a symmetrical 
and unrestricted binary operation that he terms ‘Merge’ (2004, 117; Boeckx 
2008, 79). Merge is taken to be a simple set building operation whereby two 
elements that act as inputs to the system (lexical items) are put together 
into a set. To begin with, a lexical array is built from lexical items, which is 
an unordered set that has elements capable of taking part in the Merge 
procedure as part of the syntactic component. Next, taking two items from 
the lexical array α and β, through Merge we can create the set {α, β}. 
Following this, we can apply a further iteration of Merge to create the set {γ, 
{α, β}}, and so on, to create the open-ended generative structures of 
language. Consider deriving (4*), in this case the two elements D and N are 
merged together to create a set {D, N}. In virtue of being symmetric the set 
{D, N} is no different to that of {N, D}. In other words, Merge is just a basic 
system of concatenation that is, in principle, no different to any symmetric 
set building operation. 
However, as Boeckx notes there is something special about syntactic 
structure that sets it apart from other recursive systems, namely that it is 
endocentric, “there is one thing quite clear about Merge and language: once 
you combine two units, X and Y, the output is not some new element Z, but 
either X or Y. So the hierarchical structure that we get in language is a very 
specific sort, namely it gives rise to so-called endocentric structures” (2009, 
47). In (4*), the hierarchical structure is labelled as DP. D projects to label 
the structure. The labelling aspect of syntax gives rise to hierarchy. In other 
words, after forming the set {D, N} from an initial lexical array, another 
instance of Merge occurs that acts as a copying mechanism that copies the 
head of the expression D and produces the set {D, {D, N}}. The set {D, {D, 
N}} can then be understood to indicate that D is the label and hence 
maximally projected element of the structure (2009, 48). Irrespective of how 
one accounts for labels it is central to the structures we see in the syntactic 
component, and it is instructive to how we consider the syntactic objects 
created through Merge. The label of a projection is what is observable to 
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further instances of Merge, hence, for the set {D, {D, N}} the syntactic 
component views it as being a syntactic object of type D not of type N. 
Minimalism has another facet to it that distinguishes it from previous forms 
of generative grammar. It claims that not only is syntax a link between 
sound and meaning, but it is an optimal solution to conditions imposed by 
these interfaces, “language is an optimal solution to interface conditions 
that FL must satisfy; that is, language is an optimal way to link sound and 
meaning, where these notions are given a technical sense in terms of the 
interface systems that enter into the use and interpretation of expressions” 
(Chomsky 2008, 135; 1995; 171; Zeijlstra 2009). Merge is taken to be the 
most simple generative operation available, “[u]nbounded Merge or some 
equivalent is unavoidable in a system of hierarchic discrete infinity, so we 
can assume that it ‘comes free’” (2008, 137).  
The syntactic component of language does not just Merge lexical items but 
sometimes moves elements that have already been merged into positions 
further up the structure. Consider the following sentence: 
(6) [Which team] does Ronaldo play for [which team]? 
 
The question in (6) is derived originally as Ronaldo plays for which team? 
However, in virtue of what is traditionally termed wh-movement the 
question marking element is moved to the beginning of the sentence. This 
instance of wh-movement is just one instance where expressions move, in 
actual fact movement is widespread in language.133 Chomsky claims that 
movement is easily explained using the concept of Merge. As described 
above, Merge takes two elements and forms a set from them. The first form 
of Merge is termed External Merge as the two elements to be merged are 
from a source external to the syntactic component, namely a lexical array. 
However, Merge places no constraint on whether the input to it comes 
from an external source such as a lexical array, or an internal source such as 
the elements already merged. For example, once the set {α, β} is formed 
through an initial instance of External Merge the operation can apply to an 
                                                          
133  There exists argument movement, non-argument movement (which includes wh-




item internal to this set to produce the set {α, {α, β}} or the set {β, {α, β}}. 
This form of Merge is termed Internal Merge. Internal Merge produces a 
copy of the element being merged and hence we get an account of 
sentences that employ movement such as (6).  
Importantly, this dual account of Merge, external and internal, is taken to 
be the simplest account. According to Chomsky, to deny that Merge is 
source-neutral would require empirical evidence. Hence, the dual function 
of Merge is the null hypothesis (2008, 140). The impact of the two forms of 
Merge is clear for the S-M interface but interestingly the two forms are said 
to have distinct effects on the C-I interface also. External Merge 
corresponds to thematic structure and internal Merge to discourse related 
properties of language (2008, 140). We will address this claim in §5.3. 
5.25 
PHASES 
So far we have outlined all four aspects of FL as understood by Minimalism. 
It is now time to look at the derivational dynamics of syntax, which explain 
how the individual systems interact together to become a unified 
functioning system. We have outlined some of the derivational dynamics 
already, namely that there is an operation called External Merge that takes 
items from a pre-formed lexical array and puts them together. Additionally, 
there is a process that may be termed labelling that takes two items α and β 
that have been merged together and labels that structure with either α or β 
thus forming a hierarchical projection. However, there is more to the 
syntactic system than these procedures. There is an Agree operation, which 
creates a feature-checking relation between elements in the derivation, 
there are instances of movement, or Internal Merge, where an element is 
raised up the derivational structure, and there is the operation of Transfer 
wherein the syntactic object created is sent to the interfaces. One problem 
that arises with these operations is that of when such operations are 
activated, how this activation is explained, and why it exists at all. The 
answer provided by minimalism is that syntactic derivations operate 
cyclically in what are now termed ‘phases’, and that phase boundaries 
activate the operations of Agree, Internal Merge, and finally, Transfer. 
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The idea behind phase based syntax is that derivations proceed in what we 
may term ‘incremental chunks’ (Boeckx & Grohmann 2007, 205) or 
‘successive derivational cascades’ (Uriagereka 1999, 255). In other words, a 
sentence is not derived by the syntactic component all-in-one go but is 
instead subject to smaller bit-by-bit derivations, which at certain points 
terminate and trigger the three operations mentioned above: Agree, 
Internal Merge, and Transfer. The idea of syntax working in cycles is not 
new to minimalism. Predecessors to phases can be seen in bounding nodes, 
developed in the Extended Standard Theory (EST) (Chomsky 1975), and 
barriers, developed in Government and Binding Theory (GB) (Chomsky 
1986). However, phases in minimalism are developed in line with the core 
tenets of the SMT, the claim that language is an optimal solution to 
interface conditions. 
Typically in minimalism, phases are argued for on the basis of 
computational efficiency (third factor design constraints). Recalling that the 
syntactic component is meant to be an optimal solution to interface 
conditions, the argument for computational efficiency in syntax is based 
around the idea that it should not be burdened with redundant information. 
In virtue of this, Chomsky states that the computational load of the 
syntactic component should be limited to a single cycle of derivational 
procedure. In other words, it should be limited to one feature-checking 
procedure of Agree, one instance of movement, and one instance of 
Transfer.134 Therefore, once enough syntactic structure has been built to 
trigger these operations they happen immediately. These operations are 
opportunistic, they happen at the first available opportunity, and  after one 
cycle or phase has been completed, and the syntactic object has been 
transferred to the interfaces (together with information concerning Agree 
and any elements that may have moved), it is frozen. The syntactic 
component no longer needs to carry information concerning the phase’s 
internal structure and is required only to view the label that it projects, for 
the purposes of syntax the phase acts as a unitary syntactic block. Thus, 
computational load is restricted and the next phase continues as a single 
cycle (2008, 142-143). 
                                                          
134 As Chomsky notes, it is reasonable to suppose that Transfer to both interfaces happens 
simultaneously (2008, 142-143). 
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A further facet to phase theory is the possibility that the lexical array that 
acts as input to the syntactic component is split in such a way that only a 
subset of the array is present in active memory and that subpart 
corresponds to the items used in the phase being derived (Boeckx & 
Grohmann 2007, 205; Gallego 2010, 54; Richards 2011, 76). The lexical array 
active in memory thereby contains all and only the elements to be used in 
that phase being derived. Once again, this idea is meant to capture the 
efficiency of linguistic computation. 
It is now time to consider what counts as a phase. Traditionally in 
minimalism at least two syntactic categories are taken to constitute phases: 
C and v*.135 The reason for these two categories being selected is that they 
contain valued case features, which trigger Agree, Internal Merge, and 
finally Transfer. Thus, as a derivation is computed it proceeds one phase at 
a time, beginning with the v* phase. Once the v* level, that is, the phase 
level, has been reached the agreement features on v* trigger the operation 
Agree, which looks down the derivation to find unvalued case feature and 
values it. It does this until it finds an element with no unvalued features 
and then it stops (2008, 142). Following this, any possible iterations of 
Internal Merge occur, because otherwise the item would be frozen and 
unable to move, and finally Transfer applies and the syntactic object 
created from the finished derivational cycle is transferred to the interfaces. 
To make this derivational system clear let us consider an example, where 
we will derive a basic structure for v*. According to Chomsky, we start 
with a lexical sub-array that contains all the items that will be merged into 
the syntactic component together with their edge features (EFs), indicated 
by subscript indices, (7) is such an array:136 
(7) {v*1, D1, √α1, √β1} 
                                                          
135  The category syntactic category C stands for a complementizer. It contains ‘clause-
introducing’ words such as that in I know that you are tired, but it also contains any pre-
clausal elements such as the adverb surprisingly in surprisingly John is on time (Radford 2004, 
442). Furthermore, v* stands for a functional category containing “full argument structure, 
transitive and experiencer constructions, and is one of several choices for v” (Chomsky 2008, 
143). We will argue shortly that D is also a phase (Svenonius 2004; Hinzen 2007). 
136 According to Chomsky an EF is a feature that enables a lexical item to be merged into a 




Following this we derive, through numerous iterations of External Merge, 
the syntactic derivation in (8), where the lexical roots √α and √β have been 
merged with the appropriate functional categories to render them N and V 









At this point all of the elements in the lexical array have been used and the 
EFs of each deleted. It is now time for the various phase level operations to 
take place. 
The next step involves v* triggering the process of Agree, which is a feature 
checking operation. Agree works by linking the phase head to its 
complement (domain) and creating what is termed a probe-goal 
relationship. The probe-goal relationship is produced through feature-
matching, which can be defined as follows, if α and β match for some 
feature [f], then either α and β share the same value for [f] or one is 
unvalued (Radford 2004, 287).138  Each item in the tree has a feature matrix 
that may contain both interpretable and uninterpretable features. Once a 
probe has matched with a goal (or multiple goals) the two share feature 
valuations and any uninterpretable features are deleted, which triggers the 
Transfer operation.139 
                                                          
137 For any given head, the phrase of which it is the head of will include a specifier, the head, 
and the head’s complement. 
138  With respect to efficiency, “[f]or minimal computation, the probe should search the 
smallest domain to find the goal: its c-command domain” (Chomsky 2008, 146). 
139  According to Chomsky, a probe can Agree with multiple goals thereby creating an 



















According to Gallego, it is the uninterpretable features that mark phase 
boundaries. 140  Typically understood, nominal constructions have an 
uninterpretable case feature, which must be dealt with before Transfer 
(2010, xi), whereas v* has a valued case feature that is capable of agreeing 
with the uninterpretable feature in the nominal through the probe-goal 
relationship. In virtue of this, the uninterpretable feature can be deleted. 
Accordingly, upon striking a probe-goal relationship successfully the 
uninterpretable feature of the goal is deleted and any other features on 
either the probe or goal share valuations. For instance, the probe may lack 
feature valuations for φ-features and hence receive a valuation for these 
features from the goal. In virtue of this, we might say that the probe-goal 
relationship is mutually beneficial.  












The lexical array in (7) will act as the input for the syntactic derivation and 
at the point of D an uninterpretable feature, [+/- case], is inserted as part of 
an iteration of Merge. Following this, Merge continues until the phase head 
is added, which contains a valuation, let us assume [+ accusative], for the 
                                                          



























case feature that was uninterpretable as part of the feature matrix of D. At 
this stage the derivation stops and Agree is triggered.141 The probe V, which 
inherits its feature matrix from the phase head v*, looks down the structure 
for an appropriate goal (a goal with which it matches in features) and once 
it is found there is a mutual sharing of features. Firstly, v* shares its case 
feature with D, thus deleting the uninterpretable feature [+/- case], and D 
shares is φ-features with v*, thus making them interpretable at the 
interfaces. At this point the Agree operation is complete.  
Once the operation of Agree has taken place any instances of Internal 
Merge can apply.142  Internal Merge is enabled through the structure of the 
phase. In order to understand the notion of a phase further we can 
reintroduce X-bar theory and produce a model for a phase. For instance, 
take a phase head X (which might be C or v* for example), the phase head 
will have attached to it a complement, which is the category it is initially 
merged to, and a specifier position, which is the position through which a 
syntactic object lower than the head may be moved into. The phase head 
projects up the derivation, in a manner identical to a phrase head, to label 
the resultant structure of being of type X. Furthermore, we can distinguish 
between what is termed the phase edge and the phase interior, where the 
edge contains the phase head and the specifier and the interior contains the 
complement to the phase head. Movement thus occurs as a syntactic object 
is moved from the phase interior (the complement) into the phase edge (the 
specifier). For instance, in (10) the phase edge contains X and SpecX, 






                                                          
141 It should be noted that Chomsky takes V to act as the probe in virtue of V inheriting the 
feature matrix from v*, and the same goes for T inheriting a feature matrix from C (2008, 
148). 
142 Our analysis implies that these operations proceed in an order with Agree applying first 
and Internal Merge second. However we can just as easily take the two to operate 










Internal Merge is an operation that draws an element up from the phase 
complement (its interior) and places it in the phase’s specifier (its edge). As 
we can see in (10), ϑ is moved up the derivational workspace from the 
complement phrase (YP) to the phase edge (SpecX) leaving behind a copy. 
Following Transfer the parameters of the particular language in question 
will dictate whether the lower copied element is phonetically realised or 
not.  
Internal Merge creates a chain that links the various instances of the item 
that has moved (Boeckx 2008, 31). The varying forms of movement form 
varying chains, for instance head movement creates a chain between two 
heads and A’-movement between specifiers. Critically, every instance of 
move is from the phase interior to the phase edge (Legate 2003). 
Additionally, an item may go through multiple instances of move. It is 
through this process that questions such as (6) are explained, repeated 
below: 
(6) [Which team] does Ronaldo play for [which team]? 
 
The process whereby an element moves multiple times up a derivation is 
termed successive cyclic movement and it is enabled by the phasal 
architecture of minimalism (for more on successive cyclic movement see 
Sato 2008; 2009). 
Once Agree and Internal Merge have operated the process of Transfer can 
take place. Transfer is the operation that sends the syntactic object 
produced to the interfaces to receive a phonetic and semantic assignment. 
Within phase theory, Transfer applies to the phase complement. In other 
words, only the complement is sent for an assignment and it then becomes 
frozen as far as syntax is concerned. What this means is that anything 
within the complement becomes dormant to syntactic operations 
happening further on in the derivational workspace. For instance, Gallego 
notes that DPs whose case has been checked (thus signalling Agree, 
Internal Merge, and Transfer) become ‘inert’ with respect to further 
syntactic computation (2010, 36). This is called the ‘phase impenetrability 
condition’ (Chomsky 2008, 143). It is for these reasons that movement takes 
place to the edge of a phase as this allows the element to be accessible to 
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further syntactic operations, which is critical to successive cyclic movement. 
Following Transfer, the syntactic component has visible to it only the phase 
edge and the syntactic category it exhibits. This is syntactic derivation by 
phase. 
Let us briefly recap FL as presently conceived in minimalism. The input to 
syntax is LEX. A lexical array is built up from which the syntax draws its 
input. Syntax contains a simple recursive operation called Merge that 
builds up recursive structures. Once a certain amount of structure is built, 
and a phase head is reached, Agree is triggered, which forces all unvalued 
features to become valued through feature-matching. The Agree function is 
forced through legibility conditions imposed by the interfaces. Once Agree 
has been completed any operations of Internal Merge occur. Finally, 
Transfer applies and the syntactic object built up is sent to the interfaces C-I 
and S-M to receive a semantic and phonetic assignment respectively. 








In (11) we illustrate that the syntactic component works in phase based 
stages, which leads to multiple instances of Transfer to the interfaces. We 
can call this picture of FL a multiple transfer theory. 
Whichever form of FL one adopts it must be understood as a natural object. 
Research into its structure and operations must therefore be understood as 
a naturalistic enterprise (see Hinzen 2006, 156-157 for a detailed account of 
the various formulations of FL). Finally, all of the aspects of, and operations 
described in, FL are meant to uncover a mental reality that lies behind 
natural language. Research into FL is meant to be understood as 












in designing FL comes from a variety of sources including but not limited 
to biology, neuroscience, and linguistic fieldwork (Jenkins 1999). Through 
this amalgam of empirical strategies one can hope to provide a linguistic 
theory that is explanatorily adequate. In what follows we will attempt to 
provide an account of natural language semantics that is built using the 
core tenets of generative grammar and its latest incarnation in minimalism. 
The reason for doing so is that much of the architecture in semantics that 
has been posited over the years can be seen as originating in syntactic 
structures once we accept that syntax and semantics are not autonomous. A 
grammatical theory of meaning will thus endorse the naturalistic values of 
generative grammar and research into FL. 
5.3 
NATURALISED SEMANTICS 
As we saw, minimalism posits a C-I interface as part of FL whose job it is to 
provide a semantic assignment to a syntactic object that is transferred to it. 
It follows from this that the C-I interface is also an object of naturalistic 
investigation and so is the interaction between the syntactic component and 
C-I. It has been noted that, traditionally understood, philosophers take the 
C-I interface to include some type of formal semantics that assigns a logical 
form to syntactic objects. However, to reiterate Hinzen’s warning “[w]e can 
formalize semantics, to be sure. Yet, this won’t tell us why it exists or why it 
does what it does” (2008, 348). Of course, these are precisely the questions 
that a naturalistic enterprise of semantics is concerned with. A naturalistic 
enquiry into semantics will seek answers to the question of why semantics 
exists at all, and why it operates in the manner that it does. The answer that 
we will put forward in response to both of these questions is to be found in 
grammar. As a guide, we will follow Hinzen in taking syntax to produce a 
‘skeleton of thought’ (2009b, 128), and hence likewise defend the view that 
a theory of “syntax therefore is a theory of semantics” (2008, 350). Therefore, 
the reason for the existence of natural language semantics, and its 
operating as it does, is that our species has a grammatical mind.143 
                                                          
143 The idea that grammar informs semantics in such a manner as to ground a ‘skeleton of 
thought’ in conjunction with the truth-conditional structures it enables is not new. In fact, in 
the 12th and 13th century medieval logicians and grammarians likewise considered grammar 
to be central to the construction of truth-conditions, and may well be understood as 




THE SKELETON OF THOUGHT 
Within minimalism, every syntactic derivation is understood to progress in 
an identical manner, syntactic categories are derived in a particular order to 
enable a clausal, that is, sentential, structure. We can call the structures 
produced a ‘clausal skeleton’, and following Hinzen associate them with a 
‘skeleton of thought’. The clausal skeleton is captured in the following 
categorical order: 
(12) [CP C-T-[v*P v*-V-[DP D-N]]] 
The structure in (12) depicts the three core phases in a syntactic derivation 
and the basic projections that they include. We can, using broad brush 
strokes, describe the tripartite structure as crafting object reference (D), 
event reference (v*), and clausal reference (C).  
Syntactic structure is built from the bottom up. To give an example, 
consider a toy sentence comprising a subject, object, and transitive verb. 
The derivation would proceed as follows, first of all a structure is built that 
bares the grammatical object (DP), next the grammatical object is merged 
with a verbal phase (VP) and a larger verbal shell (v*P), following this the 
grammatical subject (DP) is merged and a thematic matrix is formed 
providing the DPs with thematic roles, and finally this event structure is 
tensed relative to the speech-event (T) and given sentential force amongst 
other things (C). We might state therefore that the derivation proceeds 
through three levels: the construction of arguments, the placement of those 
arguments in a thematic matrix relative to the verb, and the situating of this 
clausal matrix in the discourse. In accordance with UG, we will assume that 
the clausal skeleton is universal across languages, and that language 
variation is a matter of which projections are morphologically realised and 
what movement chains are enabled. 
Through our analysis of FL above, we can state that the C-I interface is 
responsible for the assignment of semantic content to a syntactic object. C-I 
is meant to capture the ‘duality of semantics’ through assigning both 
conceptual and intentional information to the syntactic object that is sent to 
                                                                                                                                                   
extending the requirements to well-formedness beyond those of grammar, the medievals 
got a method of stating the truth-conditions of sentences” (1981, 41). 
184 
 
it (Chomsky 2008, 140; Munakata 2009, 48). The thesis to be advocated here 
is that much of what is posited in C-I as part of the rubric of logical form or 
pragmatic machinery can be explained by a clausal skeleton that is derived 
in the syntactic component. The argument will proceed through an analysis 
of the three phases C, v*, and D and will demonstrate that each has a 
significant and distinct impact on how we should understand the semantic 
infrastructure in C-I. The result will be a radical clear-out of machinery 
employed in C-I to deal with compositional semantics. This work will 
provide the grounding for our grammatical theory of meaning. 
5.32 
C 
The C phase is the point in a syntactic derivation where a clausal structure 
is realised. A syntactic derivation that has reached the C level is either an 
embedded clause that is part of a continuing derivation (as the complement 
to an attitude verb for instance) or it is a matrix clause. For the purposes of 
this analysis we will stick to looking at matrix clauses. The role of C in a 
derivation is multifaceted. For instance, the C phase assigns tense to the v* 
shell in its interior, which provides the event captured in v*P with a 
temporal value relative to the speech-event as well as values for the speech-
event location, and the logophoric agent and patient (Sigurðsson 2004b, 232; 
2007, 154). As well as tense, C is responsible for providing the clause with 
illocutionary force, mood, focus, and so on, which locates the clause in the 
speech-event’s discourse. It follows naturally from this that the C phase is 
responsible for creating something that is usable by the speaker. Finally, we 
can understand the C phase as being the level of grammar for which the 
question of truth arises (Hinzen 2007, 165). A matrix CP therefore produces 
truth-conditional content that is placed in the speech-event at hand.  
As a point of departure into the semantic contribution of C we can begin 
with a discussion of illocutionary force, which is pivotal in the immersion 
of the clause in discourse. The illocutionary force that an expression carries 
informs us as to what contribution it should be understood as making in 
the discourse, it determines whether the derivation expresses “a question, a 
declarative, an exclamative, a relative, a comparative” and so on (Rizzi 1997, 
283). The illocutionary force attached to a clause is often silent in English, 
but it nevertheless has an effect on interpretation. For instance, the sentence 
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Ronaldo is a footballer has no phonetically realised material acting as a 
marker of its illocutionary force, but it is still interpreted as a declarative 
and amenable to an inquiry into its truth. The illocutionary force attached 
to an expression ζ provides a speech-act involving ζ with a certain purpose, 
the purpose of declaring ζ, questioning ζ, ordering ζ, and so on. 
There are however many languages that do phonetically mark force 
(including literary English). For instance, (13) and (14) explicitly mark for 
declarative illocutionary force on C as illustrated by the fact that the force 
projection in CP is phonetically marked by for in (13) and che in (14): 
(13) [CP For], football is more than just a game.  
(14) Credo [CP che] loro apprezzerebbero molto il tuo libro. 
 I believe that they would appreciate your book very much.144 
 
In virtue of being explicit we must assume that the force elements are part 
of the syntactic derivation. According to Rizzi, the C projection in syntax is 
not one unitary projection but is instead a collection of projections whose 
positions contain force (ForceP), topic (TopP), focus (FocP), and finiteness 
(FinP) phrases. This is observed by Chomsky also, who states that 
projections such as C are “cover terms for a richer array of functional 
categories (2001, fn.8). The multifaceted analysis of C provides a richer and 
more complex interaction of the clause with discourse. The reason for the 
split CP analysis is that sentences such as (15) in Italian have a multiple of 
these projections phonetically marked (we will mark the projections in the 
original and the direct English translation): 
(15) Credo  [ForceP che] a [TopP Gianni] [FocP questro] [TopP domain] fli  
[TP dovremmo] [v*P dire]. 
 I believe [ForceP that] to [TopP Gianni] [FocP this] [TopP tomorrow] we 
 [TP should] [v*P say]. 
 
In virtue of these elements being phonetically realised, and realised above 
TP in terms of the syntactic tree, we cannot take CP to be a single projection 
(1997, 295-297; Abels 2010). We can therefore split up CP into the following 
                                                          
144 The second example is taken from Rizzi (1997, 288). 
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set of projections (with specifiers omitted), which is enabled through the 








At this point we can raise the following question, what impact does the C 
phase, and the multitude of projections it contains, have on the semantic 
assignment at C-I? The answer is that, the values that are attached to the 
projections in C give an utterance a place within the ensuing discourse. The 
CP therefore codes for intentional information regarding, at least, the 
illocutionary force that is being expressed in the clause. We need not then 
proliferate C-I, and by extension any pragmatic machinery, with operations 
designed to facilitate illocutionary force. Moreover, the grammar of C 
facilitates the interaction of truth-conditional content conceptualized in the 
v* shell‘s thematic matrix with the ensuing speech-event. 
A further development of the C domain can be seen in the extensive 
cartographic problem developed by Cinque (1999). Cinque provided an 
intricate account of numerous projections in C, besides those listed above, 
that fall within an adverbial hierarchy.146 The adverbial hierarchy is simply 
                                                          
145 Syntactic cartography is a method through which one attempts to establish the hierarchy 
of phrases in a grammatical derivation through cross-linguistic research. The aim is to 
provide a universal hierarchy for syntactic phrases, and thus to uncover what projections 
exist and where they are situated in relation to each other. In other words, the methodology 
is one of mapping the universal grammatical hierarchy that underpins natural language. 
The method can be seen in practice in the work of Rizzi (1997), Cinque (1999), Borer (2005), 
Sigurðsson (2004a; 2004b; 2009; 2012), and many others. 
146 The term adverbial hierarchy is meant to capture the idea that adverbs follow a strict 
word order that is spread throughout the clausal hierarchy exhibited in syntactic derivations. 
The hierarchy is meant to hold universally across languages and is therefore part of UG. The 












the strict order in which certain types of adverb must fall within a sentence 
in order for it to be grammatical, as exhibited in (17) below. Just as with 
illocutionary force, the adverbial system found in C likewise correlates with 
semantic information. The adverbial system is more refined than Rizzi’s 
split CP hypothesis and is expanded to include, for instance, a range of 
adverbs that express grammatical mood. The adverbial hierarchy captures 
a range of types of adverb including those that exhibit grammatical mood, 
which can be listed as follows: Moodspeech-act (Frankly), Moodevaluative 
(Suprisingly), and finally Moodevidential (Allegedly) (1999, 76). Adverbs that 
occupy these projections enable the speaker to express how they feel about 
the clause that follows, and how it should be understood in the speech-
event. Take (17) for example where the speaker’s mood towards the clause 
is explicit: 
(17) [Moodspeech-act ∅ [Moodevaluative Surprisingly [ Moodevidential ∅]]] John 
was late for his lecture. 
The clause that follows the adverb in (17) can be felicitously used on its 
own. However, the addition of the adverb lets the audience know that 
John’s tardiness is unexpected by the speaker. Once again, the adverbial 
system that Cinque posits involves projections in C that are related to 
intentional information that accompanies the expression, including but not 
limited to grammatical mood. Finally, under the strong interpretation of 
Cinque’s hierarchy we can understand the order and existence of these 
adverbial projections to be part of UG (1999, 76; 2012, 9-11).147 
It is possible to enrich C further however, to include syntactic projections 
dedicated to the speech-event. According to Sigurðsson, we can posit a 
‘syntactic speech-event’ that “contains the time and location of speech… 
and the inherent speech participants, that is, the logophoric agent and 
patient” (2004b, 230). Critically, these projections associated with the 
syntactic speech event are part of C and enrich and unify with Rizzi’s split 
CP analysis and Cinque’s hierarchy (2004b, 230; 2012, 326). The idea behind 
                                                                                                                                                   
follow a strict order with one being higher up the hierarchy, and thus constructed later in 
the syntactic derivation, than the other. 
147 It is worth mentioning that Cinque’s adverbial hierarchy actually stretches the whole way 
down the clausal skeleton (2002a). In his own words, “the various classes of adverbs (more 
accurately, ADVPs) are also ordered among each other in a syntactic hierarchy, and that this 
hierarchy turns out to match exactly the hierarchy of Mood, Tense, Modality, Aspect and 
Voice heads” (2012, 10). 
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this enriched CP is that syntactic features associated with tense and person 
(at a minimum) are valued in relation to projections in C associated with 
speech-time (ST), speech-location (SL), and logophoric agent (LA) and 
patient (LP) (2007, 154). The syntactic speech event that is formed through 
the projections in C therefore impacts how the clause becomes embedded 
in a speech-act and leads to what Hinzen calls a ‘deictic frame’. Critically, 
the enrichment of C is said to hold universally (Sigurðsson 2012), and is 
taken to operate even when such elements are not phonetically marked 
(2009, 172). These syntactic heads may therefore be called ‘active silent 
heads’.  
The contribution of the C phase to semantics is therefore extensive. The C 
phase takes a syntactic object and turns it into a clausal structure, it values 
its temporal and spatial aspects of the clausal event (relative to the time and 
location of speech), values its arguments (relative to logophoric agent and 
patient), situates the clause in an illocutionary act, expresses the speaker’s 
mood, and most importantly provides an expression with truth-conditional 
content. The complexities of the projections found in C are intuitively 
posited by philosophers as part of either C-I or some general pragmatic 
machinery that the speaker has access too. The reason for this is likely that 
the material is often not phonetically realised. However, there is a wealth of 
evidence to suggest that they are grounded in grammar as part of the 
syntactic derivation. In defending the significance of grammatical structure 
we therefore slim-down the operations required in C-I and plausibly 
pragmatics as well, and all this is achieved without proliferating syntactic 
structure one iota. All of the syntactic projections in C posited above are 
called-for independently of our semantic program, which suggests that 
further syntactic research may uncover further semantic correlates.  
5.33 
v* 
We now need to turn to look at what syntax can offer us with respect to 
developing a clause-like structure in the first place. The core point that we 
will make is that the v* phase organizes and establishes a thematic matrices, 
which can then be situated in a speech-event through C. To follow through 
with our aim of reducing the burden of semantic machinery in C-I we can 
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first look at how a thematic matrix is established using the formal system 
from §2.2.  
Predicates come in various shapes and sizes and accordingly contain a 
varying number of argument places, called the predicate’s ‘adicity’. For 
instance, a predicate of type <e, t> has one argument place and is thus 
monadic, a predicate of type <e, <e, t>> has two argument places and is thus 
dyadic, and so on. We can illustrate predicate adicity in natural language 
through the examples below in (18) – (29): 
(18) Intransitive Verb 
 [1 John] is sleeping. 
 
(19) Transitive Verb: 
 [1 John] loves [2 Mary]. 
 
(20) Ditransitive Verb: 
 [1 John] gave [2 the book] to [3 Mary]. 
 
The role of the verb in (18) – (20) is to organize the arguments into a 
structure and assign them roles in the event it captures. This is what we call 
a thematic matrix. For instance, the thematic matrix of (19) indicates, 
through the roles it assigns, that John loves Mary but not that Mary loves 
John. Likewise, the thematic matrix in (20) indicates that John gave the 
book to Mary but not that Mary gave the book to John. In other words, the 
thematic matrix captures the distinct thematic roles that the arguments take 
on. In (19) it ensures John is interpreted as the agent and that Mary is 
interpreted as the patient. 
We can provide a formal semantic account using Heim & Kratzer’s 
functionalism (1998). With respect to (18), functionalism will argue that its 
thematic matrix is derived through what is termed a lambda function, 
which is a function that saturates the predicate with an argument. The 
lambda function creates a truth-schema for the sentence that can be 
illustrated as follows: 
(21) John is sleeping. 
 ‘λx. x is sleeping (John)’ is true iff x is sleeping. 
 ‘John is sleeping’ is true iff John is sleeping. 
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The idea behind functionalism is that the truth-conditions of (18) are 
derived through functional application, which creates a thematic matrix 
through saturation of the predicate that results in John being interpreted as 
the agent of the clause. 
According to Heim & Kratzer, the functional application contains what 
they term a ‘prominence relation’ between thematic roles, which are 
captured in the derivational system employed in functionalism. Following 
Grimshaw (1990), Heim & Kratzer state that, with respect to (19) the 
prominence is that of the agent over the patient (1998, 54), which is enabled 
through the order in which arguments take part in functional application: 
(22) John loves Mary. 
 ‘λy. λx. x loves y (Mary)(John)’ is true iff x loves y. 
 ‘λx. x loves Mary (John)’ is true iff x loves Mary. 
 ‘John loves Mary’ is true iff John loves Mary. 
The step by step functional application thereby follows the idea of a bottom 
up derivational dynamics. The first instance of functional application 
saturates the object position of the verb with the argument Mary and in its 
second it saturates the subject position with the argument John. It is 
through the order in which the arguments reduce the verb’s adicity that the 
prominence relation is established. In the first instance Mary receives the 
thematic role of patient, and in the second John receives the thematic role of 
agent. It is through this method that the formal semantics of functionalism 
establishes a thematic matrix. Critically, in virtue of being determined by 
logical form the matrix is constructed as part of the C-I interface. 
The confusing part about the account of thematic matrices by formal 
semantics is that it appears to offer nothing that cannot readily be captured 
in the expression’s underlying grammar. Baker, for instance, argues that 
thematic relations and thematic roles directly correlate to grammatical 







(23) Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis 
Identical thematic relationships between items are represented by 
identical structural relationships between those items at the level of 
d-structure. (1988, 46; 1997, 74)148 
Baker’s idea is that the syntactic component produces a thematic matrix 
prior to any instance of Transfer, and that the structure it produces is 
identical to a thematic matrix, a matrix that dictates the roles of the 
arguments in the clause. The derivation of the v* phase produces enough 
structure to enable a thematic matrix to be formed, which means that it is 
produced prior to C-I getting its hands on it. 
Using Baker’s work we can look at this hypothesis in more detail. One 
piece of evidence in favour of the hypothesis is that it is uniformly the case 
that the agent of the argument structure occupies the grammatical subject 
position whereas the patient or theme occupies the grammatical object 
position. For instance, take (24): 
(24) Ronaldo kicked the ball. 
As Baker correctly points out, it is never the case that the patient or theme 
occupies the grammatical subject position (1996, 2). 149  For instance, the 
proposition expressed by (24) cannot be paraphrased as (25) whilst 
remaining grammatical. That is, we cannot interpret the ball as the theme 
and Ronaldo as the agent in (25): 
(25) *The ball kicked Ronaldo 
                                                          
148 The term ‘theta’ here is another word for argument-role. A theta role is a role carried by 
an argument in a sentence, for instance the role of being the sentence’s agent. D-structure is 
shorthand for deep-structure and corresponds to a level of syntactic representation that was 
defended prior to its eradication in minimalism (see Chomsky 1995). The deep-structure 
representation of a sentence is the level at which arguments are merged to the grammatical 
derivation and receive their theta-roles. The deep-structure of a derivation was understood 
to take place prior to any instance of movement, which are understood to form a level of 
representation termed surface-structure. For instance, the two sentences John loves Mary and 
Mary is loved by John have the same deep-structure but differ as to their surface structure. 
The names John and Mary have the same argument roles in each and the two sentences thus 
exhibit the same thematic matrix, but the in each case the deep-structure is differently 
expressed. 
149 It is worth pointing out that in a passive sentence the grammatical object has been moved 
up the derivation about the verb and subject. Critically, the thematic matrix is assigned 




What is the reason for this asymmetry? The simple answer is that the 
patient or theme of (24) must originate in the syntactic position to which 
the appropriate thematic role can apply.  
The thematic role of patient/theme is thereby associated with a syntactic 
position directly c-commanded by the verb itself, the grammatical object. 
Agents on the other hand are not c-commanded by the verb and appear 
higher up the syntactic structure, always occupying the grammatical 
subject position.150 Rather than being c-commanded by the verb, the agent 
of (24) actually c-commands the verb and by extension the theme. We can 








The tree in (26) illustrates the c-command chain that is present in the 
construction of (24) and it is through this chain, which is simply a structural 
relation between syntactic positions, that the argument structure is 
arranged.151 The subject c-commands the verb and whatever occupies this 
position receives the thematic role of agent, and the verb c-commands the 
object position and whatever occupies that position receives the thematic 
role of a patient/theme. Additionally, c-command links perfectly with 
                                                          
150 At this point we can reiterate Radford’s definition of c-command as “a structural relation 
between two constituents. To say that one constituent X c-commands another constituent Y 
is (informally) to say that X is no lower than Y in the structure (i.e. either X is higher up in 
the structure than Y, or the two are at the same height)… a constituent X c-commands its 
sister constituent Y and any constituent Z that is contained within Y” (2004, 440). 
151 At this juncture it is worth pointing out that the verb kicked moves to the v* position 
following the operations that take place at the phase level. It would move as part of the 
instances of Internal Merge triggered by the phase head v*. This instance of movement is 


















Grimshaw's prominence relation.152 Therefore, it appears that the syntax of 
v* contains all of the necessary information required for creating a thematic 
matrix. 
Let us bring this account up to date with minimalism and phase based 
derivations. The first point to make is that the argument structure is 
completed and the thematic grid assigned in the v*. The c-command 
relations that are central to our syntactic account of argument structure are 
secured in the v*. This accords with the view that the v* phase corresponds 
to the organisation of conceptual information. To recall, one of the central 
structural features of a phase is the distinction and resultant asymmetry 
between the phase edge and phase interior. Recalling (10), the phase 
interior contains all of the structure from VP downwards. The phase 
interior therefore includes the theme/patient of the thematic matrix. 
Conversely, all of the structure above VP, which includes the phase head v* 
and its specifier, is in the phase edge. The phase edge therefore includes the 
agent of the thematic matrix. The geometry of the v* phase therefore 
corresponds with the thematic matrix and the roles of agent and 
theme/patient. Agents are in the v* edge and themes/patients in the v* 
interior.  
The development of our grammatical theory of meaning is one step closer 
with the above analysis of how grammar produces thematic matrices. 
There is reason to believe that any machinery whose role it is to construct 
thematic matrices in C-I is redundant. The syntactic component provides 
all of the necessary structure and information regarding thematic roles and 
their relation to the verb. We can thereby reduce the amount of machinery 
in C-I for compositional semantics. To ignore this would be to inflate C-I 
unnecessarily. At this point in our analysis we have the v* phase producing 
clause-like structures and C turning them into actual, truth-evaluable, 
clauses situated in a speech-event. The ‘skeleton of thought’ is beginning to 
take shape, and we therefore make a step toward fulfilling Hinzen’s claim 
that “syntax… is a theory of semantics” (2008, 350). 
 
                                                          
152 Grimshaw’s prominence relation simply states that arguments are valued in a hierarchy 
that matches with grammatical hierarchy as produced in a tree derivation ( for more on this 





The third and final stage in our analysis of the clausal skeleton involves the 
D phases, wherein arguments are found. So far we have employed the 
work of Chomsky (2001, 2008) and others (Boeckx & Grohmann 2007; 
Boeckx 2008; Gallego 2010) to state that the v* and C projections are 
instances of syntactic phases. However, there is reason to suspect that these 
two projections are not the only phases but instead there is, at least, one 
further phase that is associated with the D projection. Svenonius argues 
that the nominal projection of D is in fact highly related to the clausal 
skeleton consisting in C and v*, and that much like this clausal skeleton has 
a strict syntactic order that enables movement so does the D projection 
(2004, 259).153 Sheehan & Hinzen take this idea further and argue that the 
three phases signify three ‘referential dimensions’ of language, with C, v*, 
and D corresponding to propositions, events, and objects respectively (2011, 
1). This tripartite distinction in grammar is then understood as expressing a 
grammatical ontology. We have already seen how the v* phase might be 
associated with events (through thematic matrices) and the C might be 
associated with propositional structure (through tense and force for 
instance), in what follows we will outline D’s role in constructing object 
reference and what this tells us about the semantics of arguments.  
5.341 
DP AS A PHASE 
The first thing to establish is that each DP is a phase. Initially, Chomsky’s 
view was that C and v* were phases in virtue of the fact that they triggered 
Agree, Internal Merge, and Transfer. The triggers are standardly taken to 
be the result of phase heads containing an uninterpretable feature(s).154 It is 
through the need to rid phase heads of these uninterpretable features that 
C and v* (strictly speaking these features are inherited by the tense phrase 
                                                          
153 For a historical perspective on this claim, one of the first mentions of the similarities 
between the structure of clauses and that of nominals is to be found in Abney (1987). A 
nominal projection is the name given to the syntactic projection(s) wherein arguments fall. 
154 Richards states that this view of phase heads being ‘all-powerful’ is not on an equal 
empirical footing to a theory that takes phases to be constituted by lexical sub-arrays (2011). 
The debate between the two positions will not have an impact on our thesis, but it is 
worthwhile noting its existence. 
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TP and verbal phrase VP respectively) create a probe-goal relationship with 
a lower head, which in turn provides structural case to the arguments. 
Acting as the probe in the Agree operation, the phase heads match their 
case value with the probe in their domain. In other words, one of the 
responsibilities of the phase heads is to provide arguments with structural 
case. The problem with taking D to be a phase is that it does not appear to 
assign case.  
When we looked at the C phase we found that it could be dissected into a 
multitude of further functional projections including force, topic, focus, and 
finiteness, in addition to a whole host of adverbial projections and 
projections related to the speech-event. So far considered, our view of D is 





Following Abney, we will take all arguments to be DPs (1987, 179-182).155 
Hence, the structure in (27) is present whenever we have an argument. We 
can deconstruct DPs further into more functional projections, which 





                                                          
155  It is worthwhile noting that this analysis is not universally accepted. For instance, 
Bošković suggests that the majority of Slavic languages, and some others, lack a determiner 
layer above NP (Bošković 2005; 2008; 2009; 2013; Zlatić 1998). However, these suggestions 
are questioned by Progovac (1998), Rutkowski (2002), Trenkić (2004), Pereltsvaig (2007), and 
Caruso (2011). Overall, there is enough support for the existence of a D layer above NP for 
us to continue our analysis of it as a phase. Interestingly, when a D layer is rejected, treating 
NP as a phase becomes more tenable. 
156 The above analysis oversimplifies what DPs might contain. For a more thorough analysis 
of the types of functional projections that may be present in DPs see Zamparelli (2000b) and 













Introducing this additional functional projection NumP gives us some 
insight into the first reason as to why D may well be a phase head. 
Consider the differences between the following sentences: 
(29) a. John ate [DP [NumP one [NP steak]]]. 
 b. *John ate [DP [NumP three [NP steak]]]. 
 c. John ate [DP [NumP three [NP steaks]]]. 
As we can see from (29a) to (29c) there exists a close relationship between 
Num and the NP that it c-commands. In (29a) Num contains one and hence 
the noun attached, steak, is morphologically realised in the singular. 
Moving onto (29b) we can see that Num contains a different lexical item 
that is not compatible with taking a NP complement whose number feature 
is valued as singular. Hence, (29b) is ungrammatical due to a feature clash 
between Num and N. Finally, in (29c) Num and N agree in their respective 
number features and hence there is a suffix -s morphologically realised on 
the noun steak and we get a perfectly grammatical sentence.  
All this becomes clearer once we recall that a word such as steak starts life 
as the lexical root √steak, which means that it contains no valued number 
feature. It must receive this feature from somewhere in order for us to be 
able to account for the morphological differences observed in N through 
(29a) to (29c). The clearest answer to this is therefore that Num provides N 
with a valued number feature thereby ridding it of the uninterpretable 
feature that it carried with it once initially merged.157 What we observe in 
the relation between Num and N appears to be the sharing of features, an 
                                                          
157 As Borer observes count nouns such as steak can be transformed into mass nouns so long 









instance of Agree, which is noted by Svenonius (2004, 268). It is results such 
as these that indicate that D might in fact be a phase head. 
In addition to instances of numerical feature agreement in D there is also 
strong evidence that D triggers instances of Internal Merge, which is 
another strong indication of phasehood. There is extensive evidence that 
there exists N to D movement in Western Romance (Longobardi 1994; 2005), 
which can be seen explicitly in Italian. Furthermore, this adds support to 
the view that all NPs are in fact headed by DPs. Interestingly for our 
purposes Longobardi’s thesis is particularly pertinent to the grammar of 
proper names and definite descriptions.  The empirical work Longobardi 
provides illustrates that Italian proper names, when used to refer to people, 
can occur with or without a determiner and remain grammatical. The idea 
can be illustrated in the following pair of sentences (reproduced from 
Longobardi): 
(30) a. Petrarca è uno dei miei poeti preferiti. 
  Petrarch is one of my favourite poets. 
 
 b. Il Petrarca è uno dei miei poeti preferiti. 
  The Petrarch is one of my favourite poets. 
 
As we can see from the above examples, in Italian the proper name 
Petrarch can occur on its own or following a definite article and remain 
equally grammatical (2005, 5). Longobardi then raises a question over 
“whether Petrarca of (30a) occupies the same surface position as Petrarca of 
(30b) or rather as il of (30b)” (2005, 5). The evidence would suggest that 
Petrarca of (30a) occupies the position of il in (30b), namely the D position, 
rather than that of Petrarch of (30b). This can then be illustrated through the 
interaction of proper names, definite articles, and adjectives. The upshot of 
this is that, an adjective may appear in the prenominal position when there 
is also a determiner present, but is banned from such a position if there is 
no such determiner: 
(31) a.  Il mio Gianni ha finalmente telefonato. 
The my Gianni finally called up. 
 
b.  *Mio Gianni ha finalmente telefonato. 
My Gianni finally called up. 
198 
 
However, the proper name Gianni and possessive adjective my can co-
occur but in such an instance the possessive must be postnominal: 
(32) Gianni mio ha finalmente telefonato. 
Gianni my finally called up. 
Comparing (31a) and (32) we can see where this analysis is heading. When 
a determiner is present the possessive can appear in the prenominal 
position and when it is absent it cannot. This therefore suggests that in (32) 
Gianni is occupying a syntactic position above the possessive. In (31a) 
Gianni is occupying the N position and in (32) it is occupying the D position 
(2005, 6). Longobardi therefore draws the conclusion that proper names in 
Italian, when a determiner is absent, are moved into the D position, an 
instance of N-to-D movement.158 The analysis is extended to English and 
universally across languages to state that whenever we have a proper name 
acting rigidly it has gone through an instance of N-to-D movement (2005, 9; 
Sheehan & Hinzen 2011, 7). 
The evidence presented above strongly suggests that D is a phase head and 
that a DP constitutes a complete syntactic cycle. There are clear instances of 
D triggering both Agree and Internal Merge, which are characteristics of a 
phase head. Firstly, numerical agreement appears to be triggered within 
DP, which allows the DP then to merge with a verbal structure with its 
number feature already valued (something that is central if it is to then rid 
v* of its uninterpretable number feature). Secondly, as Longobardi 
hypothesizes, if a proper name is present in a DP when D is empty, then it 
is forced to undergo N-D movement, which is explicit in Italian and silent, 
but still present, in English. We conclude, therefore, that D is indeed a 
phase head and that DP is consequently a phase. Taking this analysis 
forward we can now look to see what the DP phase contributes in terms of 
semantics. In doing so, we will have a full analysis of the clausal skeleton 
outlined (12) and the semantics contribution of the three phases. 
 
                                                          
158 Other instances of elements moving upwards and out of DPs, including successive cyclic 
movement of wh items, also point towards DP being a phase. It is important to note that the 
Italian examples and analysis is entirely drawn from Longobardi (2005). These examples 
illustrate everything that is needed in order to establish the existence of movement in DPs, 
which is all we are interested in at the moment (for more on the primary empirical evidence 




THE SEMANTICS AND TOPOLOGY OF DP 
The work so far on D has led us to the conclusion that it is a phase head. 
Prior to this we have argued that the phases v* and C contribute heavily to 
the construction of semantic information, both conceptual and intentional, 
carried in an expression. We have provided reasons to believe that the 
syntactic skeleton exhibited in language is productive with respect to what 
is traditionally labelled semantics. The final part of our analysis of the 
clausal skeleton concerns the D phase, which we will take to produce the 
semantic information associated with arguments and whether or not a 
particular argument is taken to be referential. We will argue that the D 
phase determines the place of the argument within a ‘referential hierarchy’, 
which directly impacts its semantic contribution and how the expression 
may be felicitously used. 
In what follows we will adopt what Martin & Hinzen term the ‘grammar-
reference link hypothesis’, which is repeated below: 
(33) The Grammar-Reference Link Hypothesis 
Referential strength (from predicativity to deixis) is not an intrinsic 
property of lexical items, but rather of certain grammatical 
configurations. (Martin & Hinzen 2014, 102) 
The hypothesis can be split into the following two claims. The first is that 
reference is not something we can ascribe to an item in LEX (or a property 
derived from lexical items merged to form an argument). The second is that 
an account of an argument’s referential capabilities is to be found 
grammatical structure. The grammatical configurations enabled by the D 
phase exhausts the potential forms of reference that an argument may take. 
The grammatical explanation depends upon the topology of the DP and the 
phasal architecture it exhibits. As Martin & Hinzen note, with respect to 
DPs, “there is a basic bi-partite division into a predicative core (‘the 
interior’) and a referential periphery (‘the edge’)” (2014, 100). The 
interaction of this predicative interior with the referential edge gives the 
variety of possible semantic readings for arguments, ranging from purely 
predicative bare nouns to directly referential elements such as pronouns. 
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Martin & Hinzen term describe the DP topology as constructing a 
‘referential hierarchy’ (2014, 97). 
We can use the evidence presented above for N-to-D movement as an 
initial step towards a grammatical theory of reference. For instance, 
following our analysis of the lexicon as containing lexical roots, an element 
such as Ronaldo begins life as the lexical root √Ronaldo. As it stands in the 
lexicon the root √Ronaldo has, at least, two potentialities with respect to its 
role in the syntactic structure. The first is where we use the root 
predicatively as in (34), and in such an instance it will occupy the 
grammatical position N: 
(34) That kid is [DP the [AP next [NP Ronaldo]]]. 
However, when it is to be used as a rigidly referential proper name it must 
occupy D. To do this the root is initially merged in N and then moved to D: 
(35) That forward is [DP Ronaldo [NP Ronaldo]] 
 
The idea therefore is that N is associated with predicative (descriptive) 
meaning and hence if the lexical root √Ronaldo is merged and remains in 
this position it receives the same semantic reading as any run-of-the-mill 
noun. Conversely, if √Ronaldo is merged to N and then moved to D it will 
receive the rigid reading associated with proper names in a standard 
philosophical analysis. It is through such examples that Martin & Hinzen’s 
hypothesis becomes favourable over standard philosophical work. For, it is 
not the case that the lexical root √Ronaldo is in any way destined to become 
a rigid designator. It is not referential whilst stranded in LEX. There is 
nothing special about the lexical root that renders it rigid. Whether it is 
interpreted predicatively or rigidly is entirely a matter of grammar. In other 
words, there is no such thing as a proper name (as understood in standard 
philosophical analysis) prior to its being placed in the appropriate 
grammatical configuration. 
The ‘grammar-reference link’ hypothesis is meant to cover all of the 
variation in referential strength that arguments can have, which gives us a 
‘referential hierarchy’ with a more expansive set of forms of reference than 
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that detailed in §2.4.159 We can illustrate this with respect to the following 
sentences (using ∅ to indicate an empty projection): 
(36) a. Ronaldo plays [DP ∅ [NP football]]. 
 b. Ronaldo plays [DP ∅ [AP amazing [NP football]]]. 
 c. Ronaldo scored [DP a [NP goal]]. 
 d. Ronaldo scored [DP an [AP amazing [NP goal]]]. 
 e. Ronaldo scored [DP the [NP goal]]. 
 f. Ronaldo scored [DP the [AP amazing [NP goal]]]. 
 g. That is [DP Ronaldo [NP Ronaldo]]. 
h. Ronaldo scored [DP that [NP (goal)]].  
 i. That is [DP him [NP ∅]]. 
The referential hierarchy can be illustrated as follows. Firstly, (36a)–(36b) 
contain material in the phase interior N but no material in the phase edge D, 
and in virtue of this express a purely predicative reading, the weakest form 
of reference, with added specificity gained through the introduction of 
further descriptive content in the adjectival phrase. Secondly, (36c)–(36f) 
contain material in both the phase interior and the phase edge due to the 
demands of articles, and are open to both referential and quantificational 
readings with the adjective once again adding specificity, which we can 
label an intermediate form of reference. Thirdly, (36g) contains material in 
the phase interior that is then moved into the phase edge through N-to-D 
movement, and thereby expresses a rigid reading of the proper name. 
Fourthly, (36h) contains material in the phase edge and optional material in 
the interior, and is an instance of a deictic reference. Finally, (36i) contains a 
pronoun in the edge but no material in the interior (the interior must be 
empty), and expresses the strongest form of reference, person reference (for 
                                                          
159 The referential hierarchy has similarities to the hierarchy of suppositions taken to exist in 
various works in medieval logic (Ebbesen 1981, 44; Spade 1982, 196). 
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a comprehensive table of the options concerning material in DPs see Martin 
& Hinzen 2014, 102).160 
The grammar-reference link hypothesis is one that gives an explanation of 
the semantics of arguments purely in terms of their underlying 
grammatical structure. There are two points at work in this explanatory 
hypothesis: the first is an account of how arguments come to be referential 
in the first place (as opposed to quantificational or predicative), and the 
second is how the forms of reference that an argument can invoke emerge. 
Assigning an argument the appropriate semantics will therefore depend 
upon looking at the grammatical configuration that it is in, which includes 
an analysis of the DP and the wider grammatical configuration within 
which that DP resides. Critically, the theory involves positing no further 
structure in the syntactic component that is not already employed in a 
phasal theory of syntax. Each of the semantic distinctions that one can note 
in (36) is explained purely in terms of the phase edge/interior dichotomy 
and the positions that are filled. As with v* and C the theory takes syntax to 
provide a blueprint for semantic information, which contributes to syntax 
being a ‘skeleton of thought’. Furthermore, the analysis of D provides the 
last piece of the clausal jigsaw, the analysis of the forms of reference for 
arguments. 
5.4 
GRAMMATICAL STRUCTURE AND DIRECTIONS FOR USE 
In the above we have looked at the way in which the grammar of the three 
phases codes for semantic information. We have therefore provided reason 
to think that we can understand syntactic structure as producing much of 
the semantic machinery traditionally associated with the C-I interface, 
including, but not limited to, illocutionary force and mood (in the C phase), 
thematic matrices (in the v* phase), and the semantics of arguments (in the 
D phase). Through this analysis we have provided the first part of our 
answer to the two questions raised by Hinzen concerning ‘why semantics 
exists’ and ‘why it does what it does’. This thesis contends that the answer 
                                                          
160 Martin & Hinzen state that once the phase is structured as in (36h) we activate a ‘deictic 
layer’ of the DP, which is grammatical without the interior being filled or being deleted at 
the S-M interface (as in N-to-D movement). Further to this, they distinguish (36h) and (37i) 
by stating that (36i) also activates the person feature system and thereby “go further beyond 
this deictic layer” (2014, 102). We will return to these points in §6.11. 
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to the above questions is that semantics exists in virtue of being created by 
grammatical configurations and that these configurations inform and 
restrict semantic content. We can consider this the first stage in our 
grammatical theory of meaning and take it to directly contribute to the 
‘skeleton of thought’. Nevertheless, in order to provide a thorough account 
of definite descriptions we need to look at how grammatical structure 
informs language use and communication more generally. We need to give 
an account of how meaning gets into the world through language, which 
will provide us with an understanding of how to account for the three 
ambiguity problems that emerge in actual language use. Therefore, the next 
step in our theory will involve placing this grammatical grounding for 
semantics in a wider theory of language use, which will involve illustrating 
how we get to the level or linguistic meaning and what is said. 
The thesis that we wish to defend is simple. It states that grammar creates a 
‘skeleton of thought’, which, in a particular utterance, completes the 
compositional aspects of its linguistic meaning and what is said. In virtue 
of this, grammar informs and restricts felicitous uses of the utterance. We 
might say that grammar provides speakers with general directions for 
using any natural language expression. The view has a historical precursor 
in Strawson, who argued that semantics should be understood as a theory 
of general directions for using expressions (1950, 327). We simply ground 
these directions in grammar. The semantics of an expression ζ therefore is 
equated with general directions for using ζ, which are provided, on a 
particular occasion, by the grammar of the utterance.  
To begin with let us briefly explain our reasons for endorsing the general 
directions view. Strawson’s theory was developed in opposition to 
Russell’s ‘On Denoting’. We can understand Russell as defending the view 
that if one wished to argue that an expression was semantically referential, 
then it was important that we could guarantee the identification of its 
referent. As described in §3.1, it was concerns such as these that led Russell 
to deny a referential status to definite descriptions irrespective of how we 
may employ them on particular occasions. The upshot of this was that 
reference became understood as a property of an expression in isolation 
from its use, it became part of its lexical entry (under Neale’s modification), 
which is one of the core tenets of literalism. The manner in which we may 
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use an expression on a particular occasion did not impact that expression’s 
semantic-type. 
Strawson argued that we should understand reference not as a property of 
a word itself, but as a property ascribed to a speech-act in which that 
expression is used. Therefore, terming an expression ‘referential’ without 
reference to its use is a mistake. In Strawson’s own words: 
‘[r]eferring’, is not something an expression does; it is 
something that someone can use an expression to do. (1950, 
326) 
In other words, it is not the case that an expression is referential as it lays 
dormant in the mind of a potential speaker, but is instead something that 
emerges through use of that expression. Strawson thus puts his semantic 
theory forward as follows: 
Meaning (in at least one important sense) is a function of 
the sentence or expression; mentioning and referring and 
truth or falsity, are functions of the use of the sentence or 
expression. To give the meaning of an expression (in the 
sense in which I am using the word) is to give general 
directions for its use to refer to or mention particular objects 
or persons; to give the meaning of a sentence is to give 
general directions for its use in making true or false 
assertions. It is not to talk about any particular occasion of 
the use of the sentence or expression. The meaning of an 
expression cannot be identified with the object it is used, 
on a particular occasion, to refer to. The meaning of a 
sentence cannot be identified with the assertion it is used, 
on a particular occasion, to make. (1950, 327) 
The theory outlined above requires some unpacking. The first point to 
make is that meaning is associated with the way a sentence or expression 
can function. If a term can function referentially in a speech-act, then it is 
understood as having a referential semantics. Meaning is determined with 
respect to use. The semantic theory thus follows from this observation, and 
involves producing an account of the general directions for using a 
particular expression-type or sentence-type. In other words, it is not the 
case that the meaning of an expression is determined by its use on a 
particular occasion, for instance the meaning of I am tired is not to be 
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associated with its use on an occasion to mean I don’t want to go to John’s 
party. Instead, the meaning of I am tired is determined by the directions for 
use that govern its felicitous employment across varying contexts and 
situations. The following will be an attempt to provide a grammatical 
analysis of general directions for use. 
5.41 
THE ROLES OF THE THREE PHASES 
In the following, we will derive a sentence from scratch and produce 
something usable by the speaker. Through this we will be able to illustrate 
how grammatical structure feeds directly into general directions for use. 
The sentence we will use is that in (37): 
(37) John loves Mary. 
The syntactic component of language derives sentences from the bottom up 
(with respect to the hierarchical structure we have depicted throughout the 
thesis). That means that the first syntactic object that is created is the proper 
name Mary. As we have stated previously, a rigid proper name is enabled 
through N-D movement. The lexical root √Mary is inserted in the N 
position and then moved into D in accordance with Longobardi’s 
observations (2005): 
(38) [DP Mary [NP Mary]] 
 
The grammatical structure of (38) and the DP it exhibits is such that the 
phase edge is filled with the term Mary and the phase interior is empty in 
virtue of N-D movement. Assuming that the DP is a phase, the interior is 
then shipped to the interfaces. At the C-I interface, the interior appears with 
a deleted interior, and as such there is minimal semantic information 
provided. 161  We can tentatively take C-I to now contain the following 
structure, which we can illustrate as follows: 
(39) [DELETED MaryI] 
                                                          
161 The construction of a semantic representation is completed phase-by-phase in keeping 
with multiple transfer, which it has been argued is enabled by certain syntactic elements 
acting as ‘anchors’ for the lower phase (Uriagereka 2009; Narita 2010). 
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The structure in (39) can be understood as containing any values held by 
functional heads in the interior of the DP, and would transfer information 
to C-I. Additionally, we might understand the nominal Mary as being 
indexed to its lexical root and hence C-I might call up idiosyncratic 
semantic content concerning the root at this point. Critically, there is no 
suggestion of rigidity at this point, and no thematic role assigned. 
The next stage of the derivation involves the merging of the root √loves as 
part of the verbal projection, as illustrated in (40): 
(40) [v*P [specv* [v* loves [VP [V loves [DP Mary]]]]]] 
  
Following this, a further DP containing the subject John is merged into the 
specifier of the v* shell:162 
(41) [v*P [specv* [DP John [NP John]] [v* loves [VP [V [DP Mary]]]]]]  
 
At this point the v* phase is complete and a standard iteration of Agree 
applies, which provides the DP Mary with accusative case, and following 
this we get Transfer. The formation of the thematic matrix now becomes 
clear as we have the interior of the v* phase complete with its thematic role 
sent to the C-I interface, and the agent of the matrix in v*’s extended 
projection. We can illustrate what C-I contains as follows: 
(42) [DELETED lovesI [PATIENT.RIGID MARY]] 
The DP containing Mary can now be interpreted by C-I as being a rigid 
proper name in virtue of C-I receiving information regarding the content of 
the phase edge. Additionally, the argument matrix takes shape with the v* 
interior informing C-I as to the patient/theme of the clause being derived. 
                                                          
162 It should be noted that the DP containing John goes through the same process as that 
containing Mary. It includes the merging of the root √John, the N-to-D movement of John 
into the phase edge, and an instance of Transfer. Interestingly, this seems to suggest that 
there are two derivations proceeding simultaneously, one that is deriving the v* shell and 
one deriving the DP placed in its specifier. The reason that these must be done separately is 
that the DP is merged as a phase itself already built. This leads to the conclusion that we 
might have simultaneous syntactic workspaces (for more on this see Krivochen 2013, 5-8). 
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Furthermore, the lexical root of loves may be accessed for its idiosyncratic 
semantic content. 
The third and final stage in the completion of this sentence is the derivation 
of the C phase. At this point, no further lexical material is added to the 
syntactic component. The Agree operation activated by C provides the 
grammatical subject with nominative case and provides the verb with tense. 
Additionally, the C phase contains the wide range of functional heads 
detailed in §5.32, including at least Force, T, ST, SL, LA, and LP. These 
projections help complete the clause through valuing it relative to the 
speech-event and giving it illocutionary force: 
(43) [CP [ForceP DEC163 [LA LP [ST NOW [SL ABSENT164 [TP [specT [DP John] [T PRES  
 
 
[v*P [specv* [DP John] [v* loves [DP Mary]]]]]]]]]]]] 
 
 
In the T projection PRES stands for the fact that the tense projection is 
valued as being present tense. Furthermore, any operations of movement 
that were made in previous phases have been omitted to retain clarity, and 
we have only included the projections that contain lexical items or are 
unquestionably contributing to the expression’s semantics. The transfer of 
C consists in two parts: first of all, the interior (TP) downwards is 
transferred thereby completing the information surrounding the thematic 
matrix of the verb as well as the fact that the grammatical subject is also a 
rigidly referential proper name. We can illustrate what C-I contains at this 
point as follows: 
(44) [AGENT.RIGID JohnI [TRANSITIVE.PRESENT loves [PATIENT.RIGID Mary]]] 
As we can see the whole thematic matrix is now present in C-I, both 
arguments are rigid, and tense has been assigned (although not yet relative 
to the speech-event).  Finally, the C edge is transferred (in virtue of C being 
a matrix clause): 
                                                          
163 This is meant to represent that the Force projection is valued as being declarative. 
164 We are assuming that neither John nor Mary are present in the utterance context, and we 
indicate that the clause is absent from the speech-event location. 
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(45) [FORCE.DECLARATIVE [LOGOPHORICAGENT.NO [LOGOPHORIC.PATIENT.NO [SPEECH-TIME.PRESENT 
[SPEECH-LOCATION.ABSENT [AGENT.RIGID John [TRANSITIVE.PRESENT loves [PATIENT.RIGID 
Mary]]]]]]]]] 
The clausal structure of (44) is then valued relative to the speech-event that 
is being constructed, which values, for instance, the event relative to the 
speech-event location, tense relative to the speech-event time, the 
arguments relative to the speech-event participants, and finally provides 
the clause with declarative force (for an extensive discussion on how 
speech-event values interact with the clausal structure see Sigurðsson 
2004a; 2004b; 2007). The structure present in C-I is thus complete in the 
sense that the speaker now has everything at her disposal to use the 
expression felicitously. 
We can now briefly some up how grammatical structure and the C-I 
representations it produces inform general directions for use. To begin with, 
the two DPs John and Mary have the same grammatical topology. Each 
contains an instance of N-to-D movement that leaves the interior empty 
and edge filled. In alliance with the ‘grammar-reference link’ hypothesis 
from (33) the DPs must be interpreted as rigid proper names. The only 
difference between the two is whatever idiosyncratic information the two 
roots hold in LEX. The two DPs therefore, must be used and understood as 
rigidly referential. The grammatical structure of DPs therefore creates their 
general directions for use, and in the case of (37) the general directions for 
use are that the names be interpreted as rigid (with all the implications 
concerning trans-world identity that such an interpretation entails). 
Whenever an expression ζ has the grammatical configuration of these DPs 
it must be used rigidly. 
The DPs are then situated with the v* phase, which contributes to the 
general directions for using the expression by placing the arguments within 
a thematic matrix, thereby creating an event-like structure. The 
contribution of the v* phase is found in the organisation of the arguments 
participation in the event being described. The general directions for using 
the expression come about through the grammatical configuration once 
more, which details the thematic roles of the two argument in the event. 
The name Mary must be used as the patient of the event and interpreted 
accordingly and the name John must be used as the agent of the event. The 
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grammatical configuration of v* thus informs general directions for using 
the thematic matrix it captures. 
Once we have the clause-like structure of v* the derivation proceeds 
through the C phase. As we stated above, a lot of functional structure exists 
within C whose job it is to orientate the clause with respect to the speech-
event, its participants, time, location, and it must provide it with force. The 
C phase contributes towards general directions for use in numerous ways. 
First of all, it is responsible for situating the clause in time through valuing 
T, and this is then valued with respect to the speech-event time ST. The 
implications of this to how the expression can be used are obvious, it 
restricts the temporal aspect of the clause to whatever it is valued as. It can 
only be used to express a certain time-stamped proposition. Furthermore, 
the clause is situated relative to the speech-event’s location SL, including 
situating the clausal participants relative to the utterance context (as being 
either present or absent). Irrespective of whether spatial information is 
phonetically realised, the functional projection SL restricts felicitous uses of 
it. The C phase also values the logophoric participants LA and LP and the 
clause can only be used in accordance with these values. It also marks the 
clauses force, and therefore restricts whether the expression can be used to 
make a statement, ask a question, give an order, etc. Overall, C has the role 
of turning a clause-like structure into something that can actually be used 
felicitously in a given speech-act. The values for the projections in C 
therefore directly contribute to general directions for using the syntactic 
object created.  
At this point there is one more thing to consider with respect to general 
directions for use, which concerns the distinction between lexical and 
compositional semantics. The theory that we defend is one that states that 
compositional semantics is formed through grammatical structure, and the 
above is concerned with illustrating how that comes about with C, v*, and 
D. However, grammar has no effect on the idiosyncratic descriptive 
information carried by lexical items. The reason that the grammatical 
theory of meaning should be favoured therefore is in its account of 
semantic composition, rather than lexical semantics. The explanatory 
advantage that the grammatical theory of meaning has is that it does not 
require additional machinery in C-I to capture the compositional linguistic 
meaning of an utterance. In conclusion, grammatical structure produces 
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general directions for use in C-I that can be equated with compositional 
semantics, but it does not explain how idiosyncratic information attached 
to lexical items contributes to these directions. 
5.42 
LINGUISTIC MEANING AND ‘WHAT IS SAID’ 
We can now turn to analyse the grammatical theory of meaning’s account 
of the two core parts of semantic theories that we discussed in §2: linguistic 
meaning and what is said. An account of how our theory interacts with 
these three aspects of language will enable us to locate the theory in 
opposition to both literalism and contextualism. 
To begin with we can sketch out how the grammatical theory of meaning 
contributes towards the linguistic meaning of an expression. Let us repeat 
what we said about linguistic meaning in §2.1, ‘the linguistic meaning of an 
expression is derived from the conventional meaning associated with a 
given expression-type. The linguistic meaning of ζ therefore is the meaning 
of a particular expression-type ζ. In virtue of this, the linguistic meaning of 
ζ can be given in isolation from a particular context of use, it is context-
independent.’ The linguistic meaning of an expression ζ therefore is an 
account of a particular type of expression that is explained through its 
conventional – and context-independent – meaning. In §4.16 and §4.24 we 
gave a critical analysis of how certain theories employ the notion of 
linguistic convention and suggested that such an account may derive from 
grammar (at least with respect to referential uses of descriptions). The idea 
presented there extends readily to all linguistic expressions. The linguistic 
conventions governing language use are derived from grammatical 
structure precisely because the grammatical structure provides general 
directions for use (which are the linguistic conventions of a language). We 
can state therefore that the linguistic meaning of an expression is produced 
through the grammatical structure that underpins it, which includes the 
information expressed in the syntactic configuration itself (the topology of 
the phases) as well as the various feature values carried by the projections.  
The idea of linguistic meaning being presented is only minimally different 
to that described in §2.1. The only real difference is the idea that linguistic 
meaning is read off grammatical structure, which in turn underpins 
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linguistic convention, instead of semantic-types. Grammar provides 
general directions for use, and therefore a particular grammatical string ζ 
captures the linguistic meaning associated with the expression-type ζ. Once 
again, the issue of idiosyncratic descriptive meaning attached to lexical 
items rears its head again. In an instance of the lexicalisation of a root, 
where a particular phonetic label becomes learnt and placed in LEX, there 
will be a myriad of idiosyncratic pieces of information that are attached to 
it, and more pieces of information may be added over time. These pieces of 
idiosyncratic information play no role in grammar or in compositional 
semantics. There is no difference here with formal semantics. For instance, 
a type-based formal semantics does not pay any closer attention to 
idiosyncratic information than grammar. The composition of semantic-
types, as exhibited in functionalism, is purely based on those types, rather 
than any descriptive information the lexical items, that those types are 
attached to, carry. The linguistic meaning of a fully-fledged sentential 
expression therefore is to be equated with its general directions for its use, 
which are in turn provided by the compositional semantics captured in 
grammar as well as the idiosyncratic information carried by certain lexical 
items (namely descriptive/open-class roots) present in the expression. 
Critically for our purposes, the linguistic meaning of the definite article is 
based in grammar, as it is a closed-class lexical item. 
We can now turn to see how this grammatical account of linguistic 
meaning specifies what is said, and consequently truth-conditional content. 
In doing this we will contrast our theory with both literalism and 
contextualism, as well as all those theories of descriptions so far discussed. 
To begin with, we can repeat the definition of ‘what is said’ that we 
employed in §2.1, given an expression ζ, what a speaker says in using ζ is 
associated with the propositional content expressed by ζ, ‘what is said’ is 
the truth-conditional content of the utterance (Recanati 2004, 5), and in 
Hinzen’s words “it is to take such propositions to form the contents of 
propositional attitudes; and to take them to be ‘complete’ in the sense that a 
truth-value can be attached to them in a context of use” (forthcoming, 4). For 
literalism, what is said is entirely dictated by linguistic meaning, whereas 
for contextualism what is said depends upon free contextual enrichment on 
the utterance. Alternatively, we will take our grammatical theory so far 




There is a clear point of departure into the debate surrounding what is said 
that is to be found in the clausal domain of syntax, the C phase. We can 
begin by splitting CP up into its edge and interior, and following Sheehan 
& Hinzen we can state that the interior (TP downwards) ‘constitutes the 
descriptive core of the proposition’ and the edge ‘serves to make the 
proposition ‘refer’’ (2011, 424). We might therefore understand the CP in a 
matrix clause as turning the ‘descriptive core’ of the clause towards the 
world, matrix CPs are therefore extensional (2011, 425). It is no surprise that 
this result emerges with matrix CPs when we consider the projections that 
CPs contains, including illocutionary force and speech-event features (Rizzi 
1997; Sigurðsson 2004b; 2007). The role of a matrix is to transfer something 
to C-I that is amenable to being tested for truth against the world. The 
grammar of matrix CPs thus provides general directions for using the 
clausal structure below to make a judgement about the world, which can be 
tested against the extensions of the elements it contains. The question for 
what is said is whether what matrix CPs transfers to C-I is fully specified 
for truth-conditions, or whether the semantic or pragmatic component of 
language must embellish the syntactic object. 
The argument for grammar fully specifying what is said will mirror what 
we have said about linguistic meaning, grammar fully specifies the 
compositional aspects of what is said, namely the structural aspects of 
truth-conditional content, but it does not have full control over 
idiosyncratic information. In a grammatical derivation particular lexical 
items will be merged, which means that we get a fully specified linguistic 
meaning in so far as those lexical items carry their descriptive content into 
C-I. However, as Borer notes, lexical roots are “creatures born of perception 
and conceptualization”, not grammar (2005, 10-11). However, we retain the 
non-lexicocentric conception of compositional semantics by retaining the 
view that the semantic contribution of a lexical root to truth-conditional 
content is ‘exo-skeletal’. It is dictated by the grammatical environment in 
which the root falls, as can be seen in the root √race in (4) and (5) (Borer 
2005). To this end, Hinzen states that “modulo potential contextual 
influences on the lexical specifications of utterances (a domain where 
grammar is not in control)… grammar… not merely constrains but in fact 
fully determines the propositions expression, without enrichment by further 
elements, where these are not independently grammatically 
licensed…pervasive and uncontrollable influences of context on the lexical 
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specification of meaning in an utterance will occur; where grammar is not 
in control, context takes over” (forthcoming, 4; 26). Nevertheless, the claim is 
that grammar controls all of the compositional parts of meaning. We will 
now turn to explore this idea further. 
To begin with, let us recall the manner in which literalism and 
contextualism relate linguistic meaning to what is said. Starting with the 
former, literalism defends the view that linguistic meaning produces, at 
least, a minimal proposition for any declarative sentence. For instance, the 
sentence in (46), repeated from §2.3, can be associated with the minimal 
proposition in (47): 
(46) I’ve had breakfast. 
(47) I’ve had breakfast at least once in my entire life. 
The minimal proposition in (47) is understood by those defending 
literalism to constitute the smallest fully-specified set of truth-conditions 
for (46) (Borg 2004). Nevertheless, a standard felicitous use of (46) is not 
intended to express (47), but is instead almost universally employed in the 
communication of (48): 
(48) I’ve had breakfast this morning. 
The idea behind a minimal proposition is that (46)’s linguistic meaning can 
be expressed with (47) without reference to its use of a particular occasion, 
but when it is used the linguistic meaning of (46) demands saturation from 
the context. The idea is akin to that of a hidden indexical discussed with 
respect to Neale’s theory of descriptions in §3.3. The linguistic meaning of 
(46) requires saturation from the context, but the role of context is not free 
but heavily conditioned. An utterance of (46) is typically associated with 
(48) because its linguistic meaning must be saturated by the context. In 
other words, we have a minimal proposition that fully specifies truth-
conditional content, but in an instance of use the expression is accompanied 
by contextual coordinates demanded by its linguistic meaning. In other 
words, the linguistic meaning fully specifies what is said by demanding 
saturation (a form of indexicalism).  
Nevertheless, as Hinzen points out, associating (46) with the minimal 
proposition in (47) is ‘psychologically implausible’, and more crucially it 
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fails to be captured by its ‘linguistic form’ (forthcoming, 5). It must be 
remembered that when we discuss what is said we are discussing 
something enabled by our species’ linguistic endowment, we are discussing 
propositional structure, which is something that competent speakers can 
produce, interpret, and judge to hold true. We have propositional attitudes 
towards what is said in a given utterance, and we can have attitudes such 
as beliefs, hopes, and so on, that are dependent upon what is said. 
Therefore, what is said in a particular utterance is something captured in 
the psychological reality of having a linguistic mind. Consequently, it has 
to be psychologically plausible. The proposition in (47) is psychologically 
plausible, but not as minimal proposition expressed by (46). If we are to 
keep to the idea that grammar creates a ‘skeleton of thought’, then there is 
no time at which the additional material posited in the minimal proposition 
in (47) is constructed. There is nothing stopping (47) being derived, but it is 
not derived as part of (46).  
Contextualism agrees that we cannot claim that (47) is a plausible minimal 
set of truth-conditions for (46). The conclusion contextualism reaches is that 
the linguistic meaning of (46) is insufficient for fully specifying truth-
conditional content and what is said. To overcome this problem, certain 
theories endorse truth-conditional pragmatics. The idea here is that whilst 
the linguistic meaning of (46) fails to provide a fully specified set of truth-
conditions, it is subsequently supplement by free contextual enrichment 
which is part of speaker’s meaning and thus pragmatic (Recanati 1993; 
2004; 2013; Bezuidenhout 1997; 2002). Through employing free contextual 
enrichment, contextualism takes what is said in (46) to be determined 
partially through its linguistic meaning and partially through further 
pragmatic enrichment. 
The issue surrounding the truth-conditional content expressed in (46) is one 
concerning a distinct lack of phonetic material regarding the time at which 
the speaker claims to have had breakfast. As an alternative to both 
literalism and contextualism, we can consider whether grammar fully 
determines what is said. Hinzen claims that grammar constructs a ‘deictic 
frame’ that is complete in the sense of what is said, and facilitates 
successful communication. There is no need to add anything to it (hidden 
indexicals or truth-conditional pragmatics), as ‘nothing is missing’ 
(forthcoming, 18). Hinzen describes the completeness of grammar as follows: 
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[j]ust as temporal reference to an event as taking place 
contemporaneously with the point of speech is not the same as 
describing it as taking place ‘now’, or deictic reference to me 
with ‘I’ is not the same as describing me as being ‘me’, spatial 
reference to an object or place relative to the location of speech 
is not the same as describing this place as falling under some 
lexical predicates such as ‘in Palo Alto’ or ‘here’… The Here is 
established in relation to the speech act, as, when and where it 
takes place, and fixating spatial relation grammatically, without 
the help of additional descriptive predicates, and through the 
speech act itself, is different from a location saturating 
descriptive predicates specified in an utterance. (forthcoming, 17) 
We need not add information in the form of a complete minimal 
proposition, nor do we need to supplement the linguistic meaning with 
truth-conditional pragmatics. The idea is derived from the concept of 
speech-event features, which we introduced earlier, from Sigurðsson 
(2004a; 2004b; 2007; 2009). 165  If we take any complete grammatical 
derivation, with a full matrix CP, then we will see that it syntactically 
encodes for the clause being understood relative to the speech-event taking 
place. To reiterate what we have said earlier, a matrix C, with fully 
specified speech-event features, places the clause captured in its interior 
within the event’s location, time, and with respect to the speech 
participants. 
To provide additional material in the way suggested by either literalism or 
contextualism will lead to “propositions misrepresenting the thoughts 
expressed in the original utterances as the thoughts expressed by lexically 
and grammatically different expressions” (forthcoming, 26). Grammatical 
structure, once enriched in the manner demanded by the speech-event 
projections discovered in syntactic cartography, contains all of the 
information required to give (46) a fully-specified truth conditional content 
relative to the context. For instance, consider (49): 
(49) I am tired. 
The proposition expressed by (49) might be paraphrased as ‘the speaker is 
tired at the present moment’. How do we reach this through grammar 
                                                          




alone without recourse to a minimal proposition and without recourse to 
truth-conditional pragmatics? This becomes clear once we consider the 
expression in relation to the values assigned to speech event features. To 
begin with, the clause is valued relative to SL in the speech-event HERE (it 
is valued as being true in the present location of the speaker). Next it is 
valued relative to ST in the speech-event NOW. Following this the first 
person indexical is valued relative to LA as being the logophoric agent 
(Hinzen forthcoming; Sigurðsson 2004b; 2007). Finally, it is valued as 
expressing declarative force. There is nothing left to that it required to 
complete what is said, the grammar has already placed it within the 
interlocutors deictic frame and the utterance’s speech-event. This is what 
we understand to be a fully grammatical account of what is said.  
5.5 
SUMMARY 
We can conclude this chapter with a summary of the grammatical theory of 
meaning.  
(50) The Grammatical Theory of Meaning 
i. Grammar provides blueprint or skeleton for compositional 
semantics that we can associate with a ‘skeleton of thought’. 
The semantic skeleton is achieved through the mechanics of 
the three phases: C, v*, and D. 
ii. The topology of D corresponds to a ‘referential hierarchy’ 
wherein arguments fall, the topology of v* corresponds to 
thematic matrices wherein events are structured, and the 
topology of C produces a clausal structure fully-specified in 
relation to the speech-event. 
iii. The grammatical structure of an expression ζ provides the 
speaker with general directions for using ζ. 
iv. The linguistic meaning of an expression ζ can be directly 
read off its general directions for use. 
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v. The linguistic meaning, derived through grammar, is 
complete with respect to compositional aspects of truth-
conditional content and what is said in an utterance of ζ. 
vi. Contextual factors, not already determined syntactically, can 
only interfere with idiosyncratic information carried by 
lexical roots.  
vii. From (vi.), whether or not definite descriptions are 
referential, quantificational, or ambiguous is therefore a 
matter for grammar to decide. 
The grammatical theory of meaning thus stands opposed to literalism and 
its formulation in formal semantics, and contextualism with its 
employment of truth-conditional pragmatics. In virtue of defending a view 
of compositional semantics as being grounded in grammar, we therefore 
have a motivation for exploring such a grammatical account of the three 
ambiguity problems. Furthermore, this account will attempt to unify the 
problems raised against the Russellian QT (§3) and the two ATs (§4). We 
will now turn to provide such an account, and conclude with our solution 














DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS AND 
EXPANDING THE FORMS OF REFERENCE 
 
The aim of this chapter is to extend our analysis in §5 to look at DPs in 
more detail, as well as the grammatical environments in which they can be 
placed. The work here will further the view that both referential and 
attributive uses of definite descriptions, and their associated linguistic 
conventions, have their origin in grammar. We will begin by expanding the 
forms of reference introduced in §2.4 in accordance with facts about DPs 
and their interaction with grammar more generally (§6.1). The idea here 
will be to develop a ‘hierarchy of reference’ in line with Longobardi’s 
topological analysis of DPs (1994; 2005; Sheehan & Hinzen 2011; 2013; 
Martin & Hinzen 2014). The hierarchy will be seen as emerging through the 
grammar of DPs and the wider grammatical environments in which DPs 
are found.  
We will pursue this line of inquiry through a discussion of deictic definite 
descriptions (§6.11), adjectival modification within DPs (§6.12), possessives 
(§6.13), and epithets (§6.14). In §6.2 we will employ our results in rejecting 
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the idea that the definite article is lexically ambiguous, which we will label 
an erroneous lexicocentric assumption, in favour of an ‘exo-skeletal’ view 
(Borer 2005). Following this, in §6.3 we will provide a final thought on how 
linguistic conventions surrounding definite descriptions arise. Finally, in 
§6.4 we will complete our thesis with our grammatical account of the 
genesis of the three ambiguity problems. We will discuss each of the CAP, 
GAP1, and GAP2 in turn and provide an account of them in terms of the 
GT. The conclusion of this chapter is that the three ambiguity problems in 
definite descriptions, their forms of reference, the linguistic conventions 
surrounding their uses, and finally their linguistic meaning and 
contribution to what is said, are all accounted for through the grammar of 
DPs in conjunction with the grammatical environments in which they can 
be placed. 
6.1 
EXPANDING THE FORMS OF REFERENCE 
The central focus of this section will be to develop an expanded set of forms 
of reference, which are intended to track the subtle nuances and differences 
that grammar affords us in using language to refer. We can begin by 
reiterating what we said in §2.4. It was observed that if an expression ζ is 
taken to be referential, then ζ will receive the semantic-type <e>. 
Conversely, if an expression ζ it is taken to be quantificational, then ζ will 
receive the semantic-type <<e, t>, <<e, t>, t>>. In order to introduce the idea 
that there are levels of referential strength in arguments we dubbed these 
two types of expressions instances of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ reference 
respectively. As was stated in §2.4, the conception of linguistic meaning 
espoused in formal semantics takes individual lexical items to exhibit fixed 
semantic-types, and restrictive ones at that. The two semantic-types 
outlined above exhaust the options available within the type-driven 
lexicocentric view of meaning (Martin & Hinzen 2014, 98). However, as we 
have illustrated in the case of proper names in §5.342, the referential 
function that lexical items exhibit is a direct consequence of the 
grammatical configurations in which they fall. For instance, we denied that 
the lexical root √Ronaldo should be assigned a semantic-type <e> and 
illustrated that its being referential (and rigidly referential) was parasitic an 
instance of N-to-D movement. When √Ronaldo failed to undergo N-to-D 
movement it could not be interpreted in the same way, it could not be 
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interpreted as being rigidly referential. The conclusion reached therefore is 
that grammar determines the referential status of arguments through a 
‘referential hierarchy’, and that ‘reference’ is not a property held by an item 
in the lexicon. 
In what follows we will develop an understanding on where definite 
descriptions fit on the referential hierarchy, and how their position on this 
hierarchy interacts with the grammatical environment in which they are 
found. The upshot of this will be to state that the definite article as a lexical 
item is not pre-destined to create either a referential or quantificational 
expression, but instead gathers its form of reference grammatically. In 
other words, we will reject the Russellian QT (§3) that the definite article 
creates a quantificational function as well as both Kaplan and Devitt’s ATs 
(§4) that the definite article creates, at least in some cases, a referential 
function. It will be argued that if we are to apply a semantic-type to definite 
descriptions, then this must be done on a case-by-case basis after the 
expressions have been transferred from the syntactic component. The idea 
to be developed is similar to that of Borer, who claims that “it is the 
properties of the 'outside', which ultimately determine the overall 'shape' of 
what is within, rather than the other way around” (2005, 15). A lexical 
item’s ‘shape’ (or analogously its semantic-type) is determined by the 
grammatical context it is in, it is determined through its ‘exo-skeleton’. 
Through an expansion of the forms of reference and their grammar we will 
be able to better understand the contribution of definite descriptions to 
linguistic meaning and what is said.  
The subsequent work will be dedicated to analysing various constructions 
containing definite descriptions that are brought up in the literature. The 
idea will be to develop and expand the forms of reference that standard 
semantic treatments admits of them, which we will take to correlate 
directly facts about grammar. As a background to this work we should 
remember that definite descriptions fall directly in the middle of the 
referential hierarchy. In §5.342 we described the referential hierarchy in 
DPs as one concerning the interaction between the phase edge and interior, 
and we stated that definite descriptions exhibit material in both. It will be 
illustrated that it is this fact that leads to the two ambiguous uses. 
Furthermore, we will show that when a definite description is felicitously 
understood as being referential it is because its interpretation is depending 
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upon the phase edge, and conversely when a definite description is 
felicitously understood as being attributive it is because its interpretation is 
depending upon the phase interior. We will also show that it is often the 
wider grammatical environment within which the DP is placed that 
determines which of the edge or interior is critical to the interpretation. 
Thus, we will attempt to illustrate that the various forms of reference 
exhibited in definite descriptions (from the very weak attributive readings 
to the strong deictic readings) are grounded in grammar. 
6.11 
DEICTIC DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS 
As a point of entry into our theory we will begin with an analysis of deictic 
uses of definite descriptions, which exhibit perhaps the strongest form of 
reference available to such expressions. Deictic uses of definite descriptions 
are the most commonly called upon examples of referential uses (as will be 
obvious from our work in §4). Such uses are often cited as clear examples of 
referential uses constituting instances of a linguistic convention. A deictic 
use of a definite description is one wherein the speaker employs the 
expression in order to make reference to a particular individual that is 
salient in the speech-act context. It is deictic in virtue of the fact that ‘what 
is said’ in an utterance contain a deictic element depends upon the context. 
Language is inherently deictic, that is, it is tied to our comportment 
towards the world in every instance of use. Language might be understood 
therefore as creating a ‘deictic frame’ (Sheehan & Hinzen 2013, 284). In 
using language there is a frame built between the speaker, her utterance, 
and the world (speech-act context). We will now look at how definite 
descriptions interact with this frame to produce their particular form of 
deictic reference. 
Prior to delving into deictic definite descriptions it is worthwhile pointing 
out that deixis is not a property of lexical items, but is instead a property of 
grammatical configurations. For instance, it is not the case that a pronoun 
can be understood as being deictic as it sits in the lexicon. Instead it gathers 
this ability if and only if it is situated in an appropriate grammatical 
configuration (Sheehan & Hinzen 2013, 117).166 If an argument is deictic, 
                                                          
166 Through a discussion of romance clitics, Martin & Hinzen illustrate that pronouns derive 
their deictic status grammatically and it is not something that they are by-rights guaranteed 
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then it has a certain grammatical structure and is placed within a 
grammatical environment that engenders this reading. Our analysis of 
definite descriptions will proceed in this vein. 
Deictic uses of definite descriptions are ubiquitous in language use. 
Consider (1) for instance, which will understand to be spoken in the 
presence of a contextually salient desk: 
(1) The desk is covered with books. 
A speaker may employ (1) in a situation where they have been presented 
with a study space, which happens to be in a state that renders it unfit for 
purpose. In such a scenario, we can state as an initial analysis that the 
definite description picks out the relevant table through interacting with 
the speaker’s deictic frame in conjunction with the descriptive content 
contained in the NP. Uses such as (1) abound, and it is no surprise therefore 
that they are perhaps the keystone piece of evidence in the ambiguity 
theorists’ arsenal. Should we conclude that the definite description in (1) is 
therefore inherently deictic? Does (1) indicate that the lexical entry for the 
should contain a semantic-type that captures this referential function? The 
answer to these questions is negative.  
We can illustrate why this is the case by comparing (1) and (2): 
(2) I hope the joiner builds the desk in mahogany.  
Unlike (1), a felicitous use of (2) is not deictic and the definite description 
the desk does not pick out a contextually salient desk (even if there is one 
unique desk in the context). The definite description remains the same, and 
hence we shall assume that the DP it is contained within is the same also, 
but we nevertheless interpret its contribution to ‘what is said’ differently. 
In (1) ‘what is said’ concerns a particular contextually salient individual, 
whereas in (2) ‘what is said’ can be associated with a speaker’s desire 
concerning an event in the future that involves the creation of an individual 
that exhibits the properties of being both a desk and being made out of 
mahogany. The definite description in (1) therefore exhibits a stronger form 
of reference than that in (2), as it refers to an already existing, contextually 
salient, individual, whereas (2) does not and cannot be felicitously used in 
                                                                                                                                                   
to achieve. According to them, “their interpretation is determined grammatically by how 
high they are located within the structure of the extended phase” (2014, 104). 
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this manner. We must therefore look beyond the lexical entry for the and 
perhaps beyond the grammar of DPs in order to account for the form of 
reference exhibited in deictic definite descriptions.  
It now seems more appealing to state that the difference is one concerning 
the grammar of the two DPs in conjunction with the two respective 
grammatical environments in which they are placed. The latter therefore 
dictating that the same definite description the desk can in one environment 
elicit deictic reference and in another fail to do so. The subsequent analysis 
of this deictic uses will be based upon Sheehan & Hinzen’s claim that it is 
“grammar-based means of referring” that “systematically establish 
relations of relative distance between the object of reference and the 
immediate features of the speech context”, and therefore “characterize 
these forms of reference as ‘deictic’” (2011, 406). In order for (1) to be deictic 
it therefore needs to meets the conditions placed upon expressions by 
grammar for being interpreted as such. We can begin with the claim that 
the grammar of (1) makes the relationship between the definite description 
and ‘relative distance between the object of reference and the immediate 
features of the speech context’ a close-knit one. Grammar therefore dictates 
that (1) is felicitous when used deictically and (2) is not. It encloses the desk 
in (1) in a deictic frame. 
The first avenue to pursue is that the topology of DPs partially contributes 
toward situating the definite description in a deictic frame, and thus 
contributes to its role as a deictically referential expression. Let us 
reintroduce the dichotomy in DPs between the phasal edge, which is the 
locus of strong reference (including deictic reference), and a phasal interior, 
which is the locus of descriptive (lexical/idiosyncratic) information. We 
therefore have the following dichotomy: 
(3) [EDGE deixis [INTERIOR descriptive material]] 
The analysis in (3) can capture the DP in (1) as follows: 
(4) [EDGE the [INTERIOR desk]] 
We can begin to analyse (4) through determining what role it is that the 
determiner plays in the edge of (4), and whether this role alone is sufficient 
to account for the act of deictic reference in (1). Following what we said in 
§5.342 we can understand referential strength to be determined through 
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“the extent to which the NP restriction is active in a particular context” 
(Sheehan & Hinzen 2011, 417). As a predication, we can state that where a 
definite description is being used deictically this is because it is ‘edge 
heavy’, in such a case the edge of the phase is more fundamental to its 
interpretation than the interior. 
In investigating this predicate we can begin through a comparative analysis 
of deictic definite descriptions with other available deictic forms of 
reference that language affords us, including pronouns and (complex) 
demonstratives. The first observation we can make is that more often than 
not a deictic definite description can be exchanged for a complex 
demonstrative or third person pronoun without loss of communicative 
efficacy: 
(5) The striker is wasting opportunities. 
(6) That striker is wasting opportunities.  
(7) He is wasting opportunities. 
The substitution of the definite description in (5) with the complex 
demonstrative in (6) retains the filled NP complement if it is to be felicitous, 
but retains the deictic reading. In (7) the third person pronoun can be 
substituted and, in virtue of the grammar of pronouns, forces NP to be 
empty, and we once again retain the deictic reading. The fact that each of (5) 
– (7) can be used to refer to a particular contextually salient individual 
might suggest that there is a strong relationship between definite 
descriptions, demonstratives, and pronouns. Ideas along such lines have 
been around since Postal (1966), and they have been defended numerous 
times in the literature (Heim 1988; Elbourne 2005; 2008; 2013; Schlenker 
2005; Johnson 2011). Nevertheless, it is the case that there are distinctions 
between (5), (6), and (7) that are captured by the hierarchy of reference. 
Demonstratives for instance can, on occasion, appear bare, without a filled 
NP complement. The same does not hold of definite articles. Moving 
further up the scale, pronouns actually bar a filled NP complement and are 
ungrammatical with one. Demonstratives and pronouns are thus more 
‘edge heavy’ than definite articles, but the fact that each of (5) – (7) can be 
used deictically could indicate that in (5) our interpretation rests more on 
the edge than the interior NP. 
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In the semantic literature, it has been argued that deictic uses of pronouns 
and demonstratives can be understood as free variables. The free variable 
that a deictic pronoun exhibits, for instance, is then bound through the 
context with respect to the φ-feature bundle that it contains (person, 
number, and gender). We might thereby understand the φ-features that a 
pronoun carries as its descriptive content. The free variable analysis 
straightforwardly extends to deictic definite descriptions once we tack on 
the NP restriction as part of the descriptive content. Through this analysis 
we can treat the subjects of both (5) and (7) as exhibiting the semantics of 
(5*) and (7*) respectively, where the free variable is valued with an 
appropriate contextually salient individual: 
(5*) [x]*(φ-features, NP ‘striker’) is wasting opportunities.  
(7*) [x]*(φ-features) is wasting opportunities.167 
The star * in the superscript indicates that the individual that comes to be 
the value of the free variable x must satisfy the conditions placed in the 
brackets otherwise it is not felicitous.168  The only distinction between the 
semantics of (5) and (7) therefore is that (5) contains additional descriptive 
material captured in the NP complement.  
As already stated, the deictic uses of pronouns constitute the strongest 
form of reference that grammar creates, which is understood through 
grammatical complexity being derived in the DP’s extended edge (Martin 
& Hinzen 2014, 115).169 The efficacious substitution of the striker with he 
speaks to the idea that definite descriptions used referentially are in fact 
akin to pronominal expressions (or the opposite, Elbourne 2008, 10). 
Furthermore, there is significant support for the idea that demonstratives 
are also highly related to the pronominal system, as evidenced in the fact 
that many languages use them instead of third person pronouns (Lyons 
                                                          
167  We use the star * as both an index and an indication that the utterance would be 
infelicitous if not valued relative to the content of the brackets. The use here is non-standard 
but it provides a neat way of capturing both pieces of information, that it is indexed, and 
that its felicitous use depends upon the content of the brackets. 
168 In order for a free variable expression to be felicitous it is a requirement that all indexes 
provide an individual in the context (for more details on felicitous use see Heim 1988, 165). 
169 The strongest forms of reference are to be seen in personal pronouns. The types of third 
person pronouns that are interchangeable with definite descriptions come lower down the 




2003, 145).170 We want to understand how it is that all three appear to have 
similar interpretations in (5) – (7), one such reason is the interpretation of 
each is edge heavy.  
To further this idea we need to briefly revisit the syntax of DPs. As we 
mentioned in §4.16, Martin & Hinzen lengthen the standard analysis of DP 
to include functional projections that extend its edge (2014, 110-111). The 
dichotomy captured in (3) still holds true, but in addition there is more 
complexity in the phase edge than just the functional projection associated 
with the phase head D. Martin & Hinzen extend the phase edge to include 






The tree in (8) is simplified to exclude further functional projections 
(including NumP and nP) as well as any further adjectival or adverbial 
                                                          
170 As Lyons notes, “It is very common for demonstratives to serve as third-person personal 
pronouns, and for languages to have no personal pronoun in the third person distinct from 
a demonstrative. Often it is a demonstrative unmarked for deixis that fills this function. In 
Latin, for example, the general demonstrative is is used, especially in non-nominative cases 
where there is more need for an overt form (Latin being null subject). Similarly in Finnish, 
the general demonstrative se also serves as inanimate third-person pronoun, and sometimes 
replaces hän ‘he’, ‘she’. Sometimes one of the deictically marked demonstratives supplies the 
personal pronoun. Again in Latin, the demonstrative related to third person, ille, frequently 
occurs rather than is. In Turkish too it is the third (distal) term of the demonstrative system, 
o, that supplies the personal pronoun. Persian uses the distal form of a two-term system, ān, 
for the non-human pronoun. In Lezgian the medial demonstrative am (in a three-term 
distance system) is used. Often there is no particular member of the demonstrative system 
that has this function (presumably becoming unmarked for deixis in the process), and 
whatever deictic choices apply to the demonstratives apply equally to the personal 
pronoun” (2003, 145). Lyons notes that sometimes when the distal demonstrative is used it 
lacks its deictic marking but what he means here is what we have previously termed 
‘locational information’. The interesting part about this is that we suggested the same for the 
definite article in §4, where we observed Montagnais and certain dialects of Mandarin using 
the distal as an article.  
171 The notation of # next to the higher D# projection is not taken from Martin & Hinzen, but 







parts of its cartography. What we see in (8) is an extension of the phase 
edge to include a deictic projection DeixP and a further D position. The 
extended edge can be understood in the same manner as the topology of 
DP in §5.342 with the strongest form of reference (personal reference) 
occupying just the D# position. The evidence for the extra projections comes 
from a wide variety of Romance clitics that occupy grammatical 
configurations depending upon the phrase/word that they replace, ranging 
from third person object reference in the lower D, to deictic reference in 
Deix, and finally to the strongest form of personal pronouns in the higher D 
(Martin & Hinzen 2014, 115).172  
We can integrate the extended edge analysis with the referential hierarchy 
proposed in §5.342 (developed in reference to Longobardi 1994; 2005; 
Sheehan & Hinzen 2011; Martin & Hinzen 2014): 
(9) a. Ronaldo plays [DP ∅ [NP football]]. 
 b. Ronaldo plays [DP ∅ [AP amazing [NP football]]]. 
 c. Ronaldo scored [DP a [NP goal]]. 
 d. Ronaldo scored [DP an [AP amazing [NP goal]]]. 
 e. Ronaldo scored [DP the [NP goal]]. 
 f. Ronaldo scored [DP the [AP amazing [NP goal]]]. 
 g. That is [DP Ronaldo [NP Ronaldo]]. 
h. Ronaldo scored [DP that [NP (goal)]].  
 i. That is [DP him [NP ∅]]. 
 j. [D#P I [DEIXP [DP ∅ [NP ∅]]]] am tired. 
                                                          
172
 The idea of an extended edge is similar, but not identical, to that between a strong and 
predicative determiner phrase introduced by Zamparelli (2000, 15), where the edge of the 
former has been expanded to include DeixP and the higher DP. 
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Evidence for the extended edge comes from various sources, one such 
example is that of Norwegian, which exhibits multiple determiners that are 
spread across the two D projections:173 
(10) [D#P det [DEIXP ϑ [DP ∅ [NP hus [AFFIX et]]]]] 
 That       house-DEF 
In Norwegian, a standard definite description occurs with a post-nominal 
affix that produces a definite reading (hus-et). However, as Leu notes, there 
is an option of a pre-nominal determiner, which then forces a deictic 
demonstrative reading as with det hus-et, that house, above (2008, 18). Leu 
argues that the pre-nominal determiner (det) indicates the presence of a 
morphologically null adjective whose role is to provide deixis, which we 
have indicated by ϑ.174 
The evidence for the presence of a deictic layer further abounds once we 
consider similar patterns in Swedish. For instance, the distinction between 
that house and this house in Swedish is produced through the two terms där 
and här (roughly there and here).175 Therefore, we have the deictic layer, it 
would seem, explicitly realised: 
(11) a. [D#P det  [DEIXP där [DP ∅ [NP hus-et]]]] 
  That  (there)  house.DEF 
                                                          
173 The referential options further divide in the case of personal pronouns. Martin & Hinzen 
observe that there are at least two further options for the phase edge, which are when just 
the higher D and Deix are filled, which can be seen in Latin dative personal pronouns, 
which exhibit deictic information. The example below captures person in the higher DP, 
deictic information in DEIXP, and location information in bi, which is moved into DEIXP: 
 
(i). [D#P t   [DEIXP i-bi [DP ∅  [BI]]]] 
2ndPERSON  DEICTIC LOCATION 
 
The second person pronoun tibi in latin therefore has no content in DP downwards, 
therefore forcing one of the strongest referential elements of language, person reference. The 
distinction between the first/second pronouns and third ones is that the latter contain a 
valued gender feature, which Martin & Hinzen posit to be valued lower in the overall DP 
structure than person. Hence, we get the fact that first/second person pronouns exhibit the 
strongest, most deictic, form of reference (2014). 
174 Interestingly, there are effects observed in language acquisition. According to Anderssen, 
Norwegian children acquire the post-nominal determiner much earlier than the pre-nominal 
one, which may be a reflex of the fact that the pre-nominal determiner is more 
grammatically complex (2007).  
175 Thanks to Alex Wilson for help with the Swedish examples. 
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 b. [D#P det  [DEIXP här [DP ∅ [NP hus-et]]]] 
  This  (here)  house.DEF 
The expression captured in (10) is understood as a deictic demonstrative 
expression. The form of reference it exhibits includes explicit marking for 
deixis (in DeixP) in conjunction with the descriptive content of hus. The 
Swedish examples in (11) illustrate explicit deictic marking for location, 
which determines their respective interpretation as that house and this house. 
All of this defends the view argued for in §4.24 that we can understand the 
definite article as a distal demonstrative bleached of its locational 
information. In virtue of this, is it correct to state that the definite article has 
had its deictic information bleached?  
The answer to this above can come through a comparative analysis of (1) 
with the clearly existential readings of (12) and (13): 
(12) A desk is covered with books. 
(13) Some desk is covered with books.  
The two examples above fail to exhibit deictic reference, and this is because 
they fail to provide referential specificity and ‘definiteness’. Whilst it may 
be true that the deictic definite description in (1) does not explicitly code for 
locational, or deictic, information (unlike a demonstrative equivalent), the 
fact that it is capable of substitution with a complex demonstrative but not 
an indefinite or existential construction as in (12) and (13) is telling. 
The distinction between (1) and (12) is one concerning the difference 
between strong/weak determiners and the way they organize the 
interactions between the phasal edge and interior. An indefinite existential 
such as a table does not activate the deictic layer and its interpretation is 
thus heavily reliant on its nominal complement (just as one would expect 
with a quantificational expression). However, strong determiners do 
interact with the deictic layer and hence we get the wide-scope reading 
most naturally with (1), and the subsequent deictic use (Martin & Hinzen 
2014, 98).  
It is therefore tempting to interpret the underlying grammatical structure of 
a deictic definite description as follows: 
(14) [D#P ∅ [DEIXP ϑ [DP the [NP desk]]]]. 
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The idea behind (14) is that we have the DP containing the phonetic 
material and as expected D#P is null, but the DeixP phrase now contains a 
phonetically null but nevertheless active element ϑ that restricts the use 
and interpretation to being deictic (whilst nevertheless failing to provide 
direct locational information). We nevertheless need to account for the 
distinction between (1) and (2). The following is such an account.  
When placed in an appropriate grammatical environment, the silent deictic 
element in (14) becomes activated and contributes to the expression’s 
linguistic meaning. In a suitable environment e the silent deictic element ϑ 
becomes capable of linking with the speech-event projections in C 
(Sigurðsson 2004b; 2007), and therefore forces an edge heavy interpretation 
and we get a deictic reading. The speech-event projections can be 
associated with syntax’s contribution to our ‘deictic frame’, and hence is 
naturally extended to contributing to deictic reference. 176  A definite 
description that is capable of linking with the speech-event features in such 
a way will become understood relative to the speech-event location, 
speech-event time, and logophoric agent and patient. The deictic definite 
description in (1) is therefore understood as present in the speech-event 
location (the context), taking part in an event at the present time relative to 
the speech-event, and as distinct from the logophoric agent and patient. 
Sigurðsson also claims that the thematic roles assigned to arguments are 
tied to the ‘speech-participants’ of the speech-event as a result of EPP 
(extended projection principle), which drags subjects into SpecTP (2007, 
145-146). The form of reference exhibited in deictic uses of definite 
descriptions is thus mediated by the grammar of the whole clausal 
structure, stretching all the way up into C. 
Through this analysis we can modify the free variable idea of deictic 
definite descriptions to include this deictic element (keeping in mind that it 
is only active in particular grammatical environments): 
(15) [x*(ϑ, φ-features, NP ‘desk’)] is covered with books. 
The idea behind (15) is that it captures the fact that the referent must be a 
contextually salient individual, as demanded by the deictic element ϑ. The 
                                                          
176 This is further attested to by the fact that pronominal reference is only fully established at 
the C level, wherein pronouns are valued relative to the projections standing for logophoric 
agent and patient (Sigurðsson 2004b). 
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contextually salient individual must also satisfy the φ-features the 
descriptive content of the NP. The result we get from this analysis is that 
the interpretation of the definite description relies on both the edge and 
interior, as predicated by the topology of DPs. However, in line with our 
predication above the interpretation is edge heavy in virtue of a deictic 
element being in an appropriate grammatical environment that links up 
with the projections concerning the speech-event, which in turn dictate the 
role of the expression in the deictic frame. It is because of this that both (6) 
and (7) can be used interchangeably with (5) without loss of 
communicative efficacy. Deictic definite descriptions are thus edge heavy, 
whilst partially mediated by the descriptive content in the NP interior. We 
have no need to commit to the definite article having a referential function, 
nor do we have to commit to definite descriptions as a whole having the 
semantic-type <e>, in contrast the form of reference that definite 
descriptions exhibit is determined grammatically, and one such form is that 
of deictic reference. The analysis brings deictic uses of definite descriptions 
in line with third person pronouns and deictic demonstratives, which are 
both edge heavy, and distinguishes them from quantifier phrases. 
We can now turn to give an account of why the definite description in (2) 
fails to get a deictic reading whilst, on the face of it, being identical with 
that employed in (1). The first thing to note is that it is not enough to have a 
definite description that is, in principle, capable of being used deictically, it 
must to occur in the appropriate grammatical environment for this 
interpretation to emerge. The definite description in (1) therefore has its 
deictic layer activated in virtue of being in such an environment whereas (2) 
does not. 
To give an idea of an example where the deictic layer is not activated we 
can consider an example from the Catalan system of clitics. For instance, 
some definite descriptions are amenable to being substituted for a case-
neutral and φ-feature bleached clitic ho. According to Martin & Hinzen, the 
sentence in (16a) that contains a definite description in predicative position 
can be replaced with the clitic version in (16b) and remains perfectly 
felicitous (2014, 104): 
(16) a. En Pere  és el porter. 
  The Peter  is the porter. 
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 b. En Pere  ho   / *el   és 
  The Peter  NEUT / *ACC(φ)  is 
  Peter is  (the porter) 
The explanation of (16) is that the definite description in (16a) is acting 
purely predicatively, which is illustrated by the fact that the clitic in (16b) 
does not contain structural case (or a thematic role) and does not contain a 
valued set of φ-features. In comparison, were the definite description el 
porter in the grammatical subject position it could not be substituted for the 
clitic as the description would be case marked (and have the thematic role 
of agent) and carry a valued set of φ-features. In other words, the 
grammatical environment that el porter is in in (16b) determines that it is 
interpreted predicatively, as opposed to anything particular about the 
definite description itself.  
We can apply this idea to (1) and (2). The first thing we can observe is that 
the definite description in (1) is in the grammatical subject position of the 
matrix clause, whereas the definite description in (2) is in the grammatical 
object position of an embedded clause. The two grammatical environments 
have effects on how the definite descriptions are understood relative to the 
speech-event that actually takes place. To begin with we can separate the 
sentences up as follows (taking SEF to stand for the group of speech-event 
features): 
(1*) [CP SEF1 [TP the desk [v*P is covered with books]]] 
(2*) [CP SEF1 [TP I [v*P hope [CP SEF2 ∅ [TP the joiner [v*P builds the desk in  
mahogany]]]]]] 
The speech-event features in the matrix CP will relate to the definite 
descriptions in distinct ways. Let us begin with tense. According to 
Sigurðsson, the embedded clause’s ST2 projection (part of the bundle we are 
calling SEF2) would be valued as future, whereas the ST1 is valued as the 
speech-event NOW (2004b, 25). 177  The two thereby contrast in tense, 
meaning that the embedded clause is understood as providing an event 
                                                          
177 It would match with the grammatical tense that is understood to be settled at the TP level, 
which is valued as being [+ future] (Sigurðsson 2004b, 25). The matrix C’s ST projection can 
be understood as always the speech now, which contributes to the fact that language is 
always involved in the present deictic frame, situating information relative to it. 
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that is in the future relative to the speech-event time. Whereas, the tense of 
(1*) is present and valued as such relative to the speech-event NOW. The 
definite description in (2*) is therefore not to be understood as member of 
an event structure taking place in the speech-event NOW. A similar 
phenomenon exists with respect to the embedded clause’s location. Its SL2 
projection is valued distinctly from SL1, thereby stating that the event 
captured in the embedded clause is not part of the speech-event HERE. The 
converse is true of (1*). Therefore (1), and not (2), is capturing an event in 
the HERE and NOW. It is for such reasons that (1) enables the deictic layer 
of definite description, whereas (2) does not as the event described in the 
embedded clause of (2) is not understood as taking placed in the speech-
event’s HERE and NOW. The two grammatical environments that the 
definite description is placed within force distinct forms of reference to 
emerge relative to the speech-event.178 
The account of deictic definite descriptions detailed above falls in line with 
the fact that language is engaged with the world, and how this is mediated 
through syntax (as opposed to semantics or pragmatics). This engagement 
is neatly captured by Hinzen, who states that: 
[t]he Here and Now of speech are intrinsic or ‘inalienable’ 
aspects of it… an utterance is a physical event that takes place 
in space and time, and ipso facto it will, as witnessed online, 
have specific temporal and spatial coordinates… Whatever 
other times and places are referenced in an utterance, in short, 
they are determined in relation to the Here and Now of 
speech. (Hinzen forthcoming, 10)  
Therefore, the grammatical environment in which the definite description 
in (1) falls is part of the HERE and NOW exhibited in the speech-event, 
whereas the event contains the definite description in (2) is displaced from 
the speech-event HERE and NOW.179 It is this, we content, that explains the 
deictic uses of definite descriptions as a form of reference, and as a form of 
                                                          
178 The syntactic work surrounding the interaction of the speech-event features, grammatical 
features, and event features, are highly complex. We make use only of a restricted and 
simplified version of them, but we maintain that what has been used is in principle readily 
extended to the more thoroughgoing analysis provided in Sigurðsson (2004b; 2009). 
179 Sigurðsson takes the interaction of the speech-event projections with the rest of a clause to 
explain “the displacement property of language, that is, the property that makes it possible 
for humans (as opposed to most or all non-human animals) to communicate about events 
that are displaced, not present in the speech event” (2004b, 7). 
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reference not captured in a type-based semantics such as that in §2.2. We 
thereby expand the forms of reference details in §2.4. 
6.12 
ADJECTIVAL MODIFICATION 
The second form of reference that we will now analyse is captured in 
certain instances of adjectival modification in DPs. It is clear that adjectival 
modification embellishes the descriptive content of a definite description 
(as a working assumption we will understand this as filling the interior), 
but it can also help in the disambiguation of a reference thereby enabling a 
form of reference that we will term ‘contrastive’. 
In the following we will discuss a range of different phenomena that can be 
labelled as DP internal adjectival modification, but let us begin with some 
interesting results that emerge cross-linguistically. To begin with, let us 
return to the Norwegian data, wherein adjectival modification within a DP 
can further endorse the theory being developed that the edge/interior 
dichotomy is responsible for the forms of reference available in natural 
language. For example, as we stated previously in our analysis of (10) the 
expression hus-et equates to the house and the expression det hus-et equates 
to that house, however, once we get adjectival modification an interesting 
result arises: 
(17) det   svarte  hus-et 
 the/that black house-DEF 
The expression in (17) contains explicit adjectival modification exhibited in 
svarte (black), unlike (10) the adjectival modification enables the expression 
be understood as either a definite description or a demonstrative 
description, as either the black house or that black house. The first observation 
we can make about (17) is that the adjective, which is phonetically realised 
in DeixP, enables the definite description reading in addition to the 
demonstrative one. Leu states that the adjective contributes ‘deicticity’ to 
the expression (2008, 18). In the definite description reading this is the only 
deictic information carried by the expression, whereas, in the 
demonstrative reading we get the silent locational information as well 
(2008, 18). The point to make is that the two readings are both edge heavy. 
The adjectival modification and resultant determiner spread take place in 
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the phase edge. It is therefore no surprise that we get a strong deictic 
reading of the definite description, a strong form of reference. Furthermore, 
the idea that the definite article is a distal demonstrative bleached of 
locational information is further defended. 
Another interesting piece of cross-linguistic data comes from adjectival 
modification in Greek. In Greek certain instances of adjectival modification 
in definite descriptions trigger determiner spread, with corresponding 
interpretive effects. The option of determiner spread is enabled when an 
adjective is capable of forcing a contrastive reading. The following two 
sentences illustrate the phenomenon (Kolliakou 2004; Alexiadou 2014, 20): 
(18) o diefthindis ipe oti i     kali erevnites tha apolithun. 
the director said that  the efficient researchers will be fired. 
(19)  o diefthindis ipe oti  i kali   i erevnites  tha apolithun. 
the director said that  the efficient  the researchers will be fired. 
The sentence in (18) is ambiguous between two readings: the first 
understands the efficient researchers to be part of a wider group of 
dismissals and the second contrasts them with other employees stating that 
only the efficient researchers will be fired. Conversely, (19) has only one 
reading, which is the second contrastive reading (2014, 20). We therefore 
have a difference in the form of reference exhibited in the two definite 
descriptions, which is a direct result of the grammar of determiner spread. 
The phenomenon of determiner spread in Greek coincides with a 
distinction between definite descriptions that introduce novel referents and 
those that pick out familiar referents (salient in the context/discourse). 
Drawing on work by Heim (1988), Alexiadou argues that the distinction 
between (18) and (19) mirrors one between (20) and (21) respectively: 
(20) John read a book about Pirlo and wrote to the author. 
(21) John read a book about Pirlo and wrote to him. 
In (20) we understand John as writing to the author of the book, who was 
not previously introduced (although assumed to exist), and the definite 
description the author therefore introduces a novel referent. In (21) however, 
we understand John as writing to Pirlo, and the pronoun him is thus co-
referential view Pirlo, it picks out a previously introduced referent. The 
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single vs. determiner spread constructions in Greek are said to follow the 
same pattern. Determiner spread constructions depend upon the referent 
being salient/familiar (2014, 22). 180  As Alexopoulou & Kolliakou note, 
determiner spread constructions are “associated with contextual 
constraints that go beyond the uniqueness presupposition of standard 
definites” and “require their referential index to be anchored to an entity 
that forms a proper subset of some previously introduced set” (2002, 216). 
The result of this is further evidence for the idea that if a definite 
description is edge heavy, then it exhibits a strong form of reference. In the 
case of Greek determiner spread, the edge heavy grammar produces 
contrastive reference to a particular familiar individual.  
The form of reference exhibited in determiner spread in Greek produces 
contrastive reference to a particular familiar individual, which means that 
certain instances of adjectival modification in DPs fail to create poly-
definiteness. An example can be seen in (22), where determiner spread is 
not licensed: 
(22) *o platis  o Irinikos 
 *the wide  the Pacific 
In (22) determiner spread is banned due to a failure to produce a ‘restrictive 
reading’ (Alexiadou 2014, 20).181 If there were two Pacific oceans, one wide 
and one narrow, then the determiner spread would be enabled. It is clear 
that once again grammar enables a variation in referential strength and 
produces a wide range of forms of reference.  
We can now turn to briefly analyse adjectival modification in English. To 
begin, let us consider the two sentences in (23) and (24) and assume them to 
be uttered in a context where there is a single desk (which happens to be 
both large and mahogany): 
                                                          
180 It is an additional point in favour of this idea that the same results are observed with 
instances of clitic doubling, which explains ‘novel definite cannot undergo clitic doubling’ 
(Alexiadou 2014, 22-25). 
181 It is worthwhile noting further that ordinarily when we have a felicitous determiner 
spread the adjectival phrase headed by a determiner becomes focused. It has undergone 
movement to a focus projection (Alexiadou 2014, 38). If, on the other hand, the other 
determiner phrase appears first, then they suggest this is the result of it undergoing 
movement to SpecD (2014, 38). In each instance, we get results where the edge is employed 




(23) The desk is covered with books. 
(24) #The large mahogany desk is covered with books.  
The two sentences in (23) and (24) have distinct interpretations, with the 
latter providing extra, potentially disambiguating, descriptive content. 
With (24) we have indicated that it could well be marked in virtue of the 
context providing only one salient individual. In the situation described, 
the definite descriptions are deictic, in the sense outlined in §6.11 above, 
and hence their interpretation is edge heavy. In virtue of this, the interior 
heavy definite description in (24) becomes less felicitous. The descriptive 
content of (24) is akin to linguistic static and does not contribute to the 
speech-act. However, in a situation wherein there are multiple desks we 
begin to favour (24) in virtue of its ability to disambiguate. In this situation 
we might understand the form of reference exhibited in (24) as creating a 
fall-back option, meaning it relies on the interior in order to get the act of 
deictic reference completed.   
Following our analysis of adjectival modification above, we can further 
extend the forms of reference that grammar enables with arguments. First 
of all, we can extend it to capture the grammatical phenomenon of 
determiner spread in various languages, where the form of reference 
created is contrastive interacts with a familiar referent. A theory of 
descriptions must account for such things as determiner spread if it is to 
become integrated into a universal linguistic theory. Therefore, we must 
include the forms of reference exhibited in determiner spread as part of our 
theory. In addition to this, a further form of reference can be exhibited in 
English when adjectival modification provides a disambiguating function. 
The form of reference exhibited in such instances is still contrastive, and 
thus we can understand adjectival modification as exhibit in Greek and 
English as related. We also see once again that the interpretation of a 
definite description is partially constituted by the topology of DPs and the 
fact that they involve material in both the edge and interior. Finally, we 
should note that the DPs containing adjectival modification are sensitive to 
the grammatical environment in which they are placed, with (24) forcing a 
contrastive deictic reading through being valued directly in relation to the 






The next form of reference we will consider is that concerning possessive 
constructions. We will observe that possessive constructions do not have a 
single form of reference, but actually replicate much of the referential 
hierarchy detailed in DPs topology. It will be argued that this is the result 
of possessives containing two independent DPs, one for the possessor and 
one for the possessee. We will show that it is the topology of the possessor 
DP that dictates the form of reference exhibited.  
Possessive constructions have been brought up numerous times in the 
descriptions literature to serve distinct theories, in fact the two expressions 
that initiated the ambiguity debate were both possessives, her husband is 
kind to her (Linsky 1963), and Smith’s murderer is insane (Donnellan 1966). 
Some possessive constructions appear to support a QT and others appear 
to support an AT or RT. We will argue that a full account of possessive as a 
general form of construction supports a GT. For example, (25) below is 
often used to defend a Russellian theory of descriptions: 
(25) The mother of every child was angry. 
It is obvious that the truth of (25) does not depend upon a particular 
individual but instead is understood to predicate ‘being angry’ of a set of 
mothers each of which has a child picked out in turn through the quantifier 
phrase every child (together with the domain restriction). We therefore get a 
natural attributive reading and a weak form of reference, quantificational 
reference. The reason why (25) suits a Russellian analysis is that a strong 
referential reading is highly marked, if it is possible at all. The referential 
reading becomes even more marked once the quantifier phrase is placed at 
the start and we get cliticization: 
(26) Every child’s mother is angry 
The quantificational reading of (26) reigns supreme and it is therefore 
tempting to treat this as good evidence for a QT. 
Nevertheless, there is nothing special about possessive constructions that 




(27) Smith’s murderer is insane. 
It is readily accepted in the literature that (27) can be read as exhibiting a 
stronger form of reference than (26), and can be used to refer to a particular 
individual, Jones for example. The difference between (26) and (27) leads to 
the following question, what is it that is responsible for the clear attributive 
reading of (26), which is lacking in (27)? And, vice versa, what is it that is 
responsible for the clear referential reading of (26), which is lacking in (27)? 
A clear difference arises when we look at the possessives’ structure. The 
possessor DP has a different grammar in each case. 
We can begin our grammatical analysis by looking at the possessor’s DP in 
each case: 
(28) [DP the [NP mother [of [DP every [NP child]]]]] is angry. 
(29) [DP the [NP murderer [of [DP Smith [NP Smith]]]]] is insane. 
 
The syntactic structure of (28) and (29) therefore consists in two full DP 
layers. The lower DP contains the possessor and the higher DP contains the 
possessee. It is worth nothing that it is the overall structure (the larger DP 
shell) that would be case marked and receive a thematic role. As far as the 
wider expression is concerned the wider DP shell acts as a single unit. 
Additionally, there is no need to commit to stating exactly what 
grammatical category the possessive of or its clitic counterpart ‘s occupies, 
nothing in our analysis will depend upon this.182 As we can see, the lower 
DP could function as an argument on its own and hence we can consider it 
a proper DP containing all the relevant projections. 
Following our topology of DPs in §5.342 we can analyse the lower DP in 
(29) as containing rigid proper name. In virtue of this, we can state that the 
root √Smith had undergone N-D movement. The presence of an N-D chain 
in (29) is illustrated in the interpretive differences that we observe between 
Smith in (29) and Ronaldo in (30): 
(30) The shot power of the English Ronaldo is astounding. 
                                                          
182
 The embedding of DPs is not a new observation, and perhaps indicates a further instance 





(30*) The English Ronaldo’s shot power is astounding. 
The root √Ronaldo in (30) is more than capable of undergoing N-D 
movement, but does not. Instead it remains in N. We therefore do not 
understand the possessor DP in (30) as picking out Ronaldo but instead as 
picking out the individual that satisfies the definite description the English 
Ronaldo. The interpretive difference between Smith and Ronaldo in these 
examples is therefore a direct result of the underlying grammar of the DP 
that they are in.183 
The facts concerning the lower DP form an interesting prediction, the 
overall referential strength of a possessive description and by extension the 
form of reference it expresses will be directly affected by the grammatical 
configuration present in the possessor DP. The prediction is exactly what 
we would expect in defending an exo-skeletal approach to the forms of 
reference exhibited in definite descriptions, and it provides further 
evidence against a lexicalist account of the ambiguity problems. If the 
possessor DP contains a quantifier phrase (existential, universal, indefinite, 
or even a bare nominal), then the overall possessive construction will 
reflect this, create a weak attributive form of reference. However, if the 
possessor DP is headed by a name that has undergone N-D movement, 
then the possessive construction will correlate with a strong form of 
reference. The distinction between (25) and (27) is therefore explained by 
the grammatical configuration of the possessor DP. 
The theory being developed provides us with the following predication. If 
the form of reference exhibited by the possessive construction reflects the 
form of reference exhibited by the possessor DP, then we should see an 
increase in referential strength exhibited by the possessive in line with an 
increase in the possessor DP. The predication is made through the 
‘grammar-reference link’ hypothesis. In other words, an increase in 
grammatical complexity in the possessor DP will correspond to the overall 
possessive position on the referential hierarchy, with quantificational 
                                                          
183 We have been taking the lower DP to be a full DP projection, however we leave open the 
possibility that, in virtue of being an embedded DP, it lacks the extended edge captured in 
DeixP and D#P. 
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readings on one side and deictic personal readings on the other. Indeed this 
is exactly what happens. 
Possessive constructions exhibit a progression through the referential 
hierarchy in tandem with the progression exhibited in the possessor DP. 
For instance, when we use a complex demonstrative as the possessor DP 
we consequently force a deictic form of reference for the overall possessive 
(the interpretation thus becomes edge heavy, just as we observe with 
demonstrative DPs more generally): 
(31) The brother of that guy is a professional footballer. 
(31*) That guy’s brother is a professional footballer. 
Nevertheless, we do not get the option of dropping the descriptive NP 
complement entirely, which is illustrated by the ungrammaticality of (32): 
(32) *That’s brother is a professional footballer. 
 INTENDED: That guy’s brother is a professional footballer 
Some descriptive content is therefore required in a possessive when using a 
demonstrative, but this does not interfere with the fact it produces a strong 
referential reading.  
Interestingly, once we take the step to pronominal expressions acting as the 
possessors the standard definite description translation becomes severely 
marked: 
(33) #The brother of him is a professional footballer. 
However, its standard possessive structure in (34) is perfectly felicitous, 
deictic, and edge heavy: 
(34) His brother is a professional footballer. 
The referential strength once again increases as the advancement through 
the referential hierarchy becomes transparent. Moving further up the 
hierarchy, once we drop the gender feature, as in first and second person 
pronouns, we get the strongest form of reference available for possessives: 
(35) Your brother is a professional footballer. 
(36) My brother is a professional footballer.  
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In each of (34) – (36) the possessive clitic is now morphologically marked as 
part of the pronominal expression acting as the possessor.184 We can see 
that the increase in grammatical complexity of the possessor DP and the 
corresponding development through the referential hierarchy has direct 
effects on the overall possessive construction.  
As the ‘grammar-reference link’ would predict, possessive structures that 
contain a possessor DP formed of a definite description fall directly in the 
middle of the referential hierarchy. For instance, (37) and (37*) are 
seemingly ambiguous: 
(37) The manager of the team is responsible for tactics.  
(37*) The team’s manager is responsible for tactics. 
The two readings available to (37) and (37*) are as follows: the first reading 
interprets the speaker as stating a general trait concerning the role of a 
manager in tactical organization, and the second states of a particular 
individual that she/he is responsible for the tactics of a particular team. On 
the surface it seems as if the possessive construction is ambiguous. Its place 
on the referential hierarchy is thus between (38) and (39): 
(38) A team’s manager is responsible for tactics.185  
(39) That team’s manager is responsible for tactics. 
The indefinite possessive structure receives a weak referential 
interpretation and is thereby unspecific, whereas the demonstrative 
possessive forces a strong referential reading picking out a particular 
salient individual that satisfies the descriptive content ‘manager’.  
We might employ the concept of speech-event projections to deal with and 
eradicate the ambiguity in (37) and (37*). For instance, as we have argued 
                                                          
184  It is very interesting that once we move beyond demonstratives in the referential 
hierarchy we can no longer felicitously paraphrase the possessives in the form the F of G. 
Instead, when pronouns enter the mix, their referential properties (that derive from 
grammatical complexity present in the DP edge) stop their being subsumed under a the F of 
G structure. 
185 The example in (38) is an instance of what Poesio terms a possessive weak definite (1994). 
It is interesting to note that it has been argued before that the possessive weak definite 
reading may be the result of the original definite descriptions the manager of a team falling in 
a particular grammatical environment (for more on his idea see Barker 2003, 90). 
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above §6.11, all clauses are valued relative to the speech-event location, 
time, and logophoric agent and patient. The two readings available to (37) 
would therefore be determined by the way the clause was valued in respect 
to the speech-event HERE and NOW. The strong reference reading would 
be understood to pick out an individual that was in the HERE and NOW of 
the speech-event, whereas the weak reference reading would not. The 
important point to note is that the availability of these two readings is not 
determined by the lexical entry for the definite article, but is instead the 
result of the topology of DPs and the place on the referential hierarchy that 
definite description occupy. Once again, the ambiguity finds its source in 
grammar. 
We can conclude this analysis of possessive constructions by stating that 
the forms of reference they exhibit are vast and are a direct result of the 
grammar of the possessor’s DP. In other words, examples such as (25) do 
not act as evidence for the Russellian analysis (QT), and examples such as 
(27) do not act as evidence for an ambiguity, or referential, thesis (AT/RT). 
Instead, both of the examples, and all the further ones offered above, speak 
to an exo-skeletal account of the semantics, and referential strength, of 
possessive constructions and definite descriptions more generally. The 
grammar of the possessor DP falls in the topology described in §5.342, 
which in turn forces the form of reference that the possessive construction 
exhibits, and that form of reference in turn is dependent upon the 
grammatical environment in which the possessive falls. The form of 
reference exhibited in any possessive construction is therefore explained 
thoroughly by grammar. 
6.14 
EPITHETS 
We will now further our idea of there being multiple forms of reference for 
definite descriptions through a discussion of epithets and pronouns. The 
former are most often realized as definite descriptions and the latter are 
often considered a form of reduced definite description. For instance, 
definite descriptions and pronouns are often interchangeable: 
(40) a. The manager replaced the striker. 
 b. He replaced the striker. 
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The same phenomenon applies to epithet constructions as well, where the 
definite description in (41a) and pronoun in (39b) are co-referential with 
John: 
(41) a. John is such a bad driver that the idiot will get himself killed. 
 b. John is such a bad driver that he will get himself killed. 
It is often thought that the many instances where definite descriptions are 
interchangeable with third person pronouns indicate a strong relationship, 
which might be characterized in the claims that the latter are minimal 
definite descriptions. We will now look to see to what extent this 
relationship holds, and whether it can tell us anything useful about the 
forms of reference available to definite descriptions. 
Let us begin our analysis with (41). The first thing to note about (41) is that 
when we replace the epithet with certain other definite descriptions, or 
indeed demonstrative descriptions, the co-referential reading becomes 
harder to grasp. If we do, then the expression becomes marked, at the very 
least. For instance, a felicitous reading of either (42) or (43) where we intend 
a co-referential interpretation becomes marked (using indexes to illustrate 
the terms that are meant to be co-referential): 
(42) #[John]1 is such a bad driver that [the man]1 will get himself killed. 
(43) #[John]1 is such a bad driver (that) [that man]1 will get himself killed. 
Whilst both (42) and (43) are not necessarily banned from having the co-
referential reading, it is certainly less natural, which is especially clear in 
(43). According to Schlenker, the reason for this concerns the nature of the 
NP complement to the article. Standardly, (42) struggles to get the co-
extensional reading in virtue of the fact that it would be understood to 
violate condition C of binding theory (2005, 386).186 The reason that (41) is 
felicitous as having a co-referential reading is arguably that the description 
contains an ‘expressive’ component, that in the case of epithets “specify the 
speaker’s negative attitude towards the denotation” (2005, 386). Once that 
                                                          
186 Condition C states that a referential expression (for our purposes we can include proper 
names, demonstratives, non-anaphoric pronouns, and definite descriptions) cannot be 
bound by an element acting as an antecedent to it, which contains it within its c-command 
domain.   
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expressive content is dropped, as in (42), the co-referential reading is 
harder to grasp. 
Schlenker proposes that we can account for the differences between (41a) 
and (42) through reference to the NP complement of the determiner. The 
idea is that a use of (41) is felicitous through the fact that the descriptive 
content “serves to express the speaker’s attitude towards the denotation”, 
where (42) is not as it fails to do this. Accordingly, Schlenker proposes an 
idea which he terms ‘minimize restrictors’ whereby definite descriptions 
should be felicitous only when the NP restriction they contain does not add 
superfluous descriptive content and is doing “more than merely helping fix 
the referent” (Johnson 2011, 9). Hence, the epithet in (41) is felicitous as it 
contains expressive content capturing the speakers attitude towards the 
referent, however (42) is less felicitous in virtue of containing descriptive 
content that fails to add anything to the denotation (assuming the gendered 
role of the name John). The role of grammar seems to be minimal in this 
instance as what we are discussing is the role of the lexical/idiosyncratic 
information in the definite description, which we argued in §5.4 is immune 
from grammatical influence. However, grammar does have a role, and it is 
illustrated in the distinction between (41) and (43). 
The first thing we can note is the main distinction between (41) and (43) is 
that whilst the epithet in (41) is clearly intended to be co-referential with 
John we cannot say the same about the demonstrative description in (43). 
Let us rewrite (43), ignoring the CP that, without intending the co-
referential reading: 
(44) John is such a bad driver that man will get himself killed.  
It is very easy to get a felicitous reading of (44) whereby that man refers to a 
contextually salient individual, and hence is interpreted as being deictic. 
The first thing to note therefore is that the co-referential reading of (41) is 
enabled through the NP complement of the definite description being vital 
to the interpretation. In other words, the felicitous reading of the definite 
description being co-referential with John is enabled through the DP 
phase’s interior, as opposed to its edge. Therefore, the interior is enabling 
the referential use. Nevertheless, if we translate (43) by using the same 
descriptive content the co-referential reading still escapes us: 
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(45) John is such a bad driver that idiot will get himself killed. 
Once again, the most natural reading of (45) is where the demonstrative 
description creates deictic reference instead of being co-referential with 
John. The underlying grammatical differences between (41) and (45) might 
offer us an answer then. With respect to (45) the deictic reading becomes 
favoured in virtue of it being edge heavy, and the expressive NP cannot 
override this, whereas the co-extensional reading of (41) is allowed because, 
whilst remaining definite and thus specific, its interior is doing the relevant 
work. The only way to get (45) to come out co-extensional is through a 
focus on the NP complement, and that reading remains challenged through 
the edge being heavy.187 
The idea behind Schlenker’s ‘minimize restrictors’ is that a definite 
description can only break the rules of condition C if a more minimal, for 
instance pronominal, expression is unable to communicate the same 
content. For instance, the pronoun he in (39b) is felicitous but it does not 
rule out (39a) as it does not provide the expressive content of the epithet. 
Additionally, Schlenker notes that definite descriptions whose job it is to 
disambiguate referents will be favoured over pronominal expressions, 
which ultimately fail at this job: 
(46) [A linguist]1 working on Binding Theory was so devoid of any 
moral sense that [he]1 forced a physicist working on particles to hire 
[the linguist's]1 girlfriend in his lab.  
(47) A linguist working on Binding Theory was so devoid of any moral 
sense that he forced a physicist working on particles to hire his 
girlfriend in his lab. 
 In (46) the definite description in bold disambiguates and co-refers with the 
linguist working on Binding Theory, whereas in (47) the pronoun in bold is 
ambiguous between the linguist and the physicist. Hence, the definite 
description is enabled through providing a disambiguating function that 
the pronoun does not (Schlenker 2005, 387).  
                                                          
187  The difference between (41) and (42) may well be the result of the expressive NP 
complement and therefore a lexical distinction. It could well be explained through 
pragmatic effects (as indeed Schlenker argues). However, the distinction between (41) and 
(43) is a grammatical one, and the descriptive content becomes a subsidiary problem. 
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There is something going on here that is pertinent to our understanding of 
how grammar distinguishes pronouns and definite descriptions. It tells us 
why they are similar but at the same time why they are distinct. Definite 
descriptions must be employed if they contain information that is pertinent 
to the utterance context, the expressive content of the epithet in (41a), or if 
they disambiguate a co-referential expression, as in (46). Otherwise, a 
pronoun is sufficient. This explains why there is a subtle difference 
between (40a) and (40b). If the individual to whom the manager refers is 
salient, but is not salient as being the manager, then a speaker will employ 
(40a). However, if the same individual is both salient and known by the 
speech participants to be the manager, then the speaker will likely employ 
(40b), providing of course that the speaker wishes to express something 
about the manager. The differences are subtle, but they concern the weight 
that grammar puts on the descriptive content contained in the argument. 
Pronouns contain descriptive content but it is restricted to values for φ-
features, whereas definite descriptions have their descriptive content 
explicitly marking in a separate NP complement together with φ-features. 
Pronouns such as those in (40b) are therefore more edge heavy, whereas 
the interpretation of a definite description will partially depend on the 
interior. The same result was viewed with respect to the differences 
between (41a) and (45). The edge of the demonstrative fails to provide a 
natural epithet reading, whereas the definite description does not fail in the 
same way. These results point towards the idea that the grammatical 
structure underpinning the DP provides insight into the similarities and 
differences between definite descriptions and other arguments.  
Following from this we can make additional changes to the forms of 
reference that definite descriptions exhibit. First of all, a definite description 
can be used as a co-referential epithet in instances where it provides 
expressive content as part of its interior, which details the speaker’s 
attitude to the co-referential term. In such instance, the co-referential use is 
enabled by the content of the DPs interior. We can therefore state that at 
times the DP interior is central to an act of using a definite description 
referentially. Secondly, the distinction between epithet definite descriptions, 
demonstrative descriptions, and pronouns all comes down to the phase 
edge/interior dichotomy. Thirdly, we can use definite descriptions in 
deictic contexts where a pronoun would work so long as the phase interior 




REJECTING A LEXICAL ACCOUNT OF AMBIGUITY 
In what follows we will provide our final analysis of the genesis of the CAP, 
GAP1, and GAP2, wherein we will propose that each of the ambiguity 
problems has a genesis in grammar and that each can be solved through 
reference to the grammar of DPs in conjunction with the grammatical 
environments in which they fall. The first position that we will reject in 
reaching our conclusion is that the ambiguous uses of definite descriptions 
have their origin in the lexical entry for the definite article. The position 
divides into the following, either the lexical entry for the definite article 
contains both a referential function and a quantificational function, or there 
exist two lexical entries attached to the phonetic label the. We reject both 
options. The idea driving our critique is that it is not possible to posit 
syntax-like information in the lexicon (Marantz 2000; 2006; Borer 2005; 
Boeckx 2008). We will charge the lexicalist account of ambiguity as doing 
just this. 
To argue that the lexical entry for the has a semantic-type is to posit and 
commit to something very much representative of syntactic structure in its 
lexical entry. For example, let us take the lexical item the to be linked to the 
two lexical entries, which we can term ‘listemes’, one of which represents a 
referential semantic-type <<e, t>, e> and one of which represents a 
quantificational semantic-type <<e, t>, <<e, t>, t>>:188 
(48) a. Listeme One 
  [the] = <<e, t>, e> 
  [the F] = <e> 
b. Listeme Two 
[the x] = <<e, t>, <<e, t>, t>> 
[the x: Fx] = <<e, t>, t>> 
The first thing we can observe with the two entries in (48) is that neither 
contains any descriptive idiosyncratic information, unlike the entry for 
                                                          
188 We have not encountered the semantic type <<e, t>, e> so far but it is easy to define. Using 
the type-based semantics introduced in §2.2 we can state that a type <<e, t>, e> expression 
takes a predicate expression of type <e, t> (in the case of the definite article this would be the 
NP complement) and produces an expression of type <e>, namely a referential expression.  
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apple would. It is not obvious what kind of descriptive information we 
could attach to the. Therefore, it is safe to say that whatever the lexical 
entries in (48a) and (48b) amount to, they are of a different kind to the root 
√apple. 
As a comparison class we might take a verb such as ‘kick’, which, at least 
superficially, can be understood to be more complex than the root √apple. 
For instance, we might take the word kick to have three lexical entries 
standing for its use as an intransitive, transitive, or ditransitive verb 
respectively: 
(49) a. Listeme One 
  [kick] = <e, t> 
 b. Listeme Two 
  [kick] = <e, <e, t>> 
 c. Listeme Three 
  [kick] = <e, <e, <e, t>>> 
As we can see, the lexical entries for kick now contain the positions within 
which a varying number of arguments may fall (in other words the lexical 
entries contain information regarding the verb’s adicity). It would appear 
from our analysis of kick that we have something resembling a thematic 
matrix in the lexicon. We have argument places, and they are ordered, thus 
we have a thematic matrix! However, as we observed in §5.33 a thematic 
matrix is constructed through a multitude of syntactic projections, 
including functional projections (non-lexical projections) as part of the v* 
phase. The adicity that a verb exhibits is a direct result of the v* shell, and 
therefore it is not something special about the word kick. Additionally, 
there is nothing stopping kick from being nominalised as in the first kick of 
the game. Are we to assume it also has a lexical entry for this nominal use? 
The answer is no. Instead, all of these uses are derived in virtue of the 
grammatical positions in which the root √kick can fall. The meaning of kick 
is derived by its exo-skeleton, which is the surrounding grammatical 
environment in which it is placed.  
The reason is because the listeme for kick is an open-class root, whose 
presence as a certain verb or even a noun is derived. When used as a verb it 
gets this property in virtue of being merged to v*, whereas when it is used 
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as a noun it gets this property in virtue of being merged to D. We come to 
this conclusion following Borer who states that: 
[s]yntactic properties typically assumed to emerge from 
properties of listemes, are, by and large, properties of structures 
and not properties of the listemes themselves… it is the 
properties of the 'outside', [the] larger structure which 
ultimately determine the overall 'shape' of what is within, 
rather than the other way around. (Borer 2005, 15) 
And, 
The lexical entry for a word contains descriptive information, it 
contains information as to why the word “potato is distinct from 
a pumpkin”, but it does not dictate what a word’s structural role 
is. (2005, 15)  
The lexical entry for kick contains idiosyncratic information but no 
information regarding its being used as a verb or noun. It contains no 
information as to its grammatical role, its adicity, or any further structural 
information. If this ‘exo-skeletal’ view from Borer, that the outside (the 
syntactic structure) values the inside (the lexical item), is correct in respect 
to kick, then is it correct for other items like the? 
The two lexical entries for the offered in (48) contain complex semantic-
types, and are thus structural. At the very least, each contains a place to 
accommodate an NP complement. The first entry contains a referential 
function that combines with a phrase of type <e, t> to produce something of 
type <e>, whereas the second entry contains a quantificational function that 
produces something of type <<e, t>, t>. The lexical entries therefore contain 
information about the nature of DP and its projections including for 
instance the fact it has an NP complement (or at least a complement of type 
<e, t>). We therefore have syntax in our lexical entries. In addition, the two 
lexical entries dictate how the expressions are to be interpreted and their 
contribution to what is said. The two entries dictate a very restricted set of 
forms of reference available to definite descriptions and, as we saw 
throughout §6.1, the forms of reference enabled by a type-based semantics 




The problem with the lexicocentric approach is that it leads to a 
proliferation of information in LEX. In rejecting such an account, Borer 
states that the LEX/syntax divide is best understood as follows, “the 
dividing line here is not between vocabulary items and syntactic structure, 
but between substantive vocabulary on the one hand, and functional 
vocabulary (including derivational affixation) and syntactic structure on 
the other” (2005, 10). Substantive vocabulary includes the idiosyncratic 
information carried by a listeme, and is what we traditionally associate 
with the meaning of the root √apple for instance (edible, spherical, and so 
on), and functional vocabulary that is inherently grammatical. The 
following passage from Borer sums up the concept of the lexicon that we 
are defending very neatly: 
I believe that the proposed dividing line is a real one, and that it 
distinguishes between what is grammatically real—structures and 
formal properties of functional items, and what may be very real, 
but not grammatically so—properties of substantive vocabulary. 
The latter, I propose, are creatures born of perception and 
conceptualization, representing an intricate web of layers upon 
layers of a complex perceptual structure and emerging world 
knowledge, concepts which come to represent it, the reflection 
upon these concepts, and so on. Their properties, however 
characterized, are thus fundamentally not grammatical. (2005, 10-
11) 
The distinction is one that we started this thesis with, a distinction between 
descriptive/lexical words and functional/grammatical words. We thereby 
reject the idea that we can place any grammatical, or semantic-type 
(compositional semantic) information in the lexicon. 
The work provided in §6.1 developed the idea that a definite description’s 
contribution to what is said is derived in virtue of its DP in conjunction 
with the grammatical environment that DP is place within. We expanded 
the forms of reference it exhibits in conjunction with the options grammar 
affords. We therefore do not need to posit anything like a semantic-type in 
the lexicon, and we do not need to posit anything syntactic in their either. 
The maximum information we can attach to the lexical entry for the might 
well be that it is only to be merged in D. In other words, we might state that 
it has a [+ determiner] feature attached, but we cannot posit any structural 
information regarding the complement it takes, the information in its 
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extended edge, or the wider grammatical configurations it is placed within. 
If we are to continue with a type-based semantics, then we can only capture 
a definite description as having a particular semantic-type after it has gone 
through the syntactic component. We leave this final option open, but we 
maintain that it is not the case that the lexical entry for the contains a 
semantic-type, and by extension reject any lexicocentric account of the 
ambiguity problems. 
6.3 
REVISITING LINGUISTIC CONVENTION 
At this point it is worthwhile revisiting the question of how the linguistic 
convention associated with referential uses of definite descriptions 
emerged. The answer to this question should be clear by now; the linguistic 
convention is a direct result of the underlying grammar of such uses. In 
§4.24 we illustrated that there is good reason for taking the definite article 
to have a close-knit relationship with the distal demonstrative. This 
relationship was illustrated with cross-linguistic work in §4.24 (Cyr 1993; 
Huang 1999), the grammatical topology of DPs in §5.342 (Sheehan & 
Hinzen 2011; 2013; Martin & Hinzen 2014), and our analysis of various 
substitution instances through §6.1. However, we also noted differences, 
including the fact that distal demonstratives do not require an NP 
restriction and contain deictic locational information. These observations 
become concrete in our analysis of the topology of DPs. The referential uses 
of definite descriptions emerge in virtue of their on the referential hierarchy 
captured in DPs topology in conjunction with the grammatical 
environments in which they can be placed. In §5.4 we provided an account 
of how grammar feeds directly into general directions for using. We can 
therefore claim that the linguistic convention for using a definite 
description referentially can be read of its general directions for use, which 
are in turn grounded in grammar.  
In the cases wherein a definite description is indeed interpreted as making 
reference to a particular individual we observe that the DP it is contained 
within will be interpreted as being edge-heavy, which is in turn a result of 
being placed within a grammatical environment that is amenable to such 
an interpretation (the deictic uses outlined in §6.11 exhibit one such 
example). Conversely, the linguistic convention for interpreting a definite 
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description attributively is a result of the DP it is contained within being 
interpreted as interior-heavy, which is once again a result of being placed 
within a grammatical environment that is amenable to such an 
interpretation, as seen in examples (2) and (25). Furthermore, the possible 
range of linguistic conventions available for using definite descriptions 
correspond exactly with the range of options for DPs (their internal 
topology) and the grammatical environments that they can be placed 
within. The intuitions that we have about the uses of definite descriptions 
are therefore grounded in facts about grammar more generally. We can 
understand grammar as the source of compositional semantic linguistic 
conventions.  
6.4 
THE THREE AMBIGUITY PROBLEMS 
It is now time to turn to provide our grammatical account of the genesis of 
the three ambiguity problems from §1.1. We will begin with the two 
grammatical ambiguity problems (GAP1 and GAP2) before turning to the 
classical ambiguity problem (CAP). 
We can begin by repeating GAP1 below: 
(GAP1) The First Grammatical Ambiguity Problem 
Take two grammatically distinct definite descriptions d and d’ 
that are part of the same wider expression ζ, is it possible that d is 
semantically referential and d’ is semantically quantificational in 
virtue of being grammatically distinct? 
We will answer GAP1 in the positive. It is the case that given two 
grammatically distinct definite descriptions d and d’ that are part of the 
same expression ζ, d can be semantically referential and d’ can be 
semantically quantificational. 
Answering the GAP1 in the positive is necessary given the framework that 
we have developed. The first part of the framework involved giving 
grammar a central role in the composition of semantic content within an 
expression. One central part of this work included stating that the grammar 
of DPs determines a referential hierarchy that equates to a set of forms of 
reference that an argument can exhibit. The forms of reference were then 
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understood as emerging through the topology of DPs and the grammatical 
environments in which DPs can fall. We therefore answer GAP1 positively 
in virtue of the fact that there exist grammatical distinctions within DPs 
that enable certain definite descriptions to exhibit a strong form of 
reference and others to exhibit a weak, or quantificational, form. Finally, 
the fact that the problem exists in the first place is a result of the grammar 
of DPs providing a rich and intricate set of interpretations for definite 
descriptions. 
We can offer a defence of this answer through the following two sentential 
expressions, which are distinguished only insofar as the definite 
descriptions have a different grammar: 
(50) [DP The mother of that child] is angry. 
(51) [DP the mother of some child] is angry. 
The first thing to note is that we have placed the whole possessive 
construction within a single set of DP brackets in order to indicate we take 
the possessives as a whole to be grammatically distinct. We can understand 
the DP in (50) to constitute d and the DP in (51) to constitute d’. If we recall 
that we defended the view in §5.4 that grammar fully specifies what is said, 
then it is clear that we are committed to the view that what is said in (50) is 
distinct from what is said in (51). Through defending the claim that 
grammar determines what is said we are thereby committed to the view 
that the truth-conditional content of the two is distinct. In order to illustrate 
this we need to place the sentences within a context and create a speech-
event, which is required for the two to exhibit a complete propositional 
utterance.  
We can situate the two sentences in a speech-event that takes place in a 
context wherein there is an angry mother who is salient but there is no 
child present. To begin with, let us take a speech-event involving (51). An 
utterance of (51) in this context is perfectly felicitous. In this case the truth 
of the utterance only depends on the woman being both a mother and 
being angry, it does not depend upon her being the mother of any child in 
particular. Conversely, an utterance of (50) will be marked if it is not the 
case that there is either a contextually salient or discourse salient child. The 
truth of (50) therefore depends upon the woman being the mother of a 
255 
 
particular child. The truth-conditional content of each utterance is therefore 
distinct. The difference between the two sentences is captured in the fact 
that the form of reference exhibited in each DP is different, which as we 
explained in §6.13, is the result of the grammar of the possessor DP. The 
form of reference in (50) requires a salient child, whereas the form of 
reference in (51) does not. The definite description in (50) falls higher up 
the referential hierarchy than does (51). 
The interpretive differences are accounted for through the fact that the 
grammar of (50) produces a strong form of reference, with the distal 
demonstrative, in the speech-event described, forcing deictic reference, 
whereas the grammar of (51) produces a weak, quantificational, form of 
reference that fails to pick out an individual in the speech-event’s deictic 
frame. The difference between d and d’ is therefore the grammar of the 
possessor DP. We therefore conclude that the genesis of GAP1 is to be 
found in the topology of the DP phase. A solution to this problem is to 
make explicit the forms of reference that the DP phase enables, which has 
been pursued in the ‘grammar-reference link’ hypothesis (Longobardi 1994; 
2005; Sheehan & Hinzen 2011; 2013; Martin & Hinzen 2014), and the work 
provided in §6.1. 
It should come as no surprise at this point that our account of the genesis of 
GAP2 is also found in grammar. The problem is as follows: 
(GAP2) The Second Grammatical Ambiguity Problem 
 Take two grammatically distinct expressions ζ and ζ’ each of 
which contains the same definite description d, is it possible that 
ζ forces d to have a referential semantics and ζ’ forces d to have a 
quantificational semantics purely in virtue of the grammatical 
configuration in which d falls? 
We once again answer GAP2 in the positive. The grammatical environment 
wherein DPs can be felicitously placed will have interpretive effects on the 
form of reference they exhibits.  
To illustrate our account of GAP2 we can return to the distinction we drew 
earlier in §6.11 between (52) and (53): 
(52) The desk is covered with books. 
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(53) I hope the joiner builds the desk in mahogany.  
We will take the two speech-events exhibited by an utterance of each to be 
made in the same context, a context wherein there is a contextually salient 
desk (which we can take to be made of mahogany). The two utterances are 
equally felicitous in this case. However, (52) picks out a referent in the 
speech-event HERE and NOW. It picks out the contextually salient table. 
An utterance of (53) does not, and cannot, because it is part of an 
embedded clause understood in the future tense relative to the speech-
event NOW and as displaced from the speech-event HERE. We can assume 
that both definite descriptions exhibit the same grammar, and therefore 
that their two uses are not a direct result of the topology of the DP, 
therefore the form of reference that each exhibits is a result of the wider 
grammatical environment in which each is placed. It is once again an ‘exo-
skeletal’ effect on meaning, this time happening at the phrase level. 
The wider grammatical environment is pivotal to the interpretation placed 
on a definite description and to what is said. To recall, in §5.4 we stated 
that the level of what is said is only reached once we have got a complete 
matrix C, which contains values for the speech-event features that project 
within it. It is the matrix C cycle that leads to interpretive differences 
between (52) and (53), which values referent of the definite description in 
(52) as being part of the speech-event HERE and NOW, but does not do this 
with the definite description in (53). It is these grammatical facts 
concerning the relation of the definite description (or the clause it is part of) 
to the matrix C, that governs the distinct form of reference each exhibits 
and the consequent impact on what is said. The GAP2 is therefore 
defended on the basis that the form of reference that a definite description 
exhibits is not solely the responsibility of the topology of DPs. Instead, it is 
this topology that provides options for interpretability that are then valued 
(for instance as being a strong deictic form, or a weak quantificational form) 
through their place in the wider grammatical environment including, 
critically, their relation to the speech-event projections. The genesis of the 
ambiguity problem GAP2 is therefore found in grammar, once again. 
It is now time to provide an account of the genesis of the CAP and a 




(CAP) The Classical Ambiguity Problem 
Given an expression ζ containing a definite description d, is it 
possible that in one context of use d is semantically referential and 
in another context of use d is semantically quantificational? 
The first thing that we should mention is that what is said across contexts 
will be distinct in virtue of having distinct values for the speech-event 
features that accompany any utterance. Therefore, if the CAP is developed 
on the understanding that we have the exact same grammar in the two 
contexts, and thus the same linguistic meaning and what is said, then it 
does not hold. Nevertheless, no two utterances are valued the same. Every 
utterance has values the clause it expresses relative to the HERE and NOW, 
and the speaker and addressee. Grammar encodes for information 
surrounding the clausal interaction with speech-event time, location, and 
the logophoric agent and patient. The first thing we can say therefore is that 
if we take a sentential expression ζ containing a definite description and 
produce two distinct speech-events with it (i.e. use it in two distinct 
contexts), then what is said will be different on each occasion. In other 
words, whilst the two speech-events may appear to both involve the same 
expression ζ, in reality they do not. The expression is the same only insofar 
as we can ignore grammatical facts that impact the interpretation and what 
is said, which happen to be phonetically null in English. There exists what 
Sigurðsson calls ‘meaningful silence’ in the grammatical configuration 
(2004a; 2009) that underpins a speech-act, and it therefore distinguishes two 
uses of the ‘same’ expression. 
The idea we are pursuing leads to the following conclusion, we only get an 
ambiguity between two uses of an expression containing a definite 
description if there are grammatical differences lurking beneath. It can be 
stated therefore that the CAP only emerges if we conflate two distinct 
speech-events, with correspondingly distinct values for the speech-event 
projections, and understand them as involving the same expression.  In 
reality, it is never the same expression used in two contexts. Therefore, 
what is said in using an expression in two different speech-events will 
always be distinct and reflect grammatical facts concerning the values 
given to the related speech-event projections. 
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We must at this point clarify that we are not rejecting the idea that the two 
speech-events are closely related in their linguistic meaning. In §5 we 
developed the idea that grammar produces a skeleton of thought and a 
blueprint within which we can understand the composition of semantic 
content in a sentence. We argued that the topology of DPs corresponds to 
varying forms of reference, that the v* phase corresponds to the available 
options in constructing thematic matrices, and finally that C provides the 
range of options for the force, focus, topic, and speech-event values. In 
virtue of this, the options available for grammatical configurations exhausts 
the options available for semantic content, for forms of reference, 
quantification, event structures, illocutionary force and mood, and so on. 
Therefore, if a seemingly identical sentence is uttered in two contexts it will 
contains the same values for everything except the configurations that relate 
to the speech-event. The linguistic meaning of the two will be identical 
except for in relation to the speech-event. Therefore, we can state that the 
CAP has its genesis in a conflation of two distinct speech-events, with 
distinct values for the speech-event projections, which mistakenly takes 
what is said in each case to be the same.  
It is for these reasons that we saw it necessary to distinguish the ambiguity 
problems in the first place. For the most part, when an ambiguity is 
proposed it falls into one of the GAP1 or GAP2 categories. The descriptions 
literature tends to introduce particular sentential forms in the defence of a 
QT, RT, or AT. For instance, an AT (or RT) will use sentences such as (1) to 
defend the existence of a referential semantics, and a QT will use sentences 
such as (25). However, we have given good reason to think that the form of 
reference exhibited in each is to be grounded in grammar. The CAP is 
therefore ill founded if it conflates two distinct grammatical structures in 
the construction of the problem it is meant to exhibit. All forms of 
ambiguity in definite descriptions have their source in grammar. 
To conclude this chapter let us reiterate the position.  
(GT) The Grammatical Theory of Definite Descriptions 
i. The topology of DPs creates a rich variety of forms of 
reference that arguments can exhibit ranging from weak 
quantificational reference to strong deictic personal 
reference. The topology creates a hierarchy of reference 
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(Longobardi 1994; 2005; Sheehan & Hinzen 2011; 2013; 
Martin & Hinzen 2014). 
ii. The hierarchy of reference is dependent upon the phase 
edge/interior dichotomy.  
iii. Definite descriptions fall in the middle of this referential 
hierarchy. Their interpretation depends upon both the edge 
and interior. 
iv. The forms of reference a particular definite description 
exhibits on an occasion of use is in part determined by the 
topology of DP and in part determined by the grammatical 
environment in which it is placed. 
v. Certain grammatical environments force the definite 
description to be interpreted as being edge heavy and thus 
we get an instance of deictic reference (see §6.1), others force 
it to be interpreted interior heavy and thus we get a weaker 
form of reference.  
vi. Finally, the form of reference exhibited is always taken with 
respect to the speech-event HERE and NOW (Sigurðsson 
2004b; 2007; Hinzen forthcoming).  
vii. In virtue of (i) – (iv) definite descriptions exhibit a wide 
range of forms of reference, which explains the existence of 
the three ambiguity problems.  
The above constitutes our account of the genesis of the three ambiguity 
problems and the grammatical solution to them.  
The account is distinct from those in the literature. It defends the existence 
of the two uses as being distinctions in what is said but rejects all previous 
accounts of the distinction. It rejects the view that we can give the lexical 
entry for the definite article an ambiguous semantic-type in virtue of 
rejecting the view that we can give any lexical item a semantic-type. The 
semantic contribution of any word is derived as part of the syntactic 
component of language. It is ‘exo-skeletal’. Furthermore, it rejects the view 
that the two uses emerge through pragmatic machinery, as no pragmatic 
machinery is required in order to reach what is said. Grammar provides a 
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complete, fully specified, set of truth-conditions for an utterance, situates it 
in the speech-event, and specifies what forms of reference the arguments it 
contains exhibit. Therefore, grammatical structure provides a suitable 
account of the ambiguity problems in definite descriptions and contributes 





























The problem(s) of ambiguity in definite descriptions concerns a wider 
problem in linguistic theory, which is that of how expressions, as such, 
interact with the world and its language users in acts of communication. In 
language use we employ a multitude of cognitive faculties in the 
production, and subsequent interpretation, of a linguistic expression. A 
speech-act goes through, at least, the following stages: first it is ran through 
the syntactic faculty, whose job it is to take lexical items and form strings 
from them that abide by rules of the language (including feature valuation, 
thematic matrices, and morphophonemic structure), then it is sent to the 
two interfaces, which include a semantic faculty, whose job it is to interpret 
the composition of meaningful information captured in the string (both 
structural and lexical), and a sensory-motor faculty, whose job it is to 
enable production and interpretation of the morphophonemic structure of 
the string, finally once the string is placed in an actual speech-event it is 
understood in conjunction with pragmatic machinery, whose role is 
traditionally conceived of as enabling speech participants to understand 
the string in relation to the utterance context, the speech participants 
intentions, the cultural background, and much more besides. The 
ambiguity problem in definite descriptions is typically formulated at the 
border between the semantic faculty and pragmatic machinery, however 
we have given reason to believe that much of what is traditionally labelled 
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‘semantic’ and ‘pragmatic’ is in fact grounded in the syntactic component, 
in the expression’s grammar. In virtue of this, we have attempted to 
provide an account of the ambiguity problem(s) in definite descriptions 
that traces its genesis back to facts about the grammar of such expressions 
and the wider grammatical configurations in which they may be placed, we 
called this the grammatical thesis (GT). 
At this point it is worth briefly revisiting the first limitation that we placed 
on the thesis in the introduction. The first limitation was that the GT will 
not argue that grammar impacts the idiosyncratic information captured in 
descriptive/lexical words over and above their grammatical role in a clause 
and any further grammatical constraints placed upon them. We can 
understand this limitation relative to an example: 
(1) Ronaldo is a footballer. 
The idiosyncratic information held by the lexical root √Ronaldo will vary 
from speaker to speaker. Those well informed about football may associate 
the following propositions with the root: ‘Ronaldo is a Real Madrid player’, 
‘Ronaldo is an ex-Manchester United Player’, ‘Ronaldo won the 2014 Ballon 
d’or’, ‘Ronaldo scored in the 2008 champions league final’, ‘Ronaldo is 
Portuguese’, and so on. Irrespective of this, the root’s meaning is not itself 
equated with one or the other of these propositions. It is simply that an 
informed language user, upon hearing the word, may associate these pieces 
of idiosyncratic information with it. Furthermore, grammar cannot 
differential (2) and (3): 
(2) The cat is in the garden. 
(3) The dog is in the garden. 
The idiosyncratic information that we attach to the roots √cat and √dog 
cannot be influenced by grammar. What is influenced in cases such as (1)-(3) 
is the structural role, and form of reference, that the roots exhibit (or the 
form of event, if we are discussing roots acting as verbs). As we stated in 
§5.342, a root such as √Ronaldo becomes rigid, not in virtue of its lexical 
entry, but in virtue of undergoing N-to-D movement in DP. Grammar thus 
has an impact on the form of reference associated with Ronaldo in (1), it 
dictates that it is to be understood as exhibiting rigid reference, but it does 
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not dictate his gender 189 , nationality, profession, or incredible goals to 
games ratio. These are aspects of meaning that grammar has no authority 
over. The same observation exhibits between cat and dog, grammar dictates 
that they are to be understood as a singular NP complement to a 
determiner, but the fact that the former are felines and the latter canines is 
incidental to grammar.  
A pressing question thus emerges, how can the GT deal with instances of 
misdescription? As we illustrated in §1.2 the classical ambiguity problem 
(CAP) was formed in relation to instances of misdescription, and it has thus 
been part of the landscape of the literature. For one last time, consider 
Donnellan’s courtroom example: 
(4) Smith’s murderer is insane. 
The first thing to state is that the possessive construction can be given an 
analysis through which the form of reference it exhibits mirrors the 
grammar of the extended DP shell and in particular the grammar of the 
possessor DP (§6.13). The form of reference (4) exhibits is thus stronger 
than when the possessor is a quantifier phrase and weaker than when it is a 
pronominal or demonstrative phrase. Furthermore, the speech-act captured 
is grounded in the grammar of the speech-event features (SEF). Thus, the 
values tied to these features will tie (4) inherently to the speech-act taking 
place, including a valuation to the speech-location (SL) and speech-time (ST) 
that places it in the HERE and NOW.  
However, there is a distinct possibility that the descriptive content in (4), 
the idiosyncratic information tied to the lexical roots employed in Smith 
and murderer, misdescribes. Jones may well be innocent. The point to be 
made here is that the form of reference exhibited is not affected by 
misdescription as it is entirely grounded in grammar. Reference is 
opportunistic. Once a grammatical structure is built, the form of reference 
that is grammatically encoded is activated without being interested in 
whether or not it contains the appropriate descriptive material. It is this 
that can account for Donnellan’s intuition that the speaker has in some 
sense succeeded in referring to Jones, and said something true, even 
though she misdescribes him. Critically, all of this is enabled without 
                                                          
189 Proper names such as this are not valued for grammatical gender, unlike third person 
animate pronouns for instance. 
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reference to pragmatic machinery, such as contextual enrichment of what is 
said. The speech-act is tied to the HERE and NOW and the argument 
creates a form of reference that interacts with these speech-event features to 
deliver a referential act. The same idea carries over to the Smith/Jones case 
with proper names, and any further instance of an argument that 
misdescribes its referent.  
The second limitation that we placed on the thesis concerned how we 
should understand the results of our GT on compositional semantics, and 
in particular what role it leaves for logical form as captured in formal 
semantics. To begin with, we can state that the motivation for the GT was 
to reduce the amount of structure present in the C-I interface, wherein 
logical form can be understood to reside. We associated full clausal 
structure, illocutionary force and mood, speech-event features, and truth to 
the grammar of CPs (§5.32), thematic matrices and the organization of 
events to v*Ps (§5.33), and the referential status of arguments to DPs (§5.34). 
In doing so, we consequently reduced the computational burden of the 
semantic machinery often assumed to be present in C-I through illustrating 
that it can be reduced to facts about grammar. The thesis might thus be 
seen as an attempted refutation of the usefulness of logical form as a tool in 
natural language semantics research. However, this would be both hasty 
and wrong. There is nothing in principle to stop an integrated theory of the 
grammatical observations raised in this thesis and formal semantics. In 
concluding this thesis we will briefly look at how such a theory may 
develop.  
Throughout the thesis we have endeavoured to show that a lexicocentric 
account of compositional semantics is misguided. The problem with a 
lexicocentric account is that the labels attached to lexical items contain what 
is essentially grammatical information (§6.2). For instance, a word such as 
Ronaldo is traditionally labelled as being of type <e>, standing for a 
referential term, but we have indicated that it becomes referential (and 
rigidly referential at that) through N-D movement, an operation that is 
grammatically complex. Through giving a lexicocentric account of its 
semantic-type we thereby preordain it to being rigid. This is false and 
illustrated in the English Ronaldo where it acts as a predicative NP and 
would receive the type <e, t>. However, there is nothing to stop formal 
semantics looking at grammatical patterns in its determination of semantic 
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types. To illustrate this idea let us first illustrate an extended account of 
DPs: 
(5) [D# [Deix [D [Num [Mass/Count [n [N]]]]]]]190 
We might understand a type <e> version of Ronaldo as (6): 
(6) [D# [Deix [D Ronaldo [Num singular [n [N Ronaldo]]]]]] 
 
Through analysing Ronaldo as taking part in an instance of N-to-D 
movement we can now label it is a rigidly referring expression. The 
structure present in (6) can thus be understood as being of type <e>, with 
the caveat of being a rigid type <e> expression. In the instance where N-to-
D movement does not occur, as in the English Ronaldo, then Ronaldo is 
valued as type <e, t>. An analysis of this sort would thus avoid the issues 
concerning lexicocentric analyses often present in type-based compositional 
semantics, whilst retaining a robust integration with the underlying 
grammatical configurations. It is a contention of this thesis that extending 
an analysis of (6) to further aspects of compositional analysis will prove 
more productive in the long run than its lexicocentric counter-part. 
Furthermore, the empirical status of formal semantics would be 
strengthened. Of course, the example in (6) is of the most basic form and 
further complications would doubtless arise as the functional structures in 
grammar were extended, dropped, or reinterpreted. Nevertheless, there is 
no reason to take the present thesis as a direct attack on formal semantics, 
but it should be viewed instead as a criticism of a lexicocentric version of it. 
In closing, it is hoped that we have illustrated how a thorough study of 
grammar can help shed light on a theory of descriptions and the genesis of 
the three ambiguity problems. A theory of descriptions is only as sound as 
the compositional semantic theory within which it is placed, and to that 
end we have endeavoured to illustrate how grammar might be seen as 
productive in constructing a skeleton or blueprint of compositional 
                                                          
190 We have introduced a mass/count projection only to indicate that something of this sort is 
argued for in the literature (Borer 2005), and little n as well (Chomsky 2007). The DP in (5) is 
still restricted, there are numerous further projections that may be posited (Zamparelli 
2000b; Cinque 2002a; Svenonius 2004; Leu 2008), and perhaps instances of feature 
percolation (Sigurðsson 2004b; see also Bondaruk, Dalmi, & Grosu 2014; Dalmi 2014). 
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semantics. Moreover, we hope to have shown that there are good reasons 
to doubt any compositional semantics that takes lexically grounded 
semantic-types as primitive word-units in the system. The thesis is not 
meant to be a comprehensive account of each and every grammatical 
variant available for definite descriptions, but instead limits its scope to 
deal with examples that are frequently raised in order to defend one or 
another thesis on descriptions. It is hoped that further work on the 
grammar of DPs will capture the variants of definite descriptions that we 
have no addressed, and that the grammatical framework for meaning that 
we have provided will capture their semantics transparently. In sum, if 
nothing else, the thesis has shown that grammar is not simply ancillary to 
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